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This thesis is interested in the problem of debt nsnegerasnt during 
the rJno teen~£i£tiea. Kationnl debt lies nowadays grown, ©specially* after 
two world wars, to fantastic figures in may of tbs advanced countrios*
For this reason, the problem of the national debt has hseeos on insvithbll 
subject fbr discussion not only in Britain, but also in may other 
countries.
the
iioaal debt was, indeed, an incidental subject in/Britlah lltsmtue 
One of the prcBiincnt ecoaoaistx wrote, in the early years of the fifties, 
a little book SfeyaMsstag Id© dissaticfactica with this neglect of the 
probler. of the debts *’••• Its aid ^he book’^Z is primarily to provoke 
...discussion on the subject of the rs&e of the national debt in our 
eoonotaio aystaa, a question which.., IiaS never boon treated in full in cny 
published work in thio country. A quarter of a century has passed since 
XiGrcroavao wrote the only eadiaustivs sttt^r of the national debt, and a
great deal of water has passed under the bridge since then. Wen the
»
learned journals are innocent of any full discussion of the significance 
end functions of the British national debt, in very sharp contrast with 
their opposite numbers in the Xfalted States of America.”^
1. E. Jovin, Cardiff 1$>, p. 9
She events of the 1950’s, with the activation of aaaoMegr policy, haM 
however attracted norc and mro attention to the role of the national debt 
in the economic life of the nation. And debt nisnagonont, ae & necessary 
part of monetary and fie cal policy, has bocotae a lively subject for
discussion.
Thi3 theois vill try to dlaouse tho significance of the British 
national dobt fiw different points of view. Nevertheless, the ©lose 
relationship between debt .-uawgenont end the monetary policy obliges us 
to devote the groater part of the study to the inpact of debt on the 
monetary policy. however, for purposes of analysis, this voxfe is divided 
into five ports as follows: -
I - an introductory part on the structure, the growth end the 
owership of the debt.
II * Part ?wo traces the impact of Teriaes types of debt on the
course of monetary ;;>oXicy; i.e. discusses i.^onatery policy 
in relation to debt naangencat.
XII * ?art Throe tris to ossosa the effectiveness of thia Amotion 
of 11 te debt.
IV - Part Pour gauges the coat of monetary policy.
V » tho analysis is extended in Part Pive to involve economic 
growth in relation to debt management.
The period of the analysis Covel's tho 1950’s. ‘"The nineteen-fiftieo 
are a particularly interesting period in the economic history of the 
United Kingdom.*1 Thio period has been, indeed, one of real growth in
XV
output. But it he* been ciao oharcxtoriaed by aevere inflation. So 
be acre accurate, the analysis deals with the period bc^inninc with the 
and of 1951 when rionotar” policy started to be applied siore actively 
than in tiie preceding years. however, it nay be profitable to extern 
the ©nnlyeic to include the early year© of the i960‘e (i.e. 1960-62) 
in order to brine it, as far as possible, up to date. Lastly, tliis 
thesis is a theoretical as wall as a statistical one.
PASS CSS»
inmmeu
j-'<wpaa>eiorwarar*
Tho original intamtion wis to atnrt thte work directly on the
probIon of :>©bt kiroageumt. But oeoond thou^ite gi^wM that the
concept of the National Debt should first be inte^dueed. "Answers to
the question©, *What is it?*, ’’Iwfi is 1 'Why doe© it ea&at?*
are a prerequisite to inferred discussion of tlie influence© uhioh d€tot
exerciser la our chtnydrg society.3, -teoeew, debt ’a^nfigeoent Implies,
by definition, govemsmt policies directed toward© changing the sis©
or the structure of debt. E. Ralph oddst by affecting the sis© or the 
a
composition of "that part of debt in private bends.** by B. IbnrinF 
’bebl rmaaecszaat ho© been defined as, and is generally thought of a© 
being, the study of policies uhioh arc directed to
or ’structure’ of a country’o public debt. To thia, however, met 
cXoarly be added policies relating: to the ’diotribatien’ of the debt, 
since it ie oXear tlx^t changes in the distribution of a given volume
1. 1.3. Hitter (ed.), »3At. JoHyll and ifcto", la MgajCJBOffiSBBia 
AffUrlfa (Mcond aditioa), 1561, j>p. 3>38.
2. S.d. Ralph, "lobt Management* Sou© kXiooretical Anyacts", ©♦ 105 
leasm of tiw iagtitut
for the Zurich Congress, September l?6u,
3and tj/pe of debt can have prcfoiw) oconoetle effect®.1’^
^ar those seasons, Pert One io devoted to a atatietioal en&lyei@t~
JL introduces the oo^poaiticn of national debt with its various 
itsaat together with chances i» its ri®3 and structure.
Chapters II g^ XX^ explain why debt T4U> increased In our day to m 
astronomical figure.
Chapter XV analyses the distrilH>tion of debt aneny the different 
sector of the eeenoxsy cad throve light on the -f.unmt In the hands 
of overseas creditors.
shows that it is not only tho ocpitrl value of debt that 
is of si&idficowee, hut also the service of the debt; especially 
interest cixertTOS.
1. 2, ISevln, "Jcbt lua&Mjenont
19eQ» p» io»
.-■.yfc&to .>%¥&&&»
■' • »<<
.
>
\ ’" 'K4
iWtWBt J
aisiot? or jus iksschm. lasw
■• « -
/ V.
5inco the Second World War, nation;*! debt has recorded a raoarkdble
Growth in the United Kingdom, a® well fi© In Vaster®, ;tet>pc, the United
Stctee and jaw otlicr countries. Table 1 preoeata data or the increase
e
of debt, from 1939-40, in tvwdy~ano countries of different stages of 
devolo^'ant. It shews th&t debt of the United Kington has aultipiicd 
by four tine®, six tines in the Uhitod Jtatee, fowty tides in Italy, 
ner® tbxi tMrty times in Japan. •. •mt ©s or.
Telle 1 diacloooc also tb© intsrostix^ foci that the growth of debt 
in the viidexdsvoloped cenmtrios, in ^enorol, io nuefc lose thon that in 
the more edveacod ©gsrorI©®* Hott&owr, debt ha® developed norc rapidly 
in the bGllicorerd countries than in the neutral ms©» "War finanoe 
gave Mae to the large debt® found in...the United Kingtoo**,Stance end 
the United Jt&tec*.»in general countries with large naticnel debt© 
as&surod in relation to national incase ore the wealthier, induotrialiaed 
eouatrits. With too© oacoetiona, tho 1m© developed countries have wall
national debt®, a fhot explained by the difficulty encountered in
2aelliiv; debt except to the contra". bank."
1. XMticnal debt was, of course, inoreatJin^ before that dates a© * 
Unit to the study, the 1939*60 period only i© taken into considera­
tion. Bcr & further ©tody on tlxo period since 191k, sea S. Itevin,
The jfegg&Ufe of the. Chanter 1.
2. E. Uolph, 03. clt* i p?* 106-7
&'lelativo be national income (in r;eftoy tcasaa) tho incroooe in 
feat been vexy nubfc loos rapid, partly ae a result of the rogKid increase
in naticwU Incom. Iteoover, inflation bm been * ..........oftfle phenom-
non in the post-war period and affected aluoct all iXoxjpe.^ Them 
novoxmte in price have influenced the rah.tlonalilp between debt and 
national Incom. and tie ratio between the two hue beeu falling in met 
of time coisttetoo. ftraa Table 1 we ooo that the dnitod Kingdoa loads 
the met of the couitnos by having higbeot ...eroeatego of debt to 
nttioncj inoooe. Cowernin,; the burden of the debt, Table 2 shows that 
the V.K. still pays in I960 the M^joet amt of interest charg'd, as 
a pexeertege of totrJL gwoxv&ient corpenditures (oesoept the United States).
To investicato the composition end the developmnt of the British 
national debt we start with a brief ascription of the gross debt of
the public jootor. Th© Anff^t ^trast classifies it into (Tables >4)i-
Ai '■ • • il *1. ~ debt of central government). *.;•/• "**■’ '4 -r ,.• • ;?•'
2. • of local u'utlicritioG; and
2J. * of public cor ^orations.
— Debt of the motes! rovorra^t takes the fbm of national debt (« 
the direct debt), bnn2 notes ml cola©, d<abt of Xforthom Ireland
1« See Odin Claa&, "ftfblic XUnans© and Ixon^ee in the Value of Money*', 
fifty* Jgy— December 1245, PP. Urns the post-war inflation
io demonstrated.
2. Ito? rjoro details on the figures of ocol. iton, see the .butract
of dtatjcti.cya^ 1%2, p. 246, Tkble 298-
7ppRemSSt cad psetmer credits/'*
— Debt of the local authorities consists of ftlrcst tstiiioc to tbs eestot
plus bcmwiac from the control ^wmsant through the "Public
Wor&a Loan Board". Tho latter type is, in effect, a reflection 
of borrowing by the ‘fru^Kijy.
— Mbt of public corporations reflects lorn fson central gmeneezxt,
pwenimt gncionteel eeeflaeWUe securities* and other kinds 
of ddbt*
Debt of the central ^voawant, the bulk of the gross debt, ba© 
inorotx-cc by were than four thaao froa 1235-1962 (^able 3*). As a poo> 
oentacc of cross debt, it is ocntinuoualc deoro^inc ever the ottse 
period ($&£» l}> This is the eecolt of the rapid deeslepesst of debt 
of the public corporation®, specifically loraia frou central ewarnaent*
2hc following analysis will bo cammed with the netioeel debt ss 
representing tlie goverutamt bacaxK&ag Co/ the direct debt) whether for 
ito own purposes or for xwlendiEg.^ jn o^h^r word©, the total considered 
will oKOlude boxrcwinc by other porta of the public scoter: !«•• local
<U ®e Annual /betract includes as wall H; corned internet on national 
savings aertlff/iuton”, which io excluded hero.
fc« Gcnreraaent pusmteed securities eee discussed on //w
3. Shle by no asms represents the >f the further chapters, since
government guarmieed securities will be discussed in the saalyeis.
attithoritiee, public corporations (whether ^uersntood securities or not)
saad ifce fSMment of Northern Ireland. Alec the note issue of the Baxfic 
i
of ?^laad will be aaeoludsd.*
Katioml debt w ** olmoiflod Into;*
1. Internal debt?
8« itetawal dtfctf
or more precisely into sterling end iion-otorlinc debt.
^.JaSsssaUMS.
Thio Is tho overwixelminc^Z creator port of the debt (Tofclee 5*7) 
md msjf be broken down into throe divisiama-
X. awtie&t
2. Floating*
3» Other wifuwded.
The choices in the is^ortence of ouch di^Uion fSren 1$> >O~1962 are shown 
in M&ea 6*?.
U) Bbw nr flSse.Mtt
ie a perasnant pert of the debt - i.o. there is no contractual obligation 
on tho govexmmt to redeen (to repo7 capital value) on or by a
1. I'Legfc- studies on the ocopoaition of the national dobt ooncentrato, as 
a usual practioo, on the debt of the central government. Sene sources 
do not consider other kinds of debt as a port of the national debt. Wr
<kwXo in wc of ti«, ^aiWEOsasset, Vffirt *»
p. 106, para. 2, marketable stocks of tkfc mtionalissed industries,
-tood b^ the fovernnent, ore not considered a part of the national 
debt fclthcueix they are an indispensable port of goverment securities 
for puspooes of debt riunc^^ont. A.H. Prest in ij&lio xlnanoe, Ch. 12, 
pp. 201-2, does not consider either /*inrr.ntood stocks or debt of local 
authorities as part of tbs □etionol debt.
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apeoified date* In other words, the stockholders have no legal right 
to repayment (though the government has the option of doing so at any 
time if it feels so disposed)*
Funced debt is now a relatively smaller part of the ntional debt, 
lj$ of the total amount in 1562 compared with Q8fi in 1900, 50& in 1955 
(Pig, 2). The factor behind this decline in value and in percentage is 
that the total debt has multiplied by four times since 1955 (as & result 
of the rapid growth of floating debt and unfunded debt), while funded 
debt has recorded only a slight inox-ease (Table 7)*
Funded debt is composed almost wholly (9?. 5 in 1962) of marketable 
securities - i*e* quoted on the London i took Exchange « in eight separate 
securities* The amount and importance of each in shown in Tables 8-9*
The «.-.•< Consol at- Some of the funded securities have their roots
from the middle of the eighteenth century. At that time, Consoli­
dated Annuities'* were issued as a first attempt to consolidate a 
variety of annuities by which the government had, in the past, 
raised money charged on many separate funds* The 2-& Consols have 
descended from this consolidation* They were issued in 1888 in 
conversion of some consolidated and other Annuities, and carried 
2^4 interest at first, later reduced to 2# as from 1905* The 
original issue was for 549 L*m., which, with various additions, grew 
to 591 L.m* in 1 05* iter a large conversion into one of the loans 
of the First World War and subsequent purch ses and cancellations, 
the total in March 1962 was 276 L.m. or 7»5^ of the funded debt.
10
12
are Ito eaalleet component of the funded 
debt, loss ton one per cent cltogethar* They wo issued between 
1053 end lB3h In <.«eb} usage for various >< stacks, then outstanding.
She Wag hoar. Ifrfffi or affftff? i© the bluest addition to the funded^ 
ddbt, l.e. ©apprising the bulk of toe pert of the debt, f& in 1962. 
Thay tiro the result of to unauiw oonvaraion in 1932 of the Sy Wee 
Lorn 1929*19^7 iasusd during to Ztost World War. Conversion ie not, 
in of foot, ropc^wnt of debtf it ie oolcr to ^change of new debt 
for old, Intended to reduce to esmtel hiteroet pa^-asais on debt.
If tow interest on to new debt io losu ton to interest on to 
old, to burden of debt ie reduced. By toe logfce, 2 000 I.u. of 
War Loan were converted, in 1932, fron to 3&'>, ruktog on mmal 
saving in to interest clwu’ga of 30 Lua. Tiio eucceos of toe con­
version exceeded sjeav oxpoctotioua. But to way was well prepared 
for it by toe© factorsi bad tode, a Tre&euzy aaberge on new loans,
end heavy purcuiasoo of gilt-olgod aoouxitiee by to bants. Ml
' . ithese three factors brought dawn to note of interest.
JS»E5w^$U5aJBSLaE y la* in 1%2, dates oopiginMly
frai four oon/eraior oporuiiorio in 1921 caul 1922, end was added to 
three ttos ia 192$. ?hl© atock hno Boon raduced through to sinking 
fund in to follo^inc W> && ovory hslf-yoer in which to oversee 
aaackct price of to stock io below n&wty a cun of no loss ton one
1, H. Belton, 
p. 193'
22nd i^swiiott,/.oA4i;'A/vi/7.
M*
per omt of tbs amount outstanding at the end of that half-year 
vill bo used during the succeeding balf^yeer to puroheoe stocks fim 
the mtet, and Mfteen It. This process operated continuously fron 
1922 to 1932 sod towa 19S* till now.
W11"! *T' ^"W8, ,^wfi>,JWS ffr ^W» • «aeU «* 1**°» i-**
in 1962, was issued to tie holders of the capital stock of the Mebk 
of .inland when the latter was iu.tioaaUsed in 1946. The labour 
govesmmt, after the Labour victor te the cener&l election, aationfi^- 
Hsed the Bank of Bn&Und. Kenoo, tfae Bank of Joglaad lot took over 
the private sbs^wjldincs in the Bank, treating Bank stock as the 
ofiuivrJent of gern'raaent s»arifcius and stabilising the inooeao of 
tho roeipionts.
irwiwalnc &«*»
13, in 1962, use Issued in 1946.
Tho only, and the mallest, part of landed ~>ebt, $«*)& in 1962, that 
is not quoted is debt incurred to the Bank of Bsglond between 1694 and 
1746 (11 &«su}» and to the Bunk of Xxvlunu between 1782 and 1821 (2.6 
L.n»)> it bee been unalxanged since 1034 ml 1840 respectively. Those 
debts are poxpobuul annuities in the fteS of intoreet at 3&>t «Qd 
represent the consolidation of iwonto lent to the ^vOTsnent beginning 
with the loons node by each Bml: vixen it vno first incorporated.
At the Other extrrna is tho flouting debt, which lies to be repaid (usually
13
by neons of iootdiv new obligations of siuil&r MM, at ffaort periods.
The lecuos nro node la auooosjion oo fchnt Futurities take place day by 
day* Ploatinj debt has been gently dovoleped. It inoreaeed fben laoo
•“ •'• m- •' A' ■' 'v 7A - *
«asi # of «he teW debt in 1900 to 20< Ift 19*52 (Sables 6-7). Sloattae 
debt, Wkloh reyreeanto a very short-tor:i barxowingt oonsioto of 
(Sableo
(a) Sreeaury ~>epo«<t Seoolpte (aitol 1951)I
(a) Trounay 25.11a!
(«) Voye end ■ leans /Jvanooa.
W 3SS&W. ZaWMi w>» • aort of tmponay
borrcMne wMefe took th^ form of a caipiloory levy. 23d» eyston oonais-
tai of direct a5wt*ten; loans bra&a, described by the borrowers ee
"Treasury 3e^oelte by hanks" mft by beadaee as ‘’Treasury Sapoeit
Seeet£te*» Xt wee first introdnoM in My 19**0 and continued throughout
tte Second WH W until Fabruury X2$2 (W- 3). $h*t efcfcsoe isemen
ted a direct borrcMnc by the tlxhcQuor fxu& tine banks on Treasury
Deposit hocoipts in order to prevent an MMeelVe (WA/ of treasury
bills, particularly bto&e* bills - i.e« to MniMse tko infX&tlonesgf 
1
ascension by preventing an ehsorriai H^uidiV in the banking ;.^'3tm»
Bar tM* rows on ^♦D»*x.to wave fawewtefi to be rather leee liipitd Shea
tTfreerry M *1^ which the buuks included in their "liquid aoaote**, tiuM^k
1. In August 19^5, TU3.H.‘s oonyx-laod 3ft of the ramtial banks’ total 
assets, compared with £vs? tro?-4jury billet and the bosks’ bolding?® 
of bills reprcccn^od loss than, j$» of total treasury bi lie Qfutatnndittx 
at that tiaet Bc/JsMn U« Kinins, "LcFihard iroot in War and Ueoo&~ 
ateuetioa", ?to»wia. Optional 3uwwu of Soaawto
Beeeeeeh}* 2MU, Occasional Paper 23, June 19**9» P- w.
—,-------------------- - -----------
T i ‘
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! 1
Figure 3: Growth of Treasury Deposit Receipts
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also licxdd enough to induce the banks to «»o?t than. Tha
oenfinefi to the London oloaring banks and tea 3ootti«I>. banks, with the 
addition of the central banks diructl; ^xauting is t»» London
i
1
- ntsaely. the ftwaonwaalth Sank of Auetmlia and the national Sen!: of
brants showed that the banks found the 3LS.fi.'• troffteimtli liquid,
during the war, to nake than fuel oomforteble, and
f v ' :• •*'••
-fe *
tho setose
without protest, while on tho other hand regarding the S.S.fi. *s as loss 
liquid teen the treasury bills te.cy novor liked than, end after the 
1BWWB xncOTunr^i,. to be ric ox Saws*-
Between 1S#W end 1951, f.L.E. ’a conotituted a ver. inportant part 
of tec floating debt, rising to ft staten of 21?t- l.n. in Septank 
in that year S.S.S.’s represented about %of tee total floating dobt.
The difference between T.3.II. 'a cad ‘nsaaury bills is partly
' •., ; - ;- .v, '■ . '•*• \ •> r! e_ '•. . J; - * . . ' .v-^ ’ ‘ ‘ .~-
the tear hod a ousreney of six routes while tee latter had only
Vbilo treasury bills are uorketahlo, tee T.B.E. ’a were non-
.of W
>.t?w
1. fi.3. __
War).
2. J3S&'» >• i®80*
3. See Connitteo oa tea Wos&iiig of tea ..snatesy dyaten, iinutec of 
ayidanoe. S.K. Stationery Office, tendon i960, da 3781-8, 5090-3-
4. T.B.fi. tyrtea routed® us of tho ".'Special Lapooits" announced in 
April 196c to control banks* liquid!ty. Sy this dor ice, soak bonk 
had to surrender, to the Sard: of Ungland, a percentage of Ito liquid 
assets (X' of gross deposits for tho clearing banka and &£ for tea 
Scottish teaks) against a blocked bulcsraoe ttefc Is xcle:wrblo ■wholly 
or in part only when ths rorntec;. authorities think fit) fbr more 
details see Chapter 13.
It
-Hftriaetable. Trie , c.?-urt fro:i SUa pooBiMUV of being rodeejad
prior to mturity# **• £iw; to of liquidity by a mturity
date* 3ut .jiven the rooc^iiitiai that to &24U wua, at least, loss
liquid tlian a treasury hill, it ocussod approseiautely /g above
to hill sets *> i*e. 1*^ ton treasury hills rate was rec&mad ee *$
during the war, then roduood to in ;xrfccher 194-5 tom, Interest rates
wee vetoed on treasury hills to fpp
Sine© 1951, T.D.h. *3 war© Bbasidoned? in I^brurry of tot yew the 
s
last receipts wre repaid,
The TbeceBBry usually isouce treasury bills and/or Ways end Hecaw 
Advtsxras to rjwt seasonal deficits. The idea behind thia ootbod Is 
tot budget revenue and eo^onditw?© has to ho net unevenly over the 
financial year, so that for lone poriodo of tfao yew the Tbaetoiuer omnot 
finance its oomitoni© out of the roratuc. Tho Treasury has, toroffcr©, 
to borrow temporarily in order to cover such soaaonM deficits.
(h) .^BtoW to Insect yaart of floating tot. toy
wo to outcome of Welter Begtot’ft advice, in 1376, for ft □ore antis- 
factory iaetonto of tort-tern <toiwto towtog then to to 
tototo? hill, Treasury hills retoned to principal totmeni of 
aljorfc-toru aoMiKsmafc borrowing until the leoond World War, ton $,>*&. ’«
IHiwr iM. uawnmwi fnciw t*
1. alto, op. J&&*» P* W*
2. In cjeneml, T.2.B. *e were replaced, by urfcetebla treasury hills.
3. The ooxioonal factor© arc- discussed onp-iltf
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inoroarjod for & xnzobor of yeean. Treasury wore, aa
seen above t originally de$i£n.M to cover tesagpor&zy dofidta in tko
.xchequor revonuo in relation to currant ^enditure. Treasury bi Ila
qee usually issued in two w^ss-
(1) by weekly tender (sold on the market), and 
(11) on tap (held by vnc&oua jywffimt depertwrta)*
Houghly % Of the total aaomt tokos, over the $MO*a» the Am of 
"tender” bills, Xn 19JCL, thia ratio hea AMMaaad aa a result of the 
sepsyaeni of the T.B.B. *e> than dropped by the ad of Ito year (Table 
12). in Kowaber, the govo^r^ant um^Mjsd the rex>laeeie»t of 1000 L.ru 
of bills Iwld dxioiQy by banks ukt otim* umay fcarket iaatitattooa by 
one, two, end threv years Serial Funding Stocks; uud a year later when 
the shorteot*dntad of those stocks a&turod, they and an addition^3 
&50 l«u« of bills were abaobbod into further Ilciding jtocsfc iasuao. Wo 
puxnxjoo of the operations, howwsr, ws to reduce the volua© of liquid 
Carets of the batiks and thus restrict timr lending power. These 
tewnaaotioae* than, sBces^lliir the risn&genent of the national debt as an 
inatruneut Of oonotasy policy» .
An iraportent distinction butvoon these two typoe of bills la tlM 
"tender" bille are receipts given by the ibwwurp ibr money borrowed 
free* the public, while ntapH bills sspe lam od osecluoively to ^ovasmont 
departments In ree, >00t of eurplua iXaido lent at short tern to the Ux- 
chequer* Tender bills thus ropscomt a part of the •’effective** floating 
debt (i.o. hold by the public/ while tan bille leaned to government 
doportrxmts ftam "noMnaT debt (i.e. no mire than an Internal bookkeeping
traaaoction within the govomnont eeotoc
Tender blllo nro dwwn on the govorf^sent and ar© repayable at par
X not© is inserted in tho Ixyidop,
Cfisotto ©very Friday epeoiftdnc tii© total mount of bills offered tor 
tender on the following Friday. People tender an offer to buy a oertain
iScheQ.ucr a certain cun of ssoiwy for ov >ry flOO, in roturo for which 
they will o©t flOO ninety-one (or oixtc'-tSmM>) do;^ afterwards The 
difference between the £XOG and the awn offered roproeonte the rate of 
interest retired for tMt euu over the 91-dryo period. Other people 
tender with ideker or lover piiocs (i.o. lover or higher interest rates) >
the l:i<ehest tenders arc accepted, then the nerct hi<£xa©i and so on until
... . j. . 3
the required amount of bills aro allotted.
Tender bills ore Gubeoribod for by the discount Jiouaeo, oVorueac
control hanks, dosses tic financial institutions end large industrial 
busiaesaoa. Tho aciuS. tender for any offer has to be md© through e
1. Sy tho Act of 1077, treamojy bills ware issued for any period not 
QKoeedinc 12 noatha. After 191?, bills offered at tiie tenders war© 
all for three odendar non tho. inco lp^f mturlty date has been
ataiuurdissod at 91 days, except for a w.^oreay and ^oceooal use of 
<S3-dey bills in tbs final veeha of tix ^tae fro© 1955 to 1%2$ see 
Of?h» Txv&surr Bill**. Bank of Un'land uarterlv Bull ©tic.. Jeotdiber 
19&b pp. 186-93.
2« In effect, bills ere drawn for dononizw.tion® of<gG0OtCXO 000,
£5° QCG, or £100 000 but tenders ^«ot bo for a ninimm uraount of 
£50 000.
3. The rate of interest is, as wo shell see, very wok related to ebonies 
in monetary oouditione.
X9
London bunk, a discount house or a brokoxu
2hc :.»ciiiiMxry for dictxibuti:y; Hh& weekly issues gives tto overooae
holders an advantage over discount houses and the banks in obtaining 
tender bills. Goanereial banks do not, in practice, apply for bUlo 
on tiioix account at tho weekly tender since they buy their recguiwwnte 
of bills fra: the discount fccuooa after the letter have held the bills 
far at least a week* Chia is booexno purdming and celling bills are 
an oesentisl part of their daily business in order to adjust their 
liquidity' ratios. 2ho discount houses are famed into «B euwodation 
known as "tbe a;vtdioato", through which tray tender for the weekly 
offcri:y; of bills ae a group (at sn q&reed price) in eorapotition with 
tenders of overseas creditors* Usually tte outside tenders ere accepted 
in full, end the syndicate gets the rest, which is allotted raaong the 
discount houses in proportion to their individual tendex's. Therefore, 
on increase in the appetite of the outsitarc for bills is satisfied at 
tlio erponce of the discount houses. As a result of such reduction of 
bills, tie discount houses find thecuBolvos with mwpluo Amdo, w£ ioh 
they can two to repay loans at the bcs&c. ^hus, the licroid assets of 
the bonks (in the tees of ponsy at ooll and short notice) are reduced. 
Moreover, when the banks’ bill holdings nature, they way find it in- 
oreaaingly difficult to obtain nev bills from the discount lcusoo., which 
aufffcr a shortage of bills. .Again basfes’ liquidity io o<iueosod as a 
remit of the substitution of bills for deposits3
1. Sho dlaausaion an the overseas holdi.yjs of tr**M»ury bills to 
developed ffcfr.zfi-i
2t
■
Ae W tdmll ooe in Part SSio, the xf.stenco in the wr&ot of largo 
caaouate of treasury hills feci11tat cd the control of the banking oj’Btoc 
fry t5io contra! bank ai&oe treasury' frlllo orc ideal securities for the 
central frank to frqy end sell. And the rss&at Itself la pleased enough 
to liold treasury frills, ozr-iocinlly sinoe 1229 when the supply of 
oomeroial frills lias freon so oaanty.
In the ocrlv after a treasury frill lias freeai issued (uben it 
otill has nearly three maths to run) it io celled a ”Iiotn frill. At <sy 
tine after sever. deyo one of the big freaks uoy, as laantioned above, fryy 
it, hut aost of the frills atcy with W.o discount liouocc for at least 
throe or four souks. After that, the franks laxgel; buy few of
then regain in the portfolios of the diooount Iwuees until the mturity 
date.
W-c to: ulor issues vaay continuously in order to offset variations in 
govemnent receipts end expenditures. At the peal: revenue oeoaon (the 
Inst quarter of the ftnoixeisl your), tlie frill issues are reduced and 
nuturiticj of old frills are allound to osoeod the voelly offer. On the 
Other hand, an excoca of government expos aiituros rd&frt nocseasitatfr a 
tangperary eaperelon of tix> frill issue* and new issues earned asturities 
of old frills.
Sen frills arc issued to ^msssmst ddPB'tients (including, in
1. During the great depression of tfco 19$ the total value of «o- 
uerclol frills outstanding dmii2#xi to a luadred Mllions or sot see 
Soywee, Ilodorn, feildiv;, 3rd od., Oxford 1951, p. $6.
addition to the ordinary doportoents, the {xnras&aeat ccart^ga brake,
the etafeatosy inaur^<eo funds, the 3rak of l^Uiid Istra© lapartnont,
end the UraUe^e d<£u^B&tlm .dscomt), 2hc idea behind tap bills is
that the ^toh©Q^cr usually ptf&ea uoo of the govegnsoont idle or surplus
funds before borrowing' fare* the outsiders. She possible ourrracv of
te$> bills ia up to 91 deye>* tt® rate of intercet (on unknown rate) ie
fixed by the Troasur, and is Irrelevant to the disoouat norbet. However,
since toy bills arc norwlly held only' by the t&enol&s of the £ovornnoKt
itself, it io net surprising tliat the rate $©&& on than is lower thm 
2the trader rate. Ao matlaned chcvo, the ttp ieeue, for the xaaet port, 
io laerely ncsidaal debt, regenerating internal bookkeeping transection 
within the ^werrwnt, rad is not mmilcblc to serve as liquid coaeto to
the beahin<; ayctou-
(e) .SWKM ,«ri, «rs o-xllar &fcm of the total
flootisig dab-, >« In 19v2 (Sable 11). 2hcy fluctuate according to the 
needs of the govormsntn These sdvunooa are zaeds, alnost wholly, by the
!• r. Kevin shows that tbs ostimtod lives of tap treasury billa run 
for less * sausttuos considerably less - than three rsontha ("Sone roots 
clout Sep Sjfcusuxy Mile", 2jfiJJssfe&:» 1955, W>. W-jO).
2. Bsc rate of interest on top Mils aay be reduced to a purely nooinel 
figure in oartain ooms. cm Sir Herbert Brittain, -Bo British 
Budrarteg,- aretqn. Landon 1959, P- 196« nee also Kevin, 0£. jjii-, p. JO.
3. 3m W.U. Daooy, **h aft., London 1962,
Cb. Vllj S.3. Seems, gp. cit., pt>»
22
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gcnirmwBiit Aepwteiaats (by various official funds, including the 
national insurance funds, the Iron end Steel Realisation Account and > 
other covoxvmnt departments; possessing surplus funds for temporary 
lending to the SbBObSfusr to met her seasonal need© (isbls 1>). In 
other words, together with tap Mils, '.’ay*5 end Means Advances constitute 
the floating aoaotc of the public doportrmta.
The Backing Repartaant of tho Sack of hegtad is also & pocsfbio 
source for the ibMhoqwr to barrow in Veyo md Means advenes©! but it 
ie a very acjall elscmt in tho total. Tho Exchequer, as for as poeeible, 
avoids those advunooo freu the Ituib of *l^Ur4 since they arc traditionally 
rogardod as irfRxvtlon&Ky (beoaux* wy increase in the total assets of’ the 
Banking Bep^rt^oat tends to ineresoc bark. cash and therefore their 
liquidity, and hence beep thei to a uiirhw. Ouch borrowing ie alec 
regarded by the hadoliffo CWiittce as "a last eacpedient to be avoided 
as fur ee possible”, nuinly because of the adverse effects which borrowing 
from tea central hank is believed to Iwo on confideswe at taa© and 
atoood. hosort b^' gcvcitKamt© to their control banks is associated in 
the public rJLnd with bad :^:equsr u^u^-sont - i.a. with cBaceeaivs 
reliunco on bozuowing the govomnent with consequential largo-ooalo 
inflation.2
1. Tfeoey, oy. sit.. p. 72.
2* Itittifikanante ** >* **•* p*» «t MttWOtiUbBK> Q
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(3)
* en increasing Item in the total debt. 63f in March 1962 (T’able 6) It
takes the few (Table 1&) oft*
(a) Marketable securities;
(h) Non^mrfcetable securities.
(a) iiwriMtatiU Ai«X!>>»rt,tlaa era the U«Mt and a continuous^ 
developing (both in mount and in proportion to the whole) iteu, 6ft in 
1%2 (Fig. 4>). Tliis development shows the great ehsnge in the structure 
of the national debt that has happened since the beginning of this century 
when they hardly* existed.Thio itea baa no less than 25 different secu­
rities, in March 1962, quoted on the London Stock i&ohaage» Many of thee 
have two dates for redemption, e«g« 3 wrings Bonds 1965*75 (for 1073 
L.n.) iaeans that IO?3 L.a. of these securities are outstanding and oarryiag 
3/ interest * that the government is -able to redean them at way time for 
a certain date in 1%5 hut no later than 1975*
It would he tedious to discuss the twenty-five different securities 
separately. ihr this reason, only the leading lines will he presented. 
Marketable securities may he olasaifiea into the following groups accor­
ding to their min features**
x Ccnverslett stocks the greater pert bee heen issued in enoheage for 
maturing earlier issues.
1. Table i shows that total “Other Unftwded Debt” which includes aar- 
ketable securities was less than 10’> of the whole debt in WOO, 36> 
in 1935 end 6t in 1962.

It
x Any security vith the word "Beahetpes” in its title ie generally 
a fairly short one.
x Astllag Teem and Amitwg steafcer ee* substitution af longer- 
torn securities for treasury bills or short-dated securities.
x flsrlugs Baade we* lemted during the Seeand wentd Ver* than 
saving wue important as a nee&s both of financing the war and 
combating inflation.
X It looks peculiar to consider "Serial funding Stacks as items 
of other unfunded debt • a United duration debt. In fast, the 
ter.a “funding” ie oieleeding ee applied to eeeuritiee with a 
Had tod life, especially after using tho taru Funded Debt” to 
describe that part of ddbt which has no final date for repayment.
iaxkatsble securities huve boon <^wuped* in Tables 15-17« aocci'ding 
to their maturity structure: i.e. into abort* saodiua, and long dated 
(or up to 5 yeare* between 5 cad 15 years* and over 15 years). Axr 
securities with more tiun ono redemption date* the latest one is consi­
dered.
The conclusion of this grouping is plotted in Table 18. However* 
in order to dioaues tho structure of the whole mcrk^table debt, funded
1. Ther* 3 a no particular difference hare between "Loan” and *^took%
2. The difficulty in this ;;rocees is that a given security can be ci&sal 
fled as Icng-taru at one tiiae and as olicrt-term at another tine which 
ie closer to its date of repayment. “Long-teeni debt gredu&ll,;/ tumo 
into ahort-tera* us its date of xepoyiaont approaches* like a boat v.deb 
seemed securely beached on tho shore* it ie sooner or later floated off 
on the rising tide of tiiae” (Dalton, op. eftt.. p» Zk$).
3. In feet* b Victory Benda are arbitrarily included with the raedlm
teem eeeuritiee: see p. l > £ footnote *--
Msecurities are added to thrice ^swps (Pig. $)• Within thia port of the 
dsfct, 36?0 out of 15 263 h.m. (or W^eenaist of ”funded” debt in the 
nost rigorous sense of the tern, i.e. debt which the ;;ovornrxmt is wider 
no convulsion ever to redeem. These figures are in contrast with 3385 
out of 12 449 L.ta. (3J^1) in 195° • Moreover^ securities with a life of 
over 15 years have actually declined, despite the ferpenoion of the total 
debt. Over the son© period, the ^cdixam-terr securities (with a life of 
between 5 and 15 years) base significantly increased from 10» in 1950 to 
33 • Together with this part of clefet, the short-dated oocurities oon- 
prlse a quarter of the marketable debt. 2his high proportion refers to 
the gevemmont policy which airaod (since 1951 when activation of 
monetary policy resulted in higher interest rates) at raking the issue 
of iisrketable securities for as abort a period ss possible, a policy 
wliich la reflected in a change in t3»e structure of the mztetdble debt.
In othez* words, the tendency has been for the intemrJ. debt, so far as 
it ooswlets of '.'nrkctfiblc securities, to become sorzewhat shorter, not 
only by the effluxion of tine but also by ebanfen in composition end the 
fora of securities issued in the process of enlargement of the total. We 
shall see that ahoxteniny the average life Of marketable securities 
creates difficulties in debt ramgenont.^
(b) The part of "utker Unfunded Debt” baa been,
as a whole, declining over the 1950’e (Table 14), mainly as a result of
1. Oe© Chester g.
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the reduction in Annuities. Thin pert of debt consists of (Tables 19*20)f*
(i) Small Seringa;
(ii) Annuities)
(iii) Tax Reserve Certificates?
(iv) Other Debt.
S&ftAi «as> the min part of non-:iai<<:etable debt,
63f in 1962 (Teblo 20). The ns&n signifienreo of this part of the debt, 
fron the point of view of policy, is that increuees or dbe-
creases in its volume are aefttbar completely foreoooable nor completely 
within the control of the authorities. Those Idn&s of aocuritiee are 
issued, available on tap, in small dencRdnoticna to ©neenwage the rela­
tively lov incma gM&e to eave. Snail oeringc have a variety 
securities suoh as (Tables 21-2)1
- National Scarin'o Certificntea)
- Befercoe Bonds)
— rreoirn Wingo Bonds)
— soarings Stomps md Gift ttfas&o.
Tfcqy ere available through the Poet Offices, tho ',-Wings Bat&s and 
imnerous representatives of the National I Wingo ’Weesnts. They cm be 
<Mfes& on demand (in the case of Nation©! Barings Certificates eat 
Pre*dun swings Bonis) or on a fov months* notice (in the esse ©f Defence 
Bonds) without esv capital losses.
bisect ctrrponant of snail
savings, 6*> in 1962 (Table 22). They here been issued since 1916 as a 
nemis of encomAping snail savings during the First World War. The
ai
current issues are wvailubie in units of 15b., with a oaacioua boldine 
oiw (d%c). Intersat is not poid suwrantly but ncosiletss
unteL is dsuanded, free of inooao tec <und aurtec. If & oertifi-
cc.tv of IJe. is held £we Sevan years it beooaea worth £U
Bqfenoo £&2h& hears hoo-. isouod since 1939* Bhev er® sold in unit© 
of €5 or vault iples thereof with a MtiUa&x individual holding of fcJOGC, 
Interest, at the rate of jb par annum, io paid hodf-yearly and is oubjact 
to tsau There is, aoruover, a tete&sa bonus of £3 par cant wfc&ah is 
paid at the and of aovon ysars*
Throughout the poet-wax yjtffk a gsvammsi snaousageA Msaall 
seringa” by publicity end eduoaidunai effort rather then by offering 
higher interest raleo. But when tho rise in rates bocatw proaounood in 
the 1950’», the Rationed bevinge Hovsnont fslt tho adverse effect of tho 
increasing eea^tition for "saall soarings'd Tlaw tho Treaauxy sharply
raised, in the Budget of 1956 > rates on Searings Certificates and 
Befefcioo Borne and iiwre^eed the poruiaeihlo holdings •
xli© ©nnouncouont of these ota^ea wuu coupled with the introduction 
o£ £X^‘xMu Afelfe (at**** ISowedber 1956) which have qguiokly grown
since then * IQ- of the total Stations! Sowings in 1962. The uaoci&uu 
individual luclding is £300. These boudo bear no o<mtr&ctuaX rate of 
intoroet; instead on mount reprosmtiiig interest at the rats of b£&* 
per omuh cm the total outetnndinc is cel eside to flaaa & find to bo
1* Corxiitts© or. the forking of Monetary Policy, Hfcdcliffo hu^or/v, paras, 
m, 55^-
2J
dtetributea M sriaots, ranging £25 to CJOOO tax Sroo on too result 
of a oaothly taw.1
-«viiu:o gjfeajs ^zwido a ftothar exMOuroeenaat to
wtttR.11 savins and uartloulftrl:/ to th® nx^jof’ctlva huver of National 
tieeinoc Certificates. Qugr ore cwailcblo in unite of 6d. end 2e.6&., for 
ovvIk^ st&sajxjj und in wrious dcQX<xAiii*~tio©£5 for ^.i ftf tcdgona * 
ceding nn interest* 2heue tuiataas *qpy b© awte-njed for
Of the securities ft-l?^raly □entiOUGde
Annuities are t3io rterrfc Hxsri In dtnnortfmea of twwwnprifetfb^l®h^tW JKto rir^ -jfe, vtor> «*lfe JSte JS5» ** Wtoi wwWtotow re^ tr^u to --•••yWeto A \r« * •***» wrVtoA-
dMMk *Phe total ■ &et8t*U3diQ£ %MB decliliad ftrffF* jft X9$0 t*> i&
1962 (Table 20). Annuities are etaadMM into (Tables 2>W)i.
— Xif® tlflfrfl |
— St00rtOI&Xa Ax&ittl t&C0t f
— $tB nuitiou.
life >uBiuit±©fii2he A&iion&X 3efei ux&cLasionara (tfeD.Cs j lisve-w —- to to - ■■’- ■*■ toto "j— w w» »e*® >*•*•*»< to»vrew««M»a tor" ^ o« wsto wr w toOTtoWto tow
boui authorised to sail i&utuitiao for lives to individuulo an rocoivirv?
oltil&r in <yxih <537 p3Va®nDOilt otOCli, UQOCaPdixI^ to X&lQS '•>' nd
izi tobies o'; the ^a&ausye Vbir* rx^Mffw hsa boon applied sinoo
iSCb* *a4 she outeet the ^ovaxmont lo©t v«y large suks by this pro,joot> 
frou their granting onmitiao on advtmod livaa at too lev r&taa* Shia 
error vae, howevor* rectified, and the mtftieft were then sold at tboir
1 iwrisetom<eeM»«Si»s^s9BBt<awtostoto»
1. Map all bondt? held for nore them thzroo rxmtho*
2* He Brittain does not include life to the foytoX concxt of
"Other Uaftoicd Debttf Co^> >*
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fair value.The cash received by the iJ.XC. is used to Twohaoe f^nrem* 
nont stock in the nerfeet, end this stock (toother with ray stotfc trans­
ferred to then* by purchases of annultion) is then ormcolled. The result* 
for the national debt, is that an Itteanese in the purchase of annuities 
?:©cns a reduction In the <sciatin£ otocl-u. On the other hand, a new iteu
is added to the debt * i.o. Annuities - ;^yabl© when holders die.
The life comities cohone !wj not attracted the public: only 3 Xmu
hove been issued since 1929 anti non* at all since 1941. The total out- 
standing Is oontimxally declining, 8 L.o. in 1%2 (Table 23), viiick rjcons
that the sale of nau annul ties is not lseopinr pace with the <?or>iriny ones. 
However, the power to sell new life anroiltieo to individuals was withdrew
by the Pittance Act 1962.
?c^in^^ are tho najor port of total annuities. Tlieoe
enroritiec are issued to the H.B.C. in throe groups with interest at #Vy, 
3 > rod >V> resTKKJtiveV (Ttfble 24). Tertinrble annuities represent a 
nediur through vfoich the Treasuxy con obtain funds; and, at the eoae
tine, are a prof!table investnant fbr the Itb.C. on Wtnlf of Javinga
Berifes.2
- The biggest itex is the total (Table 24).
They were issued between 1943-49 to the H D.C. for 1300 L*n., 
and held ty them on Wuxlf of tJie ?oet~Offlee and Trustee Scoringa 
Banks. These cuuiuitioa have a t©r& of 2?, 30 and 31 /oars. The
1. J.K. lioCullooh, rsoticsl Influence~ - ■ «»fc ■ ■ fc
?. 432.
2. There are, in addition to these, perpetual annuities uaounting in 
total to 14 L.jsg representing debtu to the Bank of l.togland anti the Brofc 
of Ireland which have been undianged for mre then a hundred years. 
These annul ties cony Interest at per annua, ’which consolidated 
mounts lsnt to to. shifmi—rti for various pkmms, including toes, 
lsnt ter MSh tank tosn it was first iiwOTpowatsdi sssp/z
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total outstanding in March 1962 foil to 679 t*m.
• rj?0 Iioart taxxr*tonoa, 1ft- in 1962. ttwy wore
tooued ill May 1<X$6 fOr 250 L.ri., s&nto to tho U.B.C. on behalf of 
the 1’liaoo itoxln of umiuittoe hsare a M of 30
yeses. The total mMttttoto6 fall to hdfft 141 L.fcU, to -Xaxh 
19&,
the Mlloefc ecnMto&t **''1 *** 
leaned, in !tooh 195$ • They lusr© a tom af 30 year© and os© 
taken up by tho h’.XC. on babolf of iijo iruateo Swings Uooka.
Th© total x* i-Pff of Tcewtoahl© been rtoueed ovur
tho 195C’ot Am 1424 to 8$6 toa* LI*o room io that tho £*$.£.» tbs 
only investor, fblt uewilXtoa to toeoot ftwtiw funde to naiRoarkotoble 
dobt •» i.e. to tos^toablo amaittoo. nowver, the total metotieu um? 
tooroaoed, to &Mfe l%2f \tei liability <to etoitor annuitiae, prettouofy 
tho seBpentobilW of tho loot Office, aad valued at 170 L<ta., woo troae* 
forwd to tho
SS-S-l «0.t.rv»„O •XlAXl&SlSM (T-E.C.) oto the orallort 
ccsyonsnt of "Othw Phfbn&ed !>dbt” , (Teble 20 ). Thoy vero first tomato 
duetog tho Soomvi worM Vor, to ’\xKr-?bor 1941 t as a remonoe to Seyms* 
pro;.x?oal. Wie etoaona prwi popular col dmmXopod rapidly f&on 376 L«a» 
to ‘toptoober 1942 to 7$2 bow by tho <to of toe uar, in 1945-
Por ^rcbernoT mrvooee, nro dootonto to help to oven out tho
flee of rwera^ over tho year - t»o« to offset to MB extent tho 
oo&eon&l irrocularitioo to rownne collection, The idea behind thia
1. &• Sayers, ./toenolfrl <oijtey, pp. 2X0*12*
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sebaos runs n© follows : tho Xntatd Iwtjo flows, as said chovo, into 
the ’Wnecuar very wwweriy.1 Considering te foot that asst buoinosooa 
and ixuTlvidualo put aside, as depositu at their banks, sorae part of thoir 
tax liabilitioe, T.lhC. serve to attest thxjoe teds to the L&ohecjuor 
inetoad of the banks. In other wowls, it ootid bo conoidorod a pro- 
pc^ssnt of trass, tbs rate of interest paid, when first introduced, was 
3ft* teo of tax.
a
To these fact® on the T.H.C., the following points r»$r be addods
* T*K.C. are Issued, on tep> in mltiplee of C5 bjr the Baafc of 
^igluiul on bdialf of the Iroooury » without any liait to tbs 
hsldinos*
* Certifio&tea atm be uurroausred? to the Inland Revenue, at oqjf 
tine after being bold for two aanthe.
- She Trenwqyy emaueses ten tee to tee tbs rate of interest 
at which oortifioatss will be issued * i.e. the sets of 
interest offered is altered tequently so as to keep it in 
lino with other short-tarn rates. But variations in the rates 
do not effect certificates Which have fltetr boon issued.
- Interest is not paid in ct-ah, but added to the value of the 
oortifioat©, thuc moblin; noro tax to h© peid. Tho interest 
is • * 1‘rou inoo&o vux, surtax nzxd profits .
-A seta aeMfioaldcai was auads in 19dl wbun the mini wan dsnmins 
tian of a certificato woe reduoou tea £2$ to £5 «««i tie bolder
1. -co ../£
2. noro details, see Oe^-ere, qp. .alt.« pp* 210-213$ "Tea i&eeev©
Certificates’’, ZkvI. l&pt. 1962, PP-
SfMff.
3. It was 2£^ per swam in August 1962.
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who Wing tcaseo by a certificate vhdoh is worth sore than the 
tax due, can obtain a fresh certificate, on balance, hearing 
tiie sone date and term as the original.
* In order to encourage cwtificatoc in pr^iaent of taxes, and not 
as a oontiming invaotnont*
(a) Interest is not paid for noro than two years, however
long the certificates nro held (ad also no less 
then two isenths in oixler to avoid vary hot amwy),
(b) no interest is paid on certificates tto pc^wnt of
which in domnded in cosh.
As ugy to soon frm Sablo 20, no jrcat change has ooourrod over the 
1950*3 in the taaouni outstanding. It seem that in recent yearo indivi- 
duala fcwe WM to hold non ef these certiflcebee, but otter lmlilam, 
Xro^sely conpajd.ee, have not.X In 1960/61, We eurroiider of T.R.C. ‘s 
accounted for 1ft of inoone tax, the ouuo percentage of profits tea and 
access profit levy, and l&C of surtax.
AIM££_££&& (Wsed under the National Loan Act, 1939) is tbs 
last part of ’•other Unfunded 30W* to be diceucsed. It is a relatively 
snoU and declining item, fnorc X3' to 1*J£ in We 19J0fs (Table MO) of 
total non*narfeetoble debt. It oovoro a lurber of sterling debts to 
overseas institutions and government©, end is oa posed of (Tables 2 >26) t«
— Interest-free notes*
- Boots to other govomiontc.
B* •• •OB It -other Debt". Sti
itiportamo ta declined in tijc £ta)t li&lff off the 19F;,» than rapidly 
increased ffron $*4a 3&$b to 91 in 19*&* InUroai^fffcee notea ere hold 
by (Wsfcle 25) those international bodies>
- iBteBttanitt, ftiartwT awa (x.tw.; «»^jefeaantteriUMblK 
aaga^AB^Um, .fflfi. rMgtoSKS (X.B.3J>.), M a »«lacri?tlon of 
the United Kingdom, wlien both institutions were set up 19W.
3uoh oubscriptiona were siade partly in gold but oostly in sterling,
and the latter (i*e» the starling; was lent back to the U.K. on 
Interest l^rw Koteo until the "Xtad” or the ,rBanfcw requires it 
to £3smt credits to other nodhere. 9hose oeourltles oonotituto 
a by which those bodies can obtain sterling ffurcks ffioci tfo*
1
Cnitod hix^dc... as and occasion asisoe*
Xt is clear ffrou Stable 25 that aoet off these notes ore duo to the 
Id UP. end jn oX’tcxx roffluct operations off the Stand as
when another oountay borrows sterling. Koreovur, large uavaaeats in 
resent years have boon aeoooiatod with United Kingdom borrowing fftaou the* ” f. ' *
Awd, as when the equivalent off jpA^OO uilliono in nine curreneies wee
obtained ffSroB the Fund in August cad beptcuber l$6l« The result was an
Increase of both tho Fund's holding sterling notes and the total off
tho national dobt* iinoo tiw, this debt hse boon repaid uainly by
repurchases by Britain off sterling notes wild: convertible currencies.
- (X.B.A.), Whose intsseat free
notes started iron 196I with a modest oaouat off S l.u-
1« For tills reason, B. Kevin considers tide part off debt as "contingent" 
rather than "direct" liabilities ("The iritich National Debt", .Dpouo~
August 1957, p. 211).
2. & • P»
- . •
S S» -S.
•"W ' ?S
E§v.. 5* -.?S oV
* LttrtV* there tets»sot-<ftss© not©© Issued to tto £gfe
<*X itelaad ss a rosidue oomwotod with the Vnltod States 
doHsa? add to Jritcln (umte the lluropecn 1-ooovery i^nwaas 
and the liutmil 3s$MMSt dss&stonoo X ■'
k.'. .- V. .
of t$i±* ItSQ in~
during the first half of the 1950*8, then declined to # (Table 
26). Oris part of debt is oonpoaed of (ttfcle 25)»-
* debt to the <jovsnir.Mmt of roproconttx^ the outstsn-
dine balaneec of a loan of 62 Ubu wiish arose fson starling
-.J 4£*
> •- " '
; ■ „
ooQuirod by her during the .Tooaid World Wear. Thia debt wes 
written up V eboot 25 t.ru in W M a result of the devalua­
tion of the pound. Bowover, it is being repaid by inntalnanto.
- iobt to the gowraauta of 5sU£ ««* ^ftW» being *» 
ssssulthiss Mfttofo the flirted Slxustoi untertook to ©ssr to those 
countries in return for adwonoes in 19W3.
- a«bt to jOOMOMSMKO&SSl C-x’.V.j, letfTssmttWfc oredit
ertoadad to Britain through the Union. In other words, it 
represents the use which Britain has node of the credit fscili- 
ties ©X ths ifwtrm to ©over duXicito with ofciiax*
naufceru of the Union. She interest payable on this borrowing 
varies ccoordtag to the pended of tiae fbr Whieh the debt has
©utotorj&±ng.
>• ■?•<_
- 55)0 ri—lning Iter, includes a vartoty of assail debts/ a.g. to 
tt»u govsraeumt of northern Irdnud lent to the United Kingdon
durlxv. tlw* C*o©ond World Wort and two Atoyliavr loans
1. lA>r saor© datoil© ao© 2* :tarln, Q7>. oit«« p. 211.
%the V.E. by the United States government in 1951 and 1953.
T-astfly loans ftoii other gtyveyrataap te -i
c.-.. 2&*
The above investigation was nnaeerred with internal debt with its 
various oonpononts. It io now tine to investigate the external portion.
Wo have assn (Tobies $, 6, 27} that internal debt eeaprioss the 
ovsxwholsiing bulk of the national debt, eternal debt io then the 
smaller and decreasing part * as a result of being repaid by tnstolaonte. 
It io, now, well understood that ,!©xterael debt4* meono that pert of debt 
in ourrmoiea other than sterling, arising from borrowing abroad. There 
io, of course, no relationship between soxtemal” debt and “externally 
held” debt, ainoo, as we ehall sob in Chapter IV, a substantial element of 
*internal” debt, particularly troaouxy hills, is n*r-chased on the o^u 
xaarket by non-reaidents.
ibcterml debt is composed almost entirely of debts to the U.8.
gwexmeixt and the Canadian ^vramant^ (Tables 28-9)s-
* debt to th© United States Govsrment is the biggest item in
dollar liabilities, 77/» in 19&2« It resulted from a loon
granted to the United Kingdom by the United States government
for reconstruction purposes shortly after the end of the war.
2
It was taken tg> over the yesrs 1948 8- 1948-
1. The total excluded the borrowings arising from the Mrst World War, 
wixieh have been neither wholly repaid nor formally cancelled.
2. And furtiier loans in 1949 and 1952*
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* debt of the sf Canada is the next in size, lHyS in
19^2, and was taken up in 19^*
- a snail part consists of iutoru«t*froe loans to the Umfljaa 
govenwnt saade during the second war.
* as & result of certain bilateral agrssoorts to repay in gold 
or external currencies, s& amount of the debt to the i^uropean
195*.1
was reclassified as stomal Debt freu July
«► debt to certain members of the IJMk ifcioh were funded as peart 
of the liquidation of the Union.*'
* lastly, Mta to a^SEJSSSBSS^ ««** 03 Solglun, tat Africa, 
Ceylon. the recent component is the obligation for 215 million 
□wise francs (16 L.n.) representing th« finding of the balance 
of assistance given by Switzerland to Britain under the Basle 
agreement dated 20 October 1961.
1. a£ tea &&*& aaete U3tea&> »• *•
2. Star wore details on tha ooupoaajita see the .flaw****! £WSfi?g&». .<>£ 
sa.3V&t.
JLTtXCPMSHT OF ffiS XMaCHAL DEBT I
Tho n&tioxial debt stood at about 29 OCX L.a. on the 31st lisrch 1%2. 
We mcy ask ouroclveo; whore did this total camo from To answer thio 
question, we have to look to the past.
The history of the British debt, in fact, goes back almost throe
hundred years. The origin of the debt lies in the practice of borrowing
upon the security of particular taxes granted by Parliament, a practice
which developed after 166' but w BC/ntcsxLtizcd only after the Revolution
of 1638.1 Xt will he clear, fros thia historical review, that the
traditional opposition to the national debt gradually declined by reason 
2of Gcdgendee which appeared nor© or less uncontrollable. Thus, state 
borrowing entered as a by-product nuinly because of the increasing costa 
of wrs. Xt wee net a question of theoretical principles but of 
practical, hard nco&selties. The tradition against borrowing wee set 
aside when grave esaoTgeneiee such as were forced the issue. Xt wee, 
however, held that the fovomewnt <w.~ht to establish sinking funds end 
reduce government debt incident to war,
Xt is intended to follow, in thia ohogp-ter, the thesis that the nsia 
reason for debt increase is financing were. This review will be divided 
into two brood phases: the period boforo the first World War, and the 
period since 191&.
1. B.L. Hargreaves, The *foti<rasl Deb t . London 1990, p. 1.
t. See ipyenttw, in far a discussion on the theory ef the debt.
(See M>le JO and Pig. 6)
With the exception of the trifling nx: of €664 000t the national 
debt was wholly contracted since the Involution of 1639, when the un­
settled state of * werment and the difficulty of imposing new taxes
5
controlled recourse to losne. At the completion of the Revolution in 
168$ the debt stood at €1054925? in 1691 it rose to €3130000 booWng 
an interest ohas^e of £232 000. In the next year, an Act wss, a© nentionod 
above, passed xwvidins; that €1000 Geo mould be borrowed cm the eoouriV 
of the boor end other liquor duties.^ die yield of these teams mbs to 
fern a fund for the payment of interest.
The necessities of the wer with j&qkoc compelled further brarowinc.
The beginning the funded debt w be dated from 1694. In tljit year,
the Rank of inland was founded, and node to the govewsaent an advance 
* 1,
of 1.2 I».£u at the rate of 3^. At the peace of 1697, the debt etoad at
'jrsu,.:
1. Ito data of this table are provided (with slight differences frees 
Baetabls which are considered in our review) by H. Kai dor, ’'History 
of the National 3©ht"t Appendix C of V.E. Beveridge’s Tull T^plar/meut
^TJfeSilfor, leaden, 4th is^«, 1953-
2. J.3U McCulloch, gp. oit.. p. 414.
3. This Act io also regarded by itaeauley as the origin of the national
debts see Bootable, Public 3rd ed.# London 1917, p* 629.
4. A.1U Pros! considers this loan as the origin of tha debts ”$or 
practical purposes, the British haticmsl Debt can be said to hove 
originated in 1694 with the advance of 1.2 L.a. Am the newly ftem&ed 
Rank of England to the Govenramt of the day1' (Public bjnanoc. Loixlon
I960, p. 202).
fcl
21.5 t.a*f in the fbur succeedin’ yecra of peace, to 1701, it was 
reduced to 26 A l.su In ether wrds, there was an annual reduction 
at the rate of about Cl 2)0600 during pcrxc, against an increase of 
2<5 l.n. dunLiy, u- -C *&az? period.
During the War of the Spanish Duocoosion, which started in 1702, 
tlx rational debt increased by m annual rate of over 3 L.nwg until 
the peace of 1713 it owe to 53• 7 Dm. During the following peace 
period, ftou 1713 to 1739 > with sane slijtit exceptions, the aovment of 
the debt was not uniform; in the first ten years, owing to the South 
Sea Bubble and the war with Spcsin, the debt becerae 55.2 L.n. 3hea, 
during the rctMilntog sixteen ycoro of peace, Wider the prudent e&aini- 
stration of Walpole, ecus reduction wnu uude, go that in 17$0f the amount 
ms just under *>7 with an annual reduction of CJOC 000*
?ho first SudLf«eentuxy of the debt’s history presents several potato 
of intorosti
(a) the effect of war in adding to debt, to a little reduction 
in the onouing peace, to ratioed.
(b) the gradual introduction of "funded debt" in which annuities
cad floating debt wire absorbed, *&x> various separate debt 
accounts were blended in one clu^; 0.
(c) the "sinking fund*’ waa established in 1716 for reducing 
tlio debt. 2ho primitive fund, usually called ’Walpole’s 
Sinking fund", was not cfftoac&oue in eliminating the debt.
(d) the first instances of the ‘’oonverston* proeeee alec ooeur* 
red in tliat period. Xn 171&, the logoi rate of interest was 
reduced from 6^ to $*, and three year© later a similar
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reduction was m&e on the interest of the nati<msl debt*
in 1727 > g further redaction free to wae 
- node, by Which a musing of iftOGOOQ per aunusk was rsaliesdi
The war of 1739-43 hod the ^w»octod effect on the national debt;
31*3 l*a. were added to the prwic&o debt outstanding baring the total 
to over 73 L.a* The return of peace helped the success of the conversion 
sobers in 1749, which aay be regarded as the forerunner of the modern 
conversions* Interest on part of the debt was reduced to 3sfc‘; for seven 
years, and 3* afterwards. In the follovi^; year* interest on the reri&An* 
dar was reduced to 3^ for five ^arc, and 3^ thereafter* The debt 
holders at first dissented, but were than enooure^ed by the high price 
of stock.
Up to 1756> the debt wao reduced by about 6 X*.a. end stood at 72 14U 
whan the 3even Yours* War started* th^eadituro at onoo rose and, ao a 
result, debt continued to increase until, at the close of the war in 
1763, the funded dWbt was 122*d h.n* with a floating debt of U L.a.
The ooncoQuenceo of the war had a oontinuod effect on the ^chequer for 
soijc years afterwards. In 1?66, the funded debt rose to 129*5 h.». with 
a further unfunded one of over 10 L.n* The succoodinr years of peace 
allowed for a snail reduction, about 10 L-n. in 1775» when the funded 
debt was 125 I>*Q* and the floating one 4*2 L.&* or a total of elnoet 
130 L.a.1
tasa03aecasBS<sBtttf9<MSeaiMRttni7atfs»&£vx
1* Again there are
Ilildor,
,'ercncec 1x3 twe©* trx ee& txi.x»tv u. oi * Beatable and
Ao might be expected, the daertosn War of Irdey.cndence added 
seriously to the national defbt. At the conclusion of tiis Peace of 
Versailles (1783) the total outstanding woe aver 23G L.n. or an annual 
increase of about 13*5 L«n» During the later part of the war, the 
©train on govern:ent credit was shown by the lev price obtained for the 
Inane of that period. During the early day© of Pitt’e adsdniatratian 
fixxn 1733, which noy be called a peace period and which coded with the 
outbreak of the wr with Prance, til© national debt was not seriously 
dirdnio'ned. In 1786 the nev sinking funt’ vess ©etablietoed, and by 1793 
it had redecnod clout 10.3 l*su leaving a net capital of 223 L.uu
She diaiwtorletice of the scoond luslf-cetitury of the debt's exis­
tence arc the great grarth of both the capital outstanding and tho 
interest charge:
(a) after oonoidarin,, the snail repayments in time of peace, 
there romaine a net addition of IOC L.n. in the fifty-four 
years 1739-9^1
(b) the annual payment for interest Increased from 2 L.a. to 
nearly £.5 uvar th© aauc period.
She great ware with Prcnco, firot under the Revolutionary govomewnt 
and tiion under napoleon, comprise the mat important and critical period 
in the development of the RritisZt debt until the end of the nineteenth 
century. Prom the outbreak of the war in 1793 to 1315, loons were 
required in almost every financial year*1 The main reason for thio groat
1. See Boatable» op. olt.. p. 6>, for more details on the annual 
increase.
addition was tlu> wwillinexme of the goverrnsnt to ixatpose taxes at the 
cojxwuw-iqikt of the war. However, at th« opening of the yw 1316, the 
funded debt v/^s 016 L.uu with a floating one of 60 I»au The French 
warn, therefore, brought the national debt to one of its peeks. Since 
that date there was goto, though insufficient, reduction in it.
If we consider the historical trend of the national debt for the 
whole period of 1620*1315» am© interesting facto will cusr^s. The 
period is divided into years of war and years of peace. angularly in 
the vor years the national debt rose, while in the years of peace the 
budget vac saoro or lees buluacod, end at t&nos SMS reduction in the
debt occurred. haroovar, it i© evident, frou Fig. that there in a 
narked upward trend throughout the entire period.
The outbreak of the Crimean Var in 1853 supplies another illustra­
tion of the influence of war on the growth of debt • though the «ctrnor- 
ditwry expenditures! were net by increased taxation which contributed to 
the larger port of the war costs. Since that time no notiooehle addition 
has boon mdo to tho debt, while the growtfc of wealth node tbx> weight 
of the axietlnr chorees very meh lighter. However, the Boer Vsr is the 
last example, before the TUrct world War, since it added 160 L.su, Xiwe 
1399*1902, to the capital outstanding.
Therefore, between 1615 am 1914 the national debt ©eased to rise 
and, canoidariag t?ie whole period, declined by a very moderate mount, 
so that by 1914 it stood at 21 under 1315 level. There were eons fluc­
tuations up and down, notably tbs temporary rise in the dabt during the
vt
Boer War, X'ulXowwu by a subsequent fairly rapid rctiretient. In other 
words, vMle tb^ro was little ttotiranont of debt In the hundred years 
between the Napoleonic Vara and the MLrst Vorld Var, the debt did not 
rise.
It can be soon therefore tlxvfc Mstoxioally tlie noot laportent 
attwcrn for the jrovtk of debt (although it did not originate in a wap) 
has been tlia o&rponoee of nejor watts. A ocnperiBon of the debt incurred 
in each war with the amount paid off In each succeeding peace octal 1 lobes 
tiiia: owr 60D L.ru was added in tho Ttenoh wars (1773*1815}$ hardly 
75 b-aa. was paid off in the forty Ma1 noactn
In tho obow ulactta&ion of the d&trolopt&mt of the national Mbt?
slight attention has been devoted to its atruotuw during the period
under consideration. Bernard Mallet and provide us with the data
1
of Tables 31*3. bhftortumtely ouch infowntlan starta only ffcoa 188? > 
however there woo no re&icrl ohJSigo in tho structure of the dobt. 
hlxndsd debt continued to compose the bulk of total debt, between 80, and 
90 , over the ;>eriod froaa 138? to 1913. bhftrn&ed debt inoromed in 
mount and poroente&e during the sone period, but was still a mall 
©aasponmt, J . This is against tho continuon® decline of annuities.
National debt, in relation to national Incom, ohowed a degrease frm 
in 1337 to SfeS An 1913 (Table 33 as& Mg. 7). This tendency io partly
a result of tho slight decrease of debt in that eriod, but neiuly
■mnwiin i twiri(idi t» r «.nw»
1. Bernard Ballot, 2
XV, pp. k;^5 a.::; , London 1913, Table ted Kingdeta 1070 -xv. ew* i west, (^aexemi 1
X9W\ ^eon< J<xar,. fcarch 19^3, pp. 31*62.
4G
of tiia grant growth of the national incase.
Hie burden of the debt 4c illuctrctod in MAe >>3 Bebt service
as & pereentsge of national income hfcc docx'ousod froc 2«5* to 1«2T$ as 
a percentage of govatnaest esswnditurs elso declined froa 3Q- to XJh.
Wo liavo ©eon thefc the national debt bee recorded a figure of 650 
L«su by 1913* la otl^or wards* the total nt the outbreak of the Tlret 
World War was aotae 200 l.a. leas that in 101$. ’Than. cane the prodigious 
rise incident to the lust two world wars* ocrx^ing the total to flgureo 
that could never have been predicted * from 650 to 743$ h.a. in 1919*
' Uf-i
and to 23640 in 1946. Both wars ooRpollsd the gtAWaamt to rely 
heavily on loans as a source of fincnciik. i^enditurac (Sttg. 8)«
The cutbrod: of the first wex neooucitoted & large and imedinto 
2
^vernnont expenditure. There tma no cltcmativc but to fell beck on 
leans* even tkouf#; tlat neont m enoruous increase in the national debt. 
With the huge incrocoe in government crpmiiture, the main (question la 
not whether tiioro shall be any recourse to borrowing* but at what point 
tho balance should be struck between increased taxation mA borrowing.
1. Mallet* op* ftft *» 'Table II> pp« 476-7-
8. 8. Boiiawi, .J.ta.fl£ aMHHE, Xflnaon 1962,
shows in a table (p. 66, that government eKpendituros increased from 
leso then 200 I.a. In Iplj/Xb to 2$30 L.cu In 1918/19 the result 
was of course a Mg deficit
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Hone©, govcm-cnt m^>cnditur« Hum; woo financed by loans rasTgod frori 
io SO, (Table 35) 'n-ih an wwojc of TO '* This mans that tte gpvwm- 
went relied heavily upon borrowing froa the public and the basking 
ayotecu In tho early stages of tho war, finance was mainly provided by
troaauiy bills end Ways and Korns
longer-torn loans becme the raain source of finance (FIs- 9}*
By 191? > the notional debt juried frou 650 L.&. in 1941 to 7435 >«a» | 
in oilier words it increased by uore than eleven tine©, or sax annuel 
increase of 1700 L«eu The result is that the pcet-var debt stood in 
relation to the total national lnoone at rlx>ut the ansae level 00 in 131$. 
In boil. ISIS and 1923 the debt was twice the national incorac (Tatols 33) •
During the Second World War, locns represented a very ouch mailer 
percentage of the total genwn^mt eeponditurs, ranging frea 3% to 60 * 
With sn average of 50^ (Table 35) • -Me wo© tho reoult of tho rigorous 
policy of taxation adopted fron the beginrdxig of tho war. Oontrsxy to 
tho experience of the first war, tbs oouroo of finance oaao largely fecsa 
nediu: and abort-tars aoouritioo. Ifcwev&r Table 37 and Fig* 9 show a 
ooqpariooa between the structure of the dobt during the two world wore*
By tho conclusion of the second war, the debt inoretised froa 7131 X*-su 
to 21366 &•$» • i-s. trebling the mouat, with ox amu&X iaosesM of
2370 1^-wx
jV*'.' <

. 7
The lltteaMvar period is also of interest in the history of the 
rational debt. There wee a general tondaxv for the debt to docline 
during the 1920’s, but a quite narked trend in the opposite direction 
during the 1930’s. This increase ni$ht bo due, if not to war, at lanat 
to preparation for war- Another factor wes the active application of 
fiscal policy (l.o. deficit finance) <v*ainot the Great repression of 
1929 > especially after the failure in the effectiveness of saonetaxy 
polieyy* and aloe due to auopeneicn of pesyesent on the Aswrioan debt.
1* ibr nor a details sac Chapter YX.
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2« Gcvexwettt xicjfiewlituro and the Growth of 3otot
&national debt continued to advance after 19W, a pease-tiue period, 
toon 236iX)L.j2u to 28 6?0Usu ia 1962 (ll$» G) * i.e« an increoso by 
alnoot 5000 L.&» or 1ft«« The xaotive lector behind this increase is not 
wear, hut govemioent intervention. in ooonoraic life.
The roaco of ^wornnent intervention, through the public expendi­
tures, usually depends upon the eccicting ttatc of devolopaent, industrial 
pattern, political factow, etc* in general, the alias of government In
a nedsm ecanocy are claesificble in four diotinot functions, which aey 
1
he briefly act out as follows:-
The first, We oldest and sii^ioct function, oay he celled the 
provision of essential public services. inch services relate to the 
existence of We ^t&te itself and cannot be performed by any other 
agency. They include tlis rxaintsncncc
legislature, the usinteu-nco of lav and order, defence, etc.
The second uain function is the onooux*^e^nt or control of parti­
cular sectors of the ecoaocy far strategic, social or economic reasons. 
The rolo of govoiwent way be, in this respect, indirect, such as 
supporting hOTae agriculture through euboidios, or -^articular induetrios
1. Per txaro details see S. iovin, Tcpcthook of ' oonoo^e foslvls* 2nd 
cd., London 1963, p$« 260-2$ A*R« Prout, Ilp^Pfte*" pp. &Wh
for a ainilsr review.
V)
financial nssiotcureo or odviaooy cervAoes. Or it nay be direct, 
ao in the o&se of induatviee which crc pcc*tV or wholly ^ovexmont- 
operv.ted> e«g. the postal eervioo. The extension of this fur-otion, 
directly and indirectly, ie & hd^Ay contxworaial mttar and largely 
depends on political rather than economic coneideratlona *
The third function is the application of social policy. The inposv 
tanoe of tMa funotion hao increased during the present oentury. It 
involves both the revenue side i.o. tho level of taxation &&d ita 
distribution swat different sections of the comunity) and tlie 
expenditure of gwerment on social oervicec - education, health sod 
tlie like. Again, the ouoetlon of hcv far ilii© function should be curled 
is an essentially political issue.
Finally, modern gwexn: iontn awaw responsibility towards the overall 
eooneoy * i.e. rtoint&iaing a high end ©tcble level of coployaant aad 
stimulating a raaxiaum rote of growtl; of iiioeaua. Once again thia sroeeoa 
involveo both iwcnuc end esependituro - i.o. tla> resource© taken frau 
tlw public through taxation, tho resourcee returned to then through 
expenditure end the rolationship betaeen the two.
In order to gauge the iworiunoe of fvvoiwent intervention, tii© 
relationship between govexwent expenditure and national i&cmo may be 
token cwt a xm$i guide. Eenae, Tabla 39 i-rosenta cooperative relation* 
chips for a group of countries of the emo category of development and
toomaAc ©ye ten. As a proportion of national inooxao. control governuaat
fll
expenditure® in tl*> United arc tiw Idlest p©roontc£«, follawad
by Austria cad .nmdon.
Concentrating the analysis on Britain, Table kQ dhows the iuportenoe 
of the central £^veament coQCKditures since 19$®» This table has, in 
fact, a defect bcoause g^weiwent o^endiU-roc see computed on a finan­
cial year basis and national incouc on a calendar year basic. Tim 
different attempts ow jacwlc in Table© 41-2 to present sacre proper 
pc'rcoT’taf’OG. Both rsethoho lead to .umh the emo conclusion, that 
cov«mlent expenditures repre&mat a hi^h proycartimi of ilia national
inccrjc.
• • • • •
KoapiiiG I*1 2aind the Gbovs-ncntioned ffcwtions of the cwom^ont, 
ws now mcarainc tho central gowsaraent expenditure- The Mkftt (i*e* 
revenue and a^onditure) io usually divided. into the “ebovs-the-line” 
and ’’below- the-line” items, As a rou^i appeoxtMttton but accurately 
enough for a t’cnerol distinction, revenue nnd expenditure *’<dxnre the 
line ’ represent current incme md outyo (i.e. not reisultinc in the 
twcguioition of assets)» whereas those "below the line” consist of 
capital operations 3 The Mb©lw~thd-HneH expenditure, for eample, 
contains mainly l^ans to naticnolismd industries, local authorities and 
various scsoi-coversvxcnt oxteaisetions z Tables 43-4).
1, Prest (Public llaanoc, p. 155) concidars Shch distinction os eecca* 
tially Iiictorlorl and procedural rather than, economic^
2. For more details sec Chapter XVI? Prost, oit.. Ch« 8, pp. 155* 
78} Brittain, cp« alt.« PP* 5W>.
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Before continuing our ax^uaftgfc, It spy be useful to daxxwtrate, in
abort, the ” above” and ” be lev” the U&e £x^«nditurue. Currant expettliturae
. l
oan bo classified into different categories. The first is expenditure 
on goods and cervices such ue defcroo, health (^diich involves stuffing?, 
OQuipuwnt end operation of the >.iuticov JL Health Service), and other ex­
penditure (i.c» the coots of civil ceivice doortuont© not attributable 
to particular uorvicoe, of central police service and courts of low, 
en^layaent eervioee, etc.).
The second min outegoxy of expenditure consists of subsidise (i.e. 
XWiasntc to permit the sale of oortohi products at lefts than tlxoir full 
cost of production, such es a'jriculturo uihcidiee. About two-thirds of 
agricultural subsidies are deficiency p^nonts to fftmero on products 
sold on the hone norhot for souotixin; Iocs than the gurarainteed prices 
negotiated amnally between goraamxmnt am faraasvs* The remainder are 
direct peyrante to acslst portioulir ty^xm of farmers (e.g. marginal 
hill-farming grants) or special eepocts of farming (e.g* fertiliser 
oubuidiee). Other subsidies include the central .ovonunent'a share of 
the losses sustabiad by local govornrsont authorities in renting nualcipaX 
housing at loss than its full cost (a part of social policy) and the 
operating louse* of the railway system (designed to assist a particular 
sector of the economy/*
The third major category of expenditure consists of direct monetary
X. See another classification in bx’ittain, pp« edit., PP* ^*7«
greats to persons • 3<»je of those arc National Xasursass Bmofito (uuialy
retirment pension, uncs^ioyaeut and delates benefits} which ere eon- 
traotual payments correspcndir<: to contributions under the national 
ineurcne© cchcci© and peyahlo only to pox^osw qualified to receive them 
by virtue of such contributions. Other exeats like national Assistance 
payment®, Emily Allowances or sefaeiseshipe> hare no such contributory 
requirements; they are ftamwed frora the proceeds of t£ocatiam generally.
Lastly there are debt cervices (©♦£*• interest payments wixiah 
represent the quarterly oxj bi-mnauu pcyoswta on the outstanding debt); 
wore will be ©aid about this itw is: later cCicpterc. Also grants to 
local rammnentss.
Of capital cocporuliture, the raallor part io comprised of expenditure 
on direct capital foxuation by the gmrernnont itself in the spheres for 
which it has respcnsibility » especially fist Office capital Vogts, t>w 
naintenanoe sue enjxmsion of the road system, t&m hospitals and olinioa 
for the heal tit service, and military installations of all kinds under 
the defence $MgSMM»
i*he uajor part of capital soepmdituro by the central ^ovoru&ont is 
in fact indirect. Xt consists of loans to nationalised induan
tries («<• the coal industry or the rcHweys; to finimse their eepitnl 
formation.
Six very also of the budget figures mhos it clear tliat budget policy
1. See Chapter XTC; also Brittain, ap* ci/t.. pp. tyJMS.
$9
eua&xfc $&&&&& be decided without roTswiee to the prevailing esonceic 
situation caa to any cocipa:icato^ cntion that ney ho taken fzou tine to 
tin©. ?or cKmaplo, If the situation is inflationary tlx© Chancellor 
r.mt then ©in to roduco the {^anrnnt’o own current d&aan&s for goods 
«nd oervicoe. Waa&taKfc policy aunt also be ooiiaiderod. Xn doing so, 
the Gh^ttcellor will determine tlx© else of the revenue surplus that has 
to he produced shove the line. Such surplus cons on the one liand 
araduoing the iaconoo which give xdo© to oonsuaoro* dooand. On the other 
hand, it io a iwmo of financing capital iivostecnt in tfco nationalised
industries.
If economic conditions ere deflationary, however, then all the 
converse oueations arise. If esponditure is to be increased and taxation 
reduced, the Chruicellor night have to plan deliberate fbr a deficit on 
his budget above the line. This will dopond on the state of the budget 
(i.e. the siac of any surplus above the line) before bis anti-deflationaay 
urogreoae is put into operation. In thee* circuiaotanoea, regard mat 
be bed to the fact that any deficit inevitably ncane an increase in the 
nations! debt. The Chancellor will have to borrow to wt oom of the 
above-the line rr^oaditure; end hav ing no surplus to cany down, ixo will 
hrve to borrow more to uoet capital so^peM&ltupc bfebro *M line.
Hence, presenting the budget, Ito Chancellor does sot hove a 
einple problem of rarely balancing receipt# with expenditure©. His 
problem (given & programme of o^enditurc to which the ecvwmont is 
©omitted) is to decide how the renourcot; neoeosory far that prograrm 
ceil be obtained j by taxation, borrowing or currency creation.
VThese isaVterc Mill become clocror after the dicoussion in
Quxptcr XIII. >br the aomt, it i© : wooer cry to ronodber that the? aisse 
and structure of the memo side of the budget ia not determined merely 
by tbs noed of the government to finance its ensi oxpenditurej that a 
modem budget oust be ffcemd in a wider context. In drawing it up, tlw 
Chancellor met have an eye to the ovaxvll economic situation rather than, 
sirtply the current needs of the government itself. Each budget oast be 
framed in the light of the situation cmrro:;tly prevailing! sound 
budgeting nowaday jaey involve a eexlee of budget surpluses or deficits 
over a period of several years if the prevailing economic situation 
decumds it.
If vo apply thia arnu.wnt to the 1950’©, Table b$ shows that the 
’’above-thc-lino” budget usually records an svaja.. surplus, much fluctii- 
a tint,' according to ocononic ciixajnatpnccm, while the ’’boXov-tho^lim’’ 
records a continuous deficit less cycliordly changing. Such deficit is 
financed* in part, by the rlx>vc-thc-line surplus.
Therefore, froru the point of viov of Use overall budget, it has 
recorded in the lest ten years (19$2*62) a not deficit changing, again, 
in amount according to economic conditions. She Qwscellor is able to 
cover such deficits with 3 (a) creating new moneys (b) borrowing by
means of an ax^cu^sicn of the national debt. Shis represents sales of 
long-term oocirritias, tender treasury bille, national savings, Tar 
Beeervo Certificate©, sal co on.
However, for the period of ten years, the a&jrogato of these deficits
6X
wo 2735 X»*ft* to be reconciled vxtli u rou^Oy oqual addition to Wo 
artionel debt over the aaoo period (Tebfc 46 )• Vtot la ostonialilnc hSW 
io that (Table 47) net borrowine; ftoor. the public pltgped only a liuor 
vole In financing the deficit - 103 L*»* or of the deficit of the 
whole period froE 19$fe*62. Other proviaiok^, especially Increase in 
bard: note end oxtm-bfud^tcay funds, were the main source of financing 
the overall deficit*
To understand thio apparent oontrodioticn9 Table 49 shows that the
$ovexraeat aado net issue of laaascotable oocuritios of 2019 b*n. | 1471
L.n* stayed within the ^ovomnont holding, wlile only j28 l»*su were
subscribed for by tie public. To thio ;ramt, 862 L.au of aoall savings
securitioe (Tobis 40; ere rddsd. However, a reduction of nerfcet troe-suxy
bills by 1026 L.&. one Treasury Deposit hoooipta by 283 b.a* reduced 
2We net receipts fTon the public, cc we ’nare aeon, to 106 L.n.
1* ibr roaaor^ of ^averment holding of narkotable ©ocuritioo, see 
Chester IX*
2» Xt aay be said that the goveensaant lias, sere or less, changed the 
structure (rather than Wo also; of the oebt in tho hands of the 
public - i.e. by reducing the cucunt of floating debt against sn 
increase of lanG<»vt«m merketoble eecrurities end ncm««aaxicoteblc 
securities.
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CHAPTER BT
DISTRIBUTION OP THE NATIONAL DEBT
The development and structure of the national debt have boon 
discunsed In the preceding chapters. However, the problem of the 
’'distribution" provides another dixwnaion of debt nanagement. As we 
shall see in the next tliree Parts, the distribution of the debt amon^; 
different sectors of the ooonoray is a ei^piificaat satter during A period 
of an active monetary policy.
k’e start our investigation on the distribution of the national 
debt with the following statistical n o t e s t*
1. The period of the analysis involve3 the years 1951-62 and includes 
the following categorieis of debt (Tabla 50't*
(a) the direct debt &e defined in Chapter I, i.e. floating, 
marketable, other and external;
(b) government rv-aranteod securities of the nationalised indus­
tries. This item is included for otroag reeeons. WMMi the 
practical point of view, there are no available data on the 
distribution Ql' the national debt only. I^oreover, the 
significance of the distribution of the debt on the problem 
of debt management takes into consideration both debt and
guaranteed securities.
2. Data on tl»e distribution of the debt ere found mainly in these
(a) irendo, Beoedber 1%1: fox the year 1951 •
(b) H.V. MottgHSt^ fox the yours 1953, 195&, 1955*
(e) ^saam^M^ixiasBm* it fax taw years 1956, 1957•
(d) Bank of n^landi^ the years 1953*62.
3* Information on the Bank of inland fox the years 1950-62 is <m*» 
plotely represented. That for th© years bofors 1958 io not completes ~
(*) end I^orottOe of for **•
195*, 1956, 1957, the banking system ie represented only 
by the clearing end Scottish banks and discount houses; 
other institutions are included in the ’‘residual error*'
Item.
(b) in Morgan for the years 1953*55, Guaranteed securities
are not represented.
Co) the year 1952 is completely missing-
4. Ibr these reasons, it is worth uh.il© atteaptinc an exeroiso in order 
to fill up these gaps before dtartinc bo tcsalyee the dietribution of the 
debt* however, the result of thie eKerdae will atill be appradaete 
because of lack of data.
5* stops token by the Bank of Jutland in td.© distribution of the debt
1. K.V. Mcrga
Chef old I960,
1 2he
2. Coccilttee on the 1 arising of the ’tonataaj- _<yatex (hadaXiffe Comittee) 
Haaa£Ss&« ,♦ w-
3. aa&,.3g ..ingla^,,S,W^fflaa: Pwa,Mil., *»» 1962, M>. March
eft. ,?• 30-31.
vill bo applied hero, but with those notiificr.tionst-
(a) tho debt vill be distributed into (i) Public setter,
(il) Private (ineludinc 
external) Sector*
The Public Sector, in turn, iaciudos
- Official holdings $
- iULlic bodies (public corporations
plus local au1fo©rit±Q9}»
Conversely, public bodies, in the Bank of England, are 
included within the ”Market Iloldinco”- In any case, this 
difference is not of greet iageataasoo * about l£*
(b) the Barite of &»glaad divide* the debt intos
(i) fisacketable (govorjinent plus 
gaaxwteed))
(ii) Treasury Bills}
(ill) Other debt.
The latter ite.-; includes hays and 1 loans Advances, ^umuities, 
Snail Savings, Treasury Deposit hecoipts, and Other Debt 
(i.e. issued under the national Loan Act 1939).^
(o) ’’Other Debt” in our exorcise, excludes Ways and Ueana Ad­
vances to bo included vdth trousury bills and the total 
composes ’ Pleating Debt”.
d. lastly, external debt la excluded froea the analysis until a later 
stage, since it is, by definition, in the hands of foreigners.
1. bee pp- 3$-36
(l) Kov, w begin to analyse the distribution of the national debt 
starting ^ith floating debt, which is in the iiand© oft-
(a) the Public ^cctqy. odaprioingt
(i) Official holdingi includes the holding of the Beak 
of Bnglsnd (both Issue end Banking Departments, 
unlaca dated) , the liwshangc y^ualization Account, 
the Kctioaal Debt Cora&ssioner© end certain 
government departments. The holding relates to 
31st Karsh in each year.
(it) i’uhlic bodiesi date oca their holding ore not avail­
able in many years; however to the published 
figures, they wear of little iegmtakoe,
(b) the Baticing System. which include© the holding of i
(i) clearing and Scottish banks: book values, on bank 
make-up date a in Kerch.
(li) overseas bank© in London (i.o. the British Oversees 
Banks, the American Bank© and the Other Ibreign 
Banka) and the Accepting House©. Figures for l$6l 
relate to 31st March, While those for 1956*40 
relate to the previous 31et Deostiber.
(Hi) Discount house*» srwrtnsl wines at 31st Heroh.
(o) Overseas Officials, including overseas governments, central 
banks and currency board©, internaiionel organizations and
certain other official bodies.
',' ■ jh* - '’5’.'A/. • , J 44s k ' ■.?' '' • ’ JjSjf ■'- •
1. This raises the estimate above tliat of the Anra^.-. .Abstract before 
1958 where the Issue Department only io included.
67
liguroa for the years 1951-57 £<& other institutions in the bsnkiog 
syatas (other then clearing and >oottlah benke and discount houses) are* 
sis r^entionod, occluded, and added within the residual item. To fill 
tide pip, data on theoo Institutions ore collected from the Bank of 
England for 31ot Beeashar in cech year (tlx only available figures) * 
Table 51. Then for each 31st Kerch, figure© of the previous 31st 
Beeaober are applied (i.e. with a gsp of three months and henoo a loss 
accurate result)>1 except for 1951 whoru data on 1950 are not available 
end hence the ac&e figures of 31at Besemher 1951 ore applied.
For the Mseirg year 1952 the available data are not completely 
perfooti-
(&) for fublic holding^ The Btmking >epartxswnt of the Bank 
of England is not included; also Public bodies are missing- 
The result ie, of course, a lower ootimtion for the holding
of the Public factor,
(b) for th. asaHau-SaaSsR’
- clearing banks 1 make-up dates in Kerch 1952.
* Scottish banks 1 average of csontlily figures, 
w other banking institutions (including discount
houses)* figures of 31ot JecerJber 1951 were 
taken.
(c) the balance Qi‘ the outstanding bills goes to the "Overseas 
Ciiiciale1’ ulus MOther holders11.
1. Thie wey of approximation io ciao applied by the Bank of England.
1962, io. 2> p. 108, on the share of overseas banks in London and 
accepting houses.
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nJhe remit of this statistical analysis la Tab loo $2-53 on the 
distribution of treasury bills. Adding to it other item, I.O- Ways 
and Means Advances and Troaauxy Woolts receipts, ve obtain Tdbloa 
$4-$6 with the total of floating debt. The conclusion is that the 
public oector increased its lioMing fro. 1361 L.bx. in 19$1 to 2337 Z».a« 
in 1%2, or from 33?> to $1. Against this increase, both the banking 
sector sad oversees officials reduced their holdings from 37 * to 23 ■ 
and feori 27* to 18, > respectively. Other holders increased their holding 
from 3»5 % to 9 • The significance of those raovenenta, during the 
195^’©? among the four sectors, will be cleer vhon ve discus© the iaEMr- 
tonce of the floating debt as a crucial clmont in deciding the liquid 
assets Of the clearing banks and hence the mount of advanced/*
U) the anno observe iions node in the case
of treasury bills apply here.
0>)
(i) Gaerlng end Scottish bonks, book value, make-ap 
dates in March (e&oqpi 31et March) •
(ii) Serthom Irish Bonks 1 31et March in each yeer. 
(ill) Overseas Banks in London and /coopting Lcmaeat
tiie figures for 1%1 relate to the 31ct March, 
while those for 1953-60 relate to the previous 
31st December.
1. See Jhaptor VIII.
(iv) Xft&comt hounest 31nt March in meh year.
(y) Other institutions In the banking systm for the
yeara 1951*575 in the ouce of trc^ui^
bille, the firruren applied (Table 5^) sre on 
the pKWioiw 31ct Dcccrhor, except for 1951 
where data on the 31st Boooi.iber of the asm 
year are applied for lack of information.
(b) Figures for the yoar© 1953*55 takon fron Morgan exclude, as
mentioned above, the guaranteed securities. To fill this
gap, the following stops were tokens
(i) Concerning the I-\-^lic Rector ’
- Official holding of marketable securities ware
replaced by official holding of /_xJV«mi©at and 
jovsxment guaranteed stocks, published In the 
Aga^ftl Abstract of ^tatjatiog, 1962, Table 298.
The holding^ of the Bankiiig Befpsrteasnt of the 
Bank of England, which is wtrnoun, is excluded 
from these figures $ thus th© estimate is & 
little low.
iinpof the public ocorporutions are replaced 
in the sow way.
« The other part of the public bodies (i.e. local 
authorities, Is not replaced because of Xaek of
information. ■SflM luces the oatinate
(or increases the '’rooiduui error’’ item).
(11) On the SSdWL3B©B.:
- Clearing banks 1 make*up date© in March for
totU. investments, i.e. gwerment securities
1 <
plus other invoatnentc. The result iayaowwhat
Mnisi <s
1, 3ee Table CM for the else of tills error
?0
higher ostiu&tion. Tills ai/Jit cancel tho 
effect of the lover osti^tion nentionod above.
• Jcottiah festttam cvereco of □oothly figure*.
- Other institutions: figuroo for tiie previous 
31st Decenber-
(ill) The balance of the mount outatcndiiv; at o&oh 31st 
MaSMb goes to ”Overseas Official©” and “Other 
Holders”.
(d) On the aiueinc year 1952, the following steps are taken;*
(i) official holding© are taken froci the Annual Abstract 
of statistics i960, Table 291* Added to this 
figure the holding of the Backing Department of 
the Bank of Shgland of 1951 from Aconorde Trunks, 
Decmbor 1961 (66 Lua.).
(ii) i uh lie holdings j
- public corporations froa the ^rmuel Abstract 
I960 Table 291.
- local authorities. figuroo of Economic Trends 
of 1951 (135 1-bu).
(ill) the Banking aystai frou Table jX»
(It) The rest is devoted to oversea© officials plus others.
(e) The result of tills investigation ia Table© 57-59* The 
xAxbllc Sector recorded & slight bhenge over the 1950*s. The 
Hanking Jyutss reduced its holding froa 2961 l.». In 1952, 
vixen on active ricnet&xy policy vas applied, to 2119 L.au in 
1962. She impact of noootaxy policy shows itself on the 
clearing bunks which reduced it© lidding from 1935 h«&n in
1952 to9U4 L.sw in 1962 * a cut by sacra than the half.
<■
however, “other holders*' hold the bulk of marketable seou- 
ritles, 5Z la 19$2.
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other Debt inoludeei
(a) T«mainabl© Annuities issued to tho hctional Debt Cocciia- 
eionara.
(b) Other under the national loan Act 1939» wiiioh 
consists of interest-froe notes cad debt to other
countries! both held by fcs^od^ncr©.
(o) aaall fringe s National .&vln&a Certificates* Defence 
Xionda end jrreraiisa having© bona©.
(d) ttne itoserve certificates*
ho detailed breakdown ic available for the last two i tenet hence they 
are included. in the residual iten. llowvor, sone qualification is 
needed for the years 1953-55 end to fill up the year 1952* These tolas 
the following otopss
(a) Tho Public Sector: holds the total of terminable 
annuities plus the nSMM&fft&U part of the funded debt 
(i.e. 13*6 I.eu to the Bank of PJsie;Xesssfil and of Xrolcmd}3
(b) The Banking Sector doee not hold “Other Debt”.
(c) Overseas Officials« hold intoruat-fiee notoc plus debt 
to other (^ornnentc.
(&) Other holders, hare the total amount of D&&11 Savings,
Tax Reserve Certificates and. life Annul tie©.
Mimi »*—**WMmn —■ >*.«=■•»«**—
1. See p. 12.
Figure 10:
Distribution of the National Debt (195I-62)
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The result is sheen in Tcbloo 6o-6l? Public holding declines 
fraa 2ft* in 1951 to 13, - in 1^62. Tho Banking syatoui does not hold 
snxcli kind© of debt. Oversees Officials record & slight reduction 
Lastly Other holders have the noin hulk of that debt * an increased 
shore fron in 1951 to 68/ in 1962.
Considering the total mtioiiul debt, ve have Tables 62-5, whore 
the holding each *£ the vxdnoipal sectors is presented. And £ra& 
Table© 66-7 and Mg. 10 we conclude thnts-
(a) the holding of the Public doctor fluctuates around a quarter 
of tho total debtj
(b) tho Lankin,; sector is declining us & holder of the debt fran
IftS in 1951 to lh> i» 1962?
(c) Overseas Officials (including now external debt as well)
reduced thoir holding iron 201/ to 16 ;
(d) finally, the bulk of tlw national debt is in the hands of
“Other holders0 who^e share increased fron 40ft in 19 J1 to bft 
in 1962.1
The significance of this distribution of the national debt is that, 
beside the above-nentioned points, tho greeter part of the debt is inter* 
nelly held. Uoreover. nonetaxy policy has led, as will be seen, to aa 
increase in Interest payments. ’>aoh poyuanta are distributed, aooording 
to the holdings, anong tho rectors of the oeancoy end to foraig&ere.
Such distribution of interest payments is & neons of distribution of
inocsae. This point, however, vill be fully Wf*™***4**1 in Chapter aIV.
X. "Otter hold«r.'«r» guftpoMd tote the total of to. private s.otort 
howror there to hero rn astexml aXouont • i.a. too ovoauoaB ..x-i,;.— 
boXton - about toon tooro to no avuilobto iaforoatlon.
/
SEWICS OF THU ilATIUUI# DEBT
3eetion A
The service of the national debt mounted, during the fintuicial 
year 1961*62, to 1076 L.a. It io hardly enough to disuise this axcmal 
ch&xgs fro© the diaousuion of debt management. However, each tartsn 
will be handled in thio chapter wu follows; first the composition of 
the service, then its economic si^nifiou'uio*
Starting with the first point, debt service in distributed intox-
(1) Interest payments.
(2) iJa&ftgene&t and espensec.
(3) linking fund.
Those items are illustrated in Table 68 from which ve realise that the 
bulk of the ooot Is devoted to meeting luiarest charges, 93 of the 
total in 1%2.
-' • -'* * *2 '■■•’. ., • , .. . x. 3 '’fc .’•*•’ ■ .-
(1) Interest Fee?to are composed of there elements (Table 69} •)
(a) Interest above the lino.
(b) Interest below the lino.
(a) internet above the Ifee* i.e. that exeunt of money widLch the
HSsccshequcr pays Ott the moneys borrowed for its own neodc • to 
finance itself.1 Although this It®1 has increased over the 
1950*8, it has considerably declined fie a percentage of the 
total 'Interest charges - from 95C in 19J0 to 6fy in 1962.
1. See Chapter ±IX.
Obviously, the reason Ilea behind. the onor&ous growth
of the other itoa.
(fc) interest Balov tho littft. the regularly fcosxowe,
not for Ito ovm. purposes this tin©, hut to lend to others, 
e.g. to tlxj local auUioritioa, and to the nationalised induo- 
triec (the Kational Coal Board io the biggest borrower).*
Thee© bodies pay the hxohocxucr interest on their loons, sad 
the -Exchequer. in turn, pays cn equivalent mount of interest 
on the outstanding debt. This portion of interest charros 
has greafcly increased as a result of the see tensive growth of 
foremkiont loans. It ixioroasod fro~ 5 in 1950 to over J0$4 
in 1962.
(2) Haawgenent am
This is rather a modest itaa, 3 of the total service in 1962. It 
ic aervotec to the r^anagment and. expense# of the debt - largely to 
covering the expenses, 24 Urn. out of 34 J^.a. in 1962♦
K&tloci&l debt is managed by these bodies (Table 70) t
(a) The Bank of England.
(b) The Bank of Ireland at .Dublin and Belfast.
(©) The Bost Office.
(a) Apart from the Small Savings securities which *ire managed 
by the Bost Office and a s*.«ull unount of seourities regis­
tered in the books of tho Bank of Ireland at Dublin and
1. oee Chapter XVI.
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Belfast, the ^iole of the national debt i® managed for tho 
Treasury by tho Bank of jfrghand** Bba Bank, in its opera­
tions to manage the debt, issues prospectuses, receives 
wubccriptioRfi, makes allotments, keep© the registers of 
holdings, executes transfers, pays interest, redeems 
securities and carries out conversions* Mainst these 
operations the Bank receives fron t2io Treasury the following
amountst
(i) it ie repaid the out-of-pocket expenses (e.g.
fbr printing) in connection vdth issues, con­
versions and redemptions*
(il) in addition, It ia paid a fee for its other
kianagecient sorvicee in accordance with thia 
scale*
- for securities other than troi-suxy bills end 
Victory Bonds, the Bank receives £>25 per 
Billion on the first 750 L.m. of the debt,
€150 per million on the next 5250 L.m* and 
£JC per million on tho rent - all of which 
eureunts to just under V- L.u. a year.
- for laanaging treasury bills Bank receives 
a fixed sum of £17000 a year*
- for Victory Bonds, £50 or C1OC per laiUlcn are
received according to whether the Bonds are 
2registered or unregistered.
!♦ See Brittain, op>. olt** p. 107-
2* £50 for registered Bonds and £100 for unregistered} see Ijosnoial
1957-50 p. 31K’r’t
(b) The Bank of Ireland receives gJGO per million on the 
totals. Uustly
(©) the Poet ufflca, while uana^pln^ i«aticnel Bsvintjs Certi­
ficates, defease bonus, rroaim uavinge Ponds, the 
Govemaent Annuities and uorkotcblo securities, receives 
only repayment, fruu the Treasury, fbr its out-of-pocket 
expenses on the issue, conversion and redemption of the 
government stocks. Thu coot of managing Is included with 
its other/, coots of the Staring? Lepartaent* (This system 
has changed as £rc< 1961/62).
It should, however, be mentioned that expenses of the debt include,
besideo the rbove-nentioned items?-
(i) the prize money on Pronina Saviugn Bonds:
(ii) any cash payments which aay be n&do in connection with 
conversion of t;oven^uont securities.
Ct -... r
Thi i last iteu, while still a emll one, is somewhat lazier than 
’’management and Sfcpensee” (Table 66). & small part of sinking funds
(Table 71) represents the element of principal in Life Annuitiess the 
annual payment of these annuities reduces the govsruasat capital 
liabilities in respect of the ennui ties as a whole and there reduces 
equally the total of the national debt.
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The rest of the item ‘’Sinking £unds” represents the cost of the 
'lepooifion einkin, funds attached to faux particular goveraasat stocks.
TbiiBe four stocks concerned and the adnkiiv funds attached to than are 
(Table ?1)»*
A2& ,.ftg- a&<&» issued in 1221 end added to
Binoo. The Loon i© reduced in the following voy» for i*ny half-year 
In tfcieh the average aaxfcet price of the 1 oan ia below ninety, a sum 
not lose than X» of the mount of the loon outstanding at the end of 
the half-year will be employed during the succeeding half-year to 
purchu^o the Ioan in the rarket for oanoellation. Hie Jinking Fund 
operated continuously from 1922 to 1232 end from 1952 to date.
- X funding loan 1959-69 - issued in 193^ and added to since. Hero, a 
sum equal to 2$ of the issue is set aside each half-year. After 
meeting tiie interest on the Loan, the balcnoe is applied in the suc­
ceeding liolf-yoor to the purchase of the loan for cancellation if its 
price is at or umar par. In fact, whenever the price has been above 
par it has been applied in purchases.
• Ab yundlgr Loon 19§C*<g>* iastxxi in Juno 1919 cjid not added to since. 
A sum equal to of the original issue ie set aside each half-year.
After meeting tbs interest on the Icon, the bolt«noo ie applied in
the came way o& in the ca^o of the funding Loan.
* '- Victory bends? also issued in June 1212 and not added to since. A
sun eqtul to 2£b of the original Issue is not aside each half-year. 
After meeting the interest on the bonds, the balance ia applied to the 
redemption of the bonds at pur by iteans of annual drawings.
Interest Payments in Relation 1 to National Debt, 
Government Expenditures and National Income j (1950-62)
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show analysis was cuncorsiod with tho question of tho ooripositicn 
of the service. how the discussion will ho concentrated on tho aignifi*- 
osnoe of tins hipest Item of such charges * i.e. on Interest payments - 
and Ito relationship with soue interestin'; variables. The discussion io 
here a general one, and will go deeper on. nest of these variebloc in lctar 
perto.
During the financial year 1061/62, interest payment* on the national 
debt amounted to i^ore than loot L.a. Those payments have enormously 
increased during a relatively abort period. On the other bond, the capital 
mount of tho debt has recorded a clew rise over the 195Q*e. Table 72 and
11 show that the index nunber of interest charges is 201 in 1962 
(195^ • 100) while that of the debt io only 111, This neons that interest 
poyuents as a ratio of debt have continuously increased from in 1950 
to 3.5 in 1962.
To illustrate thu reason behind thie fact, it becomes neeeocory to 
show the noveoent in the <x>»%xxwnts of tho interact payments among tho 
categorioa of the debt.
(a) Tho aliarp increase in the as recorded in 1951/52 was
mainly because interest on the V.S. end Ctwdian govensment loan began to 
be paid. The continuous increase in the following years was almost en­
tirely attributed to tlua monetary policy *&4ch started in Hovedber 1951 
(Tables 73-4).
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(b) The restrictive none-fciry policy succeeded in almost doubling the 
annual interest charges over tiw 193- ^h® topaot of this new policy
ie illustrated in tlie rise of interest payments or* the floating debt.
Prior to 1931 • bank ruts (to which* no will be explained* treasury bill 
rate ia closely geared) was unchanged* at 25 , for almost twenty years 
apart from & few months at the beginning of the war. Blnce 1931 it was 
frequently increased* reselling ftS twice - end 3 dn 31st Harsh 1962.
Shia movemnt had* of course, its impact on government expenditure through 
thia pert of the debt. Payment© on treasury bills increased from 22 Uau 
in 1930 to 200 L.xa. in 1962 - i.e« multiplied nine times. Moreover its 
relative iayortanco increased from less than 6/> in 1950 to mere than 2t> 
in 1962 (Table 73 and Pig. 12). Thia increase Is recorded in spite of 
the termination of the T.h.H. ‘a.
(o) By contrast* the amount of interest peid on marketable securities* 
which constitute the bulk of tho total, increased over the 195^*© by 
nearly one half. Proportionately, they declined from 73/> to 39, u Ki#i 
interest rates meant that new issues of gevemamt stock (since the 
goverimnt had to pay the market price for her borrowing) had to bear, 
from 1931 onwards, very such higher ratso of interest* Hence, funding 
end conversion operations* which followed from the monetary policy, 
resulted in newly-issued seauritie& of short-term maturity and therefore 
oerryirk relatively low rates of intercut. In other words, tlie government 
made these issues for as short a period oe possible, a policy which io 
reflected in a change in the composition of the marketable securities
since 1951-

(<) Also, nr;r icnts on other debt, including small savinga, T.B.C. and 
terninnble waul ties, ahov a Steady increase although. declining as a 
percentage of the total (firom 21 to 16;(), However, the eostto the Ba~ 
choquer of this part of the debt varies with the prevailing level of 
intoraat rates although the rates offered are not -eared ao directly to 
the Bank Hate, end{except for T.R.C.) are changed only at cooperatively 
long intervals.
(•) finally, payments on external debt increased drastically since 1951 
due uainly to the beginning of annual payments of 39 of tho American 
and Canadian government loans.
Disoiwialn' interest payments from another point of view, auoh payments
cuxnxnt to a considerable portion cf government expenditure - no leas than
W over the 1956*8 (Table ?6 and rig. 11). However, the stability of
tills proportion ax^loinB the fact that gervernsaeat activity increased
greatly. In other words, both factors grow at more or less the scsao pose.
These interest charges burden, the economy since they are one of tho twin
factors behind the present hl^h level of taxation. Table 77 Shove tlmt
sudh disbursoiiunts are equivalent to more tlian of tho total yield ffcoa
ineoae tax sad surtax. Or put another way* os a result of government
u^pon&ituro on the debt charges, the level of taxation is higher than it 
1
would here been if the debt burden did not exist.
1. jteri; *^ows income tox could be reduoed to the
level of js.3d. If debt burden did not «xist| oee’The liationol PSb**,
May 1962, 26*31-
e$
Bovever, iobt burden as & ratio of the national income has con­
siderably oscillated over the past half-outlay,1 The burden was indeed 
very small imediatoly before the ittrst arid War « less than one par oeaat 
of the national inooaa. By the end of tiio w, end aa a result of wcsrtiBS 
borrowing, it stood at a very MBfth hi$ior rate • la 1938, the
burden was reduced to b.fy booauce of the cheep noney policy of the 1930’s, 
the 1932 conversion of 2000 L.n. war loan from 5 to 3fe, sad, to seas 
extant, the rise in the national incaae. Then the vast borrowing of the 
tfeoond World War raised the burden to 6.2>. of the national income.
However, cheap money policy end the repidly* rising national incorae (ia 
money terms) slowly reduced this ratio to 4.6 > ia 1951* Suah decline was 
checked during the 1950’s because of the adoption of a restrictive 
uoastery policy (Teblee 78-9 cad XI).
Before leaving this discussion ono point needs to bo mentioned. 
Interest payments were regarded es a burden on the econaiy, beering a con­
siderable pert of the reaponslbiliV for the high level of taxation. £roa 
another point of view, since the major pert of the debt ie owned internally, 
peyumtb are in effect, merely transfers from one pocket to another.
However, the actual cost, to t}i« country co a wi^le, of the outstanding 
debt cornea from that -portion owned by the external holders* i.e. & pert 
of the floating debt, ^arkvtublo scicuritics and the total of external debt. 
These points will, however, be statistically examined in Chapter XIY.
X. Sec B. Bovin, The Probit. of 
these figures.
Table IY, p. 36, for
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| £©l£i«a 7.8 9.3
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1.7^
Danmark 3.1 4.6 fc.l
SCXPt , io V2) 2.3
1,9^
Finland 3-5 «•< 1.8
I^runae 14.4 M 5-7
Oozmcjr
1
1.0 141
India 34.7^' 10.2 8.2
Ireland mW 4.3
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Japan 7.6 3.5 3.7
Hetherlaad 13.4 8.3 7.0
liorway — 3.8 5.5
Portugal 10.2 5.8 4.6
Spain JiSSfe 4 15-5 9.3
Sweden 5.7 3.5 4.7
Svltserlnza 9-5 13.6 1 8.4-> 1
Turkey 12>3 T#1
United Kingdom 19.7 U-0 10.9
United States 10.6 9.4 12.0
(1) 1933. 1939
(3)
1957-
<M(2) 1958.
In 6. few countries tire figures refoa- to total debt oenrtoa.
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~~ir~
ftittSRMl
liiooso
(1>,(2) (l)?X3)
L -- ---
1&38 26.2 87.4 116/
M ______
30 2.3
1309 i 26.2 87.1 1246 30
18% 25.3 i 91.3 1383 28 1.9
1891 £5.2 94.7 1 1395 27 1.8
1892 25.2 ?7.5 1336 26 1.8 |
1093 25*2
2J.2
25.0
97.6 ! 1361 26 1.9
1094 93.5 13> 26 1.9
1895 100.9 1377 25 1.8
1896 1 25.0 105.1 3A4£ 24 i 1.7
1897 25.0 109.7 14?) 23 1.7
1898 25.0 112.3 1519 22 1.6
1099 25.0 117.7 1601 21 1.6
Sfoo 23.2 143.7 I672 16 !.<►
1901 19.8 193.3 1755 10 1.1
3J0E 21.7 205.2 1724 11 1.3
1903 27-3 194.3 1738 ! 14 ; 1.6
l$04 * 27.0 156.8 1714 17■ 1.6
1905 27.0 151.3 1742 1 18 15
1906 ».o 150.4 I- 1818 19 1.5
190? 25.5 149.6 1939 17 1.3
1908 • 29.5 151.8 2035 19 ; 1.4
1909 28.0 152.3 1926 181 15
1910 21.8 157.9 1973 i 14 1.1
12U 24.6 172.0 2063 14 1.2
1912 2^.5 178.5 21k,. 14 1.1
1913 24.5 108.6 | 2268 13 1.1
_______________ _
ease; 35
Mjwrt Varid V«p ikwcwl Waarld Va»
orcnuo Loeaw Tv?AL
i&pand.
Kavonao T^awn ’-’OTAL
Expend.
1914 ij 1939
194c
; 66 34 200
1915 to ; co 100 : 38 62 100
w 22 78 100 { .• ■ 1941 : to 60 100
1917 96 i 74 100 j 1942 to 54 200
1910 26 IOC 15*3 5C 58 100
1919 yt 66 100 1944 54 to 100
i 1945 ! 55 45 100
/vaXB£e 30 70 ; •100 : Avosseo Si' 58 100
— J
l^rat Vex Second War
2. 1914 650 2. 2939 7131
2. 1919 7435 2. 1949 21366
(2) uo b •’ of (1) 1144 U> a fJ of (1) 300
*
Jogrop* D.I. Hawaii, "Public 7irmc^’t 1953, p. 204.
TA3XS 36
(at 33 .Kgpfc o£ .Qeav ^ywscj
1 Funded Terral* !
nehle
Annul-
ties
Unfun-
ded
UJ M III
floating 3ebt TOTAL
L
VJtU. T© Bills 2HB.
......... i
i»3 -- 10 ■w
10 !
* 656
1914 586.7! 29.6 20.5' 13.0 ee 13 «. 649.8
I !
1915 583.3 28.0 416.5 77.2 w 77.2 1105.0
1916 318.5 26.2 1201.7 586.7 19.9 566.8 «e 2133.1
191? 317.8 24.1 2988.3 681.2 217.5 463.7 * 1 *011.4
1918, 317.7 21.9 4366*6 1165.7 192.3 973.* «• 5871.9
1919 317.6 20.7 5684.4 1412.2 455.0 957.2 • 7*34.9
1920' 315.C- 19.3. 6230.9 1263.6 204.9 1058.7 «* 7628.8j
1921. 314.8 17.7 5998.6 1243«2 15*.5 1068.? 7574.3 j
' 1922I ' 580.6 16.2 J 6033.0 1024,5 147.3 877*2 4. 765*.3
1923 997.8 13.7 5920.8 809.9 193.9 616.0 * 77*2.2
192* 980.3i 13-5 . 5872.* 77*.9 186.2 548.3 4. 76*1.11
1925 | 1082.7 13.1 5819-9 7*2.2 166.6 575.6 ee 7597.9
19261 1073.5 12.6 5768.2 704.3 139.4 564.9 7558.6 j
19271 1219.8 [ 12.2 . 6606.8 715.8 U6.6 529*2 7554.61
19281 1350.0 12.5 5*76.5 683.8 161.9 526.9 7627-8
1929 1*78.3 12.5 5272.1 737.* 37-1 700.3 - 7500.3
1930 1*56.0 12.1 5363.5 637.4 *6.5 588.9 • 7*69.0
1931
1932
1*25.0 12.0 5382.0 594-3 24*5 569.8 - 7W3.3 j
1*67.1 U.7• 53*3.1 612.© 7.5 604.5
! • 7*33.9
1933 3376.3 U.9 3**5.1 1 814.5 34.6 775.9 4» 76*3.8
193*! 3374.3 12.1 3591.2 8*4.? *4.9 799.8 «•
[ 7822.3 J
19$
3368.1 12.1 2550.3 833.4 3*.l 799.3 «»
MM
6763.9
1936| 3366.5 12.1 2598.5 782.2 19.1 763.1 6759 3j
1937I1
3364.9 12.1 2689.6
I
698.1 23.5 674.6 • 6764.7!
1
Tuadod *GIVlX~
uubXe
.usxtxi.
tie©
i VnfUn-
,1aJ|
1 ISfttt&tag X>sbt r?<Z2*L
WM^
■' w.»u< Oills T.D.a.
1938 3364.8 12.5 2774.3 841.8 13.1 828.7 • 6993.6
1939 3364.6 13.6 3032.3 920.3 27.9 8<?2.l> w 7X30.8
1940 3364,4 V>,6 3031.0 1459-2 61.3 1487.7 7899.2
w 3364.4 17.4 4171.1 2813.5 172.3 2211.7 489.3 1OJ66.41|
<*» ,/*■<*» 3364.3 14J4 6330.2 3312.2 : 135.1 2620.6 i®6.} 13041.1
1943 3364.2 14.2 8347.3 4096.9 309.0 2838.9 969.0 15382.6
1944 ! 3364.2; 13.8 10231.0 4533.2 394.5 3149.2 1369.5 13562.2
W 3364.1 13.6 11372.0 6116.2 376.5 3680.7 1399.0 21365.9
w 3422.3 13.6 13713.5 6427.1 54.7 4423.4 1539.0 23636.5
1947 3903.4' 13.3 14759.3 6954.7 613.5 4864.7 1456.5 25630.7
w 3902.0 1 13-0 19078.8 6548.0 340.8 4910.2 1291.0 25620.8
1949 3900.3] 1£«S 15336-6 5097.4 343.5 4413.4 1135.5 25167.6
19J0 " .■
j
25002.8
1951 ’*•1 25921.6
1952 ;! ! 25890.5
1953 > 26051.2
1954 • 1 . ' ' 26533.0;
193$ 26933.7
1936 ■ 27038.9
1937 i' 2?907
195S 27232
1939 27376
I960 ■ -j 27733
1961 28252
1962 23674
(1)x * oKolifct&x; teudcsrad fox* &oct£; duties end }rald by the
Xf.L.C. eosoafpt £rau 193A-19.
(2)v ' Figaros ftea 1935 exclude oEtaKiai dobt arising' ffcon the 
3 lT3t 1 OT?d W.
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i
Fun&ea ' Taml- Uhftxn* lloeWv;
liable 
Annul* ' 
tioa
Ood
flooaj
»»•«» -w *-••*!*^^**«*-
V.w.A.. ¥«M1
1213 «• — *• —*
m!
1 1.5
1914 90.3 M 3.1 - 2.C
1915 ' 52.6 2.5 j 37.7
T»oj
• 7-0
1916 !! 14.2 1.3 : 56.3 27.5| 0.9 | 26.6
1917 7.9 0.6 j 74.5
17.0!
I 5.4 11.6
1918
5.4 !
0.4 74.3 19.3: 3.3 16.6
1919 4.3 ! 0*3 76.4 19.0 j 6.1 *lr» 0
1920 i 4.0 j 0.3 79.6 16.1 j 2*6 13.5
1921 4.2 ' 0.2 97.2 X£>.‘r 2.0 IO
1922 7.6 C.2 78.8 12.4 ■ 1.9 11.5
1923 12.9 0.2 76.4 10.5 •**5 o.c
1924 12.8 0>2 76.9 10a 2Ji 7.7
1923 13.5 0.2 76.5 9*6 2,2 7.6
1926 14.2 0.2 76.3 9.3 1.8 7.5
1927 16.1 0.2 74.2 I 9.5 M 7.9
V«8 17.9 0.2 72-7 9^ 7-C
1929 19-7 0.2 70.3 0.5 j 9.3
1930 19.5 0.2 71>8 a.5 0.6
1931 19.2 0.2 72.6 8.0 0.3 7-7
1932 19.7 0.2 71.9 3.2 I 0.1 ‘ 8-1
1933 || 44.2 0.2 M*o 10.6 0.4 10a
1934 43.1 45.9 XQ*8 oa 10a
1935 49-0 0.2
r 37.7
12.3 0.5 u.e
1936 45-3 0.2 38.4 11.6 0-3 11*3
1937 49.7 j 0*2 39.3 10.3 0.3 10 X
1938 46.1 0.2 39-7 12.0 0.2 11.3
! -
I
302/&
3**
m
gm
m
m
m
m
sm
m
SWHS 7t (oon'vlnued)
>Vmded
xwtiMb
*4UWi*
Uoo
Vafto-
ded
Debt 7otel
1 I
otel wj;^. 
L Hill ,|
2.UU0 tu>Jk
J
1939 47.2 i 0.2 - 39.7 12.9 0.4 12.5
i 100
w- ia.6 0.2 36.3 18.9 0.S 16.1 * 100I
W ; 32.5 0.1 40.3 27.1 1.7 21-3 4.1 100
W i 25.8 0.1 46.7 *^5*4 1.5 80.1 i 3.3 100
w 21.3
1 _ _
0.1 58.7 25.9 1.8 17.9 6.8 ! IOC
1944 18.1 0.1 55.2 26.0 2.1 17.0 7.5 lj 100
1945 15.? 0.1 55-6 28«4 2.7 17.2 ! 0.7 j 100
w .14.5 0.1 58.0 27.4 8*1 18.7 6.6 j 100
15*7 1 15<2 0.1 57.4 27.1 3t. 19.0 5.7 1 100
1946 ji 15.2 0.1• W2 ; 25.5 1.3 12.2 5.0 100
1949L..«...« 15.5 0.1L
41.0 23.4 1.4 17.5 M 100
38
—— .....
National
Debt
1"..... .. '"1
Suiloaal
1913 656 2268 29
191* 650 2368 27
1915 1105 2266 *9 j
1916, 2133 2591 82
1917 *011 306** 131
1918 i 5872 3631* 162
1919 i| 7*35 *372* 170
1920 ! 7829 5*61* 1*3 i
:i *921 i 757* 566* 13* i
1922 765* **60 172 |
1923 77*2 3656 201
! 192* 76*1 3844 199 j
i!l92i 7598 . 3919 19*
1926 7559 3980 190 i
1927 7555 391* 193
1928 7528 • *1*5 182
1929 7500 *15* 181 j
1930 i 7*69 *178 179
r r
National
Debt
——•—
National
Xncocse
-------- J
V* ;
1931 7*13 3957
""1
187 j
1932 ' 7*3* 3666 1 203 J
1933 76** 39tt
193* 7822 3728 210 i
1935 j 6?6* 3881 17*
1936 !• 6759 *109 16* j
1937 i 6765 *368 15* 1
1938 699* *616 192
1939 7131 *671 153
w 7899 5037 157
19*1 10366 5900 173 1
W 13041 69*1 188
19*3 15823 j 766* 206
1944 18562 3171 227 |
19*5 21366 8366 255 [
19*6 23637 83*0 283
Net national inooao at factor coat, excluding Southern Ireland 
after 1919*
at 31 2>eoaabor of the year before*
* very approximate.
TASK 39
L---------.------ --------- ... _______□
1i
Axis trie, 35-6
Belglwi 29.* 1
lenmaik 21.2
Pranoe 26.7
G**iaaj$' KMk
Italy 27.5
Netherlands 24.8
Norway 12.8
fwden 28.5
Switzerland 8.3 |
United Xin^&m 38.4
Japan 16.3
U.SeA. 18.5
Calendar yearn.
bourem £. Kerin, "Public Edbt end iconoraic Deeelojmont", 
Tabla Ill, p. 3.
TAEli 40
in /Elation tc the ffatiopal Income
(»)
(»)
years aaded 31st Haroh«
gross doaestic product at factor cost at 31 laosaber each year.
.- kre^
mu; w
jStShagw; Total apwidlture _pcd. the .’ -tiocal Incoge
la^js.t^a rsr.yr&e
' .;c figures of cross donastic product arc adjusted to * financial-year basis by reducing tfce 
total for each calendar year by a quarter sad adding a quarter of the total for” the follw.ir<e 
calendar year. 2bie aethod of adjustesst is inapired free S. Kerin, “The J Tot lea of the 
national Debt", p. 36, Tfole XT.
TABI3 42
(
■
L.a.
195°
’ ........ ’
J2j 1952 1953
,..,iaiWW,q
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 ■1961: 19^2 'i
j 1. Ej^>G;idituro 4165 4053 4953 5261 P SLOG 5256 5524 6349 6707 6926 7222 7795 2048
9 National
*' Income 10943 11370 12534 13703 14716 1558C 16636 16142 19141 19968 2O&66
<«*x* am*;
>.6
..1,
22243
a*M«3ss
23764
~^S.xec«ps«B
33.9(1.) as £ ot (2,) 33.1 35.6
_______
39.4 36.4 34.7 33.6 33.1 35.0 35.0 34.7
■ Expenditure on >1 March of each year Is related to national Incom on 31 iJoooriber of the year 
before* Thia way of adjustment ie inspired fro: the Bank of England Quarterly Mie tin, 1362, 
3o. 2, p. 103.
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lf.
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.SA^aBfei
l.i.(a) 4Si23K <2» l^nc
51#
4C6S
290
5343
<020
540^ 3630 5934
1=3 fcsasJxiMiMaE- we<i»-“.es •.-?x i*u» ■"»-«»
423
6645
5103 i52U 5?3? ;623J
®*a -■ i sau.M*«s*a*3B :«x- aWWas® »i_- jassawc:»
377 j 386 ■ 14? 410
0») Sgife; tfeejJsa
555 1 316 396 092 'K>57 1152
4l III-. Mil IMIIW II ■» wj> li «■■
53? | 7-l> I 760 IU76
•4
1451 1455 £592 il59G ;1313
NM
(<•) JkttLMMfc
549 1 721 300
486
!♦ 63
——-
es
473 52? ; 52«
& 1 433 j 357 j 29c j 423 [ 377 ! 386 I 147 410
— ■»—’>■ MW. . ||— 1 11 —
391 301 I 538n: ^aaawrnnawi
*
621 635 559 700 541 621
, asxf S -T8*-"-Tt08 * {***»"»»'grt-t ' -£r'4BPHXMF
<■243 4 149 4 436 | 297 - 68 j 141 4 331 * 212 - 132 31* • 394 -4 211
4
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Soitrcer of Wnmette tfc» Lcftelt

-*carlttes
qylyL ?I frcdC
If I • I3V52 i 52/53 5V5^ 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/53 53/59 59/60 60/61 61/62 £
m|r^>ni.. iim iwii'.w—■ l^-SMS^cogrgxt^» M MMMMMW
I&raes
r^do^>Uea
1003 413 W) 299 ' 5^ Mt I 892
...«*f' ■ MB 353 1070 5461------------
Set
•2? ;-233 -132 m2?0 .w!3fc ^202 -941 j UMfr -377 .' F -627 -442
-  ----------------------------------------1—— i■••■'■---> /—l ,. .. j.___________ _______________..__________
less lacreas.a in 
public ftol&ia&s *
^3«S^:iix3Sus;
Set Keceipte
4
976 I 12$
——- ’H...... . ■■■
306 4X5 : 24c » *49 -404 -24 H03G i -627 , 2019
i
"275 - -159 i-132 -499 »45 «4l 333 -495 -733 i 595 -1471
^0 xz 9 3—1*5 - sc csesj •*-——«<^e "THt -•*?IT''., -~Sfe»w 93MMWBMB
703 | 15s j 149 -153 ! •34 J 195 : -90 -71 -519 ^a < •3S 546
’—7"
* ({tecroasG +)♦
9661£ 86616 620K GQQOfw/A'* 92606 20606 16606 26862 12662 69682 66662 62282 WfiOJt<- J.
2826 9826 0626 2626 9626 6626 2626 8162 86/2 9UZ 2062 6062
—. , . ;'7i. ggg--->------------- -zx
pe«iuuwns • £
2261 6£6l 6902 19K 69 tZ 6902 Sioe 0612 6112 6912 8912 2612 t«M»W-9
9666 ans 00^5 6io6 K69 96»« 6889 (669 66(6 9626 U£6 <*«R0 • 6
69261 6S86l Wt U89l 9ee6i 96651 266-91 99691 01691 81661 (Oil 80/21 •W«MW • Z
1666 9669 ms 606 6969 2Z.99 6806 1986 6189 9lL9 1199 09tS »«RWU-i
2961 V96l 0961 6661
1
8661 £S6l 9661 SS6l 9661 6661 2661 l66l
qom or qeuRn Ml6)
wutjkooc poo^TOBin*) P°e W»a T®uoW’K
(OS) »WI
•«wnn0 * pwt8»K w»8 «tt
•„s*EMRisMir{ m<nu OO am nroo^e pn^muariW pm imranttukog oo ma«M (t)
■we not 06 fSf tfz 9tf £26 259 919 909 iOL 929 c©«ucni
89 39 69 £9 &! 91 9t ft 6 I L twwnoff §®udaoor
01 u ft 01 6 II 9 f 01 5 z z nSpwRM aaqto
L 0 ft 9t 01 II 1 f 9 « - 4» mmawwMMr
Hz fee t$e tse 6fe 65 56 a. 99 9e
95 16 99 99 56 55 1 - - a» e - (l) *9«»S 9»wr MMOJi
9661 5661 9661 f56t 2561 lC6t 956t 656 V 9561 £661 2561 I56t
wjo°»S p*nauM>9 pm iwimunonj •TTO ^nwwj^
„ (96 - t66l)
m£ qom «9 —9»o«g •»<
8wpja®S «tt OT «»TPOfl jmno jo al9cnpT°H
(tf) «m
liable (52)
MeteUxrttaa of tte TsMMjr Mils 
(}1«t Kmh in eaab jwr)
»«hl*(52)
( Continued)
1591 1592 1»3
L--- ----- .. 19% 1559 1594 1557 1558 15» 1540 1541 1942
1 • Zuunutt Ob'* «to.
--------- 9
-
L--L --1 -J u - -
1 - >rt1 fling Societies — — — — -• -• 5 13 14 15 15
J-Sattap tawto
4-Co^ptaakB aft
5 • XafcwVd Ooh. Cto’a. — -- 7 < 10 «-Wt --
4 - FakUo Tmftw eta. — -• — — ■» -• _W e- SB 4 6 33 21
7 • trlenflljr Societies _w
0 • Local Authority fnnfls
9 - OttMTfMto 1 z ( 1
10 • v—let—It trot -• 927/
484 )
723 \ 1 t
11 - «U« trurt
12 - Ottawa ♦ mlMI
..—
200 *7 243 3W 02 574 432 610 494
nr wr 290 30 at 574 432 540 905 772 492 02
WOL (e«fc«<M&) 9010 kzn M04 M91 032 4788 4195 4971 058 9202
-
..—. . ■ . .«.,.■ — <■ ■■
00 9331
rau (53)
xctarlbjitlcR oT tbo Tnotus^y 
(Jlri March la oaoh year)
19* 1952 1353 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961
I
1962
a - PiAUa 8«rtor 14* ITO 1552 1381 1743 1766 1547 16* 2094 1935 1673 2576
b • Other Serior 3576 25*4 du24x***£>*► JI10 3189 3022 2646 2937 200b 3267 2975 TIT,*
1 • Baek&eg Syrian 1*5 1677 1678 1520 1526 1*1 1635 1419 1500 1275 1275
2 - Oiwmm cmolala 1542 97J-T 327* 108^ 1027* 920 905 762 880 995 1048 988
3- Ottawa too 247 250 *6 642 576 430 540 505 772 652 492
TOTAL 5010 4273 IMMK 4*91 4932 4788 4195 4571 4898 5202 4658 53*
a Radoiiffa Report Table 35.
8666 666*— FTWL--------- «« MB* 1 M99 6806
MV_ M3 «U S06 .-.i 0*6 MW 9t6
M 9*06 666 , 086 „ m 606 086
StZi ftzi OQCt <m 6696 MCI «6
OXI Sizi 0061 cm 6691 MCI 9866
«tZ sue MM *oee 1668 09M ZZJOC
*.. -- . .
not UM -- M68 MS? Z30C
l£9S 0066 ie» 56*3 ’ 6t<6 *886 6908
VB L<X 9M 6< UZ UZ 668
9L& 6196 6666 TOUC <91 j 1*66 99L6-.
3361 I36v 0561 6566 8666
LU----------------- ■—
1566
...........
3566
(J»0*WO
Viacom*’
oot «W* tiO nft rttf (« * ») TOM
*5 »* Oft 1ft oce MWf
fiM* 06 Z16 wst «MH«nuuo-|
«e<t at»» LOl fiftl etiz TO»i
* • w - ft» lift** -"a”?* *
Gt6i at»», 1191 Sftl ftei •me-*
sets OK ^6K ftft O98C (Cftft) w»*
• * * • ftxr* *m>w (*
*« K ft8e ftft 9tX ■TOT-J M
fell fiftt 008 Mt» W*Z
e* vet M ecc 1ft •V*K*X< s** « OTIW '
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e=r- r——
Kt &Sl toll ftft «mw I
S56l 1S6i s&i zSfl v£6l I
m qaaqg »■(£) 
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Table (55)
ClntrlbattsD of the Floating Debt
(M«t Uarob each yr}
1951
1
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1998 1959 1960 1961 1962
1 • Public Sector 1091 2047
___
1259 1709 2098 2061 1824 1911 2435 2181 I960 2BJ7
« • rXl¥«w OOCXOx 
(Total) 3U6O 2544 2854 JHO 3109 2648 2937 2004 3267 2975 2755
a) taktag Syatau 2110 1345 1677 1678 1520 1526 1311 1635 1419 1500 1275 1275
*> SSai 1542 972 927 1086 1027 920 905 762 880 995 iota 988
«) Others 200 247 250 *6 642 576 432 540 5C5 772 652 492
TOTAL
1 5741 4611 4713 4819 5247 5033 U72 4848 5239 5448 4955 5592
Table (56)
Distribution of tbs Floating Debt
(31 at Kanab eaoh j«r)
%
1951 1952 1953 1956 1955 1956 1957 1553 1959 1960 1961 1962
1 • i ublic Lector 32.6 39.6 36.5 39.2 60.5 60.8 39.6
—...
66.5 60.0 40,0 50.7
2 • Private fieetor 
(Total) 67.2 55.6 60.6 66.5 60.6 59.5 59,2 60.6 53.5 60.0 60,0 69.3
a) Banicing System 36.8 29.2 55.6 36.8 29.0 30.1 29.3 33.7 27.1 27.5 25.7 22.8
b) Ovareaaa Ofriolale 26.9 25.1 19.7 22.5 19.6 16.1 20,2 15.7 16.8 16.3 21.1 17.7
o) Others 3.3 5.3 5.3 7.2 12.2 11.3 9.7 11.2 9.6 16.2 13.2 6,8
TOTAL 100 100 10O 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
T*l» (57)
nUfettutton rf Marfcstakls SeewMUa
(37)
1951 1»2l 1»J 1954 1955 1996 1957 195» 1959L-.-......- 19* 1961 19l«
1 - Saamaaa Oo*a ate. » «• -- — -«• 1382 1423 1491 1540 1580
£ • BullcUs 8oe*a* — — — — -aa
1 138 1«5 186 206 225
3 * Swings tasks -- — — - aa } 110 120 140 170 195
4 * Co«qp haste — -- — — — 1 77 <7 66 <8 *
5 • latest*3 Cobhu Co*». — — — — 300 290 330 325 265
6 * Public Trustee etc. — — -- — 269 268 264 270 260
7 * Pricodly Seeiett^re — - - -- — -• »70! 2200' 195 150 150 150 150
8 • Local Anth’y ftate — _ — — — — 1I 190 205 »5 222 225
9 • Otar ftate — • - — -• — 1 ( 1 j 247 248
10 - Imetafc Troet -• — — — •» -w
1
71 Tk 7200 7025 M »
11 - Balt Trust -• — SB -- -- 1 3
12 - Otter* ♦ m&teal 8611 -- — — — 7298 7384 7*83 7262
(A) Total otter holders 7941 9944 10264 10^1 10W9 9089 9194 9795 9888 9827 10409 10507
TOTAL (athttttft) 13011 16237 16630 17248 17481 iaa84 18630 18578 18163 18131 19175 18546
Table (5S)
Dlstrlbutlofi at Marketable hecutlttaa 
(31 at ttaanoh In each year)
1551 1952
1---------
1»J— 1954...........
f---------
ea- -
.....
1956
-
1957
■"■■■■— . ..
1958 1958 1960 1961 1962
1 - Public Sector 3578 3332 3202 3326 J6CQ 404 4158 422^ 3940 4453 5190 4616
2 - Private Sector
(Total) 11433 12905 13428
—
13873 13630 13672 14354 14225 13678 13985 13930
a) 9aaklo£ Systac 2535 2961 3164• • 2461 3464 2919 3013 2994 2904 2470 2136 2119
b) Overseas Officials 957 9944 10264 10*61 10109 102 1635 1565 1431 1438 1304
0) Cther* 7941 9059 9194 9795 9888 9827 10409 10507
tattL 15011 16237 16630 17^3 17481 13536 18573 i«Q 18131 19175 "T85M
Tahl*(59)
P5 R-farthtitj nn of Ltearios-table ;-0otxritA.es 
(31»t lurch la arch jrear)
M
1091: 1052 1053 10% 1055 1050 1057 1050 1050 1000 1001 1002
1 - Pthlie Motor 23.0 20.5 10.3 10.3 20>< 25.5 25.5 22.7 21.7 24.0 27.1 24.9
2 - Mmt* Motor (Total) 70.2 70.5 00.7 00.7 79.4 74.5 74.5 77.3 70.3 75.4 72.9 75.1
•) IrcHai Qytrc 10.9 10.2 10.0 20.1 10.0 10.0 10.3 10.2 10.0 13.4 11.1 11.4
h) Orarrcrc QfflclUa 0A
01.3 •1.7 <e.< 50.0
0.0 0.0 8.4 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.0
e) Other* 52.3 49.5 40.4 52.7 54.4 54.2 54.3 50.7
TOTAL 100 1fl0 l" 1® 1001 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 I
100
Table (60)
QletrtbutUm of Other Debt 
(>tat Marsh la oaob year)
1951 ,952 1953 ,954 1955 ,956 ,957 ,958 1959 1960 196, 1962
a - Public Sector 1405 1356 1J!3 1869 1224 1,77 1,26 1076 1026 975 925 1039
b - Private Sector 3876 402, 3944 3870 3768 37,2 4009 3861 4054 4425 4504 4858
1 • Bashing SyrUs* - - - - - - - - - •» - *»
2 * Oveneas Officials 22, 1038 1048 939 750 744 9,6 767 609 765 607 876
3 - Others 30» 2963 ! 2894 293> 30,8 2963 3093 3094 3445 3660 3897 3982
TOTAL 3231 5377 5257 9*39 ^4992 4889 5,35 6937 5080 5400 5429 5897
Table (61)
Distribution of ’’Other Debt" 
(51 at March la each year)
<95< 1952 <953 1954 <955 <956 <957 1958 <959 <960 <961 <962
1 • Public Saotor 26.6 25.2 25.0 24.7 24.5 A.1 21.9 21.9 ao.2 <a.< <7.0 <7.6
& • rrivftw oOOU/F 73.4 74.8 75.0 75.3 75.5 75.9 78. < 78.2 79.8 81.9 83.0 82U.
a) Banking t» • * * • <a» - • • - *
b) Overseas Officials 15.6 <9.3 <9.9 <8.3 <5»< <5.2 <7.8 <5.5 12»0 <4.< 11*2 <4.9
0) Others 57.8 55.5 55.1 57.0 60.4 60.7 60.3 62.7 67.9 67.8 71.8 67.5
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 H 100 100 100 100 100 106 166 100
Tabic (62)
lidding of the Public Sector 
(3t3t March in each year)
£•©.
JfaUU (63)
iifiifHn, Bankiug Hyntcti
(31st Maaeb in each year)
1951 1952 1953 1996 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
n«**Ug 2118 1365 1677 1678 1520 1526 13*1 1635 1619 1500 1275 1275
ttartetable 2535 2961 3166 3661 3666 2919 3063 2996 2906 2670 2138 2118
Otter MM
TOTAL 6653 6306 6861 5139 6986 6665 [ 6356 6629 6323 3970 3613 3396
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Tabla (7<)
(jaatm anted 31 at Uanh)
1 1
69/50 5^51
. J . . -J—
51/52 52/53
1
53/56 56/55 55/56 54/57 57/50 54/59 55/60 6(^61 61/62
Frinelpal of Uf»
AtsadMaa 1.1 .1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.8
3&6 Coonraicn Loan 
1961 or after
... b-n .
7.6 16.5 16.1 13.0 13.5 13.2 12.8 124. 12.0 11.6 11*2
i^SS"8 tom • > •••’ “
5A 5.6 5.0 6.0 6.2 6.6 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.2
ij£So"CIX’an
6.5 6.0 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.9 0.2 0.6 9.0 9A 9.8 10.3 10.7
4£ Victory Bonds 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.6 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.5 7.8 0.1 0.5 8.8 9.2
TOTAL 10.7 19.6 27A 35.2 35.6 36.1 36.5 37.0 37.6 3M
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TAiU(W)
XatarMt Pagnants on the National Detxt 
SuBnwry T^jle
(joara -andixl Jlet March)
49/50 5</51 51/52 5^53 53/54 54/55 55/56 54/57 5^59 55/60 64/61 61/62
Floating Debt 29.9 aa.8 32.6 84.6 85.9 79.6 155.2 174.9 181.2 143.3 142.2 190.2 203.7
Marketable Debt 366.4 367.4 376.6 393.0 414.7 431.2 433.7 463.8 480.5 501.3 502.7 538.1 594.8
Other Debt 97.5 104.0 107.1 107.5 106.2 108.5 118.4 160.7 152*2 157.2 144.1 147.8 16(44
Debt 4.3 4.3 4314 49.9 50.9. -x jj 49.2 y t • 46.2 12.4 50.7 48.9 45.2 43A
KffAl ! 4983 i 504.5 SCO *»997«< 635.0 668.5 753.1 845.6 826.3 852.5 837.9. . .. 921.3 1002.3
Tshle (75)
Interoat Pagnants on the national Debt
- -------- .
*9/50 59/51 51/52 52/53 5J/54 5V55 55/56 56/57 57/58 58/59 59/60 6Q/61
__
61/62
Mottfetag Debt 6.0 5.7 5.8 13.3 13.1 11.9 20.6 20.7 21.9 16.8 17.0 20.7 20.3
^uatetflUe Debt 73.6 72.88 67.3 61.9 63.1 66.5 57.6 56.8 58.2 58.8 60»0 58.4 59.4
Other Mbt 19.6 20U61
19.1 ' 16.9 16.1♦ 16.2 15.71 19.0 18.4 18A 17.2 16.0 16.0
External Debt 0.8 <*9 7.8 7.9 7.7 7A 6.1 5.5 1.5 6.0 5.8 6.9 4.3
TOEAL too too f 100 100 100•4 100
F 100 100 100 100 100
—i—J
100 100

TaM»(77)
M/50 5Q/5» 91/52 52/53 5VU 91/53 95/5® 56/57 57/56 w» 99/60 «/6i 61/62
1 • Iboowj Tax HJ8 w 166ji 17% 173» l«93 HU *14 220a «5?2 2243 2633 [2727
2 - Svariaz «9 121 1«9 191 132 135 139 158 153 166 181 150 224
3 - TCCU. (1 A 2) 1953 1&6 1798 1867 1663 2003 208? 2212 2366 SWfcJ 1OL9L. 2623 'ft£c
4 • Interest
496 905 56o <99 <56 <68 753 au ass 453 838 921 1002
M M % «f (J) X 33 3* 34 39 33 38 37 35 *- 39 39 >
T«WL* <7S)
Xatoaaat Waita la Salattea to Katloml Xbb—
4S/» >1/52 5^55 53/% 54/55 SS/56 S/?Z 57/53 58/59 55/60 «/6l 61/62 i
(1) Xatoreet
P«y-~to<a) 493 509 sto <35 653 <68 753 8b6 323 353 833 92* 1002
(2) 2taMopnI
IXSOOUk. (>} 11370 1«84 13703 14716 135W 16606 18142 1J141 1996S 20686 222LS 23764 24580
(1) aa£cf<2) 4.4 IhO 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.0 4,2 4.4 4.1 4.1 ' 3.8 3.9 4,1
(•) yaara «M JtatMtoafa.
(>) gross Aoaastte prcdnot at footer cost at 31 at Foailiai aaoh year.
TuKtu (73)
Interaat Piynnta in Belatun to National Iwjobb 
(Aijuata* ?!»«■«)
{
- - -....... 1 M/50 5</51 Jh/iW 5S/5- 53/5m 54/23 5VS6 56/57 57/50 59/59 59/60 a/* 61/42
1 •
496 505 540 635 650 643 753 046 823 Sbi <53 921 1032
2 -National
11049 11674 1266+ 13956 14932 15837 17051 10392 19343 20I9S &2Z7 22621 23948
(1) as % at (2) 4.5 4.3 4»4 4.6 4.4 1*2 4»4 4.6 4.3 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.2
laSax 1950 ■ 100
?Ss^£3eiit«$ 100 101 111 128 132 134 191 170 166 171 168 145 201
100 106 116 1M 135 144 154 166 175 l«3 192 205 217
(a) Both
xn
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Monetary policy is, indeed, a veiy controversial Hold of study.
The debate starts fren the very beginning: when the relationship between 
monetary policy end the management of the rational debt io invcstipatad. 
One school insists on & eeparato theox; of debt; for cocarplo Shew azviieo 
that Alone with others, Fisher, IHct’o, Klein, lorsclwk, Hansen, 
Bouldinc, Musgrove, and Kart li&ve dmonstretad the need for a theory of 
debt and assets to cupple^icnt or supplant conventional monetary theory.
I m converted to their \to? of Another school * the HodelAffe
Coanittee * atatae on the other hand that ’ ... It is not newly that 
monetary action end debt ;:ana#«Ewnt interact, ••they ere one and indivi­
sible; debt non:^cmcnt lies in the heart of aonotary control" (Para. 603), 
A» Hevin put it, "debt mna^ejant has eaeagge& aa one of the essential 
elanenta - perhaps 1 tlu? ’ eesential elw/jnt - of contnaporary British 
aonotary policy."2 3 Lastly, a sclsaol talses a niddle way? Hoos<* arguee 
that, "•••debt suinegauont uuat bo treated as a corolltixy of monetary 
policy.. .debt nmegerient, though not itself a province of monetary control 
ie nevertheless integrally related to it.”^ It is clear that the last two
1. £•$• 3haw, "Monetary lollop end the -tructure of Debt", Ai^oxiaan.
Scon. H<rr.. l?5fc, p. 6?2.
2. E. Hevin, Public Plannee, 1961, p. 62
3. H. iiooau, "Hie ScnriVftl of MoMrtOy Policy', Bcnr, boon. ate*,. 1951,
P- 35-
points of view arc, practically, sirilur in their ends.
My inclination io to take the Radcliffe Coordttee’s point of view,
not only concerning this debate but also on other auestiona treated in 
this Port w of oourse vith continuous reference to other people’s views* 
Nctlcsial debt plays its crucial role in deciding the oconaado situation 
Mlo&tlng debt is an instrument for controlling tlw oomerolal banks* 
liquid assets ratio j longer-ter x debt ia still an essential element of 
the banking ay®ten and of otlwr flrastoi&l institutions, finally non-asr- 
ketable securities show their iirortonce in different aspects*1 2
The work of monetary policy aay bo analysed in two stages*-*
(l) Tho firat stag© is concerned with the technical issues of monetary 
managemnt. It involves oxmining hov a decision to use monetary policy 
is fciude effective? in other words, the ontor in which a decision to use 
uoaatiay policy sen bo translated into a change in various rates of intea> 
eat and ti-eii- effect on the <«railahiliV a- various kinds of credit- tChis 
proceou is made up of a coriplicated chain of reactions wartdng throu^i 
different institutions? and the analysis involve;:- kicking clear what ecsah 
link in tho chain oorapriaoe, god ©mailring the strength end inportenoo of 
each link. Par e&snple, wo need to know vie ruocno by which on action by 
the jaonctoxy authorities to rootriot credit io translated into pressure on
1. Hi© following analysis will b© concerned more or lees with the oonotajy 
implications of the ”internal” debt.
2. C.k. Sosa, "ttaetsxy Control and scaaoric Policy”, BftllMrr 9fff- lwrita 
£t&t«, November 1957*
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the ccmercial benk?j to reduce their advance©. ISoroovor, wq need to know
how effactive an action by the authorities will be and whether it will
produce predictable results * e«g> in texag of on actual reduction in
advances. On this technical level of the uorkiiv, of sxmtoaey policy, the
mrticwal debt is involved in one or other of its omqt aspects. As w
shall see, liquid assets of the ootamorcinl beaks are new linked with the
national debt. This consideration is of crucial importance insofar as
the level of liquid assets lnfluerooa the bunks’ attitude towards the
expansion of advances. However, the significance of the site, structure
and distribution of the national debt is not limited to the question of
bank liquidity. (Mlt-edged securities currently constitute an important
portion of assets of banks end other financial institutions. The level
of yields and oupitul value of thio amount is of onoraous significance in
the credit situation. tWiine up, an invuetigution of the siae, structure
and distribution of the national debt, and all the ii^lications thereof,
is of fundewaontal need for an uxalexnatanding of monetary policy*
- because of the intimate oounection between the floating debt, bank 
liquidity and the volume of credit;
» and bo ecu so of the importance of tin* de&t in determining the policy 
of the major institutions in the capital market.
(2) However, changes in edvanoeo, whether bank advances or other kinds 
of lending* «re not ends in themselves > they are only neons of control­
ling the genorel ocanomic situation. Therefore, the saoon-1 ata&e of 
investigation is to inquire how change© in monetary conditions affect 
decisions about invootment and ecq>onditure on consumer goods.
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Greater attention vac concentrated on the first set of inquiries 
until the luucliffo Commit tee llirev li^it on of the oeoond croup of 
questions. Admittedly, it is only froi considering this wider oat of 
questions - i e. the oeoond sta^o * that it la possible to josasure the 
effecttveiKKis of rianetnry policy as a reciter of the movetamt of demand, 
production, onplGc,-iont, the balance of wmnte, or the prioe level. But 
to snalyoe the working' of nonet ary policy from both sides asms that fin 
exireuely wide field has to be traversed. Jtar this reason, and to be 
2-easonrhle and able to give fairly exitnaritctive answers to sone of the 
questions about the technical workings of yjonetcry policy, our investiga­
tion will bo confined ^rbaorily to the first stage of analysis.
• • • • • •
This study relates to the role at ucsxt&r., policy, durir; tbs period 
1951-62, as &i instrument of a2w>rt-tem stabilisation. As aiaattar of 
fast, the problem of inflation will be, mre or less, the body of this 
study, since it was the min phenomenon ox the 195©'•* ’’•••our inquiry 
toss been directed towards the offeotiveemo of monetary ssstststftsss ratbsc 
then that of r^onettry stimulation" (h>t« licroovor, for the clarity 
end simplicity of the argument, a olosod econoay will be assumed.
By thio logic the analysis of tills pert is built up in five chaptew»-
Chapter VI involves a review of the laonotary policy in the thirties, the 
forties and the fifties;
Chaster Yll eliows how the rwehanisr. of the banking system works;
Chanter VXXXi aonatazj* □olio/ and the control of the clesrizv? banka; 
(gffipfer IX: debw mans^auent end fuaxling policy,
(te&W X» funding policy and the role of interest rates.
!5iiB • -
: SfiV' ' ' ?3_ . - H V’1*' ."—i1 ■'* ’< 1ft .' ?' '«W.
40 aanuBaua
U WMB
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TMthdsiasm for raonetory policy has, historically reviewed, undergo*** 
something of a oydionl pattern of its own. In the period before the 
First World War, raonetcry policy W* the dasinsnt, indeed virtually the 
eole, instrument of economic stability. However, the Great Depression of 
the thirties brought it heavily into disrepute, and fieoal policy pushed 
it increasingly into the bodSsground. During the Second World War, the 
ooope of central banking action scUoh wes further restricted under the 
exigencies of war finance end a oocsprehensive national system of direct 
control was added to fieoal policy. The rostrainto on flexible monetary 
policy continued, in general, th^roughout tho early poet-war years.
At the end of 1951, monetary policy emerged throughout the world 
from its state of desuetude in a striking coco-book. There has been, 
however, a tendency to exaggerate the effectiveness of monetary policy 
and to gloss over its weeknosa. In the light of the experience of the 
1950’s, and more especially since 1955• a reaction has tended to set in. 
Once again, monetary- policy oanc under critical questioning and eoexotinee 
outri#it attack, with discussions of its limitations becoming increasingly 
oonmon. Those criticisms do not, in of foot, presage a renewed eclipse 
of the irooetory policy. They r&ther point to the emergence of greater 
xinderetondinc of tlio working of monetary nochawismo and techniques, end 
acre balanced views of tho potentialities of monetary policy.
This is, however, a broad siaoary of the development of monetary 
policy during the last fifty years. Tbs aim of the present chapter Is to 
expand tbs discussion In order to build up a useful background for further 
analysis In the next few chapters.
i»
The nlneteen-flftlee dlaolosod a revived Interest in monetary policy 
as an Instrument for ahert-terra stabilisation, In Britain as well as in 
the United States end so many ether countries 3 This remarkable oombaok 
has boon staged after being In abeyance for about twenty years.
Monetasy policy was# during the nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
turies the single established instrument for eoonctaic policy* with an
2object of maintaining price stability. In 1931* Keynes wrote hie 
Treatise on Honey, emphasising monetary policy together with public works.
1. For example Westers Germany, the Netherlands, France, Canada, etc.
2. To be accurate, fiscal policy was advocated from time to time * for 
example in 1909 the Minority Report of the Royal Commission of the 
Poor Law favoured variations In government expenditure in order to 
mitigate the problem of wisoplcgrmsnt* Xn 1916, Sir 3>« Mbortesm sup­
ported tills view; similar support camo in the twenties from Lloyd 
George and Keynes. Sos T. Wilson, Inflation, Oxford 1961, P* 13X.
B. Sayers remarks that "the belief that changes in the rate of in­
terest powerfully Influence economic activity reached its high-water 
nark in °a "»• Knt. of Interest- in
3tv4ja3_in (T.'Uwn and P.W.8. Andrmn
ed.), Oxford 1931, p. !•
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He believed thut changes in the rate of Interest powerfully influenced 
eoonoaio activity. Monetary policy was defined as that policy espleyine 
th© taonetary authorities’ control of the supply of money (i.e. currency 
and bank depoaite) through the banking system. The theory was developed 
that this could bo done by ssena of changes in the rate of interest, 
Induced by a central bank. Changes in Batik hate and open market opera­
tions would affeot the market rate of interest, but particularly the rate
X
charged by the oomereial banks. If a lower rate of interest was made 
effective, businessmen would Increase their borrowing from the banks; 
thus the quantity of money, in the form of bank deposits, would be in­
creased. In other words, swift adjustments in interest rates (or flexible 
rates of interest) should control the supply at money.
The events of the 1930’s node monetary policy very halting in its
operation and led to strong eoeptioion oonoeming its potency as a means
of control. The result was, of course, a reluotauce to use it. The main 
2root of thia sooptlclsni lies in these factorsi
• the "Great Depression" which started in autumn 19®9»
• the lntexxeovuax impact oi ksynse* uenersi Theory" |
• empirical investigations on the effect of changes of
rates of interest;
- the great growth of the national debt during the Second 
World War.
1. This definition of “monetary policy*' refers to that before the 
oations cf the 19$C*s« see Section C below.
2. H.H. Villard, "Monetary Theory** in Sl-
(B.S. BUU ®d.), A.BJk., California «*», ». 314-51-
,\XAJ*
lao
During the great depression wMcn ooverel^ rooked Urn world* aheap
zacnoy policy was triad in moat oountrioa hut industrial recovery was not
attained. -deducing rate of interest* in a deep depression* was net able
to inoroftso private investment when ^^^yvtftaifttTi ware eo ffcsalwl wtl*y about
the future, Sense, the increase in productive capacity (i.e. the increase
in private investment) wee negligible. far this reason it wee widely
represented that monetary policy was too weak to eccoopliah its function,
and the natural consequence of that disappointment was a general tendency
to belittle it. Its inability to atinulatc reoovexy from the Aepreesian
led to rejection of monetary policy ae a primary means of achieving
eoona&ic stability.1 Xn consequence this traditional measure fell into
cbeyn&oei Bask Kate was changed only once (at the outbreak of the ^eo^wA
World Var in Septerher 1939) between 1932 and Ifoveober 1951. Xn the
decade before the tfirut World War* Bank Kate was changed on average five 
. 2tinea yearly.
i Vents of the depression and tte failure of monetary control induced 
economists to put less faith in flexible rates of interest. Keynes* who
■W—■..MIIH" IIII .IB w
1. X few non continued to believe in Mastery policy* notably R.O. 
Hswtrpyi a partial defence esae from another sector of opinion <i3ai«iug 
that the authorities had acted lata and inadequately...that the failure 
of monetary policy esae* not only from the instruments, but more 
is^ortant* from the lack of courage and the attitude toward their use. 
See* e.g. * l.V. Mints, "Monetary Policy4',
reprinted in in Placed ?plioy, A.
59, cap. p. 3b6-
SI May lpbo, 
5, »• >*-
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previously emphasised monetary policy, published in 19% tbs General 
3^g?y,M Jpt^gtflndshifting the central interest
from the factors determining the supply of wney and its effeots on the 
level of prices to fiscal policy* This new policy used the governciont 
revenue and expenditure programmes in order to maintain full employment 
which night oonflict with tho objectives of price stability*2
Another blow to nonetaxy policy ocas, just before the second war, 
free two empirical investigations shoving that the Interest elasticity 
of demand for investment was extremely small* These investigations wears 
conducted by the Oxford Economists Research Group and the Harvard 
Business School on th© basis of fiuurtiaruslres submitted to a large aanple 
of businessmen showing conclusively that the interest rate is largely 
neglected when investment decisions are being mads*2 These two investi­
gations arcs**
The dMtrlM that changes of interest rates powerfully inflasnss the
' -1 •' • V-V ?*■'. *" .r -4 t ' : ■ * ' w? * 'J? - i.?
pace at which enterprises, all token togeWer, extend or improve their
1. The main emphasis during the thirties was placed on higher government 
investment in public works, with the aia of increasing the flow of 
income for the additional employment, who will increase their demand 
for consumption goods and servioeti inorosoing thereby aggregate demand
and the level cf employment.
2. Per a critical review on both Studies ess W.R. White, "Interest 
Inelasticity of Investment Demand", avu .gearu Rev. 19%, pp. %S-87« 
Theoretical studies on thia point are found in G.L.S* Shackle, "Interest 
Bates and the Pace ef Investments", wn* Jour,, March 19% • pp. 1*71 
PUL* Luts, "Th© Interest Mate and lxnrootment in a Dynaatlo Zeotwoy*,
An. Koon* Ijgy., December 19%, pp* 811*90.
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equipment has boon challenged by the tosttaony of enterprises theneelveo.
A full account of the method and results of the ueationnaire enquiry 
conducted by the Oxford Econooieta Hosotauh Group ie given in Oxford 
^gasftlo Japers*1 They interviewed 37 businesaoen regarding the effect 
of interest rate on their inveotaeut dooiaiens. Only about one-fourth 
of them considered that the cost of capital had an effeot on invoetaent, 
and even these considered it leas ixvoriont than other factors. The 
majority denied that their activities had been directly affected by chan­
ges in interest rates «• that interest was too ataall an element in coopa- 
risen with depredation end obooleeoenoe.
A much brooder survey (of ljud coses) was taken by nail questionnaire. 
About 2£ of the quoetionnairea ware returned. Beughly a quarter of the 
replies indicated that the cost of capital was a factor in the decision 
to invest in plant and equipment or in stocks. Professor Sayers* coixient 
on thio result wee that "In assessing the significance of these results*
It is necessary to consider, firstly, whether the 2$ per cent who replied 
constituted a ftedr sample, for our purpose of the whole. Wfcy, in fact, 
did the other 75 P&? cent throw the questionnaire into the vaetkpeper 
basket?.... Sty own guess is that zaoet of the fima were, as a result of
1. H.D. lendereon, "The Significance of the Bate of Interest", end
Heads and ?.¥•$• Andrews, "Swomary of Replies to (Questions on Effects 
of Interest Kates", Cxf .Kotay October 1938, X, PP. 1*311 both
reprinted to rQxftafd latest la the pp. 16-31.
2. P.V.S. Andrews, "A Further Inquiry into the Effects of Bates of 
fc»Ux«rt", fltf.Soon, P^>., Mo. 3, W, »prlntM la SMO9A
pp. 51-67.
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tlseir own experience, not convinced that borrowing terns make ouch dif­
ference to their decisions. If thia guess la the right one, we oust 
obviou&ly work on the aeewaption that the proportion of business-taon 
oonoclou© of th© effeotivenoas of borrowing terns must be much lower than 
one-quarter, ...though it may be rather uoro than
(a) Smw4J^JJ?««_3^!^LatowE 
In 1958. T5>ereol© published th© findings of a survey of the Harvard.
Business School*a investigation with a groat nunber of busineeaMu* Ibem 
133X0 oases, only 93 hod mtrepronourlal problems of business where 
interest rates might have been a factor, nnd of thee© 6j contained no 
reference to interest mtee or the coat of capital. Of the JO oases in 
which the poet of capital was mentioned, there were 20 in which It was 
not a factor contributing to the deoielcn whether or not to expand or 
contract plants or operations and only 10 instances in which the Interest 
rate or eeet of capital finds wee recognised as a factor in making the 
decision. tod oven fbr these 10 oasec It was not the sole or decisive 
factor. From this evidence, It woo tentatively concluded that the ooet 
of capital night be a negligible factor in investment decisions.
It is not therefore surprising that wtvsn th© time earns to formulate 
plena for the rntatsnazioe of stability in tlie poet-wr period, most
1. &•$. layers, ‘Business Men and the 'fexms of Borrowing*', Oxf. apery 
Pap, So. J. Pebrtu.iy 19t0, reprinted in Oxford Sti|M»a, p. OS/
2. J.F. Mbereele, “She Influence of Interest Rates upon Entrepreneurial
BMlaim* la Bwfcma", "T”38* ^WtUT 193B.
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economists have probably accepted the of Hicks, "Interest lc too
weak for It to luare nudh influence on the near future | risk ie too
1strong to enable interest to have ranch influence on the far future.**
We ooms, now, to the last footer preventing the use of mastery
policy • i»e. the Second World War. The way in which the war wee ftnmwael 
2
added huge amounts to the outstanding debt. This source of trouble will 
be the subject of the next Section.
.mea.1
The scepticism over monetary policy which was widespread during the 
t; irtiee became after the war even deeper« The enormous growth of debt 
during the war was interpreted as a crippling restraint upon an active 
iionetaxy policy.
Xt was generally anticipated, during the war, that deflation would 
be the mala and persistent danger after Its conelueicn. This expectation 
woe falsified since inflation was. In the early post-war period, a world­
wide phmuwsnon. l&onoolsts writing oh rionetaasy policy were eonvlncou 
that It was of little use In ooobating deflation! scepticism about its 
potency in oodbating inflation was lees mated. But It was ocnsldsrad
1. S. rioka, XtoLaaS-£a2iSU» <-’xfard 1939, ». 226.
3* See Chapter XX, together with the tools# on the growth of debt 
during the Second World War
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that the var-tiue legacy of large debt woe a major obstacle to the feyli*
cation of aonotery restraint* An effective stabilising monetary polity
would require* sines demand was intoroot*i3aolastic* impracticably large
fluctuations in interest rates* ^Bicec oheH|»o in interest rates would
cause violent fluctuations in the value of existing aai excessively
cccrplioatG the Masury’s problem of debt wnsgMmt* In other words,
an active uonetory policy meant large variations in interest rates which
conflicted with the gcvomeietit policy of u bond-support jrog^reuxic adopted 
1to assist war finance* These vardotiona in interest rates would*
- increase the burden of debt servicej
• offset the general confidence in the public credit j
* ooraplleote the task of reftoancing the m taring debt
each year i as a result of lowered prices of aatesad 
securities public credit will have no appeal from the 
public.
vbr these reasons* the autlioritiee wove prevented from effecting any
monetary control and the govsmoant support of security prices was 
2continued*
■HP'. jmw>r»miwiwiw«*»»—Miwxin
1* Monetary policy was in abeyance during fee war and rates of interest 
were controlled. At tho short and of the \arkst, fixed rate* wore set 
for treasury bills and T.D.S. *sj noreovur iiiniam prices were fixed
for govemnsnt securities quoted on the Htoofc Thwhang©* However* tills 
policy involved no more than a stabilisation of a “pattern of rat oar' 
which was based on end adjusted to >prn ee level* not a eraatiea of a 
new level of rates*
2. 2. Wilson (Inflation, p. 144) uhovj that the treasury not only preven­
ted the prices of bonds from falling but actually raised these pxiooc 
in on attempt to lower etill further the lone-term rates of interest, 
for that reason tha authorities bought Govsj«msnt bonds and hence bank 
deposits were increased by h*r«je suae.
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This devolanrwxt inpliod that budgetary (i.e. tax and ocpmAitnro) 
policy continued to bo the rain econc'da policy to deal with the poct-war 
inflation. By that time, the principle of '•teiotionnl ilname" was 
known sad gave fiscal policy me© support. Thio approach to fiscal polipy 
viowed governnent te< and expenditure as instmaesits for the control cf
expenditure. Xn Other words, taxes and expend!turos should bo 
inorecsed or decreased solely to affect tlio community *3 rate cf spending*
Unfortunately events proved that budgetary policy was unsuccessful 
over so mny years in halting inflation, partly because it had its 
problem too * that io, the inadaptability cf the budgetary process to th© 
requirements of a flexible fiscal ix>lley. This memte that the tneffoo- 
tivencss of fiwo&l policy, «© a cozrfcra-^’clioal force, was severely 
limited by its inherent inflexibility- rfheeo technical complex! ties were 
responsible for the failure of fiscal policy, but this was not the whole
truth. A earn basic difficulty was that the budget had other objective©
2
of national policy then otabiliaation of nonotary expenditure.
In principle, halting the po®t**var inflation through fiscal policy 
required substantial budget eurnlusoii - i.e. largo cuts in goverraaent
1* Ite nore details on "Fvaictioml Finsme", see A*>. X^emar, ^o^wioe 
Of, Control, 11. Y. X94?< end ”Tho Burden of the National Debt”, 1* 
Incone, fculqymnt jmd jUblic yolicy, (l^gye in Honour of Alvin Hensen), 
IT.v. 1943. PSP* 2£>?5l iSchwLcbjr, ’’Public Fizwaco”, In The
(Oxford University Institute of Statistic©)
pp. 85-12
2. Arthur Sfeithiee writer on the Amriccn circumstances, *W own min 
criticism of the fiscal policy as worked out so far io that insufficient 
attention has been paid to ite political end administrative aspects" 
{X'ederel Budgetary and Fiscal uolicy1', in 4 survey of Contmporta:y 
r^Ooncx;doa, ed. H.F. Fills, A*SJU* California 1946, ppf l^So9). 
also T. Wileon, oa>* olt.. p. 147-
wexpenditure and inorcaa^ in taxation# But the circumstances were not 
favourable for those expedients* On the c^endLiture side, the goveimout 
undertook, after the war, a large welfare progrmmo which included expen­
diture on social services (such as schools, hospitals, etc.) end on hou­
sing. This expenditure represented on the other hetid a competing de'isnd 
for resources needed by industry. CM the tax side, there was email scops 
for increasing taxation, if not for political reasons, at least because 
rates were already sc high aa to leave little room for further increase.
In these oircumctances, it was not possible to cut govsmMttt expenditure 
or to increase taxation, in order to counteract the inflationary pressure*
The last stage of difficulties for fiscal policy wss the Korean 1W
in the early fifties} expenditure on ermasnt increased end businesaiaon
rushed to accumulate inventories * thus increasing total expenditures.
Under these circumstances and after a succession of fiscal crises,
X
Britain was compelled to apply monetary policy, from Movesibor 1251, for 
the first time since the early thirties, therefore, monetary control 
became an active instrument for controlling abort-texm fluctuations with 
an objective of affecting the level of total dasoand for goods and services*
1. Busing the precedink ncatSw nerrly ell the Veetom governments were 
tight crying ^monetary conditions to seduce the inflationary proauur© in 
th&r various countries and in some oases, c*g. Western Corsusny, with 
oonaideroble success: A. II. Heroic, qp» clt»« Chap* XVIII. In this 
respect a point may be added, that oonotesy policy is usually applied in 
developed and free enterprise oconouiee; houever same economists try to 
diocusB the possibility of thio control in the underdeveloped countries 
see, e.g*, S. (Sicsh, ’^Maetery Policy in on Underdeveloped BteonoBy*1,
i%o, pp. 603-13.
wo
Ac a tb/s bond-cuppcc-t was tenrinated end national
debt was taker, as a help gather than a hindrance. Th© nw epprooc' to 
monetary policy paid leas attention to boldine down icrvico charges on 
the debt, to protect the credit of the //overnnent or to protect investors 
e^airnt capital depreciation-
Tiie 1950’a baa, indeed, oeen the revival of monetary policy, as a
major breach of economic polio,/ In BrXV4n as well as in the Doited
1 i
itstos end in most developed economies. The reintro due tion of monetary 
policy was explained, as said above, by the failure of fiscal policy to 
restrain the post-war inflationary pressure. It caused rnaoh controvorqy 
i^aong academic coomiato and cubinnted with the publication of the 
Kadcliffe Heport/'
Xt should bo remesabarad that the development of the fifties did not 
imply the uee of monetary policy a® a ©ubstit.it© to fiscal control. 
Indeed, this development indicated the sqpplOBsnt&xy nature of these 
policies and the need to use both types of control in a co-ordinated way
1. In the Dhitod States, the ^federal Itatorve System was able to abandon 
its policy of supporting bond prices ly mid-19**9» however, the accord 
of March 1951 between the System and the Treasury gave the central beak 
freedom to use higher l<mg*tsm mtos restraint v&s required.
2. Ccmittee on the Working of the Hcnctoy System, Cbnd 027, was appoin­
ted in 1957 and published its findings in August 1959- Xtc Report, 
ISqBQreadft and rinutog of rvidosx:. are considered as an unparalleled 
source of infoniatien cm every is^xartont aspect of the British aonoteoy 
system, including the Rational Debt. Tfeo work of this Comittec is 
discussed by W economist®: for review discussions see, e.g., H.8. 
SgyaBV, EfrU.-n 3‘onki?^, 5th ed., i960, Ch^p. 12, pp. 2^ 9*73 j 1, Ourley, 
"Whs llidcliffo Kox»rt end Widenco% >v>, May i960, pp. 673-
TOO; u®*» depart An<dyU>d’', pp. %7*5><
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if a satisfactory degree of stability was to be achieved. Jbr oxeriplo, 
llorsic uroto in the oerl; year© of the fifties, "It is not argued that 
monetary policy alone can ensure ocononi© stability* but it should at 
least be possible to avoid pm-euing a crodit policy which runs oouater
to the objectives of
□action C
□inae 1951, raonetaxy policy has ohowu interesting and issportent new 
dovelopnc&t&. She rocent growth of oonfldoice in the offeotivenoae of 
monetary policy eon be attributed, in pert, to radical rodification and 
eatrene reconstruction of the theory on utiich it rests. Star eonsaple, the 
monetaxy policy hoe shown the development of "directives” or "requests. 
This technique is a credit rationing, directed to the coisaereial banks, 
under the guidance of the tioastc^- author!tieo. These ^qu^ata hove in
the taken two fonse;
- to restrict certain classsn of loons, for uses vhioh the
govexruaeat regarded as of low pxiorVigri
* acre recently, to restrict total loons, regardless ef 
their purpose.
Thia type of control evolved froa the war period, since th© Treasury, at 
intervale, instructed th© banka as to th© type of borrower to vhcru they 
dbsi&d give preference, e.g« adesnoos for a project to earn or sore
1. ▲.&. llersic, git.» Chap aIXX, pp- 161-91. In tills respect, V. 
Snith ssy©9 on th© United States, that “The federal Jtoswrve authorities
...frequently stress the need to coordinate monetary policy with flood 
and dcbt-camageaent policy (&a.r Her,, 1956, p. 539 > footnote 5)»
dollar#. By tide logic, the banks vem n^ked at the beginning of the war 
to refrain as fhr as possible from giving cdvmcea that were unlikely to 
help the war effort. In 1965, ft now rosiest asked than to txy to favour 
the carport trad© and the re^cquipcwnt of industry. Xn July 1955, the 
bank# were asked to reduce advances and were further Instructed in 
September 1957 ft® to the imposition of a ceiling,^
Bequest© ae a medium of control ensure a far tighter regulation of 
the volume of bank credit than oould be achieved by the technique of-i^gjgRte - ■. ■.’t ,;-;7 . .- J\% J ■ dB-‘■ •
. 5 ?V'‘ if - ‘ >v‘l *-' ‘h’A-i-'-A; - . - ’• '* a* ■ • '< ..-**•* l/|L x k .S&'.v ,**• ■-•'> ^sT-.
raising the rates charged on loans* But just bow ’’modern14 this technique 
i« rvV be ox>cn to question.
Continuing our review of the evolution of monetary policy during the 
1950’e, we go*oi»d to the next point « the ehMMEe in interest end ete of 
monetary control. "The isaediate object of uanetary action is to offset 
th© level of total dawsd” (para. 397)»2 She authoritiee, aining at total 
demand, used to think in terras if the "supply of aonegr** (i«e» currency
1» Jee Chapter XX for a detailed dicuasuxon on the "requests" during 
the 1950 *•<
9. The Radcliffe Coaaaitto© listed (in ftmu 69) the objects of monetary 
Taoastwee in five points »-
• a high and stable level of onoXcynent;
• reasonable stability of the internal purchasing power of uoneyi
• steady economic growth and iaprevanent of the standard of living!
• sou© contribution implying a serglu in the balance of payiacftits, to 
the QGonocic development of tlw outside worldj
• a strengthening of London*a international reserves, implying further 
margin in the balance of percents.
W*J. Newly*, oh the other begad (ikoara of ffpoasr* Oxford 1962, p. 1A8), 
lists three objectives t-
• 1. fall employment!
• 2. revoidonoo of inflation;
- 3. asternal oQulUbrlis.
I#
and bonk deposits): now, the focrun of nmoiaxy control has moved from 
the "supply of :vxm&” to a new concept - that is the "censral liquidity 
condition" of the ©oonoiay* Thio reconstruction was set in action by the 
Sadeliffe Coaolttoe: *. tdity of the eaenaay* rather thstt
the * trap ply of ;ioncy‘, that tlw author!ties should seek to affect by their 
use of monetary measures" (Bsrst. 10) > "•••oome experts consider tlaet the 
central task of the monetary authorities io to keep a tight control on 
the supply of uGiisy... Our view is dlffxwt* Though we do not regard 
the supply of money aa an uniwportuit quantity, ve view it ae only part 
of the wider structure of liquidity In the oconesy" (Pares* 333*9'*
- . *the monetary authorities can oally influence the total
level of demand in two ways, • •♦by bringing about a change in interact 
rates” and by bringing; "•♦•about & change in the liquidity email t Inn of 
financial institution© and of business fime md people generally, so 
that those wonting coney to spend, ••find it more (or less) difficult to 
got than it vae before7’ (?ar&. 305) • The Committee calls the foxtaer 
effect <m total demand the "internet incontive effect’7 and the latter "the 
general liquidity effect”. Xt considers the latter effect ooeoh acre 
important than the fomer effect* end moreover to be quicker in operations 
"Vo attribute to operations on the structure of interest rates a wide* 
spread inflxwico on liquidity and & slowr, more partial, influence on 
the demand for capital” (ram. 933).
The new concept of the "whole liquid^tyi; was criticised by naajy
econociists uc not beizus clear* Committee. Jbr oscssaple.
f.V. Paiah comments that "The deport repeatedly instate that ’the factor
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Wild. nonetssy policy should seefc ^nee on control le.,,the state
of liquidity of the whole settmy. • But we are nowhere ,-;tven any clear
definition of Just what la meant by ’the state of liquid!V of the whole
GconOGgr.”1^ However, the state of liquidity of the whole economy will bo
defined in the follovinc ohaptorc en heine (more or lose) tJve avadlnbili^r 
2of aredit from financial instituticsi®. Tlis er<^n©nt runs aa followsi 
th® source of finance most readily avMleble to a firm oosqariaeo its own 
non-operating assets, if it hast any* Thio source of finance la, however, 
limited end needs to bo oiqjplettmtod by outside finance - the moat fcapor*
Ml fcMfc iflWNh
At tliio otace the role of intaroot rates (lone rates) and the 
national debt booems apparent. b’e have aeon. that the direct effects of 
chancing interest rates on capital oxpexditures hare been wtrebalisad. Sow, 
tho possibility that even relatively «aall changes in interest rates csor 
have quite aubetimtial effocte <m the liquidity jooALon has been o&ph&olsaJL
1. F.W. Paish, "Ifcat is this Umridity?", Tte> Bgnkqy, October 1959• pp.
59^7» reprinted in
WT ». 70-9.
2. This escplsnation matches that of 8» Jervin, Public klnmaoe, 1%1, 
p* 21 j Brian Tew, "A Case for Financial frmtr&ft, ffis Bsnk^yu, I960, 
p. 30 > J.CUh. Bow* "Fiscal Policy and lonetuxy Polley ee Instruments 
of Hconoaic Control", Vcptrlunt^r 3gc£: review, Hoveriber I960, P* 3*
In this respect Gaskin G&ik. cog,* Par. Ho. Ji "liquidity and the 
Monetary Meoh&nisa", October I960, p» 275) dho^^s that the Badeliffb 
Couwxlttee defines liquidity (in laroo. 3&>93) a© follows» on the one 
hand, it Isas a "stock" aspect, IccSstag at the amount© and types of 
asset© holds here the liquidity doctrine of the Ksport holds that in 
assesein/? the state ef liquidity saint tales account of a ran^s of 
hi^GLy liquid assets of which nonsy itoeli is only one. On the other 
hand, liquidity has a "flow” aspect in th*t it has something to do with 
the transfer of funds frou holds** to would-be spenders.
This development is attribute! to the greatly ir-creuaod i-vartanoe of the 
national debt and tho expended role pleyod by fhxancial ixwtitutionu la 
recent yeas*.
Hone©, the recent patency attributed to the nonotoay policy has 
erier^ed fror, the greatly oxpasxlad ’intiontul debt, iheptuusion of the debt 
necavs that for many financial inatitutdono (o.g. cou&erciol bonks, dinoouat 
houses, ineusmee oespsniee, building societies, etc./ gownaagt securi­
ties represent a major part of their assets* To this ax teat, variations 
in the rate of interest bacons oighifioastt not to borrowers but oainly to
loaders. In other words, the supply *£ government securities to these 
potential lenders means that some of their resources will be held in 
tl;io foinai and to the oKtent that thoir lending policies gw deteminod 
by the liquidity of their osouritdoa, cliang&e in the price of ffsarkatcble 
stocks will afi’oct the mount of lending they ere prepared. to undertake.
It io therefore the "liquidity condition” of the oconooy tlist cu^xt to be 
controllod and changes in long te ratoo thvt influence the liquidity 
position.
To repeat, a deflationary monetary policy beooasa effective, via the 
general liquidity effect, by rostreirdru, the sources of finance that are 
available to the firm. The ixoiiotoxy authorities can uddovo this end bye
1. Or as H. Boons puts it, attention hSS been focused on lenders and the 
effect of aonotexy policy on th© Wne on which they will make ibnds 
available t sec ‘‘Interest Itatou and the Central Bank*', in Money. Trrilo, 
cad <k>OR(MiQ (^wth (In Honor of John Kenxy WUllsas), N.T7l95i, pp.
STO-PS, ©s?» 275-5.
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.J-xgfc» • ’rfjw tone-ism rates, eueiaoared tgr the eutherltlea, oaa 
TOdOO® tb® XSOft®^ watae Of long-team seeurlttea,
end thus tUatoish tbs anouat af oo^ltal esRpendltere that tbs 
holders of those sssurltdes oaa flasaee tgr realiting tbssa fa?
J1TT®h
3MSA1 • rio® long-tar.'. rates oaa “lode la" the odstlae paatfolloe 
$£ fe>Hfgal IfiOdOTOe
fUadlsr sco® of tb® uoro Xlould tian of the natlaa*!
l.«. taoama© tills, ooi xeduos the volune of liquid assets Ua 
the hands of the publie. S«o, too, hijsar leeeh of long-tern 
rates tore neceee&s? for energetic funding processes.
She last two points will be explained la detail la rMf* ’ ” three
Severer, a few words will to added hero, Discussing the ooaoept of "gen­
eral liquidity condition” la the sense of liquidity of flaaaslal lnatlto. 
Hens (end aepoalally of the heats), we soallse the laportsaso of aotionol 
debt as Hi® oodet nerro^or of c^odit oloeo it roraraooats a crucial ol’ l oeifc
I21 l^rlr 03$ot—.)f.75 tc-fo&pft *
- increased odea of treosost' tills, no a deliberate action of aoastssy 
outhorltlast ffo&ir ocsbl® thsB to cx -^.id
total loan® thus tasking credit oasis? In the private eeetors XV the 
eooe t*SWi rofo^ng the yrmtot **M1# ft^t***beohe1 11*
gpifrmy aflft tafltee CTSdit fctflfoeaau
» ffla tbs loogar csad of tho ss&afeet* the fe*^**?*# systo.i sal other 
tafftltMtloffi? frftlft a oo&eidaare&Xe saoust of securities * store then 
8000 l.a. la 1968 for the bonking systecs ead roughly the *Be fiewans 
foa? ether Institutions.?’ A drop la the Basket wilms she “loot" those
1. ass Wbla 57-
i%
institutions into their bond holding and reduce the availability of 
loans to potential borrowers in tMa way. This neane that financial 
institutions, ae large holdero of jftrvetttsant securities, ere very
rise in interest rates is brought about by the mnetaxy author! tioe 
during a period of inflation, holders of those seouritieo, to ovoid 
capital losses, Will be inhibited fra selling them in order to obtain 
funds to met the Increased doaeuxd for private credit. We say call it 
the "freezing in" or "pin in” effect.
The oondspt of '‘the 'whole liqtiidiiy position” io tlw met controver­
sial point of the Radcliffe import and the least aeoepted by aooaoalsts 
who favour the traditional “supply of This debate, indeed, ioasr-
We attention; and sosse details on the op oelte ideas will be presented. 
We start with Harrod1a criticise-.'' He argues that from the Bullion 
Cowaittee (XWdJ to the IWalllsn CtacdLitoo (1931), greet stress her been 
laid on control of the quantity of uouoy ee tho priae inetnsae&t for 
regulating credit conditions. on ixiflatiotwry pressure would
require reducing the quantity of ixaioy; end conversely.
Wee ooonoedato suppose that the tokikij^ of Keynes weened us away 
frora the "quantity theory of rnney". Keynes has, in fact, challenged the 
older viow that variations in the quantity of Taoney hod a "direct" effect 
on the price level. To Keynes, the qumitiV of noney (which he oaUod in 
tho Qftnqrql '4)0°^- the aswunt of liquidity available y played a key pert j
1. Sir Boy Harrod, "Is the Honey Wply Important?", Voafc^toy BaA 
&nriovt Hovmbor 1959, PP. >7
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an increase or decrease in the amount of taoangr relative to the work it 
fend to do in circulatin' the national income hod a aronount influence on
the rate of interest* And the rate of interest influenced the amount Of 
investment undertc&en end so oouid be of irsportaaoe in dating a boor; or 
curing a recession. Therefore, the quantity of money put into circulation 
by the central bank w&a, whether according to the traditional or Keyneoiaa 
thinking, of key importance in relation to monetary poll ay.
On this point, the Radcliff o Report fdmdonei the foundation-stone 
of the monetary theory by offering in its place the concept of the "whole 
liquidity petition", a concept which was not praoiaely defined*
Continuing hie attack, Harrod cafes; What other aaaeta had the 
Committee in mind which are co iagportant that they justify the contrast it 
draws between the ‘supply of xaonqy" (said not to be critical) and the 
"whole liquidity position**? Treasury bills might indeed be used as nocas 
of discharging a liability. But they axe not eo used to a really signifi­
cant extent.
rbr haste, "loans create depoaite". Bence, if they increase their 
loans, they mton&tieally create irawsne of payment for their borrowers in 
the for.a of deposits which oontimx tc circulate thereafter from hand to 
hand within the occnooy. Xt need not bo affirmed that there are no other 
media of payment whatever. Bank deposits are the preponderating medium 
Of peyuont and therefore of liquidity. Xn so far ua the ' whole liquidity 
position" io of real importance, belittling the significance of the 
quantity of uonoy rsust bo
To Harrod, the Coaaitteo recognised (hare. Mo) that bank restriction
193
created a "diffused difficulty of boj^roving” , reducing thereby the ia* 
flationory pressure. But whet "cauaoc” tbs ’’diffused difficulty of 
borrowing’ ie nothin*; else save preoiosly” reducing the money 
other words, vdaxt the authorities car, do is to reduce the money supply 
(which must bo the "nsia" ingredient of the ’’whole liquidity position”) 
and tlius cause a "diffused difficulty of borrowing . In that ease, 
controlling the renty supply baconeu the oontre*piece of monetary policy*.
Mw British oconotaisto have also rejected the new concept introduced
by the Badcllffs Oomittoe. ~ ttM» for iiwtanoe, P. Paiah writes. "It is
• • .difficult to understand the Co^uitiau’s det< min&tion to discuss
monetary prbblsua in terns of overall liquidity* which is not aosBurebls,
2instead of in tormo of the quantity of money...which is." again,
T. Wilson says that, "Ffcom tins to time doubts hare been expressed about 
tli<3 importance of ohoagee in Uxe cuaount of romy. The Ifedeliffe Kepoi’t 
lias undoubtedly tended to otreugUien ouch ooeptioisn. It is then proper 
to ask whether the post-wsr Duropoan re&Mg were altogether pointless..• 
Moreover it is significant that oven ia liussia and acme of the satellites,
planning was not thought to make the amount of nancy an irrelevant oon-
a
sideawition.**
I. oee other angunents by M. Decay, i^agoy bnder Bevisw. London 19*60, 
Chapter VI, pp. 97-115i B.V. Ite^an, *^cncy, Liquidity end Interest 
Bated”, IlgyCc jfcgyk huviev, July 1961, pp. 26*38> M. flosfrtn, co. cit.. 
pp. 2?^n95«
8. F.V. Paiah, cp. cit.. p. 595
J. 2. VU«», Inflation. pp. i5>4.
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Th© lindcliff© ileport was aloo subject to criticism from ©eonmistn 
in other Gauntries* Xtaay bo of interest to demonstrate an American view, 
presented by Bloomfield, who mrrm’issed critical^ the Baport’s new 
concept as fallowsi-1
Tho texincnt thc~ic of the Import centres around tho proposition that the 
monetary authorities, in their efforts to influence th® level of demand, 
hew© to focus not on th© supply of isoney but on th© liquidity position 
of the whole soqsuyv in which the activities of banks play only a pert, 
although adxiitted.ly a key Oi*>. Xiowover, th© oonoept of the ganoral 
liquidity position is nowhere adequately :xolyoed, despite th© detailed 
deeeziptions of the various sources of licpiidity.
In this respect, tho Committee strosoeo th© role of tho r.on^bank fimnoiol 
institutions which oars not directly subject to monetary control. Bush 
institutions can, by their lending activities, greatly isifluens© th© 
liquidity of the economy. Therefore, rootraining the supply of money 
clone might be offset by increased adzonooe from these institutions and 
indeed by increased lending from the bonks theaselvoa. In other wordo, 
restraint on the money supply might be offset by * rise in velocity - a 
tern whieh the Comlttec does not Wee. Fbr tide reason, tho Comittoe’s 
major reconrientlution ie that tho Berth of Tto~3*»d> a» nmeger of the 
national debt, should work more egfereusivoly^ than hitherto to influence 
tii© whole level and otructuro of inturoat mbs©, and apecislly the nove- 
cent of long-tom rates, so oc to exert the desired impact on th© gsM&ol 
liquidity position and thus on tho level of total deraand. Interest changes 
will work mainly through their general "liquidity effect” (availability
1. A.I. BloaufUld, ”An -daaricsn Impression”, beetminaW Bank hovicv
JSfaverhcr 1959» PP* 15*20*
IOC
offoct), i.e. by influencing the willingneeo owl ability of financial 
institutions to lend end of bucinouseu and individuals to spend.
Although tiio Cocuittoo <xmatuutly ihLui iizee the control of aotMy supply 
focunes rathar on the liquidity position, it otreaaea the key importance of 
controllin,; the banks in norml ti^eo vie, cash and liquid noela ratios 
Control of UdS cwniay supply i» ee®; to bo of viajor importuned after all*
Ti» Uomittee insists, however, that theft# con-:?ols are alacd at the 
banks as lenders, not no creators of uonoy; but in Various places it 
atrooca the relcraace ef deposits as mftu Xf advwwes do rise tzn&gy, 
the Coranitteo favours raising tha liquid asset© zutio. If such arlao had 
to be ‘‘appreciable*', it would rcoQuumd in such oirouraetances (altbou^x 
not co a rule in nornal tinea) the to>ooiticn of comparable rectrainte on 
other Institutions*
Section a
Our alia vio-d-vis tide debate io to consider the target of noaetary 
policy in teams of the availability of credit. In fact, It would be 
eeefcrouely difficult to conduct a statistics! investigation throu^ the 
’’supply of jaoway’5 which will nooowitatQ using the concept of ’Velocity 
cf cirwlatian* •
Pcrh&pe thia difficulty has ft3 ***? rajwfo Couaittec decide to •• -■ -.-x> 
with the concept of velocity, 'fhoy o^plolned (fare. 2?lz that they “have 
net aade mem use of this concept because we cannot find any reason for 
supposing*..that there is ary liMt to the velocity of circulation* it 
is a statistical concept tiiat tolls us nothing directly of the aotlvatioo 
that influences the level of total tisntta&«*
3Ul
lijtawcr, other economists share tiw» CiiMittae’a viou on thia point.
rox instance, £. Hanson ’*X think wo should do well io eliminate,. . . ■•■
once anti for all, the phrase ’velocity circulation* from our veoeMMp' 
The ’voice! t\ of circulation* io, X feel, wdortunate beeauee
these who eaploy it tend io ueko on indepaident ontity out of it end
Infold it with a ooul. Xhie little ;auiuiihi- is placed m the stage, and
the audience is led to heliovo that it is oiklowed 4U the rower oi
decisions dirootins and eatrtxcXXing the flow of eesxegete span&ing* In 
i
fact it is nothing of the eort. Xt is a nere rcsiduai?*
1. A.U. Hansen, ;aa_ AuerUan , 8.X. 19$?, ,. JO.
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The conclusion of the last eheotai- was that, following th© Radcliffe 
Caamitte©, monetary control should operate tlurough the concept of the 
’’whole liquidity*1 of the public rather tW the n supply of money*: and 
that the "whole liquidity’1 may bo contemplated a© tho "availability of 
credit0 - particularly bank credit. Bene©, on© of the main ©date of 
restrictive zaoaxatexy policy, during a period of inflation, 1© to restrain 
the volume of bank advances.
The role of banks under a restrictive police,', •* m© W ©uggest team 
the shove per^^raph, will be the subject of our investigation* Xt is, 
henos, necessary to define, first, our bnttlefieldi that is th® London 
Clearing Bmska and tho Banking J^rstm a© © whole.
The British monetary controls work pvdte differently from those of 
Muy other countries (e*g* the United States) because of difference • in 
lav end cuotoc in tho institutional structure of the money saaateet sad th© 
benktog eye too.
Concernir<: the comeroial banks, tiwo are about twenty banks in the 
United Kingdom with approximately 12 000 breaches. Th© commercial 
bonking system ie, however, dominated by the London clearing banks,
1. For a fuller description of tho clearing bank©, ©ee &.S. Seyer j, Ij8*b£& 
Banking. 6th ed., Oxford 19<&, Appendix XX t ‘The London Banking Clearing 
155©% pj>» 301-3.
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elwr banks In BhgXand and WaXm, which belong to the London Cloorlix; 
Fouoo and urvlertnkQ almost all t3m demotic banking business. They liave 
rhout 80*' of all branches and 85 of all deposit*? in the United Kingdom.* 
Of these eleven, Besdaye* Lloyds, the Midland, the National Itrovinoial 
and the Veotrainstor are the so*oallod n3ig Pivs" whose rosoomos are 
cixMswmth© of the total. The Bictrict dt^d Ilertina follow (8% of the 
total). Then, Willien TJeccaa’a ©aid Glyn, Hills are in oomen ownership 
(of tlxo Loyal Bonk of Scotland) > end Coutts mcesd by the National Proviso- 
dal. Lastly, the Nations! 3m& is pretetouitly an Irish Bank.
Thus the British banking systen is naagi nor© concentrated. The result
of this kind of structure io that the power of the mnetuxy outhorltisc to
influence dtroctly the actions of the caxmoial bonk©, that is the moral
smoion, la ma‘; creator in Britain. A mall grou/i of bonk executives
located in London sad having alosa relations with tho Bonk of Bbglacd end
th© Treasury oxcroiso.o control over the bulk of the banking resources of
2tlio oountxy.
v/hat is the function of tliooc bonks* Clesrizu? bonks. so (wuEjeraial
undortekino^t safe-keep cash deposited with them by their cuetoners. Xn
1. W.L. uuith and &.?» hikessli, “Sbe -a^eotivenes© of xmwtaxy PoAeyS 
323E.-. J&isJ&a&v 1957, P« 23.
2. Because of its long-estobliixsod reputation sc leader and controller 
of the Banking jyntoa, ary hints or aug^estiane aside by the Bank o£ 
England to the other banks are treated with great respect* They
even load to the doeirod result without the adoption of any other 
measures. The ConctfftQdftl banka realise that in the last resort the
2tesk can always enforce its will
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general, they are mainly concerned with the receipts, transfer and 
encashment of dopoeitc fron their ewtoucro repctfBbl© on demand. They 
staid as debtors to their customers whose balances ere liabilities of the
banks end aacete of the customrG ttaioclvos. !?ron the point of viov of 
ronotwpy policy, those assets Com a crucial element in the liquidity of 
the oocmony. Concerning the liabilities, they are covered by bank assets 
of their own.
This is by no mans the only function of banks. The possession of
these cash ro’servoe enables fas to expand credit - i.e. the banks i>tcur
. ? 1 ; fc’*.. ' ' SL*
debts Milch they know fren cDcpericnoc will pass frwn hand to hand by .aeons 
of cdotcuos end only, in few eases bo drown out in cash. The banker knows 
that only about one twelfth of hie total debts will bo used by the creditor 
in the form of ©ash. Henoo, by thia ratio, for cvesy £100 in cash in his 
vault©, he can safely incur liabilities of £1200. By far the greater pert 
of tills £1200 will bo wood by depositors to make payments by cheques.
But how does a bank incur these Xihbilitiee? If a customer deposits
£100 in cash, the bank f&itonatict&ly incurs e liability of £100 in the 
shape of the depositor*n account, on Match he can call at a^y time. Mt 
her can the bank incur the ertrr. liabilities of C110C eo as to brine the 
total to the £1200 which the bank can safely incur with such a £100 cuah 
reserveTo answer thio q^ueotien we have to exanine a hank's balance ahest9
which involves both aseSts end liabilities (Tableo 00-31 and Mg. 15)3 We
X. In a full task batace sheet, certain other relatively ulnar itaas will 
net be dioouaeed • capital subatabea by ^iwro-iiOlders, value of bank 
premises, etc. itar this reason, the total assets as percentages of ^eoas 
deposits (in Table 81) ere not 100/,.
►tert vith bonks’ assets, leaving liabilities to Section B.
dasslfiah into 'liquid* sad ''risk** or ’‘ear/iic^1 
tructuro of these osaote, ve tag^ start with the 
assets« The cooebpt of bank liquidity, in
3wUa>’ osseto xae/ b* 
aascts- Mecussihg the s 
first group* i*e* liquid
go;ieral ter.^, is the ability of a bank to met dos&nds for repeyaemte
by depositors as the/ arise* -ate this rocccn, a hank has to hold a«ra© 
of its assets in S zaore or lees liquid fo&e to allow it to obtain cash 
when needed in a way that rini^isoe capital loos.
A liquid asset uic/- be defined ac that asset which can be turned into 
cask nt W* short notice end without capital loss. Th® fbetor which 
swderc a bank asset truly liquid li©-- in the power conferred by the pcs* 
asGSien of the asset to induce the Bank of iixglaiiu to create additional 
central hank credit» which constitutes buck cash. Liquidity in other 
words depends on the nohlftabilXty! to the central bank, And in practice* 
’’automtic' liquidity is confined to (a) maturing govsmwxt securities, 
(b) assets eligible for rediscount with the central bank and held by the
discount houses.
After giving en idea of the general concept of bank liquidity and 
liquid assets, ve define the nsor© specific clearing banka assets ** tho 
quickest and wot realisable assets* Liquid assets of a clearing bank 
arc oowpooed of the following four itesm -
(l) Cash receive, which coapri^c..> the noteu and coin held in the till 
O U-.'v UsrliO k/4Jui^»* *Wl» V4 4 V4 i'-> ». of jr^land* As seen above, the
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banks adopt a fira convention timt their cash reserves mat always aqual 
e ttininum of ft* of total liabilities.1 Since the banks profit fron 
acquiring the naactoun voluna of assets ooneistont with safety, they do 
not eilov the cosh ratio to rise significantly above 8^. By thio ratio, 
if the cash reserves fall by 1 Lu., the banks auot roduoo their total
■jjS. tp - ’ *e»- *\fc. 1a /’ - •> . « - ‘ ’ A. ■?** •-'IX; /. s t -4 p' v 3sii i
liabilities by about 12 !.»•; coaveraely, a rise of 1 X.a. in their ca^ 
vculd enable then to egpsnd their total liebilities by ebout 12 X».»...<’ - ?./..' • J- ; ' <i ■ ; .. ,.' ' :••■ .. ’\ •
.'- . ;•■. , ’ '" *’xe:k- '*- ’- * ' • ' ’- - • ’.-- ' -S' < ” • *'' •
(2) Haney at call and short notice, tft&dh includesi. • •
(a) loans of short duration to discount toouoea;
(b) ether a&osy at call and abort notice.
(3) Treasury bills discounted.
«
(Zj.) Other bills discounted.
These are, in short, the banka’ liquid assets, uhibh fo.-~i Ciuir 
reserve against cash demode. Tho first itm (i.e# cosh) my bo called 
the first-lino reserves# Cash ratios are usually calculated aa a percen­
tage of total deposits. Xn the wto way, liquidity sat 1 os, or the
1. Another difference between tiio British Lankin# eyettn end that of 
many other countries is that no legislation governs the reserve require­
ments. For soconple, in the United Utatoa every aember bank of the 
Federal Reserve System is caerpallcd by lev to keep reserves equal to
at least of its tin©*dopooit& end from 7^ to 13 (varying with the 
looation of the bank?* of its other deposit© (C. Crevtker, An Outline 
of Mw». London 306, 0).
2. Both call arney end bills constitute the uoney eaodfict which vill ba 
discussed later.
3. For swtro details, nee "Bank Liquidity in the United Kinodea", Bank
2C9
seconder li<juidi1gr ratios ae they two smetimee soiled, ero calcruletnd 
&a percentages of total deposits (Tufole 31).
Sbnoe» if a bonl: finds itself rMo to expend credit (i.e. if its 
or:ch reeervoa arc nore then i33 of itr csdfetirg liabilities), it esn do 00 
by acquiring any other asset < it erm go into the aoney :r,3rtteet or Stock 
Tbxshisnge to buy Milo or Xeng^t&m noenr^tiea, or it can nafco loans to 
nonsy-rndtot deel<ws> bueinsesnen or private IMiridtorlo. On either typo 
of unset the bank earns interest.
For rooson© that will be discussed, the liquidity ratio should not
fell below 30 par cent while the cash ratio is held at 8 per cent. These
two ratios differ net only in aaaant but also in several other respects^ •
particixiarly tho seasonal uovc xnitei in i&reh tliO liquidity ratio io
redwood towards the nlnism of 30 per cent of total deposits, in 3ss Briber
it is about 35 >•* cent (Table 83 «ftd Pi/;*. 14).
2
One reason for this seaooml variation ie that tho heavy inflow of 
tax into ike *bcehoriuei- (appsxx^imtoly of the total) ie concentrated in 
the Inst quarter of the financial your (i.c. the first quarter of the 
calender year ox fre kDeeedber to nid4W- <
into surplus in thio period. 3uch pcytwntB will reduce oubstoitially bank 
deposits end liquid assets. The Lenka will loan deposits and cash to the 
Beau : of ufcclml as their cue toner© pap their ta®oe» and hence en equal loss
of esek and of deposits will reduce tho honks’ liquidity ratios. The
*
1. Sea 5. Viloon. lafXattot. ?• MO.
3. Joaaoit&i viiriuuionu MN ci-iioctu, «• W&* ejr eotte—iul facto re;. aoe

result io tauit both deposits and liquidity 2*ntioa will ffl.1 seawon&Xly 
to a low point in Iteotu In othor words, ths banks vill gradually build 
up thoir ratio© between April mu’, Docedbor in anticipation of the <xu>onaX 
fell in the last throe notatihs of the fl'p/xticial poor. Of course, holding 
an aaoasa of liquidity ratio over 30 per coni provideo the banka with a 
ccm to avoid, pressure on UMr Xi$4d£tgr»
V© have, 00 fhr, aagaiA that cash ratio la rigid at 8 par soot* In 
fact, it baa not always bean quite as ri&id and inflexible as we hewe 
hitherto bean or^mninc* Sho cxwwmtionai pre-war Htiseo of 10 par cent 
waa sseroly a uinimun below which the Iwfw wre moot reluctant to allow 
tlte published ratio to fall. Until boeer&er 1<&6, however, the pu&lishod 
figures for banks’ oaali ratio were habitually lifted ©bore the true otjah 
ratio, by the practice known as ’ vindov-drosaln^**
FOr purposes of their weekly or monthly return®, every bank made up 
its statement on different days of tho woekj ?wd on that doy arranged to 
bare a laager bedding of sash than was normal.Sanaa, there was a 
transfer of cash fm the rejoinder of the fasten to the bank or banks 
ticking up on a pedicular dcy. In other voids, a certain mount of cu-sh 
served as wixidw-dreaairc in the otatawnt of each, bonk in turn. This, 
of course, meant that the published ratio wo® higher then tho true fiptwe.
To tho individual bonk, the position shown in the statement was
>• Tho bonks making up on a particular dep would often call in loans 
fror the discount houses, raising the cash item in their belonoe sheet 
at the expanse- of call money.
ion 01
<*X i *Ai* £WaX*
Thus > fro:: tho M/pu is/s* ttC 10^7 *■•‘»»>«Li V*4- w,y*T I •
oniry 05^1 . | <>» rv**tJLo o»
?hGre rer^ino the last ,<• Tiro
Vd-iPOaO’.i O£
*~.LV71*^ «£> O u w3><^0*wOmL 0«tfX y
r 1£&6, when the <>ankfc i^greed, ou 
3 ra&e yjj their tagn&fy otetouentai
^‘XX*,i<*«kOj>«od n*«wio woo also ai^a^oub 
31 instead of tne f o^uor xt^**
at axi tZjUMfO 9 cwxd xfca^t
lO U, i.e. soaring aseetu.
tffn'Wn ?<Y*f W» IcwM* k WhL
, \w/
(b) inreetoanto <
’Hkssg two nosete are usually oomddormt in ce^in&ticm, sinee ’’aolonora 
TAawwTtsH between invoGinonto ?;*$ ft&tnnoa© rre a fteillar feature of* 
benktn^T practice, And, ae we shall see in Chanter XI♦ thsrw ie a negative 
oerTOlr.tion bctvTeen tfee two liens*-
idv£uioa& to cusIosmto and other u;eounie$
WUSC? suntamers •coots
>« uviaw
am rosily, apart fron a
i l»s* ll nt<
«nwBMjmw»jnawHM«ji»»i>nnwffuMirTimjn i
1* It was criticised by the llacsaHisai Couaittee (Cocasttiae on Pto^ico &)&
fV-v? *’J<~*|'"’.’"?'V «-»lulw Vi
** • Other ilian and Poceiih'-:.?,'•
3* X^aoring, for the usmant, osaooial Deposits*
aw
in tko current accounts of custoswa (bu . - rarporatlona or ..rivale 
persons) who hwo w^rutw* In other words, an overdraft is a right to 
overdraw on an recount at any tine up to an ngrocc mxbrusx. Xnterost 
cheapo is paid on the amount actually uesd. & ousiasaw of a hank saey 
draw a ohoepw equinet kia deposit, thus di.ihxisiiing his credit with the 
bank? but he mny, as well, drew a oheqpe cgaiiwt has overdraft, thus 
inoroasiiii, bis debit with the bank* She total advu.oos is a vary impor­
tant asset to thw bank as being the west retro wretive part of their
assets.
Ipsa the point of viw of U^inaawJieu, banka arc the rx>st accessible 
source of credit, and bank advances ore the easiest and most convenient 
form of borrowing. Ou the other hand, retraining bank adrame, by the 
monetary authorities, can have a ooncidorable effect CM the spending of 
businoosiwi. Any interference with bard. advance® means altering the 
liquid!V situation of the economy. ._
Irgvaffteentq ero the final iten to bo discussed. $te mount of 
irxvestrxnts follows from the amount of edvnnces. &» the demand for 
advances rises, as^wdiw*'* that liquidity ratios ere not abnormally hi^i, 
investments will bo sold to r/uko way for the additional loans mid vice 
verse. Invoatr^nto sro hence the residual item of earning assess. In 
other words, the combined ratios of invootmeits and advances, or the total 
earning assets as a ratio of {pmzb deposits, is likely to be stable 
(2ablo 61),
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L </«, -w*J\ QC* - >-iCxXt»3 \*ebxO 04 , C* 3* »i-**»i
^X*Oj/vUi»' ><*Qli 4JS in JXiappllanoOU*.* t v» C* v**w 14*-i» £ Colonial, ...unicipal eai
O * 4*XiO iJlX^**** O»b. lr&»4iw$X W<b> 4*4»bfteia «**XX xaat and govemmnt
^XU-OTCAttOv-O «iiCa• «XxO -*•-< !>• »a2?1 etr.&oburc O f thia iten is? of ia?ox>
taaoo froa the point af view of lawtiasy polios* diuoe the end of 1P51 •
the unteitir dl^'tribution of bank ^♦O4riX«i»-~-^O Oj» ti »'» ■ -•'? oacuritiee hsve l>een
usro or lass evenly distributed between oocuritioa with leap than five
/ouro and bands with mra tSasn five j’oux1:; to run to final maturity dale*
Invoetnonte oorvo u dual function to tho bankai on the one hand,
very short bonds are roinforooi sent to ike buifce1 liquid aaeete as a
safeguard o&ninot witlidrawsle of deposits* buck oeouritie® can be nor-
kotad witxxout ^teat capitffc» xosjo• vix «*»«c OidiAiX' hand, ixsreataenta aa a 
2whole oervo oo a buffer to d*6Adon clusuigcAj in advsmpee *
Within the total of oox*niii<; nooeto, kov would their percentage be
divided between advances oawl invootexonta’i rfhe Ksdcliffe taoalttee shows 
\iu Paseu 132/ tk&t tlte uu&etjjr of the bankers to met tho needs of their
boriwlitj cuotoacrc .-slcao thoa fvi ,-proaaol by )d<;h ratios of crivsneoG
during the 1220* e) reckon on 60 pas? cent of total deposits or even mre 
in >»• > Ho it io true
that x*utioa in.ti&oooa of <So per cent have beexi peon, it Might be nearer 
to the truth to say* that, with udvmoca at these oxHted levels, few 
bankoro oan Ixove alept cox^fcrtably in uioir bed©. So far as tho future
WIMWWMiJ—KIWI iHTtFfli.iiTH iWmWI -~ sst*»
1. T Jfl *v<p M- *iy,.iy o v/a v<- laanort,
2. bhese pointe will be diocusacd in proctor detail in Chapters Vill, 
XX and XX.
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ie concerned, it would be vror<* to infer that ration of 6c per cent or
over ore likely to bo ooai lijixvor, ft©: Pig. 15 wo so© that
advances have not risen above ’>5 per ccirfc during the 1950’e.
Median 3
So far bajto* assets have been discussed. Let us now ooneidar their
deposits. Apert frou th© capital subscribed the stock-holders of & 
bonk, its liabilities ere repraemtod by its deposits - th© mounts due 
to its euettaors. A <xx;mrcial bank create© deposits by acquiring cs.ida. 
Xn other words it erodes a deposit in return for any asset it eeoepts 
ftpoa another party, whethor tills asset is cash, a goverrasant seouri'iy, or 
the pronlae of a endorser to repey a loan. I’enoe, If a back acquiree 
cash, the persons fren when tho oash is acquired sro credited with an 
equal araount in its deposits. If it &&ko« a loan, it dose eo by opming 
a deposit in the borrover’a nano for the cnount cunoexned. If it buys 
securities, it pays for then by crediting the sellers* account with tho 
snount of tlio yurohaee.
Generally, an iaidividuol holds o stock of iwo;; in tho fom of bank 
deposits for one or ruore of those reagent
(a) He my hold it to cover the interval between the dates when he
1. M. 3ooey, JliSSaiJa^KJSSSSJb P- <t6>
2. J.H. Keyaoa, & Syaatiso or, l^gME. Vol. I, London 1930, to*j). 3. 
Pp. 3W#.
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x-weeivea his poreonal incae© end the datos when he spends it.
Deposits of this kind, which my bo oalled income deposits, are 
replenished by individuals out of their personal incense and 
employed by them to neat their personal expenditure end their 
personal savings.
(b) In the oexae way a businessman, s nmufrcturer or & speculator
ie usually unable to arrange Ms roceipte end outgoings eo as
to be aimltsneouo} in other words the natch ie not, in general,
perfect. Aa a result, he will find himself in possession of 
temporary balances of bank deposits. uch deposit* held for 
business puxposea insy be called Lujliio^-depoaits.
(o) Lastly, bank deposits may bo hold as a means of employing 
•wings, i.e. a* an lnveetemt* The holder aoy be attracted by 
different factors, ouch as the rate of interest which hie bank 
allows him. Thia type of deposit© aay La called aavinge depoaito.
The first two items, i.e. the incono-depceita end tho bueineae-dopo* 
cite together, task© up what xaey be called the cash, deposits. The cash 
deposits correspond to the so-called Current Account (or Demand-Depooits 
in tho United states). The boldsms of cuxrent accounts may use their 
deposits to obtain cash or transfer then by cheque, at aay ties and 
without notice. The eevings deposits earreiwond to the Deposit Account 
(or Time-Deposits in the United Lt&tes). To use such deposits, notice of 
a week or nor© oust first be ^jiven to the Lank.
A bank in its business, as s ocmmeroiel undertaking, finds that it 
con lend out were mozuy, i.e* create mro debts against itself, than it
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has In raaem« of cash. This noano that a ban}-: 1® ahi® to "create"
1 .K * 4-'S
rsonoy. or In morn preoiee tens, croato 'fcJio equivalent of cash In the 
fora of credit. Clearly these operation© are profitable for the bank.
Bow does this liappen?
het ua assume that a buelnesannr. goes to Ills bank for a credit. That 
precisely happens' The moot usual method of making a loan la merely to 
credit the account of the borrower with tho aim of the loon. The bank 
has, then, created a debt against itself in the fora of a book entry-
Mow, the businessman has a claim u&^inst his bank and can use it as money
of
far his payments. In other words, becaue^en entry in its books, which 
is accepted in place of coat , a honk is able to create an advance, 
the borrower draws some of the loan out of cask but he is more likely to 
Spend it by cheque.
The point to be noticed is that the granting of the lean has Increased 
the bank’e debts (i.e. an increase in the bank’s deposits will ooour) 
and the old banking xaxim that “every lean creates a deposit** will apply.
Of oourae, in exchange for the debt created in favour of the busineaaaon, 
an equal debt has been created by the biviireeuatan in favour of the bank.
The ban!: ha®, therefore, a chain against the buoincssrcan.
Making loan© is not the only way in which deposits cau be created.
If a banker buys securities on the Stock -acchange and pays for them by 
crediting the sellers* account with the price, the amount of deposits will
1. For a historical review of Grouting bank credit, see E. Kevin, Taact- 
boqk M Aaalrai^. 2nd ed«, London 1963, pp. 282-66) A. 9t|r,
Outline of Monetary ioonooioa, Oxford 1%C, pp. 120-29.
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knGT&MQ, She wae tti»£ applies in the esse of the scq^ieition of s»y 
other onset.
To suru^aria© tfce above discussion, e teak creates deposits in two
weysj
(a) It creates than in favour of individual depositors against the 
MCStft of either ©ash or an order (l.o. cheque) mthorlsinc the 
transfer of a deposit in com bonk (either ©aether bonk or itself).
(b) There io a second way in which a bask ray create a claim against
itself. Xt may add to its asrnlng assets, i.e. add to Ito
investments, and pa$ for thorn by ecM&UfelS$ a claim agaiaot
itself. Or the bank way create a claim sgainot itself in flavour 
1
of a borrower; it may make ioass or advances.
In both cases the bank creates a denoeit in its bocks entitlin the
customer to drew cash or to transfer his claim to the order of someone 
elee. It follows that a bank will be, on the one hand, ctmtinuously
creating deposit© either for value received or against overdrafts, rad,
*
on the other hand, cancelling, deposits, because claims against it ore 
being exercised in cash or transferred to other banks. Thus it is 
constantly receiving claims against other Wike rad having to meet claims 
from ether bonks.
It is therefore evident that the b«nk must sc conduct its business
that these opposite processes can be spprexinately offset against one 
mother. In other words, tbs amount of cash paid out dsy by day 
together with tha amount of the datos from other banka are not very
rt.'fl.W.aswP’.-csKiaai’Wt-.n.war’ia.sMB
1. A third source of bank deposits oomso fsm a purchase by the control 
bank of securities from the public.
different from the amount of cash received together vith the amount of 
the claims against other beaks. Xt is noceeaasy for the bank to be sure 
that its daily accruing assets in the slices of o&ah and olaiw ©hall he 
as necrly eo possible equal to itcs daily accruing liabilitiee in those 
fowe.
Xt follows that the rate at which tbs bonks can? with safety, “so- 
tively'? create deposits by leading and investing has to be in a proper 
relation to the rate at which it la ?lpaosiv©ly** creating theci against 
the receipt of liquid resources fi*om lta depositors. Fox’ the latter 
iasreusos tW bank's reserves «v«k. if only a part of then is ultimately 
retained by the bask, whereas the tarns dtntntshas the reserves even if 
only a part Of then is paid swa^ to the cue toners of other banks.
By way of sumajy, the ccstaox^oial btudcc ora the jaecheniesa which 
acooB^iiahoe "saanoy creation” » To&fty, moct purchases are paid for by 
cheque© drown on bank deposits. ^Tactically, therefore, deposits have 
become accepted as money. But they sap© ale© bank debts, liabilities of 
a bank to its depositors. Kov do these bank deposit liabilities arise? 
Usually they ore incurred when a depositor brings in cash or a cheque on 
another bank which tho recipient hqhk can collect in cash. The deposit 
of tho customer at the recipient bnrt: ie increased while the public's 
total holdings of cash and deposits in other bank© are reduced by a like
OriWBMWWi B> > TWn ■»(» fW»te»t»MIMW
1. In accepting cask, whether directly fsco«Ei the public or through a 
favourable balance at the clearing bouse, a bank is passive. hen cash 
eoiaes to a bank through the clearing hsso, there ie usually a oorreo-
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amount. The nation*® total uonuy supply ronains unchanged. When & bank 
nukes a lean or toys a security, hSMSVer, It is a different atozy. She 
bank accepts ite customer1 a note ox security p-tt& in exchange gives hin 
on equivalent increase in his deposit account* Nobody else loeeo a 
deposit- Consequently, the total deposits fthe money mpply) is increased* 
Honey has boon increased.
however, the banks cannot create too ...xny loans in thin way. It must 
be remnbored tluxt the advances tho banker creates are his liabilities.
The viide ays tai depends upon the fact that vciy fev loans vill be encashed* 
Tho customs© vill exchange *»• P^’t of the additional credit for each 
(which the bank cannot create).
A banker’s whole business depends upon the confidence of tfoe public 
in his ability to aeet his liabilities on dcsasnd. If tho ouotmera are 
sceptical about the bank's ability to turn its deposits into cash on 
dousnd, uany of then will draw their deposits out of cash Just to be euro. 
Any banker, then, vill sake it an unbreakable rule of Ixis business not 
to let his cast, foil below a certain proportion of his deposit liabilities. 
He met alweyv demos trots that ho holds adequate cash, piss liquid vasete, 
that can he turned into cash, to □set ady yoe3ible dosand. In other words, 
the important consideration viiich mat ulway s influence his decision to 
create credit io that of “liquid! ty,!, Which moans his ability to convert 
oseets into cash.
Experience hbevs that banks have to hold an amount close to 8 per cent
(ooutd.) ^pendinj loss of coal; by other banks, sad a oorrospondir^ 
reduction of deposits In other banks, so that no increase in the total 
of deposits arises.
of their deposits in cask. Althouy tide re t io is aufficient to meet 
tbs norml demands for cash which a banker Is likely to encounter, the 
banker has, In principle, the obligation to repay "all** his depositors 
in oaeh on deEjand, if they should require it. SiBMy in the interest of 
safety, a banker slxrnld be able to convert sene of hie other assets into 
cask if unusual damond threatens to asksuat Ms reserves. Therefore, ia 
addition to holding a rdLnisw proportion of cash, the banks will also 
hold liquid assets which brine a low return but can be quickly and 
easily t^xraod into cash without appreciable risks of capital lose. There 
has to be, thcrudox'o, a corwraaise between liquidity on the ono hand md 
profitability on Hie other. Xt la clear that an advance io not a liquid 
asset, even tliough the banker stay he confident shout receiving full 
rapeyr-ont, since he oennot get it at a noismt^ notice when he needs 
extra tssb. l<br is a bond a liquid ascot} it is indeed markotable, but 
its value mey suffer a capital loss if it is sold. Xt is hence the ooney 
lent at call, treasury bills and oauiwciaX bills, that are highly liquid
asoetc.
As a general rule, the banks Mill wold reducing their deposits of 
eask plus other liquid caseto (i.e. their liquidity ratio) below 30 per 
cent. Vhen the creation of credit entails an increocc in their depoolts 
without an ineroas© in their liquid assets flttd hence a fall in their 
liquidity ratio, the bod; will bo increasingly reluctant to continue to 
oreato deposited
1. Aasutsing a 30^ liquidity rate, deceits cannot exceed ttoasWc 
amount of liquid assets. 5
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Xfcoii the point of view of .‘aomtety policy, the bcaaka’ observing these 
WtSM (i-a< the cash ratio end the y>'> liquidity ratio) provides the 
uonetaxy authorities wit), the rae&us of ta&ueafetag the ox'e&ticn of credit 
by acting upon the supply of cosh end of the ether liquid assets.
□eotion C
Before continuing th© diaeitsoion on the implications of tho cash r«d 
liquidity ratio©, ve etop for a while ant devote this Section to enetbar 
wiqpe feature of the British mnetaey and beefclag syetea • that ie the 
nature and role of the dtemmt mechanism. The Discount Market consists 
of tho twelve diooount house© in tho London Diecount Unaket Association 
together with sone sneller firms not in the association.
The discount market repracwte the principal dement in the London 
ehort-tens aono; market, however, the torr ’’discount market* is no longer 
a;,noi^’nous with "bill market”. It bccui© customary for the masks t, in our
i „ _
Rodeir. economy, to hold substantial amounts of s?v>rt-ter^ bond® (Table 
35) * i.e., hertag leoo then fire years to run. In foot, holdings of 
such bonds have apparently constituted their mjer source of earnings •
The Market prevideo tho clmirtny benlss with a means of minimising 
the ooeh kept idle to meet th© dmnnd of their ountoners. Hence, banka 
have kept for tide purposes only about 8 por cent of their deposits. Thfly
1. See diopter XV on the distribution of the national dtbt.
arc content to accept a relatively lev level of earninrs on stwah an n*sset 
when they can he sure of itc liquidity * i.e. of turning It into cash at 
a moment’s notice.
About half of tho Kaa&et’o borrov-od funds cones from tho London 
elcatin; banks (Table 36}$ the root cones the other connerci&l totes* 
and to a very smll extent from other cucteaero. The funds which the 
discount norteot borrows (together with its own oapitcl) age, in effect* 
lent to the govemaent by bolding treasury bills and short-dated bonds, 
and to the private sector by holding coixurciul bills. The market also 
deals to a leaser extent in bills issued by local Authority a and short- 
dated Local Autiiority stocks.
The discount market obtains Its supply of treasury bills at tho weekly 
tender. Who clearing banks hevc agreed nrenget themselves not to compete 
with the disoowxt market in obtaining tro^unu^r bills for thdir own account 
at the weekly tender. This is because, from one side, the discount neatest 
i® of irrportenco tc thm as a aeons of employing funds with the certain^ 
that they can be recalled on demand; also because banks prefer to hold 
bills with only & few wastes to run. Therefore, the tender tends te b© 
dciiinatod by tho discount bouses who. usually, cover the amount of 
treasury bills on offer. Coixaepueutly, tbs govsrnaent can be sure that 
its weekly borrowing on treasury bills will be satisfied. However, the . 
discount houses arc exposed to competition* frc^uaatly substantial, fresa 
tho dosriag todfc© tendering on behalf of their cuetenors, te»a other hastes 
and certain taenay brokers and from owwroea© central banks. Usually the
&}
outside tenders nro accepted in fill, end tho s^mdicatr gete the rest 
which is allotted ascmc the rm&wo of the syndicate in proportion to 
their individual tenders • Thus if the apatite of outsiders for hills 
increases, they sen satisfy it e* the es^er.so of the discount houses. If 
bill holding of the discount houses are rodveed in tfcia way, they find 
thanaelvetf with surplus fuad«, nddel they can use to repay leans at th© ; 
bank©. , Thus feli^id eassts of the banks (in the for?; of isoncy at oaU 
and short notice) are reduced. • In addition, os the banka1 hill holdings 
ran off, they nay find it ifeezroaoiv. *2y difficult to cbtr-in naw bills from 
the discount houcoa, which are starved for hills. The result is, of 
course, a strain on their liquidity ratio.
the discount house© have a unique place in the fimctiouing of the
. •**
□onetes* ayatec since it is throve*. then ihrt the Boni, of Baglcnd operate* 
ee lender of last resort. Traditionally„ the clearing banks have no 
direct eeceee to tSio tape of Batglnnd. Bather, it is oistcaaxy for any 
bank, whie? in the course of a day’s Uiuiness finds its cash reserves 
below the 8 per cant level, to rcplonie?, thm by calling in loans free: 
the dteount houses*
If one bank neodo the cosh, the discount houses can ordinarily borrow 
fro-4 another bank the funds required to repay the first. However, if all 
honk® arc. in need of cash (i.e* if the chcrtug'e is caused by a flow of 
funds fron hanks to the tbaabeQuar; and they eisxulimeoiialy begin to ©all 
in loans, the discount houses vdll find, it necessary- to borrow frees the
1. These points will he discussed in Chapter VIXI in greeter detail.
of IJnglend,
Currently tho Bank ie prepared to laid to the discount hemes, since 
it stands rood; to servo ee a "lender of Xeet roBort". Tho Bank eats the 
toms (i.e, tho Bank Rate) at which it ie ^reparod to lend to the dlooowat 
houses. This sate ie ordinarily a penalty rate, i.e, it is higher tl*m 
the discount rat© on bills, Bltimtely, the discount houses con, instead 
of discounting their troaoiny biUo, borrow ftm the Bank oa the security 
of treasury bills. In this case, tlw have to pay interest at shore 
Bank Ba to.
Thus, when the mrkot is fowed into the Bank, direct pressure is 
escorted to force the bill rate upward! and as a result of the tradition 
vdiioh mintaina oufltoaary differontialo between the various rates of 
interest, the whole intoroot-wte etruottir© tends to be pushed upwards,1
Meoorittafo of Ifridesw ©hows, whmi Bunk Bate is 5 per cent, norasl 
de^-to-day races;- rates will be frora 3& to 4 per cent.
Given the present institutions caaas^pouente, how ssy the Bonk date 
aerve as a monetary weapon? how ©on m incrooee in thia Rate restrict 
the supply of bank aredit? The answer to this question will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. fhe aeetmlm of the process will now be 
presented in brief. For the Bank Rate to liars my effect other Wan a 
psyoholCksioal one, th© aarket roust be forood into the Bank. This osa be
X, Certain relations noirially prevail onong the acre important afcort-tem 
rates, e.g, the rate on treasury bills normally lies between tho rates 
charged by th© benko for loans to the discount houses and the Bank Rate,
2. ftfcSoliffe Couiitteo, iteB£SMMJ»3£SEe&. yart I. D? «W Doris of 
England, Ik). J, pep. 10-12.
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ecoCB&lltiheA tlnourb the sale of soeuritioe in the open mrket by tho 
Bank of Sheland. tfueh sales reduce the batiks* cash (in the fora of the 
bankers’ deposits at the Benk of Shgland). In order to restore their 
cosh reserves, they vill contract their loons to tho discount houoes 
which vill then be forced to barren? ffen the Bank at a penalty rate.
The Bank of Inland has mdo Bank Bate effective, beeanse the discount 
Imuses arc beiny forced to re-discount bills at Bank Kate, or to borrow 
on the security of bills at jgl ebovo it*
Both the cpm-mxfeot sales of soouritico and tho effect of the penalty 
rate will work to raise the intor iot rate cm treasury bills. Thus v4sn 
the Bank Bate is raised and tbs Bank of ikj^land sells securities in the 
open weteet to mko the rate increase effective, the treasury bill rate 
tends not only to rise absolutely but to move nearer to the Bank Hate.
Since tho <&oteaary practice is to keep the interest rate cm deposit 
accounts 2$ boles the Bank Hate, tills operation tends to widen (at loaat 
initially) the differential between the bill rate and the rate on deposit 
accounts. Thia interest g&v my thus indwo holders of deposits to shift 
to bills. Xf these bills are ebta&o&d at the expense of tbs becks, 
deposits and tho banks’ bill holdings arc reduced by equal mounts, tte 
lowering the liquidity ratio and ocawint; tho banks to contract the supply 
of credit*
22C
Section I)
We here now become fmiliar with the canning of ©ask and liquid 
aacete ration of the clearing basics, also with the oiroiaastonoee that 
lead the hanks to Observe thorn The nooct step is to invest ijnto the 
conditions in which bonks are forced by inmiffioiont liquid assets to 
restrict their advances, In thio reopeot the two ratios hare to be
considered.
An important development in the toohMque of monetary policy, during 
the 1950’a» was the introduction of th© liquidity ratio, rather than the 
traditional cask ratio, as the major dotossalnant of the volune of oloaeizvi 
banks’ advances. Xn the early part of thia century, the cash ratio was 
the emir© of attention of the rxmotary nuthoritiea. The Bank rarely if 
ever saw need to strike direct at liquidity and Ixmoo took no interest 
iM liquidity ratios, it that tim, tlio volw&e of treasury bills and the 
holding by the benlsing system of bills was eoere© * floating debt was 
1£I*,eu in 1900 or 2»$ » of the total defoi,^ 3fam the point of view of the 
public, attention was concentrated upon the published cash ratio which 
boocrao the test by viiicfo the public judged the safety of bonks, Changes
in drewstanoas proved tliat mneboa^ conditions cannot be controlled by 
2operations on cosh ratio, Such change in te^rdcuu cme into effect as
!• Tables j, 6,
2. M. Dace? CrigiW-.VafliW awiow, p. 11) ex£u<» that 
“oeah actio" noc, in fact, ceased after 1914.
the validity of
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a result of the following factors.
The supply of treasury bills lias greatly increased$ and tho holdings
of tho banking system increased, as Moll, up to about a quarter of total
hills or a little less than half of tbs nnrket holding.2, Imediutoly
hofor© the First vosrld War, the volme of treasury hills uss about 15
l.su, compared with about Sfa I**r.u of trade hills. During tSio 19% *a (in
19%) the volrno of treasury hills des increased to nearly ?6c l*u* Mhile
oaxiercial hills declined to loss ttec. 300 l.a. Xn the 1960’s, the issue
of treasury hills has risen to more than 5000 I.iu whilo ooc$;iercial bills 
2
ranged from 400 to 500 l.m. To explain th** reasons fbr this developrwiti 
on the one hand, the enewous rise in the volume of treasury hills is a 
reflection of the expansion in the national debt as a whole iron less 
than 640 L.cu in 1900 to about 29000 L.su in 1962. The two world wars 
were, as seen in Chapter II, tho uu^ox factor in Ufa context. On the 
other hand, the relative importance of the ©ras^roi&I hills hes declined 
uoinly ss a remit of the i^raveuonts in transport and in banking during 
the present centaay. The fewer has auoh reduced the tlac-lag between 
production and sale, end hence the amount of capital needed to finance 
trade. The latter has enabled businasir/.icn to finance their transactions 
through the nor© flexible and eawenient nedim of bank credit. In abort, 
this development jasons that the banking sjyutsn rune nowadays on treasury 
bills which have bocoae the true basis of credit.
rwunwnimir nww»^«w iT-T»*mwaw
1. Bee Chapters I and XI.
a. E. Mwto, Barttodr at ll—te taohatt^ K?. 305-6.
Tho cignif icanoe of liquidity rrtio as a noan® of nonetar; control 
derives fundamentally from the fact that* under the Bank Bate technique, 
tho Bunk of LH land la obliged to euyply cash to the banking system in 
exchange fbr bills (by rediscounting or by lending on their security) on 
taaand at a price fixed by the Bonk Bate* To illustrate thia case, suppose 
that the monetary authorities, over * period when the broad ein of policy 
is to reduce ©n inflation^/ pressure, sell aocuMties In the open mrteet 
to non-bank public. The buyero will pey by drawing cheque© on their 
accounts- When tbess cheque* arc clourod, a transfer of funds will bo 
node for those banka1 account© at tho Behk of ztogland to the government 
account. The net result will be, of course, a reduction in banks• a per 
cent cash ratios.
The crucial point is that clearing banks are able to affect the 
affects of cpenioazket spesstiowfl on their cash loaama, Sc restore 
their cash ratios, the banks cell for roprg-mnt of sone of their scat 
liquid assets other than coal: - i*e, money at call and short notice lent 
to the discount houses. Accordingly, tlio discount houses will be coo&olled 
to borrow or rediscount bills £ra~ tho Bonk at Bank Bate. This scans, i** 
other words, iiiat tho Bunk of Bhgland will return to the banJcs the cosh 
it has previously drawn in.
Hence the interchangeability between cash and bills (with the Bank 
ready to act as th© lender of last resort by landing or rediscounting 
hill. At Rank Rfti.) Mdft th. wphMl* MMWttaKt* an the U^ildiiy ratio.
A loos of ©ash does not, in itself, man a failure to maintain the 8 par
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cent oech ratio.
$o sun up, the cash ratio doec not servo as on independent lirdto 
tion on the supply of bank credit. Ao lone a» the Baafc of ftogland con­
tinues its traditional prootioc of servicing as a loader of last resort, 
the hades can always translate other liquid assets into cash by colling 
in loans to the discount houses md forcing the market into the Bank.
The cash ratio is, indeed, ignored in noct current discussions of
o
monetary polio; and bank lending* liquid assets ratio appears now,
not as tbs secondary ratio but the priacry one. it is by forcing tlJLs 
ratio down towards the 30 per cent figure that the monetary authorities 
can force the banks to reduce their advance®*
Throughout the 1350’s, a number of economists, Sayers, Dace; , JohnaSR 
and King, advocated the theory of liquidity ratio and that monetary 
authorities should operate through it alone. Liquidity ratio bcesmo ssi
1 inurnm Tirr~wiji .,wiuirtmT wrrwrr-*-*
1* It should bo remembered that the Bart; of Shgland has me or loos 
kept til© market supplied with just that amount of cash required to 
maintain the beaks* sash ratios at ££» of their deposits* lienee the 
bonks mvo become loss sshsitivu to tixo diortage of cash* As a rooult, 
sash ratio has lost Its s£m$ms» as a controller of tbs mastery 
situation.
2. V.T. Ilewlyn still advocates the cash ratio as a aoans of control!
of doctrine remain unrosolvod it is difficult for policy makers end 
students to be dear in their analysis..* Contraction (expansion) of 
the Treasury Bill supply is neither a accessary nor sufficient condi­
tion for a contraction (expansion; in bunk deposits^ a contraction 
i in cadi is both neoesoaxy and sufficient for such contrac­
tion (expansion)/*
3. B.S* Sayers, “The Dcteraimtiou of the Volume of Bank Deposits:
• -ngland/ • •»•
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actoowledged rule in tho middle of Wo X9J£* ©. Signs of thia change In 
technique had bacon© evident since tho initiation of tho revival of 
monetary policy. An important stop toverdo on explicit ’dniraur. liquidity 
ratio for tho clearing banka vao token in 1951 when the Governor of tho 
Leak of airland indicated to the banks tiist a liquidity ratio of from 
M -s to 2S^ would be regarded ae noxml but it would be undeelrsble to fall 
below 2>/ aa an aattrema limit.
Liquidity ratio became, it is hollered, an official guidance in 
March 1955 vith the Governor1® “requests" to tho banka to observe the 30 
per cent liquidity ratios u»*.thc Bsak of England in 1955 insisted on 
the 30 per cent liquid assets ratio to the London clearing bento * a 
device of control whose existence had never been officially admitted 
before that date” (Para. <*2p). But it remained lees rigid in the sense 
that a considerable oeasonol variation am tolerated. By 1957, this re-tio 
beoeme more rigid. Then it received additional recognition from the 
toMUfto Gcaaitteet "Treasury bills...always be turned into sash...
The effective base of bank credit has become the liquid assets (baaed on 
the availability of Treasury MUe) instead of tho supply of cash” (Para. 
3*).X
1955-6", JfcSeSeaOKi»Lj£jai2J!B!&>*ia^ 9««*«
1955, wprlntad In Central Lanl’-ln.,- Wrckei. Oxford, 1957, pp. 92-
10fj W,«. Boocy, "She ftoatinc Beht ft?* low", Lloyds Lank Rqyli 
April 1956, pp. 24-381 "Traatiury Mila end the iioney Supply*',
Bank Review, J.oiuarj- i960, pp. 1-16} ftosy Un-.or gvlewi H.6.
•She Ravival of Monetary Pelioy in Britain", gfftlflt.
bo Prer-Juno 1956, pp. 3-201 W.T.C. King, “Should Liquidity Sai 
cribed?”, >»- Castor. 195^9 PP< W6-9?
1. See also Paxes. 583*90
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freotion B
Xt has boon orpluinod hov the 30 per cent liquidity ration cans to 
be cunaiderod by tty clearing banks as m i^roakable rulej and how the 
nonetary authorities operated, during the 1950’s, through it to control 
bank advene oe.^" Thio is by no rjcaas the end of the story. A switch in 
the authorities’ tactics eoaoerning the 30^ liquidity ratio has occurred 
very recently.
To begin with, early in tho year X%3, the Bank of England allowed
the olearing bonks to let their liquid assets ratio full if neeeosaxy
end temporarily somewhat below the traditional 30 per cent provided that 
g
they did not go below 29 per cent.
A acre important step in tho change in technique of the monetaxy
policy in regulating bank advances thx^ivh the control of bank liquidity
came from a statement by the Governor of the Bank of Stogiund in October
190. By tliis statement hanks hare boon authorized to go down, if nooessasy
to 28, . The Governor said in his opeobh, More recently, and in lino
with the earlier decision, the clearing bonks have been informed that
they should aim to eaiiieve a liquidity ratio of not lees than 28 per cent 
9between now end tho make-up date in April 196^*
1. llcvevor, liquidity ratio Is still criticised by Johnson end Smith as 
being a rather unsteady fulcrum of oonetazy policy sinoe it follows a 
somewhat uncertain seasonal pattern related to seasoned variations in 
the sise of floating debt. 3bo V- 3mith and I. Xikesell, OP. 01^..
p. 23, footnote 20.
2. In fact, two clearing banks did go Bulow 30 per cent, but both wore 
etill above 29 per cent.
3* 2hO«hkisr, H Good-Bye to 30 percent ”, Noreober 190, PP» ?^l-b6.
One ndjht suggest that the sew tcndoncy Is only a temporary phase.
In this respect, it has been mde clear that tho bank© will not be x^uired 
to rosters their liquidity ratios to JO/ ©gain whether in April or at wap 
other tine. "A nindnua level of JO per cent fox the liquidity ratio is 
historical." Xt is the new rxintrsuri ratio that the banks are ashed to
observe.
Vo have seem that the 30£ ratio, fxw. tl^a point of view of banking 
business, was closely observed by the bankers, on which tbs monetary 
authorities then operated. Xt was noticed by the Bank that the banks were 
willing to reduce ouch ratio. The jetik fauxl no objection to a gradual 
change. The purpose of such relaxation in that the banks sltfjuld net, 
only to restore their liquid!V ratios, abstain from increasing their 
advances; end hence to sustain the eSMtt&g expansion required by the
i **v cxTiiicnt.
It is believed that the recent change in aonetary technique ie a 
first stop towards a minimal 2J > li^iidity ratio. The authorities, 
feeling it unwise to reduce the ratio directly from >>/ to 23 , have 
preferred to approach tills structural ohm^e by stages.
However, our analysis in the neat fan* chapters will eoaside? only 
the 30 per cent liquidity ratio; in other words the new development of 
1963 will be excluded. This is because our analysis is confined to the 
peeled from 1951 until 1962.
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Becticn A
The conelusion of Chapter VII Is the development of the theory that 
banks* liquid assets ratio, sad not the 8 per cent cosh ratio, is nowaday 
the? min aedivss of monetary control. It is by forcing this ratio down 
towards the Elnirw figure of 30 per csntP that the monetary authorities 
can force the clearing banks to restrict their advance©*1 In other words* 
the mthorities can influence banks* wiTlingneoe to lend by influencing 
their liquid asset®* end hence their liquid assets ratio.
The next step is, tl f^roforo, to analyse the factors which can affect 
banks* liquid assets. Tobis 8? shows that treasury bills arc the most 
important Its®, consisting of 33,' of total liquid assets in 1951* 53 i» 
1957, then 36* > in 1962. Since banks arc always able to turn their trez-jaaaqf 
bills into cosh, and vice versa, it is their holding of bills that is of 
crucial ii^ort&nce.
Another itsn of liquid assets is also of great importance, i.e. “Call 
Honey to the discount houses (31 ’ of bosks* liquid assets in 1962).
Tables 8J-06 show that 687* in 1962 of discount houses1 resources were 
borrowed from clearing banks; of which (and 6&fi in 1952) were Invested 
in treasury bills. A call, by the clearing banks, on these advances 
obliges the discount houses to &et cask gainst their treasury bills from
1. In fact, monetary control can work in team of reducing total advances 
or preventing an increase.
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the Bank of England.
Bence, for th© authorities1 control of the volnsie of market treasury 
hills the first atop is to ©sort a proaouax cat banks’ bills, on their 
liquid assets, their liquidity xv^tio, ©jio hones tho level of advwooo to 
their customers. 2bs validity of this eanelueion depends, of course, oa 
a proposition (which will be proved statisticsilly in Section >) that a 
change in market treasury hills is most likely to lead to a change in the 
holdings of banks’ hills (in wider torse, to a change in the total of 
hanks« and discount houses’ bills).
Treasury hills play, nowadays, an i nortent port in the structure of 
national debt and in banks’ liquid eeeett. The greater part of liquid 
assets thus derive© froi?. treruMiry Mile, tbs supply of which is clnorct 
completely unr©s;xmsiv© to changes i» rates. ilxe Treasury does nct» in 
foot, curtail its borrowing from the public on treiasuar hill® beeeam rates 
are high. Xn other words, a rise in treasury hills does not mtomticclly 
reduce the supply of this type of liquid assets to tho banks.
What are the factors which detewino tho supply of market treasury 
hills, and to what cectsnt can the monetary authorities control it' To 
investigate this problem, it is iw^oaeay to arplain the methods of the 
ibechequcr finance.
1. The distinction between banka* trooouxy hills and call money is indeed 
irrelevant for our purposes six^oc c«ill uoney atapJy represents tressssQr 
hills held at one remove.
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The budget ie divided, as we haw ooen, into the “dbovo the line11 
and tho ,fbdov the lino** itea.^ Hourly speaking, tho fomnr iten repre­
sents current expenditure and receipts, tho latter represents capital 
transactions inclxiding loans to local authoritioc and to nationalised 
iMMsciss* Who "below the line’* usually records an overall deficit 
financed, in part, by the “ebovo the lino” overall mirplua. Tho deficit 
is etill covered by other sources, mcmg thorn borrowing ftm the public,
1. e. on non*narlxtable, narkctable securities and on naacket treasury 
Mile.2
faotoss will aloo ploy u los^o part in deciding; the supply 
of tender hills* In discussing tbs BMheqpes ttaasss la Chapter XXX, 
aaommol .lomaits wro, xbr the title h«b^;, ignored. Tax payments ore 
always node in Xax&e counts in the lent charter of tiwi financial yeesr.
The result is, of course, a reduction in the offer of tender billo at thatf
tiue (see Fig. l£)*J We also notice iron tha as&e figure that tho offers 
of bills at tho weekly tenders throe or two nonthc earlier are ^morally 
higher than average. Hevcrer, the siae of the weekly offer of tender 
bills varies a good dealt at psesent it varies from 130 to 2?0 X»«&»
This oasc taay be illustrated by Tables $8-90. Xt is clear that an 
overall buttery surplus, in each of the revenue quarters, is acoom ^ilod
1* iee Tables
2. See Tables ^7-M>*
3. This Figure includes the available data on the period ffccm near tho 
end of 12&U

by a substantial rode&ptioa of sagfeet treasury bills.Conversely, oa 
overall iaficit ia, la the period irou April to Aoceaber, acoocapuiiieu by 
a subatoatial increase in the supply of uurket treasury bills. Xt is thus
the currant position of the Jxcho^uor tlmt inflnsnoea the seasonal pattern
_ 2 
of t)*e treasury bill issue.
Iftnastoinc the overall deficit is not the only reaeon for increoMw: 
the supply of barist treasury Mile. Another purpose ie the mvomnts in 
the gold and dollar reserves ee reflected in the treixssotions of tho 
ikohange ^ucdisnblon ^ocount.
The Account was set up in X$32, endowed with a large saount of 
sterling assets in the fora of ’’tap’ treasury bills. Xt can use those 
starling funds to obtain foreign GKch&ngu from the banks and other fowiga 
oKdiange dealers. However, fron thu nature of its activities, the Accomt’s 
capital is divided aaong sterling, atoriii^, securities, gold, foreign 
exchange and securities in foreign cuxranMeo • Whatever it holds in 
starling, apart from its relatively cm 11 working cash balances, is inves­
ted in top treasury bills. When the Account buys gold or other foreign 
©xnhango, in the course of its cmeratlona, It has to pey sterling to tho 
sellers. In order to do this, it ask© ilia Treasury to repay eota© of its 
tep treasury bills. CowsMCly, when it noils gold or fssstgn SNMtange,
1. ilio 4■ ■ I.u3to have uara, rather than fever, bills mturing trsn«
2. By thio logic, a possible way for the monetary authorities to reduce tbs 
supply of ma&ei treasury blllo is to produce an overall budgetary eurpisfc
3. Mere will be eaid on tho XLEA. in Uiapberfh.., however, this is an 
exceptional discussion since a closed coonoqy was sssunsd fren tbs 
beginning.
it receives sterling therefore inoixiusce its iuveatmeut la tay bills.
In other words, When the country’s ^old uul dollar reseiveo are increasing, 
th£ ,4oount'a sterling assets ure falling! vim the reserves are falling 
ti# Account’s starling aosota aye xnoroauing* To r^et the Account1® Uoaoad 
for repfiyxHsni of t®|; bills* the Iroaoury urually issues additicnsl takW 
bills* l*e. borrow from. the public on ^rket treasury bills*
An increase in market treasury bills, whether to finance tbs ta&agMr 
or to meet the tcoount’e tresmetiotw ♦ is most likely to lacA to an iacrcMI 
in tho holdings of banks’ bills. On tho onr. hand, not arpendltuxq by tlx® 
Exchequer la reflected in on incrouso in bank deposits, ml on tho other, 
tiie banks invest this incro^e in their doyovits in treasury bills. This, 
of course, causes an increase in thalr liquidity
Discussing the effect of araricot tzronoury bills on the general economy, 
the biggest holders of such bills orc tho clearing banks (from 1173 L.bu 
or 33 in WJ1 to 794 L.&. or 29 in 1962),^ for who® they arc tho most 
important pert of their liquid assets. An increase of the mxket bills 
will, as said shove, certainly lend to m increase in banka’ bills; and 
such increase in banks’ bills will increase their liquid assets and hone© 
enable thorn to expand their txhreaiooa. Oanrersoly, their advances* will be 
reduced if their holdings of bills arc reduced. It is clear, thorefbr®, 
that any policy of increasing tbs voiuno of wriest bills aist be judged
1, Tables 52*3.
in the lifjit of the current economic conditions. If these oondittons are 
inflationary, the min objective of the :;wetery r.uthoritice is to restrict 
the supply of market bills in order to ajueeee banks• advances; and vice
Befoi^e reaming our cUseuoalon, it my be of interest to exenino in 
snore detail how the change in the mount oi sarkot bills will affect the 
supply of advances through ohenooo in liquidity.
Let ne nsauiw that the gwerment is sunning a deficit <m an unusual 
scale and that it is Govorin this deficit by large additional issues of 
treasury billsj else that treseury bills are held only by tfeo banks and 
disoaunt hmm* The position is, then, that the govermont twsnsfsra 
to the people, who provide goods and swriooa for govenswrt use, nose
i
bank deposits than are being transferred to the govermsnt by tax-payers* 
This aeons that |hs govcrmcut has to p^y rare in depocite than it is 
roceivte> This io effected by ohuquas drawn en the govsrmanVs account 
at the Sank of England* These Cheques (credited by customary to their 
accounts in the clearing banks and by the clearing hanks to their accounts 
at the Bank of England) increase the total of bank deposits by the sms 
enount of the deficit- Banka1 cash rwacxves will increase ss well,
The iacro&ae in cash reeervea of the clearing banks is however pre­
cisely effect by the solo of the now additional treasury bills, which the
1. ?ox , ....* deems*
Banking, 6th ed., Oxford 1964, CHwyter 10, pp. 217-60 and, especially, 
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discount mrfcet usually ©dbscribos to at tho weekly tentem end finances 
by borrovirr wrc at call fror bsnJcc and/or selling trectusy bill© to th© 
bank®.
The banks have new overshot the uork in absorbing treessjgr bill© 
either directly or ty losns to the discount socket, time increasing their 
liquid asset* ratio. In other words, this ratio is nov. above the required 
level * i.e., banks have becone raoro liquid. The repercussion of tide 
chance in liquidity i® that banks vill be disposed to lend store anu/ox1 
buy noro bond®.
Geotion B
Our conclusion at this ate<c is that bentos' liquid assets ought to be 
controlled, that the treasury bills are tix mat important iter, in their 
liquid osoota, and that to control tho volume of these bills in the narfeot 
ie the first step in exerting prooovro Oft clearing banks. Buck pressure 
on their liquid assets vill, in broad tamo, be applied throu^s budgetary 
policy, or through an increase in the amunt of debt (i.e. treasury bills, 
cs&a&etebl© stock© as veil a© non-saerketoble securities) sold to tho rum- 
bank eootox* of the econosqy. This action vill affect bank liquid assets, 
again in broad terua, in two ways ©irultunoouslyi a sslo of govern: wnt
1. To repeat, tho total of treasury bills and call money are significant.
debt to the public will reduco hank deposits no they are transferred to 
genrernnent account in settlscmt of the purchases $ thus banks will cuffs? 
a corresponding loss in liquid assets, causing the liquid!V ratio to 
fall. Hbreever* the nonetary authorities will use the jrooeeds of this 
oalo to reduce the r-arket treasury bills (funding policy).^ When the 
berths find their liquidity ratios are reduced to an wrcmfortsbly lev 
level, regarding the season of the year, they have to take action to 
redress thia position by reducing their advances.
As we any suggest from tJxis introductory sensogy, the volume of 
liquid assets held by the banks may be controlled through the most impor­
tant item, treasury bills, in one- of the following ways:
(a) indirectly, by a variation in the banks* and discount houses1 
share of the total supply of market treasury bills. This could cons 
into effect by absorption of treasury bills by the non-bank holders 
(whether the public or the overseas officials) in replacement of 
matured bills formerly held by the banks? and discount houses.
(b) directly, by reducing the total bills in tbs sestet. This could 
cone into effect throng the use by the authorities of receipts 
from the public to redeem market bills, i.e. an overall budgetary 
surplus. But tide end may «&*o be. achieved byinereaeing tbs sale 
of government debt to the general public, i.e, by funding policy.
The outhorltieo, in order to indued tho dosnsatic non-bnnk sector to
1. The concept of funding will bo discussed in detail in Chapter IX.
■ "?■ -
r' fc '• u <'
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incroaoe their purehaoec of securities, levs tc raise lonoteiu
interact rates.'
Of oourue, each of those zaethodc involve© u reduction in
mi in liquid asset© by oqp&l ubaolute uaounto, and hones a reduction in
2
liquid asset© ratio*
Wo csay start witfc the first, or the oo-oeUed traditional, Ksethod; 
that io raenilatlne bank lixjnidiV indirectly by inducin'*; the non-bank 
investors (doaastic and ovarsona) to incror.ee their treasury bills in
to deny then to tho bMMng systoa. Banks will feel &
ftt
1
1. The funds secured oro eitlier used to purchase the existing 
bills Iron the market or to noct the Treasury1 2s current needs, thus 
curtailing its nev borrovdrv* on txx^Tur/ bills.4? > -. . ,_ ,- v_:’ V • - : . , •.. ' ,,-.£’ L_
2. Hr. n.L. Crouch has recently : «n attach on this tbeosy
InMeruaey of nSmMJrtfcodoK1 Hethoda of henetaay Control", Effim. fetgh,. 
December 1%4, pp. 916-35)* Se refutes the idea that budguiTauxplun 
or funding will raduoc bank deposits because banJas buy sufficient 
bills frou the discount bouses to rxdjrUin their liejuid assets ratio 
wliile the syndicate adjusts its bid to raintain the discount houses1 
desired bill portfolio. Both tho b&nku and discount houses adjust 
their domand price for bills to conserve their desired portfolios. 
Given a reduce/. supply bills, t*4e will entail on increase in their 
price and a decrease in bill rate. criticising Professor Sayers1 
argument that “when, by tho oration of cry of those factors ^taclu- 
dinfr budget surplus or funding/, tho basics find their liquid assets 
ratio reduced.••they have to toko steps to redress fee position by 
reducing their investments asid/or their ukvancco", Mr«. Crouch shown 
that “the basks ’have’ to do no such tiiiug. They are quits at liberty 
to redrosa the position by buying mre bills. This is the critical 
weakness in irofeeaor Sayere* account, lie doe© not even o&ait the 
possibility (let alone the prdbebility) that the banks and discount 
houses will react to a I’eduotion in the supply of bills by raising 
their demand prices to protect l&eir portfolios > •
shortage of Mils which vill ulthaatoly force tSiess to reduce their
liquidity ratios. To nake tliie policy effective, the autlxoritioy my roles 
the Bank Kate, thereby causing noct other □y.ort-teni rates to rise.
Ac illustrated in Table J2, both dottsstis and overseas officials 
hold & oonsldornhlc amount of tatigfest treasury hills# Oversees officials 
held X*A3 Xi Iwi* 2**?$^* * A3Li)o CACBSfe^Qisbo .'.^
held <#2 Mb in 1262.
Concerning the do&sstic non*benk holdings, a substantial proportion 
of market bills racy be held by other financial institutions (c.$* insurance 
ooopeaiee) end by foreigners who hare akort-tew funds in Britain. Sw, 
by raising bill rate, sush investors will txy to increase their holdings 
of market bills unless the beaks take prompt action by raieinc Wo rat® 
on. deposit account (tine deposits). If a larger proportion of the SMB&et 
bills is then held outside tlic bunking aystm (i.e# outside beaks end 
die count houses), banks night find difficulty in naintcinlrg their second* 
line reserves, and as a consequence their liquidity ratios night be forced 
down. In other words, if the mn-benkin/; institutions wro induced by 
high rates to coryetc for bills, resulting in a ftmSMBt of liquid assets 
fxw banks to other holders, liquidity ratios sdght bo oqueesed, forcing 
thereby banks to restrict their advances.
Thio conclusion depends upon two points:
Xtefffe * upon the beaks’ current ogrea-uni on a single 
Gecp^Jfe, and acre important * upon the gap between bill
ratoi
and
deposDt rate. The rel&ticasfcdp between these two ratios is,
the relevant factor here.
st?
We liave oesm that the authorities can force up the market
rate of treasury hills by forcing the □ea&et into the Bank Jaore frequently!
i.e. by forcing tho discount hooeec to horwv at Bank Bat©. Consequently, 
Berk rate, at which no one was previously borrowing, become "effective”. 
By caking Basil: Pate "effective", not only will hill rate go up hut other 
short rates that are linked conventionally to Bank Hate will also rise.
Therefore, control of hank credit, hy pressure upon their liquidity 
ratios, can he exerted indirectly hy a rise in interest rates. If tills 
rise, and in particular the widening of the rargin between hill rates 
and deposit rsteo, induces hank doCBitors to switch £ta deposits into 
treasury hills, liquidity ratios adgjbt he squeezed .
Before continuing cur discussion, wo need to nation that the source 
of tho following statistical examination is Table 3J of the Badoliffe 
Report plus the information of the "FLuxicial Statistics" on the distribu­
tion of tho oaxkot treasury hills* Bill holdings are classified as 
follows i holding of honks and discount Mouses, of overseas officials end 
of other holders”. The last item (i.e. other holders, includes other 
financial and industrial fixw, which the Radcliffe CorsMttoe calls "the 
outside holders", plus overseas private holders* We ere, in fact, con­
cerned only with "outeide holders" and not the total of "other holders". 
Unfortunately the demotic element cannot yet he completely disentangled 
from tli© "non-official ovorooee”. Thia external element is s&astiass of 
groat importances the Bonk of Ekiglsrui ootiiaatcd the net inflow of private 
overseas funds in tho last quarter of I960 at 250 L.au * a substantial
■' |
amount of wliicJi wont Into treasury Mile or government stocks.^
However, Tables 91-92 show that tho ’’outside*’ ite:; i© the greater
part of the total "residual" > also Mg. 17 ahowo a similarity in their 
Bovenents. Sbr thio reason, and because it is practically not possible 
to identify the holdings of domestic non-benk holders of industrial and 
comercial f&ms, it si$it be safe enough to proceed to the discussion cat 
the basis of the total "other holders".*
Turning to Mg. 17 and Table 95» vs notice tbatt
• "Other holders" began to increase their bills fro® the of 1952,
bust after the jump in treasury bill rate fro® •££ to about fcjjd and 
the eriergence of (Table 93) a mall gap between deposit rate and bill 
rate*
* In the spring and the -sarly swgor ttifetn banks usually meet tbs 
seasonal pressure) of 1955 > the &$£*& of the non-bank investors for 
bills increased, thereby forcing down the liquidity ratios of the 
b^nks. In this period the Increase in Sank Bate was associated with 
a narked margin between deposit rate and treasury hill rate, a result 
of a change fron an * ineffective" to an "effective" 3©ak Bate. la 
other vords, since the end of 195^ end aid-195^, bill rate has been 
seriously competitive with the deposit rate for temporary idto funds 
of large corporations, i.e* provoking switches from deposits into 
treasury bills.
- In this respect the Radcliffe Cosnaittoe holds the view that "Since 
early in 1955 there has been snxbstanticu holding of treasury bills 
by industrial and oomerel&l concerns; this interest has oontixatod
««■!»» nw»«M>M<w«w<»gaw*rw<>W' T»
1. February 1961, p. 90
2. K. joooy also used the total of "outside holders" in □iagreci 5, p. 3j
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to a degree hoviuc no parallel at any outlier tine. xhe phenomenon 
io to bo acoociatad*. .both with tho absolute height of the treasury 
Bill rate and with the margin between 2roaauxy Bill rate end bank 
deposit rate” (Bara* $36).
w Between mid-1956 end ahaoct the end of 1957» ’’other holders’” 
treasury bills declined, associated with & slight at-rinlwge in 
interest gap.
- Sines then an alnost continuous increase In non*bcmk bills was ?joc<x- 
paaiod by a reeaanahle interoat c&gt
(i) in tho first quarto? of X9&0, a wide interest gegp 
induced a atrikkv: demand for treasury biHa> 
non-bank holding# roes by 167 b*su, thus accen­
tuating tho oocomal prcsGure on tl»e supply of
■ _i liquid asset# available to iho banking Ayfitaaj
(ii) in toe third quarter, euek hxldings reached a peak 
of 943 Ito*.*'
• Ifron the and of i960, there was a swift Cccline in the treasury bills 
of ”other holders11, assoeiated with a continuous decline in bill mt© 
* but without a groat shrinkage la the gep.
A statistical r*xcriination, on tlie relationship between "other holders* 
treasury bill© and the gap of interest jsatee, wnc tried on a quarterly 
figures basis fbr the years lf$3~$8. ms £br the years X95X»$2 ware 
omitted vS Aof the sweeping changes associated with the farced finding
of treasury bills at that tins, and figures of tho period 1953*62
were excluded boc.Tfcoo of lack of data,
*»*&»« sMJsra'-aw. .‘^aawsssssi^easoua «W»
1, WWke-up dates; source, fftnsB&ial btoiir tjflo.
2, See M« Becey, <F» 4**»
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Using a simple correlation technique, we find that the coefficient 
between interest gap And bills of "other holders" is positive and, indeed, 
strongs O»7O8 (Table 97)•
Another test tried with the ratio of “other holders” of bills to total
market bills, provides nearly the same correlation coefficient, 0*582 
(Table 98).
We may conclude that it is statistically confirmed that a government 
policy, by producing a differential between bill rates and deposit rates, 
is effective in attracting "other holders” to market bills*
We now turn to the overseas official holdings. The dominating 
influence affecting the movement of their bills is not changes in the 
differential between bill rates and deposit rates* It is, instead, the 
differential between bill rates in the United Kingdom and those of other 
countries (suoh as the United States). The Aadcliffe neport pointed out 
in Para.439 that the significant factor in the movements of funds between
financial centres is the interest differential.
However, figure 18 shows that the heavy decrease of overseas holdings 
in 1951-2 was followed by a gradual increase* From 1954# such holdings 
were continuously decreasing, reaching by the end of 1957 the low level 
of 1952* During this period, U.K* bill rates were increasing (faster than 
the increase in the U.S.), establishing thereby a considerable Interest 
differential (Table 94). however, since the summer of 1957» a sharp rise 
in U*K* rates (and at the sa;«e time a decline in the American rates) 
helped to check withdrawals of short-term funds. Again, fi^om i960 an
increase in bill rates and at the stme time a fall in the American rates
S. » <y v ■ r; ®, - ,’V.o» »•’;•. BI ~ ■• r -f'S’-;- — «• ;VTT\? . —>• ■
■ 'r<< ?•’.'■■••■ '*- *•;. s;;-t • .'.? I 1 -, »• *
produced a differential which helped
and to increase them.
- ^>5-
relntaln the overseas holdings
The indirect, or the classical, ncthoc of regulating hank liquidity, 
t“? ’* < -•' * ' '' •• ■ ■ '".W. ''' .- '•••>;'••
1T>3 pOtCIlC^ iUSfi 15©<R1 (U&lOnSuXfilXXX^ 18 SUDjOCv W STXCfl3£ CTlt^via 
from ooo:ioaiato who advocate Wo direct wuy of reducing the total supply 
of narkei bills tliroxuii fundixL.? process « It tsav he of interest to illust*
rate tone of tho aaia criticisms against the indirect technique*
V. King1 soys that any influence that ie achieved upon bank liquidity
ratios by the indirect lacthod la liable to quick reversal as a result of 
action fron the public or ffcem banks. If, for sxtaaple, industrial coa- 
penies that have switched before into treasury bills cone under the genera: 
credit pressure and do not renew their uaturing bills, then banks and the 
discount houses will be able to hold a bigger supply at once, eo that beak 
restored. Bio sene result aay be
attained If the banks deeide to "bid up" for treasury bills by Baking 
their deposit rates competitive to bill rates. Therefore, govemnont 
polioy Intending to squeaae liquidity tlyough /revoking • aovsnent of 
liquid assets fro» the banks to other holders (instead of reducing the 
total supply of market bills) night bo vulnerable to "unforeseeable frus­
trations" whether froc the public or froti the banks. At the very least 
sueh polioy requires a much higher level of short-tern interest rates to
1. V. King, "Should liquidity Ratios be -roscribed?", 
1956, pp. 186-19?.
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sustain it. 2br ^tes© considerations > the claasical instrument that 
operates indirectly upon liquidity has to be reinforced by tho direct 
mthod.
M» Baccy also, by examining Ms disarm, shows tliat the rise of
lank Kate in Sept cash or 1957 to did little more than arrest tho decline
in treasury bills of ’ other holders11 during the previous year* He con
eludes that there is little to suggest that manipulation of effective Bonk
Kate or producing an interest gap could be en-ployed to produce "predio-
table'* shifts in tho share of the banking system - thus affecting thoir
liquidity. "It would be pointless for the authorities to raise Bank Bate
as an indication to themselves that the floating debt should be reduced.” 
a
P.W. aiah argues that, in the early stages of credit restriction, 
when financial end ether institutions are still very liquid, a moderate 
rice in bill rates may be sufficient to attract non-bank investors. 
Afterwards increasingly high bill rates become necessary to induce aca» 
bank holders even to retain their existing holdings, and other methods 
become correspondingly no re attractive. Jicreover, a large rise in Bank 
Bate is an expensive method. Very large amounts of treasury bills are 
held by overseas owners, and increased interest payments constitute an
«*«. «Mfc)K*aa»am m*»ub» astssfl sswc
1. The burden of monetary policy will be statistically discussed in 
Chapter XIV.
2. K. Baccy, op. cit*. pp. 86-88.
3. We may add to DmCeytS argument that "other holders1** bills swiftly 
declined during 1961 and 1962$ it Is true that bill rates also declined 
in tiist period but the Interest gep was still considerable (fig. 17).
b. F.W. Paieh, htudlee ia an Inflationary kicomomy. Chapter 8, pp.!2G-5b, 
eep. 13J-4.
— ..... . Figure 18i™~----------------------
Overseas Official Holdings of Treasury Hills? 
and Interest Differentials (1951-62^ ~( - )
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additional burden on the balance of poynento.
W. Smith, analysing the British nonatery systm," suggests that It
ia true that s$ueesln& banks’ liquidity &c a result of the substitution 
of bills for deposits scene to hnro occurred in 1955. However, it la 
likely to be merely a transitory phenomenon, since the banks can check 
it by raising the interoat rates on depoalts, end increasing the price 
they pay for bills. In thio way they can restore the normal differential 
between bill rate and the dopoeit rate, thereby obtaining their necml
r-V?'; ’ i- - *’
». »?•■•••
Finally* the Badcliff© Conraittee Illustrates the possible weWamee 
of the indirect method of regulating bank liquidity from the point of
►it is clear
that the banka could, if they choec to ooqyete freely for large deposits, 
effectively prevent the development of mol larger non-bank holdings of
> ’ '
bills. But
changes would be likely to follow..." (Pare. 537). S • '.V< I- J ;
A.-
x Swtfcm
'Ft' -* = ; •'< S' -.V'--?
In the last Section, the diociujcion wes concentrated on the posai* 
bility of raaulating bank liquidity throu^J-. the indirect nethod of
1. See Chapter XIV for the external burden of uonetary polity.
2. V, Snith and R.F. MikMoll, W>. oit.. p. 26.
. - r < ;
fe ’•
? t * ’!
e» e
.
affecting tho share of the bonking oyster. of market treasury bills. V*e 
proceed, xxov. to tbn next step, i.e. discussing the possibility of 
regulating bunk liquidity directly through the reduction in the total 
supply market bills3 The iacrocsiry; importance of the money market 
has made effective monetary policy /-uinly dependent upon the Exchequer’« 
decisions about debt msajpgiottlU The met effective method of restricting 
the total supply of bunk credit is to reduce the floating debt.
It has already been ehoun that the bsnks can parry attacks on th^ir 
<iaah. through the discount houses* tooknicue. so loiur as thar&ia an
adequate quantity of bills in the banking systm, but they will be brought 
under preeeure if their total of li^xid aceete is out to the aiaiaun 
level. The strength of a disinflationary Monetary policy therefore iepead 
very largely upon the ability of the authorities to achieve a due contri­
tion, or avoid an undue expansion, of the supply of treasury bills. Tho 
liadoliffe Committee has stressed the importance of treasury bills in this 
respect i ’’...when the author! tec ore roxioue to rest riot oredit (or at 
air/ rate not to encourage an expansion of credit), borrowing on treasury 
bills tends to be regarded as undesirable*’ because "market treasury bills
have a special significance in that then held by a clearing bank they ere 
’liquid asset’ for the purpose of tho liquid assets ratio. ...Sales of
r
&•: • J*
*#../ -y.: ..r. 1. Of course, only the tender issue of txweury bills is significant 
for our purpose. There is, as xploinod, also a tap issue vfcich is made 
available to the government departments. The tap issue is merely nod- 
nal debt, representing an interned bookkeeping transaction within the 
government and is net available to serve a* liquid asset to the banking
bills to...the bpstfdsv oyster* have a spooial significance
p.’
. - m, •.
$•
L/f . A
treasury bills arc liquid oosats in the portfolios of...banka. <•" and
in the banka* landing to the...
■ ,
therefore oeke possible an 
public’* (Paras. 116-120).
To reduce tho liquid assets of tho bnrks, the Authorities aust, in 
some way, obtain disposal of receipts ouiod by the public and pay off
asafeat treasury bills. This can bo achieved tbrcu^i
(a) an overall budget surplus to retire billsj or
(b)
£; < ' - •. M, • kv k '* v
if tho budget does not show a surplus, the same result 
oen bo achieved by selling bonds to the public, i.e. 
by funding e part of tho bill issue into longer-torn 
securities, or ek.uvx1/ tka structure of tho national
The collection of taxes fron (or tho sale of bonds to) the public
tS*’’’’ -.V-V JB.... -■
and the uee of the proceeds to retire Mile held by the hanks ox the 
discount houaer. would reduce hank iopocitc and the hanks’ liquid assate 
by equal anounto and lower the bonks* liquidity ratios.
The first irthod, which involved budgetaiy (tax and expenditure) 
policy, io undeniably deflationary. Banks can clearly be brought under 
pressure to reduce or rsatriot the supply of aredit if th. scv.xrr.ent 
succeeds in producing a budgetary surplus end uses it to redeem li^uM 
acceto hold by the gensrsi public. Of course, souo part of these liquid
vill cm© iYon the banka* own holdings as well as from the discount
houses (on fund, borrowed at call fron the banka, which fron the banks
V • f ( ; . •: *t tg 258
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point of view are equally liquid assets). Thus banks* liquid assets and 
their liquidity ratios will be reduced.
The second method involves a ads of yoveamnsiit securities to the 
public and treasury bills are reduced Cfiri’espondin^ly. An increase in 
fseerment securities held by the public will reduce beak deposit®, 
end the banks will find their total of liquid assets reduced by the
-
' '-h\ ,‘!rt
.'"•' . i SkJs^r •' ' >* *' '■
amount as their deposits are reduced. This process runs as fbllcwe:
(a) Initially- tidx fall in liquid assets occurs, in settlement of 
the curohauee* through transfer from "bankers deposits" tc ' 
"Public deposits” (i.e. the govsnmont balance at the Bank of 
Saglcad).1
But banks can restore this extraordinary scarcity of cash 
ixauediately by calling on tiioir funds loaned to the discount 
houses (and hence compelling them to borrow on their treasury 
bills frail the Bank of ^iglaad at Bank Kate) whereby the 
banks redress the 8y cash ratio. In other words, the banks
will transfer the shortage fra?. thenaelves to the 
market * by axehaaginy other liquid assets (money at call) 
for cash.
i» they do ao at the expense of their portfolios of bill, 
and call money; and the in tho total of liquid assets 
TWrr.gvtTirt ©GUlli ill Cbsoluts nrurarat. ho firt 1 in their dODOSitS
the public. The liquid assets ratio will consequently be 
reduced.
(d) When the banka find their li<pii<i assets ratio to a
1. Thio, of course, depends on a proposition that the non-bank purc’iacana 
will pay "only" by eheiji.s drawn on their accounts at the banks.
Ilevel regarded as uncomfortably low, having regard to the season 
ef the year, they will restrict their rdvancea to the public and 
/•r sell their investments.
In other words, to reduce the supply of treasury hills, the govern- 
sent has to sell Instead soy sort of securities tc the non-bank investors* 
The loss of cash to the banks when the securities are paid for Is not 
offset by any acquisition of liquid assets, and pressure will therefore 
be exerted on the banka to reduce tho supply of credit3 Of course, a 
purchase of securities has the opposite effect* This mean© that, unless 
the authorities oan Increase their sale of ncn-mr^etable securities 
(especially Tas Koserve Certificates and Xrtionai Cavings Securities) they - 
must operate in the gilt-edged mj&et either by Issues for cash or by 
sales from the holdings of the ndepai*tEiont»’f. The proceeds will be used 
either to purchase the existing treasury bills or to provide the Exchequer’s 
current needs, thus curtailing its new borrowings on treasury bills* 
Whatever type of securities is told, this is a funding process. Xt aiay 
be conceived as a switch by the ‘‘departments" from longer-term securities 
into tap treasury bills, producing ©n opposite ewitcb in tho holdings of 
the private sector from tender bills to lnnger-ter^ securities. In order 
to make this policy effective, the authorities must offer their escort ties 
on teraa sufficiently attractive to induce the public to take then up$ in 
ether words the very means of funding operations io raising long-tera yield*
1. She sale of securities direct to the Ixinke will also reduce their 
liquid assets.;
2* See Chapter XX for funding policy.
-,*1
-------------
(i) Scak liquid asaeta consist of,
To sue up.-
, treasury billa
of liquid
assets are in fact dominated by variations in tho supply of "rorkot” 
treasury bill®.
"W-xM -
(2) If it is desired to exert direct pressure on the banks to restrict 
or reduce tho supply of bank credit> it ie necessary cither th&ti
• the budget should b© in a surplus which has to be used to 
redeem treasury bills (such bills are considered, from the 
point of view of the banks, liquid assets)f or that
* the «aount of gonrerrcaont debt (non-^crketable, marketable 
securities end treasury bills) held by th© public should 
be influenced. The proceeds should be used either to 
budgetary needs or to reduce market bills.
(3) If sufficient pressure is put upon the banks’ liquidity ratios, the
and, as will be shown statistically, variations in tho
R.‘
.*£)#•
« J : . i f' S*trw, • . >- * ■•-■• • -•'•
'*;A
most likely course is to reduce the extent of advances,
s'.
■ ■ V Again to summarise the analysis of this chapter, there appear to be
i?’
two channels by which restrictive policy oun be made effective*
2- '.?■• V ■' :' 5
(a) the transitional effect of a rise in the Bank BatSf
(b) the power of the authorities to regulate the else of 
the floating debt and thereby the availability of 
liquid assets to the banking system.
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Jootloa 3
Thio section io Interested in eauariining e t^t* “ tie**!ly and graphically 
the points so far 4ft eo»eeedT The statistical exajainution will consider 
the kind, of relationship between these
(a) the total of i^sScot treasury 11^ aau clearing b^nke1 £ifld discount 
houses’ treasury bills (let us call tlm the banking system’s bills)}
(b) clearing beaks* liquid assets end treasury bills of the banking 
system}
(o) market treasury bills and bank liquid assets.
We start with the first investigation, that is the relationship 
between the total supply of Market bills and treasury bills of clearing
banks and houses. This relati<xi£xiiu is stressed In the Manorcnds.
of Svidsncei^ ’’...the bowks’ willingness to lend e*^1 be by
operating on their liquid assets, Tho aosl important factor in their 
liquid assets is the Treasury Mil. To control the volume of these Bills 
in the ’narfcet1 is a first and necessary step to exerting influence on 
the actions of tho banks. ” An increase in the treasury bill issue "is 
laost likely to lead to an in tlv? treasury bill holdings of the
banks... thi^ oausea a rise in the b**?dcp»1 liquidity. ”
A statistical exaraftyyij.Ion > through th^ technique of simple 
shows tho following results 8
X. The Radcliffe Coral tt<», Hgaa^S, ofjS&S»S. s^tt2OxJfcfi~2S& 
of 5afllaBd, Pwrt X, So. 12, Paras. 5-7.
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1(ft) on quarterly figure bole, fron 1953-62, there ia a positive end 
strong correlation between changes in u&rket bi lie end changes ia 
the clearing banks* billa (Table 99). For the wider eoaecpt of the 
total bills of the banking system, i.e. clearing banks plus discount 
houses, the correlation ia still strong (Table 100 and Fig. 12s0»
a
(b) by eliaiinatiug the effect of the seasonal variations (in Tables
101~b) discussed ia Section A we realises
(i) the identity of seasonal pattern (Table* 102, 104 and 
Sig» 20) between nsrfcet bills and total banks* and
discount houses* bills?
(ii) the correlation between the aosaonaUy adjusted variables 
is lower but still significant (Table 105 «d Fig. l$3fc).
Ccj the offeot of tiuo^ljuf is. in this sc&~ixiatlon. ignored. It la argued 
that a change in goveira&eut issue of treasury bills does **>t ’’inaedi* 
ately” produce a corresponding change in banks* bills.Clearing1 r
■ banks do not directly buy bills at th© weekly tender. They prefer 
to hold treasury bills with only a few weoka (rather Uieir whole 
life of 91 days) to run. In order to consider the effect of this 
tine»iag, another investigation is mds on quarterly basis. Thia 
tine there is a quarter** (i.e. three saonths*) lag between change®
1. Th© period 1951-52 is again csaitted frexn the extinction: see p>250.
2. The technique of eliminating the ae&coswl variation Is ttkfft fr*"*** 
R.O. 3). Allen, Statistics for Bcononii^tg, 11th Imp., London 1961, pp. 
13®-53| so® below, ’’Statistical notoaH, pp.zr)4/
3. See above, pp» 20, 214
In market billa and changes in clearing banks' and dincount houaas' 
billa. Th* ranuli (Table 106) is not e significant coefficient.
(d) it bkz be useful to clot tlio correlation coefficients in the foUowiatr
tablet
banks'
bills
bixnkitjg cyetsBi**
bills
1. actual figures 0,889 0.946
2. seasonally adjusted figures 0.726
*V latrwMr* ’T^la.ttA'nAht.nX* ***w<5v^ A^»X«&V4.wiOBWl«t,jp -0.067
The next step, after having a etnong correlation between changes in
narket bills and th&t of the oleoririt; brrisa and discount Mflfr?. ±3 to 
o
show the kind of relationship by using: a simple linear regression. The
general eou&tion vill bet
Y = c< + bX
vliez^ Y refers to clearir^ bsnks* and houses1 x to
Market billa, <x and b arc parameters of the population. Then by afe- 
atitution in these aquations:^
r r Xn fact, it is not necessary to try other exaninationa in these MMIt ie aaaBunad tliixt the ralnticnshlp between our variables is linosa**
i.e. a re?r»*«M»> which can be expressed ee a 
. E.O. Bryant, statistical Anatoais, H.X. i960, pp. 118-9.
A- -£- i-j
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nsx ♦ bfX •
+ bfX2 - {XT
1 bO<x* 53V . .318 
53<\ + 76f 36ll- Wt&
we I.•■vat
Then, by solving these equations, we haw the fallowing ooefficiontos
(2)The pwrenetw «e - 8.55 
The porenetar 0,526
?hu$, tfro 0*1* i - - ••' ort *
T - 8,65 + 0.526b
Tho estiaate of x ia of llttla significance in our case, hut the re­
gression ooofficiont "h" ia of considerable interest. Xt skews how ascii 
the variable X (i.e. the uurijot hills) influences Y (i.e. the clearing 
bunks' plus diecount houses’ hills). In other words, for • one-unit 
ingrease in X, Y will inci'eace by 0>$25t which ia eirviif locate
Xt ia honoe eefe to oonsludo that there is a strong relationship 
between ohac£pBS ia market frill** and bills of tfr* clearing barfey and 
discount houses•
We novo now to the next pair of variables, i.s< the relationship 
between cloarlzv; banka* Hqufn assets and treasury bills of tho banking 
system* Tho result of the statistical Investigation is as followsi-
1. Unladed seasonally adjusted figures.
2. o< is the X intercept, or that value of " where » 0.
3» b is the slope of the line of resreeei€n> or the sseuat the Hue
arises for each unit increase in X (see ?>ryant, ap. exit*# >. 116).
ositive and &1&
nificaat correlation between the novwcaii of both variables 
(Table 107 and lUg. lXg)»
(b) by excluding the seasonal variations fgws liquid assets (Tables
103-9}» we have those conclusions!
U) tho identity of seasonal nowiont© between liquid 
assets and clewing bunko • and discount houses* 
treasury billa io clear (Tables 104, 109 end fi<< to )•
(li) a seasonally adjusted correlation between both becaaoo 
n little lover, although strf.ll positive and signifi­
cant (Table 110 and Fig. 21|&}«
(ill) what la also interesting fron the Fi^urf is that there 
is a divergence since 1953 between £fcs aovenentsi 
liquid assets are continuously increasing vdtile banks1 
and discount houses* treasury bills are continuously 
declining. There will be a discussion In Section 3 
on this last point.
(s} on quarter^*/ o£isj-*.Q|f n*oii4 , wauxv is a
j Actual figures 0.90
Seasonally adjusted o.at>5
Applying the linear regression equation!
T • <x ♦ W
where Y refers to liquid assets and 
clearing banks and discount house©* 
tions on p/» 26£- , we have**
X refers to treasury bills of the 
Thom by substitution in the equa-
HO oc - 518 A - 592
-318 « + 404880 j, - 236153
By solving those equations, we have the following ooefficiente»
<* - 19.55 
-t - 0.599
h^iic<3 ttiw fQgzwiiou frqjmfrpy*) hooootjaj 
Y - 19*55 * 0.599 J>
2hie shows how moh th» variable X (treasury bill* of hanks and diaoouat 
liouaflB j influenoM Y {lieu&d assets) ** i.e. ft ans-tttxlt itwreaee in 
will taarauMi Y 0.599 unit which in eignificaat.
The next »to;> Io to esacdne the x'elctionshl? between mrket ts^aamy 
bill® and liquid assets of the ole^i'inf: banket
(ft) Table 111 and Pig. 22e show 1fcft& vtriiition in Basket bills, frtxi 
1953-62, has ft strong oorrolation with variation in liquid assets 
o£ the slemriiwi banktf,
(b) On seasonally adjusted, basis, our coefficient ha® boon very nuoh 
lover to a less ei^ifioant on© (trifte 112 and Pig. 22b). It is 
entreated that the correlation is, as said above, between the 
eeaacmal pattern of the two variables mther than between the
variables thenselves•
r,1. —«—
Actual figures 0.905
Set-aomlly adjusted 0.501
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Ve tlxen the linear regression equation:
Y = <X. 4
wheat* v rater* to liquid aaucts md c to asatot treasury bills. Then
by substitution in the equation© on p^. 26 , wo haves
K * 53 b • 592
53 <* + 76 J361 b « 1977^
Sy solving these equations, we hove the following coefficients*
<x * ify.5 
b * 0.257
Hence the regression equation b eooms t
y • U.5+ 0.257b
Of course, the result of "b" is a aweh lower coefficient Which it is 
difficult to consider as significant.
■ ?*\t». '*vW’|r •*«» w«» *•
Our conclusion frw Section 2> io that theses exists no atron corrals* 
ticn (on seasonally adjusted biaiu) between the behaviour of clearing 
banks* assets md the overall supply of ;wket treasury bills. Also, tbs 
distinguishing relationship between these variables (on actual basis) 
cones, first of all, iron, tbs strong correlation between their seasonal 
pattern.
This conclusion is, however, subject to two kinds of interpret*, tian i
2?2
(a) the first school, which include©, $*£•? M« D&oe^ and tbs Bank 
of Inland, shews that there exist aox^e "loopholes” which asy 
frustrate the natural relationship between the supply cf 
treasury bills and the behaviour of clearing banks’ liquid assets*
(b) the second school, which includes Iqppobk and Gibson, suggests 
that whatasor else aoy ragul&is the clearing banks’ liquid assets, 
it «*-C not the sutOpl./ of <.i0n«et .x'oasruxTj cilia»
The first school show that pressure by the authorities on banks* 
liquid assets :&ay be frustrated "for a tine" as & result of the following 
factorss
Vs have seen, in Chapter VXX, that a 3xr$© proportion of the eloarixs? 
banks' isnrest&ents, clout $0 per cent, is in short-dated gowermont 
securities with lass than 5 yoare to run to maturity* This type of 
securities isay be realised without substmitisl capital lose* Hence> it 
beaoacs easy for the olearing books to reduce, in the short tun, the 
govecmaent’a pressure on their liquidity ratios by soiling ame of their
*L..^ , 1 h 1 ’ a,.- ..**
iinrsetnents. Such sale© sisy be to the authorities, to the discount 
jcarket or to the general public:
1* M* Daeey, under .ievlew* Chapter V, pp. G2~96; "Bank liquidity
in the United Kin-"doa1*, Dank of ;^-ln:?4 tu^rteriy Bulletin. 1962, pp. 
240-55*
2* D.J* Coppock and K,J« Gibson, "The Valutas of Deposits and tho Gosh 
and Liquid Assets MW, S^e .Sffi&iPjt of ^oocdcs mi
Soq&fI btudiQo, 1%3, j/p* 203-22.
3* Xteoiis&tion of ahcri~ter.. /woxment securities is, in fast, mode to 
bolster banks’ liquidity ratio as well as to increase their adranoos 
against govsmsasnt pressure; snyhov ell aspects of thia problem will 
bo discussed in detail in Chapter XX.
’>"• ■' .a?
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(i) if the sale is stt&e to the mithorltiee, their liquid assets 
will increase by the ©aotaxt of the proceeds, leaving deposits
(ii) if the sale io aade to tho disoouat OMtart, which atq 
it by selling txoueury bills or by borrowing taore call
j Kill again inerwae «qr
the amount of the stock tixit thagr have odd.
(lit) if eucfa sale was taken wp by the general public, banks* de- 
posits will be reduced by the anoint of the sales but bask 
Besets will rewitn uncross*!* Iteuoo their liquidity ratio 
will inoreeaao coafreojxjndingJy, altfioufi.. to a lesser extent 
then if the sale was nade to the mthorltioB or to the 41 
count market.'
: ‘ > Therefore, if the clearing toihs hold e large portfolio of very 
short-dated bonds, it becomes difficult to maintain effective pressure on 
their liquidity ratio©. 3y adBLinc securities, with minor ©noriftco, 
banks can bolster up their liquidity ratios (ord/or increase their 
nevences/ *
The Radcliffe Ccmlttee points to this possible loophole< “seethe
a»‘ ">•• ' t . :;&y f : ■' . * ' '•- • *.. . ■’* i. :k •>-?£'
btxnks, When to etrsngthsex liquidity ratios, can satisfy the
need by selling short bonds to the discount houses, who finance their 
Additional holdings of bonds by borrwiny nor© at call ■Cron th© b^nke- 
The bonks will then have the osna tot&l assets as before, but a higher
proportion of these will be in the conventional •liquid assets1
—
1. See also V. Itagor., "Money, Ltqjiidity and Ir.tera.it Hates", JULqffiU: 
BjykJsr^sr, July 1961, p. %.
Th© facility vith t&ioh th© hanks cculd, at local In the iilddl© 1950* c> 
dispose of their short bonds to the discount homes thus militated against 
the grip of the authoritiaa on tho liquidity position of the banks3* (Bare* 
175).
S&e scope of this offsetting factor, ee argued by the Bank of xixglusad, 
Las bosom© much attre linxitbd in recent yeere. By the end of 1952, the 
ratio of invoataaonts to tho total deposits of the olooring banks wen >3^ 
then gradually fell to IM in tho and of 1&61. Sven after tho purchases
I
of securities in lyol, this ratio was no hi^xer than 16)- attd of course
not all of thecc investment© are likely to bo regarded by the banks as 
2readily available for increasing their liquid assets (or advances)* 
Statistical examination of thia point vill be postponed to Chapter XI 
where the behaviour of the item ’’immstnontc” will be fully examined vith 
respect to both changes in liquidity and advances.
She other possible loophole, diecuosod in connection with the 
offectivonoss of government proosurc on banka* liquidity, ie the l&rjo 
increase in ocmorciftl bills. Xf tho volume of suol bills in the nsxket 
i© growing, a switch, for escmple, by tiic clearing banka in eooomaodating 
industrial and commercial custom by discounting bills, rather than by 
waking advances, will inflate liquid assotc. Also increasing advances
i
1* fig.* 25fc.
2. We have seen (pp. above) that bank inveataaents cosset fall
moh below these percontcgos.
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to tie discount ncxket to hold rsorc coauerciol paper will inflate banks’ 
liquid assets. Hence, being under banka* control , ratsiier than under the 
mastery authorities1 control, ouch item of liquid assets will provide a 
ready loophole to the clearing banks.
From Table 37 we see that ’’ether Mils” including coranereial bills 
have incransod fTc.a 66 L.a. or 3-' of banks’ liquid assets, In 1952 
nonetaxy policy was first applied, to 269 X.n. or in 1962. Call nanoy 
has also increased from 529 L.m. ox 22^ to 91? T».is. or 32f during tfte owe 
period. However, the holding of treasury bills has declined fretn 1182 L.a« 
or Sfe to XG6? X.b» or 36% (llg. 23). -Again, discount jisrfeet holdings of 
comeroial bills have imressed frm 42 b.n. or of their assets in 
1952 to 189 X-a< or 1«$ in 1962 (Table 35 md Mg. 24).
If ve I’otum to Hg. M w notice a divergence (at least since 1958) 
between the troiid of banks* liquid caceto, which ore inareasin-;, and 
bnrifca’ and clearing houses* treasury bills, which arc declining. It is 
suggested that the d’vorge^e is a result Of the growth of these item of 
liquid assets other than treasury bills.
K. baccy, eeaphasising the oiiprlfiomco of treasury bills, mkes a
graphical analysis for "anybody who doubts tint the dominant influence on
- 1
the liquid assets of the banks io the supply of market treasury bills’.
Ho first oospores the banks ’ end discount mxteei holding© of treasury bills 
with the level of clearing banks’ liquid assets for the period X953-5S cod
1. JSsS.* c^it», p. 84.
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concludes that °the virtual identity both cd' trend and of pattern,
is uwAotekobler'. Than ho eatparod e&AMS&o basks’ liquid easeto with 
the overall supply of aarfcet tewrv bills, and the cwaO&tiv© changes 
in the oleeriny banks* r/>fw*frg with the cusnulativc changes in the
overall eunrolv of narfcet iraanur* M11*. nod eoMludae that ’’the slntlc.”*
rlty Of trend end of e©i-aonal variation is roaerkablo' .
The Bank of Snglaad, supporting the first school, oasaonto on 'she
failure of the auT&cly of roar&ct treasury bill© to affect the oleeriw: 
banks’ liquid Matte os a result of the obove*di»ouesed “loopholes15 that 
"cutty of these offsetting faetoee uey only operate at certain ttaea or 
for a certain length of tine* Bat in the sphere of money control, where 
tine is important, it vuay sometimes neon that noxml monetary proesuroc 
hare to be supplemented by ’roquets’ and other measures such oe the
Special Deposits Scheme currently operating.
T
'i *
The second ociiool refutes the principle that there is "eny“ relation­
ship between the supply of tWMur/ bills and clearing beaks* liquid 
assets* Coppock and Cibsm present a table on the market supply of 
treasury bills, the liquid assets of clearing banks end the holdings of 
treasury bills by the clearing banks and the discount liouses far the 
period 195>62.
They observe that, between 195>&h t3ie market a^ply of
P;- ■ - : -■
1. #R. Sit., p. 255.
2. Sil., ,.2X5.
’WKfftfe ■,. ,4' :-, <<5 \ ■ • :••;
.
Mila fell by 153 L,n« whilst th© wltme of liquid assets rose by 430 I.eu 
During thia period, there was a substitution of other assets for direct 
and indirect holdings of treasury Mils of tlw clearing bonks. These 
other assets consisted of comeratal Mils he eetig end indirectly.
Whop conclude that whatever else nay regulate the volune of bonks’ liquid 
assets, it is not the supply of uarket treasury bills- To the extent 
that the cl oaring banks and the discount r^rkot are able to substitute 
©omeroial bills for a lose of treasuxv bills, there MU be no effect on 
the banks’ liquid ns&cts* **It aeons beyond question that the extreme 
view that the volusne of liquid assets of the bonking syoten io regulated 
by the supply of msgtaet treasury bills is invalid end that there is 
nothing in tfe© oysters which prevents the comeroial banks frax varying the 
voluas of their liquid assets at thair eyh discretion.”1
Both of those schools are, indeed, in e^reasent on the innart&noe of 
oomercial bills $ but the first one considers then as a ’’loophole whilst 
the second considers then the crucial factor. The second school, during 
their attack on the significence of naackei treasury bills, Ignores the 
ir^portanoe of bank holdings of short-tor: goverraent securities.
However, it sassy b© true that clearing banks could have escaped pros- 
sure on their liquidity through the emneneial bills. But it io not wise 
to eesaggerate the sigaificanco of this Item by considering it a key ffeetac 
in the prob Ion. Another look at TcSble 81 shows that "atlier hills" still
1* -Ov^** PP* 216-7
compose a omll percentage of total liquid asoete of the cleoring banka. 
Moreover, gush ratio includes a considerable mount of hills other than 
comercial xwpora#
Ve have already seen that tho osusonnlly adjusted correlation coef­
ficient between the behaviour of ?&rkot treasury billa and liquid asset© 
of the clearing bank© is 0.J01 teich ie ©till eigniflcant. lIowvGr, 
Table 113 provides a fairlg strong correlation coefficient between tho 
two variables, between 1953 and 1958 > before the rapid increaee in 
eosnnerci&l bills.
Lastly, whatever i© said against importance of tho market troe> 
our/ bills as © regulator of bsslss1 liquid assets, it cannot bo accepted 
that, during a period of inflationary pressure, Hie nowUry authorities 
increase their bomovdng fron the inxbXK in the issue of market treasury
bills.
statistical Kotos
1, To calculate the correlation coefficient, it is proposed to use 
1
r •
tho ’’Pearson-Coefficient” through tho formlat'
--.at-.....  -
whore
Vlu -1? 57 - D2
1 t» ..
1. R.C.D. Allen,
snd W. 31uckin, An in- 
chapter IXi s,cT3555
, Chapter VII > T.O. Connolly
7> >•
r » correlation eoeffioint}
X * the deviation of eegr x value fron the men of all the X 
valued} . ,.s ;
y «• the deviation of uiy y value fron the naan of all the y
value©}
Ox - the stnnd&rd deviation of the x value e.
Oy » the standard deviation of the y values.
ft « the total nurfber of c&sec.
But there is a shorter end siller aotboa for calculating thia
coefficient siiioc it is mt aeoaceaa^ to calculate the staadaxu devia-
2. Like axv other statistic confuted fro?; ample data, r is eeepeoted to 
vary iron its parameter p . The distribution of r ie not eymetrio, 
however. The Units of the variation of r (*1 and +1) cause the distri
button of r to be skewed to the left when p is near +1 end to be fltM 
to the right when p is near -I. Mhen p « 0. the distribution of r is 
syanotric, although not quite narnal, The s^mstadml shape of the dictri 
button when p w 0 nakoo it possible to toot the hypothesis that p « 0 
by the use of the nt* distribution!
t * *ith a w 2 degrees of frsedea.
Vi - r2
1. IfrU.. sp.123, 129.
2. fbjd.. pp. 130-11 R.L. Anderson and T.f. Bancroft, Statistical 
SiQQg,-, & JtesMCTh, H.x. 1952, pe, 37-8.
The next atop is to consult the table or ”t" in order to fine, out whe­
ther or not there is a correlation between tij© two variables in the
population fxou ufcloi' tlio aoijplo way drpswa*
fe <'•. -yn |>3 ^,-M
Si • - ' . . -*A -B-... 5 ‘ ••••]•-- • ’ ■' ’ r‘
3. in caapufcuic the seasonal variation, wo i^wred the fact ttxat ooti- 
ii 2-WHMM Q$ 0&&&(Xi£iJL VWPiiS'Mt-OP yajpy Q/f ------ —------------ - »
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1« Biyaixt, qp* oit«. Appendix, Table IX j Matuibiition of t, p. 238 f
Anderson ©ml Baftcz&ft, op* , Appoiiddx, Telle III, p. 38J.
2. Seo OX Allen, op. cit., pp. 146*51.
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Chapter XX
great increase in the national debt. Such increase has lad to the develop* 
aait of « new tccCnique of debt iwiagmcnt applied for the purpose of 
nonetar • policy.
Before the First World War, debt nontenant presented no dlfflcultyi 
total debt outstanding amounted to only 651 Uo» (in 191A) consisting 
/.lainly of old Cor***??,** 3 and ti’oaoury bills played little or no p^-rt in the 
operations of money mrfeet. Later events radically changed the situation;
V..
3 ' ■ ■
by the beginniry; of the second wr it stood at about 830C X>. 
end it surpassed 23000 L.su To-day the total is almost 2pOCu Ua.
(31st March 1962), mainly ee a oonsequejwo of government financing of 
various official and soni-offlcial bodies.
teed eeurities (none then 3000 L.a. in I962),1 we 
0001.su
This amunt of
HMW
1. Table 3
*»*«
.&K.
• 2&.'. .*.'' -M&- v- «v- .>-•:/«.?" ' ■■■/• . •...' •• s,;-’.•<£ -*•'.
—
1■ fc. »iiS
•Ml having no final date of redemption (e.g. Consols). More than otto 
half of the direct government debt consiotb of securities dealt in on the 
stock exchange (1$263 I»»bu In 1%2) and about one-fifth of floating debt 
(5591 L.n.).
Fron thia brief statement, it is clcer that nanagement of the national 
debt has become a fhr more intricate operation than it used to be. More 
important, debt ncmgment has to fit tlio recuir^aeute of monetary policy, 
State it directly influence* the national cconoey «. financial institutions, 
business firms and the general public. Debt nansgeaiont, on occasion, 
expresses itself in dramatic broadly pervasive neaeurea such ae the "forced 
funding” 1000 L.a. of treeuaury bills in 1951- bees conspicuously it 
operates almost omtinuoualy and with equally significant effects.
The Badollffo Conoittee considers that "The National Debt used to be 
regarded ae the aftermth of war... National Debt hae com to be on inte­
gral part, even an indiepeneablo part, of the w* of claim and counter­
claim that gives strength to the structure of financial institutions, end 
the mnagemont of the debt has become an opportunity for the aonetaxy 
authorities in their task of influencing tho pressure of total demaad” 
(Pw». 530).
(2)
In recent years, debt aanecen®1^ ho® boootj® a
wiwrT>W>wrrTMWi»~trrr—— rinwwr
e j*} 7*’ ' ■». - ■
.'*r .t ’ ■ ” ‘-J
lively subject of discussion
i. afcs Stock 1986-2016 (Sable 17).
' •• ! •'••- •"■ ■*■
./• -Astzifea-.
not only in Britain, hut in the United States, France and nany other
itill Vaatew Sirroii® aa wall. ~)ahi***"■-" v V*i» ■»r <4;. *4 W njTmus ,v < -jM *feX*X <* mey he defined as
,< • .s'
.V.
- ..
• « • • '.'-i
official policies that have the effect of clanging the else or the ©true*
tturn of a country's national debt. To this aust bo added policies rela­
ting to the distribution of the debut It la clear that changes In the 
distribution of a given volwaa end typo of debt oca hove profound effocto. 
The definition oay also include corns reference to policies governing' the 
terns of borrowing. Official solicloc refer to actions by goveraaent 
ngenciea including a central bank es wall as a treasury. Henee, aeoordlng 
to the definition, debt sasnsgeMont is vary closely related to end overlaps 
with noaetaxy policy. In the definition, national debt refers to debt 
held outside the official agencies * i.c< that debt held in private hoaada, 
tlie net debt, the publicly-held debt or the outstanding debt. This aeons 
that foreign-held national debt Is excluded ffcor. our investigation.
The Bedcliffo Cor&iitte© defines* in Pc-re* 16«
■W as referring exclusively to the Treasury and the Bonk of noglond* Aloe
L. M
- ! •
''■ ■•■ :;• <&• 4 <•"?-
V ■ • .
5? '..! fi: •:.-.' * A?f '
1« So© "Report on *nw■1 ,
British, branch, Butch end Jbaorlcsn R« 
National Debt.
K?"?
teSfjfar T2 *
1961, vfcieh includes 
on the management of the
2e rfhe tern "national debt’- will be used since it is preferred to "public 
debt” in British usage. The word "national“ is itself mieleedingi debt 
can only really be eaid to be "national” when it is owned externally, 
whether to foreign goversvwxts or individuals, It would obviously be 
leee misleading to speak of "govormont*1 3 *rather than "national" debt. 
Nevertheless, the tradition of talking about the "national" debt is firmly 
eetc&liehedi 8. Sevin, M>lfo Finance, 1J61, p. 2?, Ibotncte If l.R.
^J^-3as^A51^5S^LSii^ESSa!S£» London i960, p. 3C1.
3. We arc not interested here in tbe raUtionship between the Troasuiy and 
the Dank of DnglflaU. Our Interest is the policy itself and not how the 
policy Is mode. However, for awe detail on this point, see the Badellffe
T?_nirLfOwbr /xx©yO Jr®/ 11 • «
it U8<J3 the tens National Debt to denote Ac net debt of the public sectort 
1«C« the obligations of the public sector excluding those held within the 
public
—(3) figftP. #
National debt iff through public locus, which
ejoversment enters into a wide variety of debt contracts. Classification 
of such contracts has been extensively discussed in Chapter I, which 
little to be added. Novever, to
:%
sion.
* Classifying obligations according to their mturlty, ve obtain a
naturit;. including short- and long-term obligations, to others of
indefinite maturity (Consols). Claims of sezo maturity include
savin,s bonds payable at a specified price on demand. Jran, in the
case of finite maturities, the Treasury need not fix a single date
at which As dCbt must mature. 1 raaxinvar maturity; date may be
fixed while the option to determine an earlier date is left to tho 
>
--■& ■
Report, Chapter IX, pp* 269*79? H.S. 
pp. 68*7^*
6th
X. S99 C.r. BaaUble, Public gjwwa, 3rd ed., Book V, Chapter VI.
2. A widespread practice in Soutti Atiorica Is that the Maturity for par­
ticular bonds ie determined each year on a lottery basis} ef. Victory
and i'reniun Bonds in the Baited Xis^dosa.
fay
* Variations in the degree of meskctabilHy provide the second 
dineijsion of debt mnagersent* Xn the case of jasrfcetable Issues 
the identity of the investor becomes minr^rtant since the 
Treasury contracts with the bearer; ihile in the ease of aon- 
isarketable issues, the oontmot is with a specified holder who 
oust hold the obligation until the Treasury redeems it. The 
feature of non^rjarketability is, of course* a disadvantage to the 
investor i who is compensated by granting the option to redeem the 
contract at an earlier date.
» All these debt instruments involve purely voluntary contracts 
between and borrower. Oonmlsion is usually discussed in
connection with war finance. A conmlsory or forced lean is, 
however, rare in modern public finance. Xt was a favourite method
with sovereigns in curlier tines $ it w 
reign of Charles X. **The compulsory loan
used in England to the 
io in fact rather a tax
than a credit transaction. ♦ • Its injustice and inconvenience ou^h\ 
to effectively exclude it fr&a the list of fiscal contrivances.
(4) Technique of Bob t I lonas wvfc
Xt is nov clear that a substantial amount of the national debt ie held
tMKta. eBW»en»S3 jsswraw skcwaexwa.
1. The Second Vorld Vaa* has soon oono sorto of compulsory loans « The 
first is Income Tax Post-War Credits which date from the budget of 1941 
when the personal allowances and tlio earned income allowance for inoaae 
tax purposes were reduced. Howvex\ the government was unwilling to 
naka the reductions permanent; at the ocr.e tine the need to combat 
wartime inflation made it neeoes^ry to withdraw purchasing power iuxiedi- 
ately. The extra tax payable as a result of the reductions in allowun* 
cos wo3 therefore credited to the tax-payers to be repaid after the war 
The other sort of forced loans are the I&cess Profit Tax Post-bar 
Refunds. This tax, imposed in 1939 at 60%, was raised to 10€$& in 1940 
in order to discourage expenditure. Xn 1941, it was provided that 2Q 
should bo repaid (as in the case of Boot-War Credits) on conditions, 
and at a date, to be determined by the Parliament. See Sir M. Brittain 
The British Budgetaty System, pp. 104, 134*
2. C.P. Beatable, o£. ci t.. p. 68$.
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by various govwuaont agenciea - i*e. about a quarter of the debt which 
is quoted on the Stock J&ohang© end belt of the treasury billc are In
bonds • What is the Of rtr^r> p ‘jpg thio SiaOUJlt?
*- Ay. ■ •;• -u Vi
2ha dordimting fact in the dabt-caKiegecrant problem is that the beala
. •
for the operations ie the large anount of govemmsnt securities held by
>»,-'W^r '•■-‘A.;, rl?;' the public departments. Th© largest component of thio part ef debt is
hold by the issue-E, ■-!• ••« of the Sunk of shglond (which represents
the booking of the note issue), together with those in the
Equalisation Account (which is by the Bank of England on behalf-■■ T ' • h •" - '
of the ) and those held by the National Debt which
comprise tho tarestaents of a togs number of official ftois (the
isrportant of Which are the National Insurance Jhnds and the 
deposited with the Poet Office end Trustee faringe Bank.).
;*i:.
The holdings of the official bodies are considered a "masse de
Hi
' ...
HAwfanfra^ "* which can be used, if the goveanment wishes. to affect the 
conditions of the economy by switching holdings fron one security to
another*
To discuss the function of those ftmde for the purpose of stabilise- 
tion, we start with the tooimiqiue and guiding principles of opera.tian©
!• Stoles », 57-
£♦ It should perhaps be noted thet national debt is not only ooaosrned 
with the objective of stability* A lr.rr»© wount of debt is, in fact, 
incurred for providing tho public invaotoenta with sufficient funds. 
Hence, that part of the story of national debt, which is related to 
monetary policy, is only mentioned bore. However, the whole problem 
of public investments will be discussed in Chapter XTX.
JL
•M . • f-X -V •. •--*. ' . AS?
;,v ■ —-i„. *» .»•' .■•.
■rs&Wd* '£
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conducted by the official bodies.
The Issue Department of tho Bank of England holds about Ztyffy L.B.1 
in 1962 of government obligations at) baoklttc; for the note issue. The 
ocRsposition of these holding 1s never disclosed, but it is thought to 
include a variety of gllt~Gdgefi oscuritloo with & substantial quantity 
of ten trcasur r bills- It 1® sunnosed that a vide froedon of action is 
enjoyed in respect of these securities.. By the nature of their function 
as cover for the note issue, these seeurltieo are not subject to staingsnt 
selective tests. Changes in Hie portfolio (i.e. witches between holdings 
of different • -yr** jis&e to -assist government debt
operations.2
Concerning Hie National Debt Comisoioners, it became possible to 
throw light on the toolmiquo of iwuaging their holdings. years $^o
the Controller General of the M.B. Office was questioned by a parliamen­
tary Committee about the choice of investments for funds under control 
of the Comiaaianers.^
£•-■■•<■ -I, •;,• ’V The aggregate holdings of the Oomiesionere, which are almost
•~-
>
?r “■ •• ’• -
• 4. -;. . ~ r- .
l f -4- .• , '. z . t • r
1. Source 1 Wjdfe-fiO&-^.A€
2. For a orltioal study on tbe holdings of the Issue iMpcxteawvt and th»
B.3.C., mm B. Kevin, At -fee Satl<mal Chapter in,
». S8^9.
^Government Debt Policy and Hie Banking ^st«a”» PP. >7.
b. It© full name ia ’’The Commissioners for the Reduction of the 
li&tional Bebtn. It w established ia 1766 for the purpose of the 
reduction of Hie National Debt. The Cocxaissioaera cosjmrisQ the
! '■ : V •<" • ■ • ’
'A. ' •
2$C
wholly of coverrciGnt and ^overment securities are of two
7^-; .•< &'• -'W' ' • {« A"-'
. ■$& ... . •_•-< "• . • : • ..
distinct categories. On the one head, about tvo*thirda of the whole
■ • . hf;
:•
covers deposit in the Saving® Banks; on the other hand the trust funds 
of
©onsist/alwst all the reserves cummlated under the National Incur*
>•...= > F > , ..<.V
anoe cohenes. h
liabilities of the swinge fcenko arc considered more liquid in the 
sense that it is difficult to foresee the balance between the revenue i 
outgoings and hence what not anount of ooafc nay ease in or be required 
to meet withdrawals year by year or even toxth by month. On the other
hand, with the aid of sotuariol cmleuletionr?, the running iwenuo and 
out^oineo of the Kattonal Insurance Stoto can be acre cooildesitly 
foreseen, as to aegnituflo and tlaing, ovor the year. In ttio light of
»'. £'-■•• 'A-1?.'. ■ . r/ '.A ; .-r ..it m-. t v*<
the foreseeable requirements of the ftaSB»> the National £«bt Offioe 
determines the spread of aecwMtise etpM&Mtely to be held ae
»• -, . '■■ 3* --jjte *• «■«< SJ ' fct*- 1
»V.- >• *%■'
[7 • ■-, '-.i -<k
of the national ijwurence funds*
.i :r ' v i •**$ '* • dsL Jt
Hence, the revenue of savings bank. -icy be considered ae floating 
funde, wbici. the Ccaptrolier nay invest sronjitty or bold back for later 
inveataent, whereas trust fluid atauiya have to be dealt with at mini®, 
delay. In other wards, savings bonk aonayc are trading funds by the
.
hu
Chancellor of the 3Kchequer, the Governor and Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of a^jlend, the C> ?oih<t>r of th** House of CoKoonc, the Lord Chief 
Justice, tha Haeter of the Bolls end the Accountant General of the 
Su^rosxe Courts threats showed that the Gucniseiondrs were not 
ful in their pursuit, and adjninioteMng certain public funds boeem 
thoir predociinant task - Urn most im^portmt are the National Insu­
rance Punds, the deposit© of the Post Office and Trustee eyine® 
Banks. The Comfcdssiouers have not assmbled since 18d0; they are 
in effect a section of the Treasury known as the fi.B. Office,
i/’;, •-
r
-J&y j®, r.: 7 ’ .•
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of which the Comptroller can maintain a reservoir of investments, ao- 
<iuirod ae opportunity cxioea.
Th© CoLSitroller O7X2rG.tG$ on tho ba&x© of hi* ovn ind/zomant ainae the
inner quorum of the Comnlosionora 1© very rarely oonsulted. However, he is 
in frequent touch with the Treasury and the oentral bank. He considers the 
Treasury aa "having avery groat voice" la broad polioy, particularly as 
regards the funds of the savings banks* Ke cited the oodbatiang of inflation 
as an aim of gaesmmtt policy that h© BM to further.
Wito s& ?X<^aLfe°J^aa
• '
' ;^>.i
-
These official funds ere used by the monetary authorities
I «»« whAw4- -*— » 4 Mot a An s -"’\»> io support new xasuosi
(b) to assist the replacement or repayment of monetary issue©5 
(o) to modify the maturity structure of debt held by the general 
public by buying and selling operations in tho open mrisot.
The authorities aim to prorcoto tho steady absorption of seontrltiee into
" ' ’ ’ ■' ' I
private hands. Kenoet when an Issue of stock is made, the general public is 
invited to subscribe. Tho enount of such issue is usually too lar^e to be
absorbed in the date of isms. However t the authorities amounco that tho 
issue i© fully m&ocrlbed. The wmssrtad cxxrunt is, then, taken by the 
Issue Jcp&rlmont of the Bank of i^Rgland and grtxlvfilly sold to the ; iurk»t
over the following weeks and months aa conuitiems permit (in offset tlio new 
issue io spread over a period of two years). ’The Issue Bsparteont of tho 
Bank of Snglond is in ©ffoct the undopwidter for the government stock 
(Pars. 109)«
5 >1;:
The /rovemrant broker acting Tor rathVrt dexxirtiients offers suitable)
&evom.'.ont occuritioo at currant conditions in the Stack
^ohany-a. Thus, ba takes advffntrv?© of any opportunity to make sales to the 
public. It is in this twy that r^cetoble scurities generelly reach tlie 
invootiny public. The proceeds of ttio not sales are placed in tap treasury 
bills for the tine beix^, and the bills in turn are relinquished, as required, 
to mke up further new issues#
The 3.1).C. also invest the funds under their control in new stocks, 
with a difference from the Issue Bepartarat. The latter a$<mt subscriber now 
issues; at a temporary holder while the 3.D.C. usually hold their stock as a 
permanent invsstnoat. In this wsy» the authorities suarantes a steady ab­
sorption of £ilb*ed£©d swuritieo into private hands.
In the case of lauturiny securities, We authorities systematically buy
up seouriiios as their maturity date approaches wit: the result that at that
date a st&otautial portion of naturinc issue is in official hands* If the
issue is replaced by a conversion stock, tbs success of the operation is
largely ^yu-nudoed. If, or. hu od™ no offer of conversion is usds,
1i.e* if cash payments arc involved, lax^o payments will not #> to the
public * to the banking system. In either case, the government ainiaises 
nctvxl
the u.cunt ofjc^' that Las to paid in^° Private hands - there will 
bo a limited addition, if ary-, to tl < II<pi‘. rcsou?cou <f the banking i’,voted.
By t? 'fic u^Guroa, hot) the nev isrjaer to the public «»d the ropey; ant
1. In this case, the uaturlng seouritieo will be replaced by tap troaaujy 
bills held by the public departments.
of those maturing in the hands of the public ere spread over a period 
instead of being ccnoontrated on particular dates. In short, the opera'
A‘ a aof the Xss&e De>wtnont and the K*IhC. ere to suvnort new issues and
mturing cecuritios in anticipation of their repayment or oonveraion. bTx©
* • j>
!&• ’-<Ats •Ti^yhyx-V V; .;■ ;' . ;
crucial issue, os they are largo holders of stocks, is that operations of 
these departments provide the authorities with one of their principal 
of influencing yield and prices in the gilt-edged market.
W ?ss^p,^L3^k^segS3?l
We have seen that debt i^iageaent io Intended to facilitate a steady ab­
sorption of gilt-edged securities into the racket. However, this 
does not always accord with the re^ireuotits of aoaetary policy. Xt aey
involve an wtpenalojt in the volume of nas&st treasury bills at a time whoa
4
the monetary authorities are aiming at a reduction of floating debt in 
order to li?ait the supply of liquid ass etc avnil shift in tiie system*
:-<■ ^*,xi / •'A ©4, • 'j*/'*'' '’ ’• *$**'•'• i'^Wh • *; .■ ••-. 'y
Por axuaplo, the capital requirements of the nationalised in&ustriea
were, until X9$6, set by issues of gm&Mfct guaranteed securitise. As 
said above, those securities were -taken up largely by the public depart- 
asnts in order to dispose of thou gradually on the market — together with 
government issues* But the total involved tended to put a strain on tbs 
absorptive capacity of the market, resulting tlioreby in slower disposals.
a larger extent &sn was required, by borrowing on tender treasury bills * 
i.©. by borrowing frc*a the banking system* ibis inflationary c.ethod has|.-’g ' n- 'b -• l
of course impeded the .--wemnont mnakr: control by iapedi^* the funding 
pXOCOGfi. '
To remedy this situation, tl»o capital requirements of the nationalised 
industries wore directly financed fxvn the Exchequer out of it© revenue 
or by borrowing. For thia reason, covemuent guaranteed securities 
proved continuous increase from 2502 l.u. in 195^ to 3292 L,a. in X95&, 
followed by a stationary situation or a
Mftgemto did not enlarge the flow of caving for investment or reduce 
the total capital funds demanded but it helped to clear the way for 
government debt operations in We market.
t A further cornlication indebt iian^gmemt may now be discussed. It
/
arises from the operations of the Exchange Equalisation Account and Weir 
effect on the volume and distribution of treasury bills.*
Import and oxpeft transactions between the United Kingdom^ sad other 
countries ere usually settled through Wo foreign exchange market. These 
transactions in foreign ourronoieo arc subject to the Foreign Exchange 
Control. -iwk Control does not in fact provide We foreign eusrenMee 
A«wuled by importers, or buy the currencies from We exporters. Instead, 
foreign currencies arc obtained, or disposed of, by authorised dealers, 
(i.e. e bank authorised by We Control) who usually match We demands of
Will *»« re.MHni.iMMW wa»saw* w
1. Triblo 3.
2. One© again, it should be noted Wat this is an exceptional discussion 
duo to our asewaption oi“ on entirely clcoed economy! see ft\zw*-i
3. In fact, Wo British S.S.A. operates so the reserve of gold and foreign 
currency not only for the V«K. but for the entire Sterling Area.
cufi toners wanting foreign curror-oloo vith the supplies of foreign curren­
cies offered by other customers who are vamting sterling. However, these 
is w> euxtomtic balance between those demand© and supplies, hence the 
Account stands behind the authorised de&Xere to absorb ouch fluctuation©*
Tli© Account Is an official reservoir of gold and foreUpl currencies, 
mnsgod by the Hank of hn?;lnnd.~ Ito copltcl is divided between sterling, 
sterling securities, gold, foreign exchange and securities expressed in 
foreign currencies. And, eo a matter of practice, It turns most of its 
foreign currencies Into gold, and practically all it© sterling into tap 
treasury bills*
From the point of view of monetary policy, the Account*a transactions 
heave effects on tho internal financial system. Xn every operation, the 
Account sells foreign currencies for sterling or sells sterling in exchange 
for foreign currencies offered to it. When in the course of its operations 
the Account buy3 gold or dollars, it ha© to pay sterling to the sellersi 
end in order to do this it requires repayment of sone of the tap treasury 
billa, tho maturity dates of idtich are c^pxwimately spread over a short 
period. Conversely, vhon the Account ha© to sell gold or dollars, it 
receive© sterling <*»» increase its investment in treasury bills, ihes,
os a result of a favourable balance of payments, the Account *e gold will 
increase and its treasury bills will decline; and vice versa. Xn other 
words, an outflow fron the gold and dollar rsstrves provide© the authorities
1. Gold is held the Account because it sen readily be sold, at fixed 
price©, to tho monetary authorities of other countries for the currencies 
(e.g. U.S. dollars) widen the Aoccunt rocuires at any tine.
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with & oorrespcruliag amount of sterling tMch is placed for the time being 
in tap treasury bills? hence the gwcnrOTt’s need to borrow on narkct 
bills io reduced. Oonvoreely, an. inflow of gold and roaorres will reduce 
the Account’s holding of tap bills and the velme of market bills*1* thus 
increased. ’Thia nexmss that an increase in reserves of sold and dollar* 
tends to increase the volume of treasury bills in tho market thereby 
raising the liquidity of the banka;. while a fell in the reserve tends to 
reduce the liquidity of the banking system.
The general ccneluaicn ie that an diverse balance of payments sill 
set up deflationary forces, and onrre©T»ondin^ly a favourable balance will 
set up inflationary- foroea. Thus when, because of restrictivo monetary
neasureo. the ftold and dollar reserves an? beliur r*rnl entshod •» that vexr
process has the incidental effect of the liquidity of the banking
aystem and so working contrary to the restrictive measures thornselves.
uQCbion jj
' e proceed now to the lost objective of "official holdings" - i.o. 
changing the composition of national debt in the hands of the public by 
langthcain its Ilf. mtourttgr - the funding process.1 Minding ie not, 
indeed, a new idea: it was advocated during the nineteenth oentwey.
According to this classical theory of debt j a sound debt
wt
structure is tha loi^-tora on© * i.c. a sound structure re^uiros funding la 
a more or less long-term deb t« □hort-teorea or floating debt usually lesees 
the government at the ataxyr of isipatimt lenders. In other words , the 
..iajor artpaaeni for long~t«ra debt is the protection of the Treasury againct 
sudden insistence by lenders that th© debt lias to be tbs
nsuxy on the verge of bankruptcy*
This traditioml theory baa been stated by C.F« Lae table i ’‘As a
t‘@nerul principle of finance it is un^uoationablc that the flouting debt
should be kept within the imrrowst limits possible.•• The great evil of
a floating debt is its uncertainty* To bo open to the risk of a sudden
dmrnd for pcytzmt is to be in the position of a banker without the
securities with which he provides himself | and it is precisely in tiaos 
t
of commercial difficulties that the call is most likely to be made,”*
Hr. K, fattorson illustrates the classical theory in the United
statesi ”Vhcn SeereteiQr KcCullocL assumed hie duties at the Treasury in 
March 136$" ho hmt tfca lasediaie necessity of bringing under control tiiie 
huge amount of floating and ahorb*tem debt obligations to strengthen the 
public credit end forestall possible embarrassment to the Treasury should 
unfavorable financial conditions develop. In thia respect for 1865 he 
stated, ‘the first stop to be token is to institute measures for funding 
the obligations that e^o soon to nature.’ later, in his memories, fee wrote 
•^br nearly throe years' after I bocamc hoex’otary I had enough to do •.•in
<i»»t»ta«5;!E*c5xasswR»wa.ji»3ies*»e's*»6
1. C.j?. jBastd-'-0, , id’* 0$’^—$.
ass
funding the imanso amount of teEperary obligations. ..this great* and In 
1
some respects difficult, work.’"
It is hence the long-term debt that is the legitimate method of
borrowing* and war debt, if not issued long in the first pjaoe* should be 
converted in the post-war period.
The classical principle any, hovwer* be argued from two points of 
2views x
Piry,t - th© real danger for the Treasury is not the inability to pcy 
sudden md large onounta during a period of oconomic distress. The danger 
comas rather from debt monetisation in an inflationary pressure when it is 
desirable to contract the degree of liquidity of the economy.
Secondly e it cannot be argued under prosmt conditions that a short-tern 
debt necessarily involves a greater risk of forced repsymeat than a long- 
term ona. This 1® true only fron the legislative point of view where 
matured securities must be paid for while non-natured debt presents the , 
Treasury with no each legal obligation. Aa we shall see in Chapter XX, 
if the banking system or nay other holders want tc sell their gorsansaeat 
investments, then tho monetary authorities vill be forced to buy* Aad 
raising long-term interest rates, in order to discourage such eale* uay or 
aay not stop this flow. Anyhow, the xjpoxlant fact to be stressed is 
that a long-texv. debt in the hands of the general public does not mean, 
by itself, that the government may be called on to pay ouch debt at the 
wrong tine.
a* ■uKW^nawnwawgiw
1. B.T. Patterson, "Federal I>ebt*i--aaagonent Policies 186$-1879% a par­
tial fulfillment of the requlrs-icnts fox the degree of Fh»D«, 8.T. 
University, Durban #.G., 125%
2. See R. iSuagrare, "Credit Controls and Ptiblie Debt"* in Incom, '’mplqy-
' -r . - -<> .............. ..
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As might he suggested froa tfoo shove discussion, the motive for 
funding differs from that in the c&essiaal theory of debt waugeuent. 
Shading is, nowadays, an instrument of economic stabilisation. In this 
respect, too, official agencies pley their role. Apart fee© nev issues 
and redemptions, adjustments of the security portfolios of these agencies 
are regularly used {depending upon the re^iWKonts of the eoeaooy as scan 
by the maetaiy authorities) in order to alter the pattern. of debt out- 
standing in private hands •
The term ’"funding”, an uribiguous ten'., has been used in different 
occasions, to moan various processes:
(a) for a loug-tmr- policy,2, it can mean selling longer-term securities 
against the purchase of treasury bills. This is important from the 
point of view of increasing the average life, and so reducing the
Xiouidixy, of the national debt — also of importance to
Hie brrto because of their liquidity conventions.
(b) there is the abort-term policy of manipulation of treasury bills in 
order to reduce the banks1 liquidity Vhc& it is desired to restrict 
credit and to increase it when espaaaion is desirable. Vo have seen, 
in the last chapter, that regulation of hanks* liquid assets is, in 
principle, the purpose of controlling the treasury bill supply.
1. E.V. Morgan distinguished between the short-term sad the long-term 
funding policy: see "Money, Liquidity rnd Interest Kates". JLloydg Bunk 
Seriotf, July l?6l. pp. 26-38.
joe
(o) finally there is the situation Where the government can rely on 
oelXing, regularly, enough securities in the market to bridge the 
gep between its revenue and QKpcnditiirc without increasing its 
floating debt. In other words, fuadii^" policy, if not in the widest 
sense of necessarily lengthening the average life of the national 
ddbt, then at least means selling stocks to the public with the 
object of keeping down borrowing on troraury bills through the 
banking system.
The monetary authorities node their interpretation of **funding44 cloor 
in a speech by the Governor of the Sank of England at Ipswich in October 
19571 “The authorities have a two-fold objective. We try to ovoid any 
increase in the floating debt, end indeed to reduce it... The aim, thero- 
fore, b«e been to sell longor-ters securities either against the purohuie 
of thia year1* maturities or against treecvcry bills.**
The short-tor: concept of funding was the subject of the last chapter 
wiiero the relationship between changes in clearing banks* liquid assets and 
changes in market treasury bills was exmined. Vs are aow concerned with 
the long-tern; concept of funding, !••• lengthening the average life of debt 
not merely by tbs replacement of flfresb-taxfc by long-term debt but also by 
increasing the average life of the debt.
The structure of the debt and in particular its maturity distribution 
hoe constantly obstructed the funding process for a number of years post.
1. Here, the Governor ie referring to treasury bill a held outside the pub­
lic departments - i.e* tainly to bills issued by tender - rather turn the
total nominal anount of treasuz^ bills*
A-.i , - ■ jrf *•• '* ri*~ < ~?V •> ■ ‘ *A»• • ’<:. r^;^. :
3C1
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To recount the story in outline, the r^pid growth of the national debt 
during the war years wise eaeatipesied by an expansion of a new typ* of 
securities, i.e. Treasury Deposit doceipte which were taken up by the 
Such securities were not a&rkoinble and therefore not counted anon- their 
liquid acsete. After the war, ¥«$•$«*? w^re ^dually replaced by 
tre&frizy billo (until the lest Soceipta were repaid in February 1952), 
entailing a grMual growth of tM
gv m ;.•••••'■'•
h; ' ' '- I ’’oreever, th» cwthorWee nade, chwinc tho war, Tdbatantl&l iaaude of
'■
ssedlun- and leng^tenr.i government scouritiee, acne of which ware taken up 
by the banks, insurance oorawdas, other financial institutions aid the
public. Since the war, the authorities W hod to deal with these issues
• ? .‘^3.**. * . g.rE » Lat, . 7? 1 • " -S. 'r..'. v' / r< c ;••.•$-
ist
Ay
aa they approached ail reacted maturity.
The ©conoay was, in short, overburdened with liquidity when the new
government took office in 1951- that point monetary policy was re­
vived aid every effort was made to reduce the outstanding voluao of the 
floating debt in order to give greater control over th© ability of the 
barking system to gmt creditt n...3y finding the authorities wore 
act ‘ . . the liquidity of the banks. They- have.. .given hi^i priority to
reduction of the* floating* debt (oven to the extent of 'forced* funding 
in 1951-52)” (£tera. ^9).
Aa for the floating debt, in 1951 * total of 1000 baa. of
tSMtigy billa, largely held by the banking system, was converted into
k?:»3.
6r ' •••' ’ '
t'S« >
Bhort-twpr rarketflible eecuritla. (on»~, twr>- and tt ro^-eaaf 1& Sericl
Fundi ry Stocks). A year later, viicn the shortest-dated of tciese stocks
iato fwrttiex fairij short- 
verv taken up by the b^nks ana
s4<&Uoiua 250 l.a. of troeousj- tiilo war® absorbed.
iiGfio coovri tioo
were foroed down
rtcoordingly, As regards the longer*-tars. debt, with the upward aovcmnt
in Interest rates the tendency of the author!ties was, at first, for 
conversion issues to be ohort-tcm scouritio:? so ae to stvoid increasing
•P , . *S* - ...■ }.
5%.- Lw»
i-A*
-/a'- <„? 
' j ,? „n., ’
v ' '. .<'.'• ‘ -- "
#}« debt burden to the 1& chequer. At the ua e tiae sone of the wdim~ 
tern issues ^de during the war ccrac to ba included &uan$ the short-tern 
securities. The result was a sharp incra-se in the waotiftt of shert-teasa 
outstanding debt (Tables 117, H2 and Tigs. 26, 27) >
however, for a critical study tbs uchiw^»ant of the outhorities
i'-! i" : " '. r."» ”-1 z * * »/ V ’ *' W< ‘f £ - - ' J * '- » \ J® " 3L 2 t - s 4’ ■* *isi ' ’ <S ’**# A *" ( V f ? y =3g \ fa
in funding, the record shows that they did not hove raush success ia their 
esdeavourat 7.' ,
In the narrow official oonoeyt of funding the reduction of the
<*••>'' *• x / ■. u 7—V 
■ axA '- .^ ■•■ *'
; rv * Hg»a£SF
(’h; •>'-’ f 'Z‘. >V& '--
‘ ■ , <* •
supply of treasury bills in the rsaa&ot, the record is not impressive. It 
is true that the had fuzu’sed XGCV L«u« of treasure bills at
the end of 1?S1, but the supply vent up a^ain in 1952*3 C*Mk 2fe and 
Table 1X4). lucre was a further □ariasd cspenaica in the supply of bills 
in the second half of 1955* *&© first ^uerter of 1957 the Treasury
add loag-tera securities sad the treasury bill issue was reduced< Then 
the ottistawdine; bills continued a rapid e^^uiion (except 1961) to over 
5300 t»»B. in 1962 (in March 1951, before the forced funding', the total 
outsWZing vac only 5000 >.«•)♦ Ale© 25a) the trend of total
treasvxy bills is aare or loss iiicroasing® Concerning mxkct treasury
of Treasury Bills
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Figure 26: ~t—
Maturity Structure of the National Debt (total outstanding)
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bills, it io cloer fro; the achievement is still not groat,
an inci^uee fro:.; 256^ L.rm in 1952 to 23O0 L.su in I960 giving way to a
reduction in 1962 to 2760 L*ia» - m point of view of the clearing
hcnka’ treasuj^r bills, tho trend (Mg. 2£e) shows indeed a continuous 
decline.r
.n© .tv of su&rketcble debt, 
s seen fro;., Tables 11647 cM 
Mg. £€, the proportion of mttottfble debt with a life of If years or ovor 
s&festsble nations! debt in­
ducing troaaur;. bills and gweraacxit guaranteed securities) to 3$g- ia
u f* ** n 1 y y*> -'***><t?5 < i Y*?’
r%> ^or** JjCX' *d>xx
1962. 3tc esKJoat’3 isoiainga 
1952 <3«Ue 116} to Mk L-k.j
vcfc hm fallen fcoa 3308 L.js. in
marketable debt, -
it also declined fxw; 51-s to 3?/ (^able Ilf aftd Pig. 27) • Moreevei, tho 
;'iarket ahaye of ”5*15 yours” or aediun debt hns increesed frou l?/» to 
2f in 1$&2, . Lastly' short^tsrr. debt increased fron Xty/ to 1% i» tho soft 
P k-*.j. .a.Ov.. • ’.^J^h© Oti Mar side of tho ?.>4»otux5o1 l*o* tn© ’‘official holdings'’, is 
12p**21 and ^0^' ^SiAGet*^ 3h&* X4bei*»</
This graphical stud;/ illustrate© the degree of success of government 
polic; of funding since the end of Iffl* ;3uch policy was widely criti­
cised by various esoskomistsf Wfc» ISea^pan, for instance, cements on the 
achievement of the authorities, %»♦ there has been and still is & need i 
for lonr-tern policy of funding* both to reduce the vol mo of treasury 
bills ^nd to increase tho average life of the debt”} while X. Kevin
1. Ob. clt.. p. 36.
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notes thet despite the cor.tinnouse and dcternined efforts to fund the
debt fron 195^ onwards, the eoxtlxritioc have succeeded la raaMng x>itifu23jr
ppo .1 ••'
little progress. ***’
This result is largely nttributubls tc government unwillingness to 
pay the price that would have to be incurred if funding were to proceed 
on a substantial sc^le. The price would be a rate of return to 
bondholder® that would leave a tolerable nargln after allowing for the 
effect of rising prices. As Tfill be seen ir. the next chapter, goverxt’sent 1 
reluctance to accept a Ion# rate of interest at which it could sell its 
own securities In sufficient asomte was the uain weakness of nonetsoy 
polio; the 195*3 Ts«
Attempts at funding have also been obstructed by the very eeale of 
expenditure undertaken or financed by the .^vemnent. To recall the 
problem, the govemaent , which inherited in 19$1 an economy cverburdenol 
with liquidity and taxation, was set with difficult! go created by the 
poot-war nationalisation and Volf^3 State* It took ovor coraltsumta for 
current expenditure, which ssade it difficult to reduce taxation, as veil 
as capital expenditure. This capital ezzpenditurc was for the uiitiou^liaed 
industries and local authorities ■/the last fbr houcing) Which domin&tad 
the ’’below the line” part of the budget. Censeqvontly, the issue of > 
tender troesury bills grew until the mount outstanding woe bask to the 
high level of the period before the ” forced funding” of 19JX*
■miount ririm ji «•vis^et-^t^KWffttusvut ..
1. ’’British luLXio Debt Policy* ^dblin 19<5l> pp. 47*6*
The taondter/ outhoritios have oontinually to face th* problem of replacing 
ox rwieening, mturod ©eouritioa. In o^ior ^s, together with tho 
problem of raising funds to finance & qotw% < *of tho 
overall capital foliation, the autharitiea have to renew the exietlnc 
debt, they, therefore, face a constant need to operate in tho lone-teaa
mrket to finance? their e&oit&l y^iTini tvs inn t« i to reolaoe an tmoeooiTVc flow
Of
another effect of the cx>np<xsivion of the debt my be added* Sinoe 
the poet-way period, the bank© boro restricted their government invest-
uente to ccssQioratively short*texu securities« Moreover» securities held 
by them during the war (of nedim and Icsas-tenu mturity) hare matured 
or are approaching maturity (2#£€)» Therefore, against any pressure by
authorities, the b&nks held securities with fairly y^eer mtu* 
rity date© and so arranged as to provide periodical reinforcement to thoiT
liquid asset© against any atjueeco by tho uuthoxitiw
. r 5.
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the volwae of treasury bills ia now of inpertaneei
of banks’ U^iidiV resides in regulation of tbs treasury bill supply.
etoofc ana purobesea of bills. Amding is thus considered tbe basic instra- 
Esnt of Bonotasy control. And Hw operative neehaaisa hero is the long-
of interest. Xn othor words,
eathorities to xsioo long-ton!, interoat zntss.
Both 3oooj and Mor„<ai'
shovWtem rates ie ©ieur * trewMwav biXU rates should remain es ter as 
possible below lon^-tcm rates, that io, my allowing wh’tis1 -
P- ;.•• ...- ' > funds in lon^tem funds.
v.* Wxy • p ';.■fcRAOsfly- J '4'- .'•tf'.r whole liquidity, they argue tlat thia runs,
i. w.ir. Ssoej, a • pp. Ub-27j B.V. Heroes,< -&i
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trtuiiLienal belief that a high 3©aak ante is desirable to encourage the 
witch lit; of fundfc fro;.. currant account to deposit account, end so ©low 
the velocity of circulation of dope©!to* Ixrv/evor» it is believed that the 
&o©i effective wey to counter an Jj^fXatioiuay pressure is to drain fund©
away from the bonks altogether into u&rkebeble <pUt-edged uni national
1
... o . ................s. JhsrcA<r^, W JMNI Mi MMfflta * MtyIRUtaMfc MBOUXKt
of funding, the average yield on long-teru securities should he well above 
the average bill-rate. If this were recognised, and if uanotary policy 
worked acre freely both uaya, so that invasters in govexment stocks hud 
com hope of capital gains ae well as looses, it would help to restore th© 
morale of the gilt-edged arokot. It io hare suggested that the relation- 
ship between short and long rates su-ould be as follows: if owners of fund* 
desire to cam a substantial yield they must look up their money in 
long-torn occur!ties, accepting the risk cf depreciation in capital values 
should the long-tom rate rise. ST/ieir ergwont thus concerns the need for 
at umsu&lly wide gap between the of short and long rates?, and on
the need for a flexible rate policy which will allow bond prices to oovo 
upwards as well as downwards and so put new life into the gilt-edged 
market. This does not, however, men that short-term rates should not 
fluctuate more then long rates, or even rise above thorn in tine© of 
unusually dear money-
MtfkMb——M at ■■BriB M wa® □» ss«W—
1. /their crguMxt ie still useful in berm of the whole liquidity of the 
economy $ a reduction in bonks1 cash end deposits will finally reduce
total liquid assets. .
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important gneotion for us now Is tho role of interest rates in 
securing a firm holding °f & volme of debt which is adeqptate for the 
liquidity requtoBinente of the economy (as veil cs the budgetary retiuimaenbs 
of the government itself) * In this rospoct, there is a clear difforaise 
in opinion between the Zadeliffe Comittoc end the sxmet&ry authorities 
on the mechanism of finding including the vexed question of how for It 
is possible to sell stock on a felling rnxfcet - i»s. whether or not a fall 
in the price of a security will increase the demand for it. There is alee 
the controversy about govemumt intervention in the n&jfcet for Its ewa. 
securities.
In spite of their desire to fund, the mnstary satliorities were not 
proposed to force up the yield on the longer bonis. They held the view 
that sales could only bo nads in any <pvantii^ on a rising aaadeet, cad that 
the dawid for then could not bo ctizauluted by dropping prices? i.e. 
raisinp interest rates (Para. JJ30» Their strict logic iriplisd that if 
funding aeless wore necessary in order to reduce b&nh liquidity, the 
authorities 3hould raise pricey end so stimulate demand, using the proceeds 
to bring about a contraction in :vrket trousury bills. Tbs author!tiec 
bald the viw (which the Comtitsc describe as one ’’not ouiy to accept”) 
that "because a teuicactioa in nsa&etoblo long-term securitise con be 
easily reversed*. • at any tis»*.»«ad boouuae defament of a purchase today 
leave® the owner of money the option of tasking the purcdiasa tomorrow or 
next week, the market in long-term securities is dominated by expectations 
of future prices? and is therefore seriously liable to react perversely tc
3M
it ucvenont of priced (Parc. 55X). Wi ^vsacment broker plained lie 
policy when <£uosti0ncd about i3aridsg down the price© of its stock in order 
to ruice interest ruteas "It aoulu be possible, wiouhtadly, but it would 
tore a Very bad effect on the mrket «us a whole. tfhe ^overowit would be 
tliou^bt to bo breaking faith with thou© people v&o bed actually supported 
tto& oa the prcepcctue<»<cnd ales with all those people who actually bought 
Una stock in its eer&y period of being on offer."* !
X^on tliis l^gments the reasons behind the authorities’ policy W be ■ 
sewwBrtiM^ as followst ■
(a) She authorities did not believe that falling prices would attract
i buyers. 3 -■• ■■
(b) 2he authorities were reluctant to see any sharp rise in long 
rsiwG icr wxe ro&sons or sne cost or qodx sorvf.ee \rara* tr*oye
(c) Pelicy was also ©wongly influonooi by a belief in
tAf.aTit® author! tft&£i b&li&v&d that '...the lanawt&m dnt&T^at 
Oft
of the governumt as a debtor was served hyxorderly market. A
«s»«m*aka:vc«Bflrs8<~ trow
-• Woliffe tenttteo, Mssts&j: IMS «• 120°9
interest r>.te9. Tl© wm^Mhwhis arsuaent (p. 387 and footnote 3)i 
"It aeen»,..legitiau.te to take other oonBid«x.tions...into account, in 
particular. the bud/retur-,r bur don of fcdPdL interest rates. In short.
Use CMC of choap noaey neede to he roooneHerod... This represents a 
ftf ar/ v^«w o£ £oux* voesFR Ar*> (tJhiftb mu £a ra» nvmrvH n~4*weX»4MS> M>* V4»vN v/4. 4VUA ^ UC-siO WWW WM iUE? WAXCSMr
factory)< sac ay aeaorandua to the Cosn&ttee, Esdoliffe Maaorenda XXZZ.9> 
Jtees. 153-4." - and (?. 328): "... i ere has been a avnnant of 
o.-inlon in all countries since 1350 la fiwouy of high interest retaa...
. The world-wide novoEeat of opinion ncy have gone too fex." 
y. See below, Ciiapter -OV, on the cost of ronatary policy.
j;.. - ufci _ a P * «- *• PwJLtWXicXSiSiXS-rSaAawL -
’ /q,
deliberate narking down of the prices at which the
IMMP van willing to sell would have been regarded In the 
noxfcet no Ju^ling, with th© cubital values of the 
owa creditors, snt tee would liove seriously douugod 1 
sent credit’" (?at. }&).
•■' '.j .4 • -•.?'.■: z#
It ie indeed requisite for the authorities, if they axe to prooeod to 
US a UOailS of controlling bank H/pv/ t.- ; V) take f3 r.~J vr».
And this wm, as will be shown, clccrly looking during meet of the 195°’«• 
Over nuoh of the period (as tlie dadaliffe Cortalttee observes in Pern. <(«9l. 
the authorities wor© anfrirfrly passive} indeed fatal is tic, in their attitude
to the tww&a&nt of lon^>torm interodt r&tee.
The Kadeliffe Comittec itself etrmjses the importance of
WO-® .» •' 'dVw* A- iVb» *? it W dJkeW*^^e *•’ £*. > eSe •• • - .. si- -’•»«•»-
to the Cossnittee, the teak of debt sene,went is "to push the rate of 
tatsraot to a level that ie high onoujji to attract sufficient firm Iwldeors 
for tho flybt ficid iff yet c’Qn®i®tv /w with the bolt^noo between • ^y^uyvi. in tho 
public sector, deiand in ttss private sector, and the available reeouroee of 
the oconouy.et An inflationary condition would oeeri to point to a combina­
tion of Thybwa'fc ouroluo and bidder interest rates• both ohookimr desaand 
a variety of ways” (Fax*. 5&h
On the other haad, it ie pointed out is Fax*. J6? that the pwblen is 
o<xaplioBted by (Mpoottttions &?id hence by the \x>£^ibility that a rise in 
yields will frighten buyers off instead of bringing then ixu However> the 
Caaaittee ooacludss in the setae paragraph that si thou#; the tnaaSset is
Of
prices (and so asy react pe Wessely to a given uov orient), the an Uxor! ties 
overrate or^ntatiasuj as independent force** and therefore underrate their 
our possible iniluexioa on those e^eotatiosta*
■ Sharp action night, os the Coms»» tabued (rare,. $66), cause the 
mrket to dry up.* however, it io also pocaiblo, if underlying circus taaoes 
ax v. ,.x*'«*»^ fha* a higher xove—* of rates, i if tile authorities "half-*hoar- 
todly^ follow ;wfcoi trends, * tP^&duully usd rwluotcntly*’ raising interest 
rates, the px’olongcd downward drag* of bond prices will eventually do 
ycraxUicn t dasxv«ge to the 4&s rkeVo uftpetity lor bends. This conclusion of 
course shows the Ccsasittee’s dia<sjr*oeucfixt with the author!ties1 passivity.
By this logics the authorities did not influence, during the firot halt 
cf feo 19JO’a or mere precisely, up to 1957, the long-run trend of yields. 
Instead, they maintained an orderly mrhot, selling stocks whenever thay 
could. They did not accept a sufficiently drastic rise in interest rates, 
hut reacted to each inflationary tendency by a moderate rise in interest 
MBit*
Before remain# our discussion, it rwt bo rwwabered that the authori­
ties hnve to provide for a regular cwp of redemptions and that they have to 
fcoe the fre^uoat fluctuations of fee htuidry; system as well as the overseas
:ssB»sS|S«^5t^!i3ei«sa»«»at»
X. 8. Kevin nz^uec that e^rionco in aocsc countries suggest© that the 
■ot of pu&t fluctuations in bond prices generated pervearsity of sac- 
pectatione in the market, so that a fall in prices ^timlated a wvenent
out of govommcsit securities rather
SSaajge, 196l» j>. 17).
rchases cf them (Ssfe?-A<?
officials* Ao seen in the proviouc chant©*', the bouartssents regularly buy 
In stocks which ere reproaching rsaturity, sc that in the few rxmtha before
I
the rod®Emtion date a big issue 1© alvsys accompanied by heavy official 
purchases. The goveryrxnt broker col-?, ac mol; os, or nor© than, he bovghtf 
hut if das was weak sales wore n&vcs* pressed to the point of causing a 
s&ju? brock in prices*
It ia ffcea the end of 195? that the attitude of the authorities skJLffced 
to a noro positive policy. There was undoubtedly & radical change of 
approach and tactics, sine© It wan rocogniccd that rlcing interest mtee 
could hr w useful offsets on the aconoqy ”txd must be accepted * but not
;wfe* 5>C* ift <r vas presumably Aus to earlier
discussion. with the Srtalt end the Treasury before the kodcliffe Comities, 
and perhaps prompted by tie sxte&x vcateacs of the market in the snrar 
of 195? • ’fhe authorities were no longer following We ru-o&st ^uite ae 
reclily ae before. ?h»gy Hhrve given the :awcfcet a positive load, resisting 
the tendency of gilt-edged prices to rise ch:a^ly. • ♦ Tteror before, in 
peaceW&s, has the level of priseii ilt*edgsA o&gfcst cam so near -
to being decided by official action’’ (Wsu 553). fife* hadcliffe Coenittea 
welcomed, in the ©ano gmrcgrmph, the authorities’ policy of restraints , tbe 
rise in gilt-edged prices* "the ms&et her recognised the power and 
1 the laod.1’accepts*.
j JMHHLM '
This section will concern the events of the 195^‘o Xn the field of 
funding policy and its relation with ciuingeB. in interest rates. Let us 
begin our discussion with the first phuac oi the lpJO’s. Tables 122*3 
and figs. 29~Jc show the actual sales , the cnuMlativo sales t ehunjec in 
prices and laa^-*ter^ yields &£ Uxc gilt*od^©a in (quarterly figures over 
tiu period 195u**o2. Cocu-fesitiaig on thca, ue fine tiiat noct of the sales
i 'Ui3.es when pg&ess voxv rising*
'■.' <-? ■-. - ... - ’•. .’ ' '■ .- • • '•? - *; ':' • - • •'*£ •*• .S-< - >;.S • ... \ . *.:•■ W •’*
To recall the story, mthorities proceeded in bovmber 1951" to 
tho "forced fubding1' operulion where tho bathe and other instl*
tutioaxs were induced to exchange 1000 i»«nu of treasury hills for short* 
tern finding atocke« ‘Jlw two end a half years faxxa the second
quarter of 195*- to the third quarter of 195^ brought the nost sustained 
increase in defesod for gilt*sd^ed. in spite of heavy x^deesptione, the 
hej^rVionfcs were net cellar® in each ci' the ten quarters * with a total 
of about lloo L.a. however, the prison went up fwro 00.5 to 99-7 (Table 
12*0 ♦ The authorities did not toko tho initiative end refrained froa 
putting pressure on the nuirhet. They refrained even fron increasing the 
supply of securities in response to riaing deo&nd, stimulating thereby a 
stroug xxps*Uai.i^o 33,1 pricoa*
X" '.S5 «•>--) '. • -J. X-je
1. The event® of tlxe period froa 1551*19^2 will be prosentod in full
Tdetail in Chapter X
2. M. Mesy, ft?,. ci,t«> p. 105
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Figure 22:
Operations in Gilt-edged by the Authorities 
and Changes in Market Prices (1950-62)
«L*XtXL
/9f<? /?J*2 I1f3 Mo n£z
'■ • •••; ji-’ ' *C»' ? h
She accncaic diffioultias which heer-.x eppaswnt by the and of 195* 
anti cuisdnatcd in the Knto feytelos? 1957 brou<£xt an abrupt
k” rA1 * > «.»/ * •
revoi’o&l of this trend. Prom the lost quarter of 195^ to the end of 1957 
there was an olnoat unintox^ptod fall in gilt-edged prices. A© seen frost 
ilg. 29, the operation© of the teutetttttc wr© very erratic, periods of 
large not p&ffQbftfttc alternating with periods of ouhstential solos* Ones 
affivtvi, big sales we closely associated with redemption operation*. 
Cubstoitial ©also ware mde, or a falling steket, in the second and third 
(juerteru of 1955 <«m et fiW begtein;: of X?5< esd 1957. Oar th. ported 
ae a whole (ifcaa the fourth nwrtar of 1956 to Ifco end of 1957) the
'h/ . •<-*, ' •* * 2 ‘•J*Pkb, .L.V- •-*
'
IiepO?tuento wore net prre^er-: by 90 Io..
Censidcsrhzc the problem in teas of interest gap, w find from Pig.
30 But the gap between long-tea yield and. treasury hill rates was
■ •'■'h-: '■• .. 3?- >• ’ r-'tfhy.V , • T:k'.‘.yc- - Wr?lr*<k t3 ••’ x> ••■.
■. i. ± y -••• -f ■,. " t . • 4..1 z it '
eraduclljr iwrrowed during the period 1956-1550. Shi. ncasrowing of the 
&V was the result of fairlj- fcifh Sajjfe Pwsfccj combined with the reluctuae. 
of the auSaseitioa to oiwouracs a very trastic rise is the loao-tena
ST.
S' • :1O,- <■'-;/,• *w.-.
' ' ' ' '
y-. -4? \'X - r *: ■ •j ;■ . f. U <;
.•/§/, j $b - ■■ .
W--'
-V. ; <y
of short end lonr rater, was arohshl^ fisi
ofectBOic to funding.
M. □acoy o&M&ts on this part of the 1950**, ’‘Odiously, the picture 
would have been radically howvsr, if Prices had boon dec?, i. "ring,
iiowcver slowly, throughout." ' Similarly XV. Morgan o&ys: "Hitherto, th*
Xe S.V. : :C's'7_'P4'i. \ Off,* cit., p. 1?) aa^iad that the ©verag© yield on Gonad* 
w, from 1922 to 1931, about & above Bat on treasury hills. 'tering 
the cheap noney period frcn XPJB to 195*, the gM|» wiged fcoa 2> to
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chronic irocknoso of tho ^41t*cdgcd market hso boon tho sajor obstacle of 
th© develomont of positive debt jaaaagoi icat as «n instrument of govern-
.-i-••;.
MM
’*• • • ' l • sXlSfc
nent policy.-.”1 "The unuillineneaa of the govsnsaant to accept a long- 
terr. rate nt tfdoh It cauls sell Its own securities in suffieient eaounte 
va© the min weakness of mnetax*; policy during th© 195° *»•*&
As said above, from the and of 195? the authorities proooeded to & 
more positive policy* During tiw& first tiire© Quarters of 19$8» there 
were not let? of ^6? L».u» do'ypit# the rwfcftT* ty of 6?6 X»»m» of tho per 
aeat Conversion Stock 1957*53 in June. ids could b* interpreted us a 
oantiani&tiou of the old policy of funding on a rising market* Kowovor,
2X» io little u&ubb that cslss wpg pressed herd with tho
intuition of moderating the rise iu prioos.
By the autumn of 1950, however, tho ^thoritiec* attention was again 
on credit x'olcc^tion* They were thus content to absorb largo quantities 
of socruritieo sold by the banks without anferoint; any sufficient rise in 
yields on the m&rkot (and at times vitlicnxt resisting a modest fem)»
tiWqP*; .. *«»>•
. •
lienee la the fifteen ewnCia frcia Jeyteibei- 1958 tc the and of 1959, 
the authorities uada net purohuaat* of 431 X.m, In other words, ly the 
end of 1959, the„ ware net bqyors for five successive cunrtare - the 
largest phase of uninterrupted purehoae sinca the spring of 1951. The 
acoaonie Suygay fox 19&> owaaauta that durlAfi 1959? "the sathoritier did 
not nook to "cross ©aloe iroon the saaxisot since it vas thou/iit Aasclrefold
.; •S&. ? .
1. S.V. Jjeswm. "IVotftlMt; Policy sad Oilt-J»ged ttefee**,
Oct. W, p. 40. ■’ *
2. E.V. iiorsen,
P» 36»
, liquidity and Interest Kates”, PAA.. July
-4 r~, .- »
■ ' ■
■
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not to take cx& action which aight check the revival of business activity.*
By the beginning of XJ>6C, the iwlorlyirg uUi woe dirsotM towards 
restraint tttd Berk Bate was raised from k to $’• However, the authorities 
were faced with a xxel; mrket duo to horary hank coles (to meet the big 
inertuiuc in advances, end tc sow wxMhhxwul of ovaracac holdings. TJjs
«S2B3a^3fiXSS£ oasaenU that "althsufij-. the authorities continued
■ ’■ • . •'■■■•■• - . ’ - - ' ?.’ ' -/, *<' .? ,t ;' ■',-$- : ’ •. ffltra ...'. ■ . *' -**»" * . '. •-. • • ■' ’/ - • '*-'- '■• ' 3‘ • p . ' . • _ ■ c . v '■ v - - - •«^Li" -d? -- Cir
to r^aixitoin a narket, they did not resist this teMency of prices to foil,
xuiO.;JIL*
since it was judged that a rise of interest rates was now appropriate.1’ 
Conseuucntlv. the mthori t±fri> were no losVic-x nrenared to smooth out the
'•«• <• " ‘ ,' ■*'• 'J '<• R“ - ij * SB** .• ’ ’ ‘i ’'•'" *' vh 1■- ’• : , W?- ' .-• /. ’ ! •• -.x ••■:,U. *
effects of bank selling.
’^1 ' . Sr- 3s/ Uk* ’2 ’ *. ■• • •$&*$•?£ 6 .;2e. ■ ’ ’ '-1'‘ *■• '■ v
pisoucsiac tlx ©vents of Uio year in wor© detail, the gotwmaent
broker si&rked down hie buying prices uxto sharply in February but even 
so tii. a«i>«p<3aente sfeiosheft Zfh t.M. daeiat the partes-. This is hsoauM 
of the stoop increase in burl: ©oiling as wil ao tho hwwy sale by the 
Xionswii: investor's flue to the unoortuiix^' resulting from the ehari. fell
7- '.-3r ? , s '•' • ?•' ,' .» * ' ’;' ‘ -’W J ' '
ia the HHSletk
K O'
< . ■ >■•• <
• ..i) •.<<•... , '
h< ; -•. ?.; ' U:
hr
'-feM to
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•’i-'i ' ** Asv"^
k.. 'r; iir ufp;
In the eeoom ^uextor, the funding process got tiirongly into its 
stride* hon-haxik investors aboorbei more stock tli&n the enamt sold by 
the banking Gy^toa, so that for the 45wt tkas fox IS months the author!- 
Uoe wars not ssllexa althangh to a m&enl extant of 31 L.m. When the
because of o:;pect*tion3 of a
further rise in Bank Sate und foera of renewed bank celling, the eathoxi* 
ties did not resist e gradual fall in $£l06&« At tha caao ttest they ;,aro 
actively intcrv©xinc to prevent a fall in the treasury biU rats, drivi^i9 . •. . • • . • . . . . ■
the dire cunt target into the lesfc on 1A ococaions In the two nonths to 
ftid-June? nt the ond «£ which period Mio Hmk Rate ws raised a^ain to $S»
Tl;© pace of the deprrtnmto' selling then rose irr^ticall*^ Xn the 
third quarter, official net £©&©& reached 2*H &•». ■ *?hi8 massive funding 
ves nehieved in spite of erne farther Millry the Mfo In the 
fourth gitarWrf the authorities: wore etill net eellers to Mi© extent of 
162 l.tt. Seme, offteiel sales dieinr the three mifirtere mounted to 
^22 I.k. el though henJoe wc not seller©. Tuning this erlodt long yield 
continued to fall tntil August and then sicediod.
Turing the first helf of 1961 tbs m&©$ atf&in osr>e under preaisur© 
fron continued teth ©alee and renewed vithdrawele of oversess funds. A 
further issue of 300 t.a. of Ckmvornion Stock 1963 wo cMo la 
February this f‘mde it esoier ffcr the suMioritiee to restrict a fall in 
short-tern rates.wl In April, the 3&' Standing Icon 1956-41 was exhausted! 
resulting in net □e?nrtncnfAl purchases during the first half of 1961 
of over W L.n.
The following period hreurfit the Wgjgnst revival, of interest in th© 
gilt-edged market. Between «i&-196l end the end of 1962, departmental 
sale reached 771 !♦». In spite of this heavy funding, the prices of 
long-torr, oectrities rose from 66 to ?9-
W© nov turn our attention to orltioisr. of the ruthorlties1 policy for
funding. It is clear frrm 29 eftd 30 end ftw the account of funding
operations in the above parc<pfapla, «**<*.> V <v* 4-— XO O *OX d usually oocurre‘ • j
on a rising uua&et# rfl*e xoluotnoo of the authorities to lixfluoncc the 
capital value of tJioir ov#i securities aeons indeed cut of line with nodsstt 
conditional '.' ..
fovcvex^ the emits of the past fev poors increased the scope far 
positive debt □ao^gm&nt; but iio full development depends on further 
chun&ca in official attitude * i»e* oa its willingness to pexnit a rise • j 
as wall as a fall in pricec* p*... •.. /ti|
this reesnt rise could, if continued, have a vox-- healthy ixxfluouoo.
Xt is also is&erwxt that both individuals and institutions go into ube 
market after a fall in tho hope of «£uicl act capital £ains. It is also 
ascess&xy for th© authoritios to bo more flexible in ooimtenmclnL’ and . u 
even initiating fxioo changes. Ibis is of ixxjortexoe if Ixqut*
ditg* ixas to bo xwtuood. Eoreavce?, earlier action inero^cd the chance of 
achieving a uiueubls impact, on li^uidi^ \£LUxcut too ^reat a fall in pricoe. 
’If cnleu are deleted until eoono&ic conditions create a falling
uurkot, the buttle io &lx‘e&4V half loot; if thsjp can to pressed hard,
vhiie tho wkxr^riA; tread of densnd io still strong, it ie wore than half
, i 1 . '■ •••'’ ■• ; ■■' • ;’ • • I "' ' ■ . ' ■>- . •' ' -fc? :' i
von.?‘ :•
« •■ -t ,,
' ■ , ■ • ' V - •
?••’■ j *.'x-??■*
V-
deotioa C
in spite of toe
down We price of its own securities over *&** ioncor port of the IftSO1**
long-’sw.a plain has atown un increase i'aon beaut 3^ in 15$u to 6> in 1562. 
Ulg. 3b). it eaeas tort tosre hss» been a slow underlining Of too Ere®- 
3uxy‘s ability to £avaw Wo iovox of £ili~«dg«d prices. Whet are Wes
. 2WOCKW behind this tread*. Wl$ huve th© authorities wanted to■
Vi/W t*."*^* AJfc 4»»i1pi4 rri > tit***! n©htx®V* ™W® *tor**,to*** ^•s aweF'd’*' *’♦'**• wiu.ua
•• >.
#: x-: 2&
the power of the awfcwtt&as?
-he hadoXiiTo Coaanittee suxuuisou thcaa fhctcus in ?erfiu 570 o» 
follows i ...we ere iiapreeoed by three tuajor f&ctora tending to dbra# 
upwards the level of bond yields... fhosc threw factor©...are the atmd? 
Increase in the debt (a novelty Xa peacetime,, tho expectation of cantlnu* 
in^ inHotic®!) and the sfo?* ft t - tuu^y investor© toward© etjuitiea.*^
V*/- ~ . *'y ->7^-: '
l2h. toted f«to...w to to rtsmutoi of ail... 2fcU is
the shift ol' i&v&sioro > notably insurcocc cuod pension fnrate3 frou
Wttda to Maxi tied* I'hi© ohifl 1© ixortlv fears of infl&tionx but
" - :
pnrtV ftiao to... toe belief toat a veli-aptced portfolio of e<jaities gtroo 
to. investor toe etoaee to store in tto benefit of (MWMMt* growth” (?aau 
573).
IVntA tr*> ahovj mymywaili. it ig nna&3Sii2r. to thlXJV li/^'h on £. TsaA-fe** rt» ’***“* Wto l.TIT K<ry », <■ ’*» MV* *** T *** ••* M' TV. Mr Vs» "** *•* ** *** * ^***h^* ** **-*#•■’' '■'. 1 ' . 7 ’ . ■ - <y ’ '/ ; '/
factor which forccu up the bond yield. Althou^ the &weynmcnt otoa&a far 
above any other sin^io borrower? its oosapotitore (chiefly coapanioo which
32?
raise loan or equity capital) present, collectively, a serious challenge« 
Investors now have aora freedom of choice, even to refuse to deal in 
gilt-edged when the; do not like the terns.
During and just after the war, the government used controls and 
appeals to patriotism to compete with other borrowers. Xt could pay what 
interest it liked on new loans. The life insurance ooapaaiee, at that 
time the major source of new long-term funds, agreed to put their accruing 
cash into gilt-edged securities. Then the post-war nationalisation 
caused vast transfers from companies to government securities* Hence, by 
1951, gilt-edged securities represented :oore than 53p of total securities 
quoted on tho Stock Exchange (Tables 125-7}•
Later events greatly changed tho aitustion. Industry had to raise 
noney tc rest the post-war reconstruction and expansion. Also there 
was a steady rise in prices. All this helped investors;: tc react against 
fixed interest stocks, and naaagws of institutional funds put some of 
their accruing new ronoy into ordinary shares instead of into government 
stocks. "Again, in an economy dominated by memories of the effects of 
inflation, the public debt (by its nature S3 a collection of fix ad 
interest obligations) ie persistently fighting a losing battle against 
equity investments for the available flaw of new funds and, indeed, for
1. These figures are in terns of market values? hover or, Table 127 
shows the difference between "market’ and 'nominal” values.
32S
the existing stock of alrcadc^invastod funds.
The result of these dordcpocats io a gradual chcz^o in the statue 
of <~ilt~Gd£ed securities relative to other cloaks and shares. The total 
of securities quoted on the Stock llkchango are currently (1962) worth 
JO25& I.d., of uhidh $t 359 L.n* arc coqpcny securities. In relative 
importance, they represent 68>? while gilt-edged represent no mre then 
28 of total securities *
OKWPMSRSsasacSfcMRSJ«W4SS ~ '
• 3. Kevin, ihxblio Finance, 1961, p.1 1?*
SMKSTIOM, AlfiflSX. HilUsVAMT 
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Table (00) 
Dcx&mbi Clearing BsmkB
(«a&«ONtar)______________________________________________________________ *»*»
* . 1 i 1991 1992 1953!---- .—L 1996—
1999 1996 1997-----—f 1J98I 1999] I960 1961 1962
Gross Deposits 6368 6333 61^60 6696 <961: 6612 6656 6929 7199 7667 7631 7928 8231—
(Total) 2960 2100 2327 2382 2671 2692 2664 2693 2628 eciMO-P 2860 QQCg
§ Cash 960 531 990 962 571 965 971 601 986 639 658 666 700
< Call Money 592 996 529 901 698 906 909 929 987 616 710 860 917
3 Treasuzy Mils 1606 791 1182 1338 1199 i 1271 1279 1603 1185 1215 1017 1106 1067
Other ehii* 101 66 79 114 129 160 139 139 165 166 250 q£q
Special Deposits 656" 102* 6» • • • - • • - 144 221
9. (Total) 3172 3829 3813 3886 6136 3763 3812 3826 4228 6928 6996 6669 6932
g S Investments 1328 1969 2168 2275 2353 ■ 2016 1980 2069 2102 1710 1271 1120 1323
< Advances 1666 I860 1665 1611 1783 1767 1832 , 1777 2126 2818 3323 3329 3609
■ Treasury Deposit Haeeipto
Tabla (SI)
Londozi
Aggregate Figure?
z ■ 1 i95q 195lj 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957^ 1958 1959 1960 1961..... . .1--------
1962
. (Total) | 39.9 33.2 36.0 36.7 34.3 37.4- 37.4 38.4 34.6 34.3! 32.6! 36.1 35.9
1 01-11 8.5 a.4 8.5 8.1 8.2 6.5 8.6 8.7 ! 8.1 8.3 8.4
8.4 8.5
2 Cell Aoney 9.3 9.4 8.2 7.5 7.2 7.7 7.6 7.4 i 8.1 3.0 9.1 10.5 11.1
1t
12.5 18.3 20.0 17.3 19.2 19.2 20.2 16.5 15.8 13.0 14.0 13.0
22.1 j ’ -i
2.1
—- -----
3.2
K - - -/j
3.3Otiwr Bills 2.9 no 1.1 1.6 2.0 2*1 1.9 1.9_____
Special Deposits 7.2 1.6 *» - w • - !• ''.. A'' 1.8.... .
2.8 -
• (Total) 49.8 60.4 59.1 58.1 59.6 56.9 57.3 55.2 58.7 59.1 58.6 56.1 59.9
Investments 24*0 91.0 33.3 34*0 33.9 30.5 29.8 29.6 29.2 22.3 16.2 14.1 16.1
Advances 25.8 29.4 25.8 24*1 25.7 9^.1, 27.5 25.6 29.5 36.8 42.4 j 42.0 43.8
Table (82)
Tx-qtAw GlG«'Xriag TUawVe
(afaanges in Aggregate figures*)
(end December) 4»su
il
....... ..... ........... ... _i 1»1 1»2 1953 1956 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962------------------4  —*
Gross Deposits -35 127 236 267 -329 u 273 270 668 166 97 303
(Total) -440 227 133 .78 89 21 172 -171 135 -77 309 91
e Cash -9 19 -8 29 -6 6 30 -15 69 23 6 36
!
6 -69 -28 -3 8 -1 20 62 27 96 130 77 1
U Treasury hills
3
Otter Billa
-636 391 156 -139 72 4 128 218 30 -198 9 -39 li
.11$ 13 35 15 11 -5... . . -
30 1 86 19
■■
(Total) 653 -12 73 250 -373 69 16 402 3» 66 -165 683 j1
*2 *£ Iarestaents 637 183 127 78 -337 -36 69 55 -392 -639 -15» 203 J
33 216 -195 -56 172 -36 85 -55 369 - 692 505 6 280 i
s ignoring Special Deposits.
Table (83)
Liquidity Ratios at the Clearing Banks
___ _____ 1950 - 6z"___
liquidity
ratios
liquidity
ratios— i
195V 1 36.7 | 3 36.9
t! 59.4 4 I 37.41
,j 39.7 I 1S2Z 1 I 32.6
4 39.9 • 33.4
1S51 1 38.7 39.4
2j 36.7 4 38.4
3i 38.5 1918 1 33.9
4 53.2 2 s 32.8
1252 1 31.8 | i 33.4
2 34.8 j 4 94.6
5 37.9 1 31.0
4 36.0 2 52.0
1253 1 32.9 3 33.2
2 | 3U8 4 34.3
3 j 37.4 I960 1 31.5
it 36.8 2 30.8
isn 1 32.9 3 31.6
1 2 33.01 4 32.61 3 33.7 196: 1 50.4
4 34.3 2 31.2
1255 1 29.9 5 34.3
2 50.2 I 4 36.1
3 | 33.5 im 1 32.6
4 37.4 2 32.5
1956 1 53.0 3 33.7
I
2 ! 33.2 4 35.9
a date on the period 1950-56 is ooaputed fraa Monthly Digest of 
Stettettoa.
Tabla (at*.)
Ccrapaoeats of "Bank Xaveabaaata" 
0Sa4-aeoeober)
£«&U
1951 1952 1953 1956 1955 1956—-- --- —J 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962
ttovamaanfc Seoaritlea iaa? 2076
rriTTr--
21 96 2261 1928 1893 1962 1996 1597 1159 1007 1204
Other Xavestomts 76 72 di 92 as S3 87 103 113 112 113 119
Torn "1965
_____
214*T 2275 ’353 2916 1980 2069 2102 1710 1271 1120 1323
1951 1952 1953 1956 1955 1956 1957
---- I
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 :
Goreraaent Securities 96.1 96.6 96.6 96.1 95.6 95.6 95.8 96.9 9366 91.2 89.9 91.1
Other Inrestaaeats 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.4 6.6 4*2 5.1 6.6 8.3 10.1 3.9
TOOL hir 100 100 100 100 L 100 100
I --
100 100 100 180
■ ' j
100
11 Aft Is 5
__
* 8
ft
*
r ' ■1 T1
< 8*•
ft s s « 8 *•
ft ft s * 8
ft ft * * g <•
ft « • ** 8 *•
K ft * m g w-
ft « 4 * 8 *»
ft ft •« *» 8 »•
ft ft * «♦ 8«•»
ft s * *» 8
ft s ’• ** 1
1
1
ii
A
a ■m
I
«<R*»
» M2? i R <•
a * 5 it 8 ft*■
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i
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a
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Table (87)
Clearing Banks* Liquid Assets
(Knd- Leoetaber)
i.ia.
1950
[t i'r m‘ ;i
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955• V ■;, . ■ , 1956 1957L-- -- - -- 1958 1959---- . i960 19&
'1962
Cash ! 540 531 550 542 57> 565 571 601
—
586
—
635 658 664 | 700
Call koaay 592 596 529 501 ! 496 506 505 525 567 614 710 840 917
Treasury Bills 791 1182 1333 1199 1271 1275 1403 1185 1215 1017 1106 10671 1403 . ■
Other Bills 181
g.wi-imiicca
66 .
r I.I.HWU—■-i«.i 79- - , I i 114 1291J 140 ( '»\■ 165 | 166 250 269
TOTAL 1 [ 2540 2100 2327 2460 j 2362 2471* ■ '■ 2492 2664 i 2493
2628 2551 kuoQ 2955
 JS
Cash 21 as 34 22 24 23 23 23 24 * 26 23 24
Call Mooay
1
23 ass 22 21 21 20 20 19 23 24 26 29 31
Treasury Bills 38 51 54 50 52 51 53 48 46 40 39 36
Other Bill* 9 3 3 5 5 6 5 5 6 ' 7__ » 9
TOTAL 100 100 100 ; 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 too I 100I
Tablo (88) 
Budget Overall 
(1957-19te)*
quartan |. 
evaded
Ateove the 
11a*__i
Below the *<— Overall
1957 » 874 -266 60S
f •480 - 65 -185
• -m -205 -325 ;
0 -200 -151 -351
1988 K j 867 i -170 657
J -130 t -180 -250
a -1tt -150 -276
a i- -2» -173 -412
1959 II 872 -116 756
1 -85 -149 -238
8 • -141 -201 -342!• '
» i -216 -225 -441
1960 M ttt -125 707
J ‘ -203 -106 -305
3 -m -172 -356•
»
1 *270 -212 -482
I nil m 804 - 51 753
J -129 -135 ■i at a
8 -214 -209 -423
B -214 -1M -355
1862 M ij 567 -132 835
J -214 — 66 -280
8 :! -135 - 94 -225
a1 -220 •301 j -521
ii the wailable quarterly figures started from 1957*
Table (89)
Financing the Defldt
1957 - 62
OwriU
Budget
1957 M 608
8 •189
8 -529
D -301
1936 M 697
jr -250
8 -276
8 •412
1959 U 756
I -258
8 -562 J
8 •441 j
I960 U 707 J
J -509
3 -556
© *632 |
1981 M 753
J -268
3 •423
© -555
1962 11 855
J -230
8 -229 )
© -521 |
jBxtans.
Budget-
*«r
-xtersial
tMOB*
actions*
Bank
or Notes
Borrowing ii 
from the 
HlhXlO
90 -48 — •100 -550
2 -64 • 75 176
38 163 e» — 125
•2 -6o — 150 503
49 -165 — •100 -465
10 -119 50 509
30 -31 — -50 327
52 -9 - 150 239
119 -91 ee •100 -684
—20 *41 56 46 215
52 -74 -13 -15 412
ee 72 23 114 232
14 -58 •8 -63 -612
a -71 145 68 159
51 -156 —1 -9 471
66 -133 28 120 401
-2 71 -27 -64 -731
29 53 118 47 22
106 278 -51 -14 104
•61 -75 51 116 324
88 -132 -65 -120 -606
19 -79 45 12 285
1 23 -94 •16 315
169 -33 -137 120 MB
TCEAL
-- —-----------
Overall
Budget
1252 M 606
J -19
• •«9
D -391
use k 697
f •250
a -376
P -412
1252 “ 756
3 -23a
a -362
p -U1
1242 * 707
j -309
a -356
t -682
1»6l M 753
3 -Ma
9 -623
tt -355
1962 M 835
3 -260
a -229
p -£>21
T—la (90)
Sorrowing froi tha tullo
«~»n
Saving* T»9*G»
i.jrtcn table 
eouritles
---- 9!
Treasury
Mile
73 -176 230 -679
29 66 -66 165
3 63 -106 165
-63 50 -68 366
32 -196 150 -639
29 72 63 165
73 70 89 95
73 77 -121 210
128 -175 -56 -601
100 44 -17 68
69 69 -66
«1 56 -460 255
109 -106 -276 -263
69 65 17 98
57 ao a»3 91
63 96 162 108
106 -196 -1JO -509
36 65 -279 290
-2 60 55 -9
-11 96 117 120
55 -185 75 -551
98 69 222 -8
8 29 262 88
62 51
I
40 269 I
TOTAL
isi
ifi
tit
sil
tf 
tH
itl
tft
si
m.
Table (91)
Holders of Masfcst Treasury Bills 
(51st beoember each year)
1951 1»2 1953 19% 1955 1956 1957 1956 1959 I960 1961 1962
Clearing Banka 791 1182 1338 1199 1271 1275 1603 1185 1213 1017 1106 1067
Discount Houses 628 705 607 6»5 652 523 565 596 635 576 533 502
Scottish Banks s a- 21 16 22 25 36 26 23 20 61 26
Overseas Officials 1171 861 1069 1021 961 927 321 691 936 923 1076 1025
Other Holders M 66 65 113 100 82 96 128 91 100 72 51
Outside Holdings <8 153 176 M2• ♦ 357 536 665 610 603 &A 633 375
TOTAL 2702 2969 3296 3376 3363 3366 3366 3636 3530 3669 3311 3062
Table (92)
Other hone and Koo-QTflgUl Overseas colder* 
(51st Deceaber earn /ear)
£.m»
1951 j 1952 1953 1954 <955 <95< <957 1958 1959 <960 196) 1962
1 • Outside holdings 68 <53 176 M2 557 536 445 610 60S 855 483 375
2 • Other * 64 as 113 100 62 96 128 S< too n 5<
3 - Total 6&«r faoXdj«r
J
$ 1C*
J
»7 261 585 657 618 561 738 699 955 55S 426
A
Outside holdlngo 65 7< 67 78 85 87 32 S3 87 90 87 35
Other 35 29 33 22 <5 <3 18 <7 <3 10 <3 12
Total Other holders 100 100 100 <00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 03)
Treasury 3111 rates and 
Clearing 3anka’ Deposit Rrt
Bill ~
Kate
(D
Deposit "
Rate
(2)
Gap
1953 1 2.404 —
2 2.383 — —
J 2.327 1.980 0.347
4 2.109 1.730 0.355
125h 1 2.959 1.750 1.3W7
2 1.831 1.481 0.350
J 1.601 1.250 0.351
4 1.660 1.29© 0.410
1 2.831 1.308 1.043
2 3.896 2.500 1.396
3 4.015 2.500 1.515
4 4.087 2.500 1.587
1956 1 4.639 2.300 2.139
2 5.039 3.500 1.539
3 5.048 3.500 1.548
4 4.995 3.500 1.495
1957 1 4.359 3.192 1.167
2 3.910 3.000 0.910
3 4.421 3.308 1.113
4 6.524 5.000 1.524
MU----
Sate
(1)
deposit- - 
Rate 
(2)
osp
1958 1 6.025 4.846 1.179
2 4.920 3.692 1.228
3 3.870 2.731 1.139
4 5.428 2.269 1.159
1222 1 3.173 2.000 1.173
2 3.344 2.000 1.344
3 3A75 2.000 1.475
4 3.479 2.000 1.479
1960 1 4.397 2.769 1.628
2 4.706 3.077 1.629
3 5.566 4.000 1.566
4 4.851 3.500 1.351
1 4.348 3.000 1.348
2 4.445 3.000 1.445
3 6.146 4.429 1.717
4 5.570 4.154 1.416
1962 1 5.210 3.769 1.441
2 3.999 2.583 1.416
3 3.791 2.500 1.291
4 3.709 2.500 1.209
j
(1) weighted average nt discount rates at the weekly allotaants cf the 
91 &ay hills*
Source> Courted from Oats of tbs rAnnual /.hstrset of SUttsttos", 
•“a-“ 1962, Table (339) ___
(2) Deposit ratei at 21 daps notioe up to 26th JaaMary, 1955* thereafter 
at 7 daye notice.
Souroot swage of weekly deposit ratse published. In the "SoonoMst*.
Table (94)
Comparison Bteaean Treasury Mil Bates la U.K. and 0.8.
Q.K. “t.l Gap 0.x. 0.8. •*
ust 1 <4913 1.400 -0.887 UBB1 4.399 3.170 1.189
a 0.912 1.533 -1.021 a 3.910 3.157 0.753
3 0.913 1.827 -1.114 3 4.421 3.383 1.839
4 0.772 1.890 -0.878 4 8.924 3.343 3.181
12221 1.329 1.840 -0.319 1588 1 6.069 1.837 4.188
a 2.383 1.877 0.708 a 4.920 1.000 3.900
J 2A65 1.830 0.639 > 3.870 1.710 2.160
4 a^os 1.923 <4489 4 JU4S0 2.787 0.641
ixa1 2.047 <4357 1*3* 1 3.173 2.800 0.373
a 2.389 2.205 <4182 a 3.344 3.020 0.324
3 2.327 2.023 0.304 3 3-475 3.533 -0.098
4 2.109 1.437 <4818 4 3.479 4.300 -0.821
i»ili 2.997 1.080 1.877 JJ&1 4.397 3.943 0.454
a 1.831 <4810 1.021 a 4.708 3.090 1.816
3 1.801 0.670 0.731 3 9.988 2.393 3.173
4 1.880 1.037 <4829 4 4.851 2.380 2.491
1^55 1 2.891 1.280 1.991 1961 1 4.348 2.377 1.971
a 3.896 1.513 2.383 a 4.449 2.327 2.118
3 4.015 1.883 2.152 3 8.148 2.323 3.823
4 4.087 2.347 1.740 4 9.570 2.477 3.093
122| 1 4.839 2.380 2.299 i 9.210 2.740 2.470
a 9.039 2.597 2.442 a 3-999 2.717 1.282
J 9.048 2.997 2^51 3 3.791 i 2.857 0.934
4 4.999 3.063 | 1.932 * 3.709 2.803 0.908 |
(a) Average of a rm airly rate fna the "Eeanoa&at".
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(66) »X<Wt
«aU» (99) 
(OenttasaA)
8»I6
(1)
Banks A 
Plsoouu v
(8)
Oversaas
ommais Other
(6)
Oti’frsi.cle
Ho&tani
(5) :
Tstsl : 
(1*2*3)
12SZ M2° 1211 913 583 as 2707
2 30 1387 833 566 637 2766
• ia 19«6 807 528 AS 8931
B 31 scat 921 961 669 3388
JJ9B **9 1971 765 702 » 3038
3 30 1980 010 767 579 3077
8 1? 1618 tot- 789 w 3169
E 31 1005 011 738 610 3636
ISStt M,a 1866 as as as
* 30 ^KAL 809 678 526 2891
8 16 1972 as • as AS
B 31 1873 958 699 3930
IMS 1606 ah as As AS
3 30 1686 905 886 771 3299
S 21 1605 as as as as
D J* 1611 923 955 8» 5689 :
1ML «15 1139 AS as AS
3 30 1896 1197 709 635 3200
8 81 13W a* aa» a» •
B 31 1680 1076 eec 683 3311
IMS « » 1160 as ah * AS
3 30 1187 1038 986 696 8791 •
8 1> 1899 aa as AB as*
0 31 1393 1023 686 375 i


Table (96)
Treasury 3111a of the Banking yyotea
ii.au
l
The System
Scottian 
Banks TotalClearingBanks
..... .......L
Discount
Ileuses
------------- L
Total
1251 X 81 1173 738 1911 4 1915
< 30 1009 &5 1814 3 1817
8 19 1143 756 t 1899 5 1904
D 91 791 623 1419 8 1427
1958 X 19 673 579 1857 8 1259 i
3 30 9« 765 1730 2 1752
8 17 1»1 744 1975 22 1997
S 31 1182 705 1687 24 1911
1955 X18eaX8888» 955 596 1551 5 1556
3 30 1149 616 1765 11 1776
8 16 1J22 652 1974 19 • 1993
D 31 1333 607 1945 21 1966
1954 X 17 995 520 1523 9 1532
3 30 ioao 4&2 1542 12 1554 !
8 15 1181 485 1666 18 1684
D 31 1199 815 1814 16 1880
1955 X 16smmm* 849 452 1901 12 1313
J 30 890 406 129s 13 1J11
8 21 1063 471 1534 19 1593
D 31 1271 658 1923 22 1945
1956 X 21 4^ "I** 421 1367 15 1382
J 30 10J1 470 1501 21 1922
8 19 1292 484 1746 32 1778
S 31 j 1275 533 | 1798 as I 1823
T«M« (96) 
(OOKltlxXUad)
The BarJdLxvj, System
Soottiab
Paries TotalClearingDOiika
Dlaoount
B8MM8 Totel
1957 M 20 915 283 1198 13 1211
J X 1053 321 1376 11 1387
8 18 1159 342 1901 15 1516
D 11 1403 585 1983 38 2026
1258 “ ” 1082 466 154a w 1571
jr 30 1112 386 1498 22 1520
8 17 118J 40? 1585 27 1612
D H 1185 9* 1779 26 iaos
19S9 M 18 877 351 1228 16 1244
J 30 1031 304 1385 19 1404
8 18 1157 396 1553 19 1572
D 31 1215 635 1850 23 1373
I960 M 16 941 446 1387 17 1404
J JO 979 436 1417 11 1426
8 21 932 390 1372 33 1405
D 31 1017 574 15?1 20 1611
1281 *’5 790 326 1113 17 1135
J 30 936 341 1277 17 1294
6 20 1079 297 1376 16 1392
D JI 1106 533 1639 41 1680
1962 K 21 794 331 1125 13 1140
J 30 340 330 1170 17 1187
8 19 968 307 1275 20 1295
D 31 1067 50? 1569 24 1593
jffiaL^isaJ^sais.-yC. ™T
]
i XlllCU’OGt 
0»p
*
»*«»■»*»
Ciuioy
IjoldArs
w
ift
! /
jfisa 3 0,347 /268 | 0.120409 71824 93.0
* Ij 0.355 I 26X j«®5 i 68ia 98.7
J2& + . J * 1 1.207 ri jO& 1.45634s i 93636 1 369.3
e* 14t* j 0.350 373 0.122500 ,j 139129 ! 130.6
3 1 0.351 479 0.1232T1 229991 168.1
"fc • OAIO 325 J 0.168100 275625 | 215.3
1955 n 1 l.o43 ?□£ 1.087849 498436 J 736.3
2 j 1.396 738 1.948816 1030.2
-Wf- J 703 i ' f a< 2.295225 ■ 519341 1092.3
2l 1.507 6J? ; j 2,518569 431649 I 1048.7
i256 «.13» 7*6 4.575321 ! 556516 j 1595.7
;®>.' 1.539 < <*T 2. 3uv»5* 1 524176 XU*.2
J I 1.546 642 : 2.396X4 708964 1303.4
4. 1.495 616 2.235025 381924 983.9
1252. 1 1.167 i 583 ! 1.361889 339889 j 680.4
2 0.910 5*4 0.82SKC ! 295936 I 495.0
3 1.113 526 1.2387(9 276784 ! 587.7
* (
1.524 541 2.322576 292681 ! 084.5
1956 1 ( 1.179 702 1.390641 498804 i S27.7
2 I 1.228 747 1.507964 558009 917.3
3 ; 1.139 729 1.297321 531441 i 830.J
* 1-159 733 1.343281 544644 855.3
•' ‘ « A «»J. V X 6 T, f 24.701 13076 132.832675 j 8378114 15986
Table (97) 
(Continued)
(1) aSXI - 8X «X
• 0.708
By <»b»icr»gy~ a teat of hypotheses oonoernlng this oorrelatlon 
coefficient 9 'kie huvet
. O.7M g* .
Referring to a table of *t* with n-2 » 20 degrees of freedom 
we see dearly that we ehoula not expect to draw a ample at random 
having a oorrelatlon ooeffldent of O«7O8 from the population with 
p a Ob Henoe, we conclude that there Is oorrelatlon between X and 
Y In the population from *hloh the smple wee drwmu (3) In other 
words, that the ooeffldent Is significant*
1} Statistical Notes, F. f ni > Jlo.1.
2) Statistical Notes, Pp. ( ) Ko»2.
3) Biyant, Pp* 130 - t
T/.2LS 93
Opy^sl^tion Wtaftam <*&
• BiUa
I ■•'- ' uttterost
Gap
» i
Other
Kold«®
y
- .
I. .1.11.1 I.,.,.,
agr j
M 0.347 8.3 0.22C409
63.89 | 2.8801
* 1
0.355 7.9 t 0.126025 62341 8.3045
' JBBBt 1 i! 1.20? 10.5 ! 1.456349 UO.25 12.67352 1
0.3JO 12.3 0.12290C 151.29 1 4.3050:
j
3 , 0.351 15.1 0.. 123201 228.01 5.3001!
4 0.410 15*6 0.166KX 243.36 j 6.3960
1 1.043 2%2 1.037649 538.24 24.1976
2 1.396 24.5 1.946816 600.25 35.2020
3 ii 1.515 22. 2.295225 484.00 j 33.3300
4 1 1.587 18.4 2.510569 336.56 29.2006
I 12& 1 i 2.139 24.5 4.575381 600.25 58.4055
2 1.539 2&? 2.364581 524.41 35.2431
3 1.5^3 23.6 2.390X4 556.96 36.5328
4 § 1.495 13.4 2.235435 338.56 27.5080
1957 1 r 1.16? 21.6 466.56 2J.2072
2 j 0.910 19.7 0.8201CC 388.09
17.92701
3 i
iai3 16.0 1.230769 324.00
| 20.0340 i
* 1 1.524 16.0 2.322576 256.00 24,3840
1958 1 I 1.179 23.1 1.39J0W 533.61
| 27.23491
* i: 1.278 24.3 1.507984 590.49 29.8404
3 f 1.^9 23.1 1.297381 533.61 26.3109
4 1.159 j 21.5 > 1.343281 462.25 24.9135
if ' i
■ < . -
LI .IL 1-611
T 0 5 A 1.
j
24.701 414.5 32.332675 8400.05
i .■ . •
j 502.3359'
Table (98)
■ • QWMBW) » C<*»WQ (ttMll
[28 (32.832879) - (2U7W)2] [s3 (81*00.05) - (M4.5)2
■ 0.882
Toting the typothoo of thia oooffioientU
«■ °-*” ~ *
j 1 - (0,662)*
shoo a significant oomflclaat•
SaU« (55)
Correlation Between Ohax^ges In Maxlcet 
th Ila 3g^ Changes 1a the Clearing Bill*
(1953-1968) (Actual ttguraa)
„ * . 1
Bills
*
Baato
Mila
X« 1»
------------- 4
XT
1981 mi -298 -887 Q5264 51525 662@l>
' * 850 15k 8M00 37636 26260
8 18 83k 173 5k756 19929 40132
DJI W 18 5<85 256 1800
198k M 17 -J72 -3k8 1383* 117649 187596
3 » 118 85 12544 <9(Ma 9580
8 15 130 101 18900 10201 1JI30
0 31 810 ia 44100 38k 3780
1988 mi -330 -350 108900 188500 115500
3 30 -88 M 78k 1681 | -4148
8 81 8k8 173 8150k 9QQ£Q 4290k
B 31 257 808 4326k 61776
JAft « 9 -51k -385 264196 105685 167050
3 30 107 85 iikw 9055
8 1> k11 261 1tt581 68181 107271
B Jl -155 -17 wcuCnft 209 3383
JAZ v 20 •wl -360 436921 129600 837560
3 30 57 ikO 3219 15600 7980
8 18 167 10k 2Yd8y 10816 17368
B 31 k57 2kk 203819 111308
1988 M 19 -350 -321 128500 103041 118350
3 30 35 30 1521 900 1170
8 17 tt 71 4652 5041 4826
B 3< 889 2 85521 4 578
uaa M1S -581 -308 357561 17ttk8
3 30 38 or^> 1kkk 41616 7758
8 16 855 78 65085 5776 19880
D 31 38k 58 I; 1k1M»1' 336k1 22272
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Takla (100) 
(OsKttntaO)
------------- P------
X I X1 1* g
IMfi * -207 -M3 814388 95041
a -ao 88 704 784 -764
« 100 -43 10000 1848 -4300
» 84 818 8835 47881 8Q588
1981 M -485 -473 835825 223789 888405
a 188 1» JpgQfc, 25281 31482
• 48 88 1800 8001 MOO
» W 283 22801 88189 38713
IStt “ -sw> -514 281800 884188 277580
3 80 45 400 2025 500
• 85 185 4885 11085 5880
• 288 894 51078 88438
TOTAL 175 -318 3338484
•
3588048 3881043
- • 0.848
, (40 (3338484) - 075)* ?(40 (3«M) - (-316)*]
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} 1 - (0,946)
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Tabla (101) 
(Continued)
0)
MUe*
(2)
am or 
:i^t|
(3)
Average
Pairs
(6)
Moving 
Average oT
4 quarter®
(5)
CevlafciaiL
of the
tvcod
<«)
Seasonal
Variation
(7)
Variations
| (a)
Qhu sifje
12«S M 18 3323
13563
13502
13183
« MM
13617 3396 -31 -197 3520 ♦266
J 30 3295 13523 3381 -38 •121 3616 -106
3 21 3335 13363 3336 ♦59 62 3353 -63
D 3, 3689 13136 3286 276 3213 •140
1961 X 15 3006
12853
12675
12662
11993
11669
11380
11290
12971 3263 -239 -197 3201 •12
J JO 3200 12766 >191 ♦ •121 5321 ♦120
8 20 3160 12559 3160 ♦20 62 J118 -203
1262
0
X
31
21
3311
2771
12218
11821
3055
2955
♦256
-186
276
-197
3035
2968
-83
-67
J 30 2751 11515 2879 •128 •121 2872 -96
8 15 2816 11335 2836 •43 62 2776
8 31 3062 11318 11306 2828 ♦216 276 2766 -81963 X 20 2881
J 13 2779
Table (102)
Seasonal Varlatlosia of Uartet Traaanrji Bills
J-------
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 Total Average
-—-- -----------------—
Meaaonnl Varlatioaa
X -235 .189 -118~VJ -315 -97 -228 -31 -239 -186 -1883 -188.3 -197.3 -197
J -25 -80 .182 -4 56 -181 -91 -202 -86 9 -128 -1120 —112.0 -121.0 -121
s 142 25 62 325 -58 -6 —Id 59 20 -18 513 51.3 62.3 62
> 183 222 322 582 >»8 330 257 205 256 216 2851 285.1 276.1 276
Total 36.1 *0.1 ! —
TaU* (102)
Eliminating Seamal Variation* of Clawing 1
Banks A
Discount
Mui*
Son or
8
euartare
<rf
fairs
Moving
Anwfi or
4 Qaarkan
1252 * 15
J 30
8 17
0 31
1953 11 1fi
3 X
8 18
D 31
1958 H 17
3 30 
• 1$
B 31
1955 H 18
3 30
8 21
B 31
1257
1750
1975
1887 
1»1
1785
1978
1985
1523
1582
1888
1818
1301
1298
1538
1923
SOSJF
7183
7178
7177
7235
7207
8988
8878
8585
8323
8079
5987
8056
6122
6325
7016
7171
7178
7208
7221
7098
8830
6611
8838
6201
8013
8002
6039
8228
1758
1793
1795
1302
1805
1778
1708
1853
1809
1550
1503
1501
1522
1556
tanka and fidaoouad» Houaoa atii^
37 1938
283 16C4
-310 1761
-110 1875
57 1937
285 1662
-310 1733
.110 1652
57 1629
233 1531
-310 1511
-110 UGB
57 1497
283 1640
I
Table (103) 
(Coatteuad)
MBA ‘ Sum of
4
Quartan
or
Bairs
Moving 
Average <jT
4 Quartern
Deviation
or
t2?-7?T
Seasonal,
Variatioog
Seasonally
Adjusted
HgH
1956 V 21 w 6537 6631 HoB '■ -861 «4to 1577 -633 30 1501 **•/«/»Ski 2 6675 1619 •118 •110 1611 ♦368 19 1766 us»
6243 6388 1582 ♦166 37 1709 ♦98» 3« 1793 6118 6181 1565 ♦853 883 1515 -1961957 X » 1198 5873
C£M^xXR» 1699 -301 -210 1408 -107
3 30 1376
6063 5968 1692 •118 •110 1686 ♦788 18 1501
6M 3 68% 1560 -59 37 1666 -22D 31 1988
65% 6676 1619 ♦369 883 1705 ♦8611958 X 19 1568
6619 6577 1666 •210 1758 ♦53J 30 1698
Skio 6515 1689 -ill •110 1608 •1508 17 1585 6090 6850 1563 ♦22 37 1568 •60D 31 1779
*»97? 6036 1509 ♦270 283 1696 -521959 M 18 1228 5961 1690 -262 -210 1638 -58
* 30 1385 6016 59» 1695 •110 -110 1695 ♦578 16 1553
6175 6096 15* ♦89 37 1516 ♦21D 31 1850
6805 6190 1568 ♦302 883 1567 ♦e
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feMe (105)
Corrolatlon 3etuem Chengwi in Market Bills and ehangea in 
Clearing Banka and Dlaeeunt Houses Treaeuanr
3111a
(1953 - 68)
(Seasonally Adjusted)
X
Uurtoefc
Bills
I
Scaling
Mila
X« 1® XT
1222 1 1*1 157 32761 “ «*»**KF ^88417
a »4 114 40796 18996 84396
3 Tl <2 5041 tftogjg 4402
4 •159 -875 25281 75685 43725
129b i 101 71 12201 SOM 7171
a 36 •81 1896 6561 -8916
i 3 -33 •23 1085 529 759
4 -24 -96 578 9604 8358
1985 1 143 •20 aw 400 -8860
0 •104 -103 iom< 10609 10712
3 s 89 7285 7521 7565
4 <3 143 3969 20149 m
1956 1 «41 •3 1681 8303
a 31 34 961 1156 1054
3 <242) 98 615OU. 24304
4 <433 -194 187489 37636 Jfyflpp
122Z 1 -188 •107 353(4 11449 80116
a -19 78 361 6084 -1488
3 4 •22 14 484 -88
4 223 241 49789 36081 53743
125fi 1 183 53 15189 8809 6919
a -37 -150 1369 22500 5550
3 -95 •40 9085 3600 5700
4 55 •32 3025 2?0U -8860
1298 •108 -58 11664 3364 6864
a •38 57 1444 3849 -8166
3 98 21 8664 4M 1938
4 130 51 22300
1
2601 7650
Tshls (105) 
(OanWsMd)
X T X? 1« 0
1SuQ 1 26b 30 70756 900
j.— ■
7900
2 •104 •72 10516 9184 1488j 3
<43 -190 36100 11970
j« 4 •140 •27 1960c 729 3780
1961 1 •12 20 144 400 -840
2 120 99 14400 3481 7090
3 •203 *43 41209 2304 9144
4 -33 17 6839 £39 <4411
Htt 1 -67 •21 4489 441 1407
2 -96 -55 9216 3029 9M5
3 -42 9604 1764 4116
4 «e 48 64 2304 -384
TOTAL 53 -315 765361 MkddO 402363
T-
40 (408363) - (53)(-yq)
40 (1*5361) - (53)* J ! 40 (404880 * (-318)2 j
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(90l) *W*
7461s (106) 
(Ccntlnusd)
I X . x2 ! 72 1 XX
266 -72 70796 $164 m19152
a -104 -190 10016 36100 19760
> -63 -27 7969 729 1701
4 -440 20 19600 400 -2800
1961 1 «4t 99 164 3401 -70S
a iao -46 14600 2306 -9760
> -203 17 41209 -3651
4 -63 -21 60t)9 441 1763
1962 1 -67 -59 6609 3025 l£ac
a -96 -42 9216 1764 4032
3 -96 60 9604 2304 -4704
TCOX* ”5T~ 1 ^575 ' ~ 76529? 330231 -36602
»(*36602) - (61) (-475)
T = » (765297) - («)« ] (300231) - (-47S)2 -0,067
t = 0.06? 39-2
\ 1 - (O.Q67)8
0.400
«hloh sbow* a Ism sdanifiamt OosfYlciont
(s— Bxyant, Ibid. P.208 for a tablo of distribution of t)
(107)
Correlation Between Beaks' liquid____________
BUI* of Banks aaA Blseount Hensen
(Aetna Tiguvee)
X
Tro&Mty
Millet
X
liquid
AmwU
X* «• XX
UBJ m -534 *J3J 112994 110349 111408J 214 199 49794 42904
• 209 175 45481 50429 54575
ft » 441 3449 -2497
122b x -422 *^02 ITftMk 141404 149444
ft 1? 96 Ml 9404 1942
* 124 44 19574 1954 5454
ft 140 182 21904 35124 54954
1955 X -915 -445 2*5149 214225 250949
jr -J 49 9 2025 •435
• 234 1<5 95494 24549 54440
ft 209 344 191521 119714 7777^1836 “ -596 -494 509154 209744 s&toa
ft 1J4 94 17994 9214 12044
• 449 204 40025 42454 90470
ft 92 177 2704 91529 92041252 x -400 -409 360000 259229 291000
ft 178 199 51444 29291 24502
• 1» lift 19424 12944 14000
ft 407 544 257149 144994 1079021852 x «w> 195400 294014 221740
ft -90 50 2500 900 -4900
• 07 j * 7549 1024 2784
ft 194 271 57454 75441 92974
1959 MXMMMt -591 305401 195400 ftWNbft
ft 197 417 24449 47009 54449
ft 140 49 282ftU 4741 11992
ft 297 249 cx3209 45921L 'v 09855
1WU (W7) 
(Continued)
X X X* x« xr
Uffi * -463 -4« 214369 160921 190293
f as 75 704 5625 2100
1 -43 16 1849 256 -688
9 219 275 47961 75625 00235
196^ M -473 -363 223729 131769 171699
f ai4 25281 45796 Aoas
• 99 120 99« 14400 11000
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Qutrtan
222£ X 21 2013
J 30 2109 8908
8 1? 2315 3929
D 31 2492 0923
1252 X 20 2007 6960
J 30 2166 6943
£ 18 2278 9115
D 31 2664 9260
12S2 X 19 2160 9292
J 30 2190 9236
8 17 2222 9065
D 31 2493 6958
1222 X 16 2053 9038
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ftaa the Seasonal Adjujfced dianre
■fcFsiiXl Variations Figure® 1ftLiquidity
-1*) -193 2206 5
-121 -79 2138 -48
♦33 2 2313 1«5
♦£62 270 -91
-236 -»93 2200 -22
-91 -79 2265 69
-20 2 2276 91
♦366 270 2396 118
-156 -193 2353 -61
-98 -79 2269 -36
-JR 2 2220 -49
♦263 270 2225 3
—221 -193 2266 23
-36 -79 2369 103
-6 2 2337 -12
+262 270 2358 21
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8 21 
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Chants
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Licjuiaity
2364 -4*4 *•93 aw
-52 -79 2371 -39
2331 -55 2 2274 -97
23M ♦210 270 2281 7
2385 -457 -193 2361 100
aws -53 -79 ate* 100
2522 0 2 2520 39
«3)OQ ♦2%. 270 259C 70
2507 •471 -493 2609 19
2803 -73 -79 2609 0
2606 -47 2 2557 -52
2593 ♦362
—
270 2685 128
Table (109)
Seasonal Variations of Cleerl^ 
Janice* Liquid -sscte
1955 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1555 1560 1961 1962 — - ■*—* iOwl A^J. Bwuuoal TaariUttona
M -222 -182 —189 -190 -254 >456 -221 -144 -497 -171 -1906 -490.6 -19X1 -195
J -u -55 -146 <421 -91 -98 -56 -52 -55 -75 -767 -76.7 -73.5 -79
s iofi 18 -6 ♦8J -20 -51 -4 -» 0 -47 44 4.4 1.8 2
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Corrolation Between Bonto* liquid .'ijinata and Tiwaawiy Kill* 
of* banka *fl*» Discount Houses
Tabla (110)
(Seasonally Adjusted)
X
Twwnary
Bills
T
Id<$xidAbxic'Vji
---------------- r
X8 XI
1252 x IS? 130 26669 16900 20610
J 116 «5 12996 3225 9690
a 6a 96 jfl44 8956 533B
> -275 -175 75&» 50625 49125
1954- M 7* 1 4a 3366 4402
3 -d? -1/ 696I 299 1377
a -23 -37 s® 1569 351
& -96 > -125 960!*. 15129 12056
12S5 ** -20 -2 w» 1 60
J -1Q3 -69 10619 6761 7107
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» 163 79 20449 6096 11156
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D 361 119 59081 13926 29638
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Table (112) 
(Continued)
X I X* X2 XT
M Mi 52 70756 2704 13032
/ -104 -39 10016 1921 4056
8 -63 -97 3969 9409 6111
© -140 7 19600 49 -900
lifil “ •12 10© 144 10000 -1200
j 18© 100 14400 10000 12000
8 -203 39 41209 1521 -7917
© -83 70 6009 4900 -5010
1962 X -67 19 4469 361 •1275
X -96 0 9216 © 0
8 -52 9604 2704 5096
© •8 128 64 16304 •1024
a 53 392 ■’
__________
76*361 210063 197740
___ 40 (197740) - (53) (592)
^0 (K#M1 )-(»)* } 40 (210963) - (592)2 “ 0,901
t - 0.501 40-2 y ]:1 - (0.501 )2 • 3,571
rtrtob •how* a aignifioent ooaffioiant.
Ttkl« (113)
r-~
Changw In Uarimt 
in Clearing Banks Liquid Assets *
(1953 - 38)
au. (179201) - (1*5) (129)
Bills and Changes 
ImmmUv Mjarta*
X
[k (51«33) - (Mt#)1} [W (139587) - (129)®^
0.670
0.670 22 
* “ 1 - (O.67O)2 • 4.2JU
sh&cah a slp&fleent Coefficient,

’able (1U)
tBHMgr MU» OnfertaaStag
I §
i§
SS
IIS
IS
 S
IS ♦503-91
-3U -3»o
-142 -76
♦68 89
♦119 297
•493 -310
-50 -76
*27 89
♦155 297
-230 -310
-18 -16
-9 89
♦aw 297 tm
§ 
H
SH
Ii
12SS
123
122
123
4Q8SA1232
j
fetal
Mila
~~. ..... 4.
&■» or
Qw»«m
X 4931 208&2
J 5190 21 ax3 3498
21058X 5582
20493X 4788
19943
4623 193218 4948 18728X 4960 18785
X 4195 18726J 4682
19451s 4809 19827X 5685 19998X 4571
20125i 4853I 19Wa 5016 20118
X 5351 20369X 4898 20651J 5104I 20987
20550
21032
21130
20776
20018
13632
19023
18J57
18736
19089
19639
19913
20062
19958
19955
20244
20310
20819
Ml* (114)
nu
im
sH
um
i

Tafeite (1U) 
(Continued)
Moving 
.vera^c; of
4 Quartern
Deviation
oftbe
trend Variation
M>eted
5295 ♦13 35 5209
5374 ♦313 257 5350
5659 -257 -Jto 5512
5431 *30 •76 5587
5355 ♦174 9 5436
5251 ♦256 297 5250
5210 -562 -310 4558
5171 ♦29 -76 5276
5255 -ao 35
1
9150

Hatarity .touofttt* of JafeL.
' ia^JS^enSiafii
at March in each year

2R3ES 118
gafattltar -4jgffifeaB?...2£. .W Ji.frtlojatf-.2fe.l.
2E
J&
S 31
9
1
i'SL
WLK 120
at 31 Harch in each year J .n.
i 1
i 11
i ^recrnnv Bills
1 13? to 5 years
5-15 years
I 1957 ' 19537
19621954 ! 1955 ; 1956 I 1957 ' 1958 1955 ! l%0 | 1%1
1132 i 170? I 1517 ; 13x7 ; 1705 i 1597 1 136S ! 15C9 , B0J4 j 1935 | 1669 2571
1950| 1951 1 1952 l 1953
1326
682
4-
344 ! 704 4S? 394 509 ’ 942 1 658 I 6j8
1731 507
ssar *»i “»
««MMB ac»£= »« »st«K3MedS«s se xtt.ja«»4ss«
TOTAL j 3776 j 3673
340
T
566 I 947 &31 I 930 ?40 I 952
T
438 j 564 i 1331i 628
I
1073 1297 1013. 121s
19%
4438
1363 1?C? 1922 1795
4365 ! 4971 I 5264
2194 2180 2151 2309 j 2562 2545
ar jasfrs-trw set^ac-weffr jrs»-s'*: s «s«-“•'
5160 : 5299 5756 6105 ; 6$11 >6 3
1 * «*•*»

Ta»U (122)
Oepartoaatttl Clxrationa in Uaitotablo 
iSoouritiaa 
1950-1962
Quarterly OtaaOattvi Quarterly
1950 1 ♦39 * ' r“ -183 f
9• <4 38 4 ♦134
3 ♦62 100 1957 1 ♦225
4 ♦71 171 2 -69
-91 120 3 *115
2 +2fl 148 4 -73
J ♦45 193 lass 1 ♦145
4 ♦787 980 2 ♦38
1952 1 •26 954 3
2 978 4 •426
3 ♦49 1027 1959 1 •60
4 *3TI 1304 2 -17
1955 1 ♦83 1387 3 •as
2 ♦111 1498 4 •140
3 ♦121 1619 I960 1 -274
4 ♦191 1311 2 ♦17
ISSk 1 ♦» 1846 3 ♦243
2 ♦187 2033 4 ♦162
3 ♦19 2052 1961 1 -130
4 afl6 1936 2 -279
1252 1 -72 1864 3 ♦55
2 ♦125 1989 4 ♦117
3 ♦91 2030 12£ 1 ♦75
4 -63 2017 2 ♦222
lass 1 ♦79 h 2096 3 ♦262
2 *4 2100 4 440
Cuaulatlaa
Soukmi Llcyda Sank Raviaa, Oat., 1962, P.46 for th» 
1950 * 58| Plaanoial Gtattattoa Aeon 1959.
Long-tern Yield, in Relation to Treasury Tun Rate 
1950 - 62
Table (123)
Lang
Yield
BUI
Hate Gap
1252 1 3.41 0.523 3.8$
2 3.38 0.513 2.8'i
3 3.32 0.513 2.81
4 3.19 0.513 2.68
1251 1 3.53 0.513 3.02
2 3.83 0.512 3.32
3 3.96 0.513 3.45
4 4.27 0.772 3.50
1952 1 4.83 1.325 3.51
2 5.01 2.383 2.63
3 4.35 2.469 1.98
4 4.19 2.408 1.78
1225 1 4.14 2.404 1.74
2 3.96 2.385 1.58
3 3.93 2.327 1.60
4 3.79 2.1 Q5 1.69
1954 1 3.90 2.957 0.94
2 3.77 1.831 1.94
3 3.53 1.001 1.93
4 3.54 1.660 1.89
125S 1 3.84 2.851 0.99
2 4.18 3.896 0.28
3 4.60 4.015 0.59
4 4.59 4.087 0.50
1256 1 4.75 4.639 0.11
2 | 4.97 5.039 -0.07
Long
Yield
Bill
Rate Gap
5.18 5.048 0.13
4 5.33 4.995 0.34
1957 1 5.03 4.359 0.67
2 5.29 3.910 1.38
1 5.76 4.421 1.34
4 5.94 . 6.524 -0.58
1252 1 5.74 6.025 -0. 29
a 5.50 4.920 0.58
3 5.42 3.870 1.55
4 5.39 3.428 1.96
1959 1 5.22 3.173 2.05
2 5.26 3.364 1.92
3 5.30 3.475 1.83
4 5.18 3.479 1.70
1960 1 5.43 4.397 1.03
2 5.72 4.706 1.01
3 6.00 5.566 0.43
4 6.00 4.851 1.15
1261 '• 6.07 4.368 1.72
2 6.18 4.445 1.74
3 6.55 6.146 0.40
4 6.41 5.570 0.84
1962 1 6.28 5.210 1.07
2 6.26 3.999 2.26
3 5.81 3.791 2.02
4| 5.30 3.757 1.54
Yields and Prices of Long Term 
Securities
Table (124)
Yield Price
1
1
Yield
I
Price
1950 1 3.41 I 93.081
------ u_-- __r
5 5.18 76.961
2 3.38 94.308 4 5.33 76.114
3 3.32 94.839 1252 1 5.05 79.010
*• 3.19 97.581 2 5.29 76.847
1951 1 J 3.53 94.329 3 5.76 71.184
2 3.83 91.789 4 5.94 70.282
3 3.96 89.885 1258 1 5.74 71.880
. 4 ! 4.27 87.871 2 5.50 75.053
1252 1 4.83 82.178 3 5.42 75.380
I
2 5.01 80.543 4 5.39 76.518
3 4.35 82.178 1959 1 5.22 77.770
4.19 83.367 2 5.26 78.178
1953 1 4.14 83.986 3 5.30 77.472
2 3.96 86.693 4 5.18 79.423
3 3.93 86.474 I960 1 5.43 76.163
4 3.79 89.094 2 5.72 74.279
last 1 3.90 93.621 3 6.00 70.914
2 I 3.77 96.409 4 6.00 71.885
3.53II 99.693 1961 1 6.07 70.678
4 !l 100.298 2 6.18 71.255
1955 1
I 94.702 3 6.55 66.847
2 4.18 90.279 4 6.41 68.971
3
j 4.60
83.873 1962 1 6.28 70.563
4 4.59 84.659 2 b. 26 70.683
1956 1
I 4.75 81«425 3 5.81 74.149
2 | 4,97 80.327 4 5.30 79.919
Representative securities^ Savings Bonds 1965-75 from 
1950j 3^fc Treasury Stock 1979-81 from 1953*
Sources weekly average yields and prices calculated from the 
"Sconomist”.
(at last woxkiag day in Karcfc)
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of &» national debt in control!^; tho total liaxUdit^ of the sconce, 
specifically liquidity of the elmriac to&a&g with the of control­
ling their advances. We fcaare also seen Mow tagpCTteat on© iter, of the 
national debt (i.e. the floating debt) woo in doteriiini^ <&© liquid!^ «< 
such backs.
'• ‘ '. ' ' "" . . • ■• ' . ... . . ■■ '■ .
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In .art three, we shell proccad to the next atop of our analysis - to 
the question of the effectiveness of the authorities’ procetow. In cOii- 
troUins liquidity. In other word.;, wo shall see shat exactly MBS the 
result of Otjueesinc bonk liquidity (apart ftros the ioubt about the success 
of the authorities In iaplecentin- it tJawaeJi the floating dafet) in 
reduatag their edvancea to their cuetcncrs end so Uniting total 
In thie respect, another iter, of the mtioral debt plays its role. Vo 
alaiU see in Chapter si that the eattwritioe’ effort to affect hank 
liquidity results not in roduciac alvoaooo but aostlj in seodfioinc a pari 
of bonk holdings of short-ten bonds. Chapter XXI will sluou that loneer- 
t«xi bonds, held hz other aaencial institutions, also ploy their role in 
defeHRainlng the eoatmlc situation.
5ho conclusion of this stogy is, egste, the failure of the authoritiw
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in attdninc thoir objective. Aocordincl^-, in Chapter XIH, w novo oa 
to the broader issue of the rirtro of monetary polio: as a stabiliser of
■/ 7 « . ' •'
■”r '-.y.'.-I-y
to strengthen aonetaxy policy to increase its effectiveness, or to discard 
it in favour of other man* ouch as flood policy direct control. On
monetary control through a redied modification in the structure of the
t • j. - -a .?.
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national debt.
A - .f is;vshb '.■ V*?'tbs?'' b ■ s y sW'S®Sfbftsty:,®Wp• ■4* ..£.•» ,S
■ ■ St
■.- . ■ ,, . - .> 1 , y ' 'r i. r ’ y » *1 -e® . »< ’ $$$&$£&
V& '"'■i-h-'.'-. :$■■“? :, •Gy-fcsiSM'. *
•■;■ ,y•■,. gy wi.:5Sw Ml
; —, '* v' '1 >'
yy, ■-.-y ; y •■ w-y&y- y? ?' yy .'-■, >. ■■■■•■ <*’ < ••.„«>. ,--y • ,? y-^, ,y>-* -y y-y y—. "iyy
» -’k * 4 * z ' •■ * - /r . <-* / „ v * & « -.
• ’. ■" ' ‘ f ■ - ■ - ■ y • ' -■ ' -. '.. -■ - y ? ■ ■■ ■■
iOSIIiOftiSf O
CKOT3B ft
;'•■?<•'{!« r’W^’WT: ?#S <oi. jEkkt-sfea
srasss of
& / ‘ yXiiS-®'! .■’** ?jy y *•’ ' ’; .# Tt
1951-68
V -■ - - •>?’ v *’  ■. sAx ,y..~ •■ y *■'■ .’.• -v <5r,jj
.-£ .^,g??-y:->'- •••";,>;.•>•" •?? fe. y ... ,’ ■?.. * .'. ■■ i .
:?yA" - - ’? A ‘\f
' '. '. . ' ' . - ‘ ' s t
' . ' ^ . . '
■: •-? :-• ,■’ . 4't.- ■' v.b..-':’-b -■* • .. ;* <; 3i-s: s s'.iZ.-ity :. -i
- ... / ■ ■■ ' .. 
t» ~ -4H>. pi*,>,.-jph, ‘P 5.«■;rail.<..-."t*-.?', ' Ci A'!,. 5 * f*:
S -r ft '' » J ’sATS*-.™
Ve hero also Been that the authorities bare not been sucaeosful in thoir
to oertoin ’1 loopholes’* > a r_ct- one b^ing1 the holdin^js of Boo^Ti
a period of innatioaasy xxces^ur^, a p^rt
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liquid assets (end hone© their liquidity ratios) a© veil a© to continue
w
of bank advsnooa through the voluuo of thoix liquid assets* *Xn the 
liquidity* structure*««tho banks hold a oyoci&l position» in that they
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Our concern in this chapter is toosefbre to rastaae too disoussicm 
of the offoctivoeieoa of the cntoorlticc’ ocsitrol of bank advsnees, eaft 
tdMI of gf gpOOBSlMSt OMUXitlOOe S5lO
on hank vP i involvo tfoo total c^.iovnt of gutv«ra*w. It is not
into:*;l3d to break down that total into adwaioee to invostasnt, eenswsexs
ox otfowo oux intfsyflat $g otiXX co&firxd to th© pyoVV*1^ ■
l "‘ ~
Of uonetar; noliOBr.
We have denoostzatod that toe revival of renstsry policy, in the 
1950'e, ves aooaspaniod by at extensive clclorution of the theory on bbioh 
it sestet. She affects of changing iatarcet veto* on <wgomntwo ham 
been niainlsHsii instead it has been argued that changes in internet rates 
have quits aabstential effects on too CUppSy of advances. 3iis increased 
significance of interest nates has been attributed to the greater iw 
tonoo of too national debt and too CKpouded role played by other financial 
institutions. 2ho .fMcliffa Report has argued in ?ara. 393 that "a aovo- 
ner.t of rates of interest, quite apart fwn any direot affect it nay have 
on the do'.'-x:'\d fox iwwforM^t isugf Ijeert© oj^xocxtthio cffoots on th©
hohsvioux of voxioys fi.21aiic.li 11 1 ^‘xovldod tfoftt it Is net
confinod to tho akoJit sod of til® xaasScwt) a rev writ of invo.t’oot xatog 
■•nn: 4<aa Bi^JSifiCUli Cfi£21$®8 in thfr OUpitol V-V?** Of r:npy OBOOtO hy
flrunr.n:.. J institutions. A Xl&O 111 XJitOG fiftifcftfr SOGfc© lOSC villiXt£ tO 1&Q& 
becauao capital values have fallen," As be shell see in the next few
1. See toeve, rr nJ-<
L
para^Wiplvj the Ooraadttee has the extont to Udch a xis® in
interact rates produces rostriotiasra on the evailnbillty of flnaaoa. It 
will aleo b, etatlstloally oonflroed in Section C that the potency of this
„ /•<' • v>5 m •f
Sone econoEiats (notably Bobort Xtaoa&j haeve or/^ued that oeveaaenia In 
th© capital values of bonds pl^ s large port In fbsllit&ting
the problem of stabilizing the eoonoqy* It is argued that small changes 
In interest rates can have a strong roetraining effect in an inflationary
period. Snail ehan^es. it is . v5.li indues sotentlal lenders who
hold goremnmt securities to ti/^itci up their loans to custonsM« -jp^h 
ahanges in interest rntee will deter fiwneial institutions from unloading 
their securities; the reason alleged is that banks do not like to realise 
capital losses by selling in a falling
In other words, the umdllirk^asG of finmeial Institutions to take 
capital losoos by actual sales of their securities can sigrJJMo».^t
cf’.'octfj os MMM&i? eMHi H' i; i tsmands of spoodsKs credit sara intsxwrf 
Inelastic - wo w It **» "pinniaoto" ov the "look-te" *f$Wt. '-Ma 
of foot Iff achieved b^ iufluonoing the of londesw to 3 or
to put it another way, by influencing the availability of credit to 
bowowara by altering tea teproa of cra<lit ratlaateg. tern while lim'i'MMIB
lenders will be.
9it ••• •!*» 
crltiolca.
"Internet :>utee and tea Oentml Bank", la Haaay. t—ii 
Honor of John Hasty William (M.T. 1951 ).»• 270- 
H.T. 199ft W>. 55-6, <*
The potential lenders effected we primarily eesanareial banks and 
financial institutions (such es inourmco ooapmiss, building socioties, 
sttvingn banks, and the like). All these held large quantities of govern­
ment securities* It was shown in Chapter TV tliat the banking system 
holds a considerable part of the national debt/ about 2000 of mar­
ketable securities in 1%2> also other fLxwcial institutions hold an 
almost equivalent amount of securities * that is out of ItCOO L.bu outside 
official hands (in other words, their total holdings are about JB0 of 
marketable securities)*
Scab securities are, it is argued, sensitive to very small ohaz^ea 
in interest rates. This Gunsitivity adds considerably to the effective­
ness of none tar:, policy. ^>r enable, when a rise in intweet rates is 
bxeu^it about by the monetary sathoxitlea during on inflationary peeled, 
it is alleged that holders of these soottri ties, hesitant to incur capital 
lessee, will be inhibited frori selling them to obtain funds to meet the 
rising demand for private credit. Thus lU^hor interest rates as a deli­
berate action are an assurance to the monetary authorities that part of 
the investors1 funds will "stick” when econocsic stability so requires,
Therefore, with relatively smell Cbaapee in interest rates, credit 
restraint can bo effective in reducing e:spmviitures which aro financed by 
funds borrowed iron banks (even though the demand for bank advancoo i© 
extremely inelastic), because banka will reduce their lending in large 
part by direot rationing end more careful screening of borrowers.
1. Table 57.
. X&-/SLV ■.;;
L
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In this study of the effect of raonet&n policy on the supply of funds 
froci financial institutions, vo siiall (few that the growth end 
vide distribution of We national debt and the increased iaporteioo of
nan-benk financial institutions have tended to
the ooteno / of rionetarv ***>n**v-
let us start Toy examining the "look-in” effect j that is, the 
nent u sat inoraas.'sd interest r&ios usutillvwF an* M* f wf WV ^Bv
institution© fron selling their ^ovemaont aeourities. This* *MnsMffissnt need)
«;.,'• -i'.“•?>,i***.*.\£'<••;,.• • •■fr'--- ■ i’ll*.-. .I’iaiX-' i • • ■’':/■ -'-TfclSI
to be qualified, sines the strength of the reaction depends upon the
" .' '.... ■'■ '■■ ', ,. ;; ; ... . ; (••« .' . .', ■■ “ «
ssatmrities of the geep^yj tie© Involved *
' '■ t jf A. J-' J jl >-,f 7I " . g A
lypioally, whan interest rates rise
-i'V. •■* ",
ogLj'-'V ’ Z SSii
.” Ci..
• ‘ " 1
rates rise more
long-term rates, hut the prices of chort-ter^ securities fall less
: -;'r
.y -m&v
. ",- s- f''.'■ ?&;' ••’ .ip /b'
;' •#. , •• , .* • 5r*’
tno price © of a<jh&» torsi ©ecuntio8« /nis beharlour refers to tnc histo­
rical experience that short-term rates have fluctuated acre than long 
rates, rising substantially hi^tior when raters as a whole have been higher 
end felling meh lower when the general pattern of rates has been low. In 
ether words, there are certain difforoncoe in the market behaviour of 
short end long-tom securities. Vroti the verv nature of theso securities, 
it follows that equal percentage changes in yield will involve grsotor 
ysrooatago change:? in the yjrf.ee of Ion.;—bear securities. Hence, the 
typiccl behaviour of security n^'W-ffts is to record ^dvr fluctuations in
■wmwa    mm i —»
1. For a detailed study of the behaviour of interest ratee see Tiber do 
Soitovsshy, "A Study of Interest end Cayitel0, Eponordoa, August 1940, 
pp. 293-3171 2.A. awgrave, Tho Thc-rr of Public yin^se, pp. 590-8.
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the rates of short than of lonr-terra securities, combined with wider
fluctuations in the prices of long-term than of short-terra issues.
According to tills rain lysis, the decline in the value of existing 
portfolios of government securities can be expected to exercise a signi­
ficant restraining effect only in the o> se of institutions which do not 
hold large amounts of securities of short maturity. As will be brought 
out more fully Inter, recent experience shows that rising interest rates 
did not seriously deter clearing banks, which commonly hold large port­
folios of short-term government securities, from selling such securities
to meet a rising demand for loans.
Clearing banks, in their banking business, want to meet the credit
demands of their customers and are under pressure to do so. Their custorae 
relations are very important to thea.^ Airtheraore, loans are in general 
more remunerative tlian investments. I
Let us suppose that the demand for credit increases substantially 
while the aggregate volume of banks* liquid assets is held constant (or 
decreased) by the monetary a thorities. In order to be able to meet the 
legitimate demands ,f their customers, banks sell off their short-term 
government securities in the open market. In a period of sharply rising 
credit demand, the bankc may find that many of their new loan applications 
are coming from their best customers. Such applications are very 
difficult to reject.
1. As W. Smith put it, "Their customers are their bread and butter” 
(Am. Econ. hev. 1956, P*594).
-----.________. , , - —
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how, the opon narket to a hi^ly oospetitiwo or-rket, and the eale of 
securities by one bank would prob«bl„ have no noticeable affect oil market 
interest rates end security prices. But if all or most of the dealing 
batiks wre :&ot by incrs&sod crodit and rioted by BastlinG g’civoroa
amt iiwestaaat, oocurity prices would fall end market intareot rates would 
rise. As market rates rise, tiio cost to btaaks of funds to aoct the credit 
decnando of thaix* custoaara is increase'1. nr.d the r&ten tl «v eh&xuKa nuato*
■an will corrc.^wiinjl- increase. Uo the extent that banks realise capi­
tal loeoea on their assets, cuatonere' rates will rise in order to coiapaa- 
sate for thoso losses* This should be of tiitior aimlfioanoe. hovevor* if 
banks hare substantial aaounts of short-tan, securities w! ose prices «ro 
not aieS. affected by changes in interest rates. Ao seen in Chapter TO, 
since the and of 1951 the mtuxlty distribution of bank boldines of cavern-
with less than five year© and bonis with necre than five voere to run toMW W «W" w •»** *■ **™*^to» tow « V* n*-**s< tofUW ■> W<* *'-"*r(ito ■» W ’"**»*i tow w w* Ww*M»w W 4f Amtoto Ww*f?
final Maturity date.1
As the process goes on, toe result for the banks will be as follows*-
(a) a reduction in their portfolio of ,*ovemnent saouritiea. ta^thar 
with a spaduotioii in th^jt* 11 f«>ioA•fey x&ti&« th^y tfik*?
0>)
r ^ts^Tfixioaa
in thoii* aax^xin^s so a ro^ro J t of an 
and a rinn in oustfr^nTfi ‘ Ioam Atw fw.*'to w* to%>ii L't ty* *1 .J <<db V«ftotovw wW wVw • to* w'
1. See above, pin
_________
hb
tine they r^r achieve
(o) sone increase in the safety of their customers* Iona portfolio, 
as a result of higher credit standards.
As will he hrau/itt out noro fully in Section £, the experience of the
195O*c provide® no support for the theory that small increases in the rate
of interest would deter honks frost ©witching from securities to advances,
fhrourfiout this period interact rates were rising, yet clearin; hanks
financed rapidly expending loons to business, pertly from the sale of
goveiwent securities. As Sayers put it. “Th« investments are now, it
will ha recalled, the effective cushion pro tec ting the advances from any
pressure resulting from closeness of the liquid assets to the required 
1
•alnimun." Also, the statistical Inveotigstion in Section C will show 
how much loans were negatively oc&vel&tod with (end how much financed hy 
liquidating) investments.
'Cf jeuv. dn >1 *71
This section follows the development of events since 1951, with 
particular regard to the role played by the authorities in controlling 
hank advances, and to the interrelation hetveen liquid assets, advance® 
and investment's.
1. 8.3. a^Tws, Mod®mJ^ia£, 6th «1., 1964, j>. 125.
*»13
As wi explained in Chapter VI, the new Conservative goveansaant which 
took office in October 19$1 was faced vita a Oiffioult situation. Tbs 
internal situation showed an inflationary pressure with gold reserve© 
tslling at an alarming pace. The For ess War resulted in an exseesive 
deraend, tiie ateop rise in defence expenditure bein^; accompanied by enor­
mous inveetimit© in etoeka. In order to check the gold less and internal 
inflation, the gover-iaent took, In Havener, certain wasuresi the inten­
sification of physical controls, an incretsoe in budget surpluses, and c 
return to monetary policy which had teen in
However, the very hi^i existing level of inflation end rising defence 
expenditure madd it difficult to secure a lax^e budget surplus* Mroct 
controls ww intensified, especially ov.ir the volume of imports and over 
Mae types of ixveetwwdh Bat the a&in innovation was the raising of the 
Bank Hate, first to in Vevec&er 1951 and then to in Kerch 1952*
A acre interesting ’’never* measure which was directed at the abnormal 
liquidity was the ’’forced funding” of 1000 l.a* of treasury bills* By
w
funding, the monetary authorities were, of course, acting on the liquidity
1. In 1951 expenditure on stocks was three or four times as high as 
rnnoali «M J-C.H. Bow, UnMWOTl Wf «W| MSSJSWMU »• **•
2. A.E. Ileraic _gteW Howl VoUgy, Ctete XVin)
argues that monetary policy was introduced also because of political 
factor©. Port of the new govemmont’3 election platform was the promise 
of greater economic freedom. Scnoe, it wee hard to start either by 
extending controls over conaus^tion and investment, or by increasing 
taxation. The use of monetary policy to remedy the situation was tfcor©- 
for not surprising*
of tho clearing banks. Holders wore offered a corresponding amount of >§£> 
oliort-dat^d Treasury Stock end Une bouko wore "induced*’ to take 500 L.cu 
out of such offer. As a result, 50® &.u« wee switched from "liquid aaoeW 
to "investments" • thus forcing dowr; their liquidity ratio from 39/; la 
October to 33, in December end 32- In Janmzy.
The result of these efforts we a sharp decline in bank advances by 
nearly 200 L»c* in 1952» tJxot io after the eteep rise of about 220 X».su 
In 1951 (Table 32). At the ease tine, a marked check to Internal demcad 
was shown by a ffell In personal comn^rtlon and a perceptible increase in 
unerjploynenti groover tho balance of payments improved sharply*
This dremtic change in tho ooonoaie situation within a period of a 
few raonth© was interpreted as a £p?aat success for the new monetary policy* 
Fowever, it 2uy be said Wat the policy of using credit control to re­
inforce fiscal policy and physical controls contributed to a substantial 
easing of the inflationary pressure.
(2) .&& j&aasteB ,.< A2SSs& r
The period from the middle of 1952 ahovea a check to the internal infla­
tion and a much improved balance of payments* However» throughout 1953
1. The potency of raonetary policy vm still viewed with oonaidorablo 
eeeptioiem. The Chancellor himself deolered that he "did not believe 
that in present circumstances mouatcry policy by itself will have 
decisive results, but X am sure that direct influence over the volume 
of credit can. do imoh to support the other measures to combat infla- 
tian1' ISanscm*. Vol. <>93, Havener ?th Ool. 20?).
tlw clearing banks were still under rogucct to restrict their advanoou 
to "essential” purposes, i.e. to withhold credit for & aculative puxposes
of securities, real property or oor.i.^odiV end to limit flncswe for hire
•t'V a;. • L-■'
5. <,y
..
nuroh&oe. The banks had also been naked not in x^neral to for
capital purposes? those who wished to borrow frees, a bank to finenoe a
capital scheme me obliged to seek Trotanay consent through the Capital
During this period, the covera^it was increasing its below^-the-line 
expenditure. So heavy was the boxrowirig to floating debt that it had 
virtually offset the effects of the Ssmfcer funding operation. The 
reasons for the government's increased reliance on borrowing Uirough 
treasury bills were (a) the need to fulfil the housing nragrame and to 
finance the local authorities! (b) the cr.ergc: M>e of a growing surplus
J "tf-£•.-.; ;' • »<■ •;< .
■ ■..
sh't#-t ■’. ;,, i, :
Bar*-'’ v?.... ; :.••• '
in the balance of p^yneutc meant an increase in borrowing on mastet 
treoawjy bills for the "itohunge iiue-lisatiw. Aooount.
Thia reetriction in afivanooa, ta-other with the increase in narfcat 
treasury bills, la& the clearln banka to increase their liquid assets 
ratio to 30, in ioptsnbsr 1952 Vi ana Table 93). Moreover, as loans
continued to fall. bank holdings of roversvwit debt rose ataadilv ffev
163 b.a. at the end of 1952 - Table 92).
In October 1953, Saak Rate was reduced end the govemseat relaxed its 
administrative restrictions on irrvafiitricntSe Fence durinr ft vaar offtssrt*"*sis*s^ Wlft V«4>. *WS» Vi* - w# wf MN iu" • ftr ’^r#. S>W* *▼ wW WR •e^'-«v «* “ *«• "• W«* Wr> Wft Wwfc gg -flu
their borrowing fires the
banks (total advances increased by 172 b.n.). Bat inveeboeats still in-
orsassd by TS i n. Shis was, sf ceuxse, on sssotmt sf beaks' liquid assets, 
whose ratio declined to about 3«t ' by the end of 19 jt (Table 81).
clear that it was
■i .•;••■■&
f- V *• \ ‘ V-SKJ
.t - • -. IjS$? ':. ’ S
Gd£S. About the rairSdlo of alma htVTSJil to aODCJBX tk&t th© Udriod Of
ty was ooming to an end. Total doocnd (oo&sttcptisa, stock sad
fixed investment) began to expand rapidly. By the end of 195b it was
£«•£.'*< :**••• A:
-.
•.>•?,:' ’’ ■'*•' • • ' *'* ■■ ?' .6 '•■. S'
.:?<•" M <K
8,3 Jp*\ s ; «, ^vir.
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an inflatioiwy pressure (which was dormant for over a year). Consonantly 
none^ew nbv the fiimoos© of 1 Vfie in sorlsr
1955. "........ . |
The inflationary boom of 1955*56 and the method of dealing with it,
.
well deserve the attention of students of monetary affaire. Briefly i ‘the 
uonetaay authorities, in order to restrain the axoeasivs aejrec&te tlo-xai, 
relied on tiieao measures t hifjhor inter oot rates end a contraction in the
mindly of banks1 11 mii<j asiiotBe But tho classical Aid not sro*
Ann* the axnectad cure and vara later auarnlensistad ter aaaa rather ^uaorttek,^.. •■fe.. .z v.- va-*w wmu^/wV Uw\t t-m ww»»w w^,Aai» w- -'V*«iww*a eae»ve*^a<at vx\>.w . ,4. «r. wwr'
dox” measures for controlling credit. Xn spite of these additional 
measures, the inflationary forma continued during the firet half of 19^6• 
The followin.: analysis vQl expose the reasons for those dij 'Ointinc
results of aonetazy poliegr.
The reatriotive monetary polity atartod with an increase in Bank 
sate from 3^ to la January 1955 » than to tjs» in Pabruazy. Thia rise 
waa reinforoed and aade "effeotive" by other raauauzes: the Bank of 
England aold government oaouritios, thus fozoing the musket into the Bank
417
and producing a rise in sliort-tor rated. TJie treasury hill rate rose 
Sbee^By widening the gegp between it and the rate of deposits (?ig. 17).
This in turn stimulated the appetite of non-bank investors for troasuxy 
bills. At tlio eeno tine, tha amount of the tender treasury bills van 
reduced in the first quarter of the year because of the Exchequer seasonal 
revenue surplus and sterling receipts by the Exchange Equalisation Account.
The result of these measures was a squeeze in banks* liquid sseete 
in two vaye: (a) a decline in the “aiuire" of banks* treasury bills of 
total market bills due to the wider rate differential, (b) a deoxino in 
market treasury bills which produced a decrease in banks' treasury bills 
and fcenoe in their liquid assets. In other words, there wee a smaller 
amount of liquid assets available, and the clearing bunks obtained a 
smaller share of that total. Tills is olscr ten the fact that between 
$eeeaftetf 1254 end Ilorch 1255 the teu&ar issue fell by 330 Laa. while the 
holdings of clearing bunks of treasury bills fell by 350 l.a. and the 
total of clearin,; banka and discount houses by 500 L,». (Tables 25*6) •
Put another way, the holding of banks end discount houses as a ratio of 
total market bills declined ten 54/ to 43 » Therefore, the monetary 
authorities succeeded in cutting down beaks* liquid assets very sharply» 
in the early aontlw of 1255» reducing thereby their liquidity ratios tern 
34.3 ’ in Deooaber to 3G.Q&. in ;tarch. In a^ito of this signifiemt reduo* 
tian, the banks were able to increase their advances by 127 I in order 
to meet the pressure of the monetary authorities on the one band and the 
heavy detaaad for advances on die other, bonko were soiling investments
«““• ia».
stable, with en
Wa second quarter, liquidity ratios 
inerts® in odvanoes by 1& L.xa«
Thsroforo, in the first half of 1955. too clearing books had inoroaaed 
substantially their advances (209 X-a») by selling inveetnent securities 
(25^ L.e.)(Table 120 sad S*f* 31). Tho foil in bond prices, of eooxee, 
does not seen to here deterred too bwika fsun liquidating their securities 
cince they passed on such capital losses to their borrowers in the fore 
of higher interest rotes.1 tod ns shown in Chapter Tl, the rice in in­
terest ratoo did not appreciably affect the doriand for advances. Inven­
tories, an iaportsnt factor of toe ooatinued inflation sad in part 
financed by bank advances, continued to increase during tots period."
by the saaner it beotuie evident that toe pressure of denond pexeioted 
end prices were still rising. Tho government accordingly took further 
sssasures. In October, it introduced an uiergaacy budget, increasing toe
• Z-. . kc ’'.'i
purchase (sales) tax and announcing drastic restrictions on hire purcltaae 
finance, the discontinuation of further housing subsidise and reductions 
In iirreetment by (yublio authorities» In other words, monsterY oolicw woe 
©uppl^aonted by inera^ed taxation, control® on oonsumr credit and 
restrictions on investment by public authorities^
!♦ Ho statistics are available on interest rates on bank arfvsnaes> However, 
one financial esoaentator expressed tho opinion that rates on loans to tb 
nationalised industries (elaoo tbs begta4»£ ©£ Wj5/ e»& to prise tpilno 
trial borrowers bad risen to the full oxtent of the rise in the Bank 
Kate (from to 4&>) and that otm^ea to other borrowexs had probably 
risen by about 4fe Statist* Karoh 3* 1956# f. 3.
2. The value of inventories held by ooeiw&ob increased by 496 LeUe in 
1955» the inarease in 1954 beinc only 264 L.cu
)• However, the Chancellor said that tho ^overwent, in its efforts to 
cheek inflation, relied on xaenetarv see I)ow.
On the monetary policy, the authorities beome concerned about the 
continued 5 in bank advances• Tliis copper^ ov*i m noted in cl state
»snt by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on July 25. The Chancellor asked 
the Governor of the Bank of Iceland to brine: the whole statement to the 
notice of the corriercial banks. lie hod "so doubt that the banks will
agro* that it is their duty to reduce the mount of bank credit below 
what they would be clad to i&re in less difficult tines." Tlio Chancellor**
apoeal to the banks in other vaa, "I look for a positive and
■.' • •; » •. ' ••' . <
-V-.
V' l&h ^ •• '■ >■ • • •
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elgnlfioant reduction...over thu next fou nonthe." Mo opeoific target
..\ A ' 'V*. ■ xj ',v #* y . ; • ’t* a/ fy; $ f > • • ;•* "-pL *.= ; ; *’* -'M *Wf*« ?• -•■
was elven to the banks since it wtw "for the banks to decide what steps 
they ouot take to raako tills policy effective.14 hence, the bankers came 
together to discuss how the ’’aifplificant" reduction was to be brought 
about, and to consider how far a oonion approach vac praoti**fcSU>. The 
tentative view woe that the aim Should bo to achieve a reduction of net 
less than 1C$» of the total by tho end of the yeari as the
Radcliffe Report aays> "What hod hitherto been aerely a qualitative con­
trol thus became also quantitative" (Pars., t-17). Opponents to this 
directive objected to it because it M inconsistent with the philosophy 
of the government of using the oechanisnBCf free uaxket and of orthodox 
wteetsry policy as the primary regulators. To thie suggestion the 
Boonordc Secretary retorted that such direct appeal did not
the authorities ere not coin,;; on with the drive to restrict lendingfy ’ & J> .x" .e:.. Li\
r>*5
’•that
through or tixxlox controls,
r •? ( -:<'•••• ••
■ iS H. ■■ 1. July 30, 1955. W- *>5-6.
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However, this appeal tad a substantial effect 
their peak to June ‘ 2136 I.m,) snd than fell steadily until January 1956 • 
that is by 204 L.u. to the third quarter end 131 L.o. to toe lest quarter 
of the year, to a result of tiiat ulroottvo toe banks contracted toeir 
advances; but their teveetnaats continued to decline altooueh at a nuoh 
slower pace torn during toe first half of toe year (63 l.n. instead of
tv. Mf. <?,’
* '•>. '-‘y
pi
L.Ue)e Th<w followed ft substfitttial rise (by $09 L.a*) in liquid 
ftseetc available to tho hanks, besause of gwenimnt borrowing, pushing 
thereby the liquidity ratio to in Xooonbore Thio increase in liquid 
assets my be explained as follows; ftm We third quarter onward, She 
Sxehoquer exyoriomed a substantial revaux dofioit, hence the tender 
issue to treasury bills was expanded# Ifcreorer, the effect of a shift 
of non^aok holloru from deposits to bills had dec lined § oon—
seqnontly the shore of the banka and discount houses of market bills in* 
creased to ^7.0 tlxn to 54.0$ in the third and last quarters of tho year 
(Tables 95*6)- As a result of this incrorxe in the total supply of liquid 
assets, together with the iMJtees in the share yoiSo to ttxe banks, beak 
holdings of liquid assets rose by 509 X»*a. ss mentioned above from the 
tint? of the in July until the ®i$d of the year* At the earns time
toe prospects of a further rice to interest rates and of a resulting fall 
to bond prices, together with toe narrowing of toe gap between toe rates
banks fix>n incrooeirv their investments # Therefore. banks had i&ereaoed 
toeir treasury billa while reducing toeir advances and teveetaento end
E, tern-,
£were thus induced to inoroaee thel? liquidity ratios j&oc: 31*^ in July 
to 37.4$ in Seeeriber.^
In the early raonths of 1956 the ecoaaqy continued in an inflationism 
condition, end prices and incoma continued to rise. The tender issue of 
hills was again reduced as a result of the ceaoonal revenue surplus. A 
rise in the Bank Bate at 5^5* in Tbbruary appears to have incro.Boc. the 
non-bank treasury bills. As a result* the supply of liquid assets available 
to the banks declined. Advances increased a little and the liquidity ratio 
fell belou its inflated Beoeaber Isvel*
however, it appears that the masures taken during 1955 esid early 
1956 vero succoseful in ocntrollin? the supply of bank advances. They 
elsoved an alcjoot uninterrupted decline ftw duly 1955 until the second 
quarter of 1956 (Table 131 and Flg» 31)*
'lie diooppoijitinj aspect of this rooord ic that despite a quite
restrictive credit policy, reinforced by an iaoreaaingly tsitl^inflntionory
budget policy* the rise in price® continued unabated and the labour ssuteCt
regained extrenely ti$xi. ” Could it be that the authorities*. •have oor&e
round to tho view that the failurea iu 1955*56 occurred not uiarely become
Mr. Butler*e budget policy wao wron^ but also because monetary policy was
too late and too tiiaid in itu oarkot action and relied too heavily on 
. .2exhortation?”
1. Part of the increase in the liquidity ratio was probably a noxnal 
seasonal phenomenon, Table 109.
*• Eto Steitiafr, "2tof Unde on Credit", tity i960, >. SB&.
V# have so far presented a detailed report on to events of 1955*56. 
Such eocperlenoe constitutes indeed a useful case study of the difficulties 
of controlling strong influtioiuay pressures through the use of monetary 
polio/* It may f>yrther be worthwhile tc dy*ap «jyr^ Ann/p ».4mw on the 
effeotivenese of monetary policy as an ©nti-inflationary derloe for that
pcnou#
; .
Ao seen above. the results of the restrictive monetary policy applied 
Am the baginnixv: of 1955 we disappointing* Thia development does not, 
in itaelf, prove that monetary polio; is inherently ineffective. We 
cannot be euro that the inflationary pressure would not have been ouch 
more severe if to 'monetary policy had been loss restrictive. A more
-s>^ •• . v *•• ** vQ s4:V sfrVTS* v ’v j*. €V „ .. ' '■•’• >’ 4&.: &TT*7.// -fcfs r
restrictive polio; might have checked the infiationery pressure by, sty, 
to end of 1955* 89? axanple, to i&toqpcr could lu.vc prevented to 
increase in bank liquidity during to sscflMA half of 1955 financing 
the budget deficit through the issue of longer-ism securities instead of 
increasing the xacrfcet treasury bills. Or it could have gone even further 
and funded part of to outstanding treasury bills. Hercover, to Bank hate 
could have been raised hi^er than 5& > «ad to increase could have been 
cade earlier. There is little doubt that taking such additional restric­
tive measures would have increaeod to offoetivnaac of onetary policy.
The ether conclusion from tlvo 1955—56 exixrioxice is that the short** 
run effectiveness of monetary policy as an anti-inflationary devioe has to 
do with the rapidity with which it is possible to restrict credit? in
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other wordo, its affecflveneee depends v^obi the spoed with which the 
decree of restrain t can ha developed. As & practical mt ter 
to bo factors which linit thio speed. we of tho difficulties of 
ifigptoe&nt&tlon of a restrictive credit policy io the tio-in between roonctcaq 
policy and debt laanngenent. Vo iwrc seen that a severely r□etrictivs 
mmtary policy requires funding of tho floating debt into longer* tort, 
securities. Under thia condition, rapid application of a restrictive 
credit policy* i^lemntad by funding’* io likely- to embarrass the taonotaxy
authorities in their role as a mn£ger of the national debt 1)000x100 of the
: -*x
SP'
MW,
difficulty of marketing the required long-term eecuritioo on a felling 
market. Hie result for the Wreaouxy is financing its requirements by the 
issue of tender trec«oury bills os it did in the ceoond half of 195$, end
;i •
A final observation is that it eppeoro that tho aspbmis on aonctasy 
polio*’’ was due to .. ovommont feeling in favour of a naxiaua reliance (as a 
miter of principle in a Basket econflqy) on such policy to control ^cregato
■'•/. ' / ,..;p. A
fe e '<*
incraealng boxes that were already very high mat be admitted* it could 
have relied to a greater extent on fiscal policy. Aggregate daaand 
be controlled in more than
host way, even if it works affectively
I'M
<*)
’Sw economic situation be&cn to recover, during the first half of 195?9 
after the pause of 19J6. But credit restriction was still required » Lho 
Chcnoellcr of the SJxchequer when raferrin to monetary measures in his 
speech on 9th April, 1957» renewed the request to the hanks to mintnia a 
restrictive attitude towards advances* However, in the firet quarter, the 
a&vaaeee of the clearing benka rose by 63 I*m. and by 104 L.»* in tlie 
second quarter (despite the Chancellor‘a «q.<peal). The total increase in 
advonooE in the first half of the year was 167 !»•»• but investnonta were
almost stable*
In the summer snd autumn of 1937 * conditions were considered infla­
tionary* The authorities* counter-j&ecaures v,®pe "the most spectacular of 
the poat-mr resorts to monetary policy M *
In September, Bank Kate was raised to 7,/, its highest level since 
1921. The rise in 3crik Rate wno occoDpanied by other repressive meaeuroe* 
Baric a&VS&ees wore controlled not by a prooeure on their liquidity, but by 
a quantitative restriction. It took tho foxu of a ceiling on the absolute 
total of advances since banks were required to hold the level of advance® 
for the nsKt twelve months at the average level for tbs preceding twelve 
months. However, from the last -quarter of 1J$3 this ceiling wao abolished 
and tho result wao a great lucre-^30 in edvtu.cea* To review the orrente of
1. Bov, qp* £&•» $• 255
19571 the oocor^ half of the yoer tiiowed a decline of advance© by 200 l4fc 
with & slight iaarerac in ieswtrnsts by & l.a., cad hence an iaovssse In 
liquidity ratio i? nt the end of the year.
(5) 2haJe^tioaasc P«^>a.Jj)jfeJS2.-
The die cues ion no< focuses on the response of the public sad the beak© to 
the aadlny of the credit nqueoxa, in the auuaer of I958. The appetites 
of the borrowing publio for bank advances end overdrafts, encouraged by 
the -ore aggroooive lending tactics and competitive advertising of the 
bcake, war® bigger rxad more WKbjring titan expected. The result was a 
drarsrtic expansion of bank lending. In 1959, the voliaae of bank advances 
expanded faster than at any tine during the 1953*s (fig. 31)•
The aggregate advances of the clearing banks, which had risen by 
almost 200 !.»♦ in the lost quarter of 1953# rose in 1959 by a further 
692 L«au to a peek of 2818 L.su Th© yew’s increase thus amounted to 
32,^. Bor the yeex 1958 « a whole, the inevease was 19*^ »*fTno»t 
spectacular rate of increase in the XftSO’s. The nearest cpproach to it 
vets the 13.10 of 1951 ^i®n the post-Koreen boon was exerting its effects.
The clearing banks financed a large pert of their additional advances 
by selling or running down other ooaots. In 1958, nearly one*third of 
the 3^9 I»au of the additional loons woo financed in this way. In 1959 
the proportion time financed rose to considerably store than one*tkird.x
!• "Credit for BafUtioa% Pcfcrusry i960, p. 77.
i£6
However, thia point will he statin tic-lly iMrectlgttted In Section C«
In the eerly noaths of 1953, tl.o banks were heavy buyers of giltedged
securities* Although they sold 101 L.su in the final quarter, when the 
sur£;e in advances Logan, their jilt-edgod portfolios rose over the year 
M a whole by 53 L.uu This explains the reason for the sharp decline 
in liquid assets - 171 L.ru by the end of 1953 • in order to face the 
increase in advanoog. That such a decline could take placo without 
drivixiff the banks to soli their inveotnents. is because the liouiditsr 
ratio at the outoet had offered c fair latitude.1 2
Therefore, the liquidity ratio Jiaving been run down during 1953 £w»
5#*^ to 34<^', the banks throughout cioat of 1959 ware in need, of all the 
2
liq/vda asseto they could oonaend. The result wee no doubt a aaasive 
realisation of gilt ed^Rd securities which ware sold, or allowed to run 
off at maturity, on an unprecedented ooale. Following their decline by 
101 L.m. in the fosrrth quarter of 1953, portfolios dropped by a further 
17^ Mb in tho firet quarter of 1959, H6 L.a< in the aeccnd, 23 2».xu in 
the third and 79 L.n. in the fourth. Thus the deoline in 1959 as a whole 
amounted to 392 L.ra. (of which about 130 L,m. represented bonds to maturity 
reducing portfolios to their lowest point rdnee 1951 - to only 22. &- of 
gross deposits (Table 81). Lord Honoktou has described this cutting down
1. To repeat, monetary policy cannot be effective in controlling banks* 
advances, during & period of inflation, if the clearing banks held a
ly Mgh proportion of liquid aceetts.
2. They actually obtained on bailee an additional 135 L.a,, of which
SL.su etxfto frexa increases in tl&lfr portfolios of ooxxtoroial bills ehia aa).
ba?
of investment portfolios as an instance of using them as a buffer against 
fluotuationb In advances • so that the decline was an ‘ ordinary and predic­
table” jwooiapuniniont of the increase in landing.^
«) Cantram^g the .f 19<>>-6X
By early I960, the authorities fait it desirable to moderate the course 
of expansion. Bank Bate was raised from b, to 1 in January and then to
in June, and the equeeae went on. In effect* I960 was a year in which 
the instruments of monetary policy wore employed mud. more forthrightly 
titan usual and on an except tonally wide front. However, the oonsequence 
of such an active monetary policy was not only a serious gap in the 
balance of payments but also still a lurking inflation threat to costs 
and prices.
At any rate, if the criterion applied was simply to restrain the 
liquidity ratios of the clearing banks, then the measures of the year 
were indeed quite strikingly sucoosaful. But the reversal of the trend 
of liquid assets was a significant expansion of credit by a further $u$ 
L.a. - to a new peak of 3123 L.su
It was also the first year in which the Bank of hgland took a direct 
grip upon the supply ef liquid assets to the clearing banks by the new 
device cf requiring then to meke “Special deposits’* with itself.2 This
www»a—««m^i wwiWHwi ■»
1* JB&Jta&§£> ^©toruwry I960, “Credit for the Reflation", pp. 77-8.
8» The ’ Special deposits” system will be fully described in Chapter XIII.
W2S.'El J’ ; V' '
involved cofi^ellint the beaks to surrender a portion of their liquid assets 
«< of their gross deposits) in uxoh&age for a blocked balance that was 
releasable Wholly or in part only when the monetary authorities thought 
fit. This development arose from dissatisfaction with the operation of 
monetary policy during the 1950‘s.
The monetary authorities had of fee lively controlled liquid assets 
of the clearing banks through funding process as well ae the ”special 
deposits” device. By the end of the year, liquidity ratio wae only 
(in effect, recovered from 3l.j£ of oici^ov ember), the lowest recorded 
ratio for the tftffthfc Only a part of this dsortfall in liquidity ratio 
was attributable to the exchange of liquid assets for special deposits 
(which amounted to 1M* L.a. in December). The remainder reflected the 
large improvement in the capacity of the government to borrow from the 
non-bank investors - that la the funding policy.
Hence, the government applied in i960 for the first time the instru-
*i-£ ;0 *v’T;iri',rv■■ giffF-/ 5-dr*■ ist ‘'1 W-<’ EK**
ment of direct control over bank liquidity through the special deposits
system of sterilising a part of their liquid assets. The first call for
special deposits was made at the end of April, to take effect on 15 June.
i
The banks responded by selling investments and advances increased by 
236 l.m. in the second quarter (Table 128). it the end of June, further 
epeoial deposits were called for. hank advuncee then slowed down, the
1. The disposal of bonds by the bunks wua not welcomed by the authorities.
banks again sold investments though at a slower rats. However, this new 
instrument still appears to have plsyod a cud. sualler rol© in shaping
the credit pattern of the 1
I960, the principles of funding policy were ooooapaniod by a high degree 
of success, sustained by higher interest rates. The authorities were 
able to sell stocks to the public with the object cf keeping down borrowing 
on treasury bills through the banking system. At the same time, they were 
selling hills to non*bonk investors in order to deny these to the banks * 
and so to keep a tight rein on their liquidity ratios.
The consequence of such a sharp squaese of banks’ liquid assets, 
through funding as veil as the special deposits, was a considerable sale 
of inveetaonts, even at a considerable capital loss. During 1956 and 1959 
(when the underlying aims were reflationaiy), the authorities were content 
to absorb large quantities of securities sold by the banks without enfor­
cing any significant rise in yield * and at times without resisting a 
modest fall. But curly in i960, when the rorthorltiee’ aim was restraining 
the total deraand, it was considered that in the light of developments in 
the economy os a whole, and bearing in &ind the longer-run need to attract
purchases of stock by ’non-bank* investors, a somewhat higher level of 
2
gilt-edged yields would now be appropriate.
Hence, through high~rete policy, a dxen&tio change was brought about
1. K.S. Sayers, Modern Banking, 6th ed., 1964, pp. 124-5.
2. dooBOjaic Suyy<K 1%1, pp. 3>36.
in the authorities’ debt managesn&it. Tnsteed of being net buyers of 3took 
on an unprecedented so&le in 1952, the ^'oveznment was soon enabled to make 
large net sales. Their very success, b;’ putting additional pressure on 
bank liquidity, was causing thn betake to run dawn their investment port­
folios still further. In the first quarter of I960, the authorities wat 
a not purchaser of securities by 3^5 1Mb * pertly of course in coasegpsnoe 
of the steep increase in bank selling by 20$ L.m, During the next nine 
months of the year, the authorities wore, as a result of the high-rate 
policy, successful in selling eeourities in order to finance themselvee
to a greater extent outside the bonking system•
Hie events of the year leave little doubt that the net sales of 
securities to non-bonl; domestic investors during the year as a whole were 
such as to exert a much bigger quantitative effect on the banking system 
than did the special deposits which (when the second call had beer, paid up) 
aggregated no more than l$0 L.a.
hare was a striking contrast botweor the credit trends of i960 and
those of l$6l. Hie former year was mrkod by a continued large expansion 
of bunk advances, while the latter year was masked by a stability in. thsir 
volume. Moreover, the major source of credit expansion, for the first 
ti me for some years, resulted from geversnent borrowing on floating debt.
In other words, the authorities’ efforts to arrest inflation were liable 
to encourage credit through the expansion of banks’ liquid assets. Before
MX
demonstrating the events of 1961, it nay be helpful to point in acre 
detail to the factors that are liable to produce ti ls odd conclusion
one arts go from domestic circunatancco and the other from external.
A severe eqpeeee by mesne of monetary measures, and a drain by lucre*) 
scd taxation of liquid resources of the private sector, will reduce the 
available funds for lending to the government. So long as the resultant 
stringency remain* acute and so long as there is strong competition for 
liquid funds, private holders of those balances will be lees willing than 
before to lend them to the government? and if they do they tend to con­
centrate on short securities. The result, for the government, even though 
it asy succeed in reducing its deficit, is that it may suffer a eizmltsnece 
even sharper decline in the amount of its net borrowings from the public. 
Fence it will be obliged to incrroro its borrowing, to finance its require* 
stents, from the banking system on floating debt. This result may be 
called the ’♦boonersng effect”.
On the external front, If the diMnfletiontry measures succeed in 
reducing imports and in expanding exports, the decline in net payments 
that the country has to melee to overseas current account will reduce the 
Srchange SSqualiaaticn Account’s sales of gold a?id foreign currency and, 
therefore, will reduce its intake of starling (i.e. reduce its holding of 
tap treaeuxy bills by obliging the Treasury to repay them) • In thia case, 
the Treasury will be driven to borrow more from the domestic banking 
system. Each of these apodal credit Greeting roperfusaions of diuinfla­
tionary action was operative in the ©auras of 1261.
In 1959* *hen the boo-. in landing reached Its peak, hank advances 
rose toy 692 h.su g in 196b the rias in a&aaess was 505 L.m. and in 1961 
it showed only 6 L.u. increase. It should toe noted that the year’s orodtt 
expunsioai w*? ^inly concentrated in the first half * i.e. 34 L.m. in the 
first quarter and 225 !*»• in the second, reaching a new peak of 3242 l»su 
Then, in the following half-year, advxuLCoe turned sharply downwards. This 
fall in advances vuc indeed one of the sharpest novenents ever experienced 
in the period. Their voluao fall toy 261 L.<&» in the third quarter, tout 
increased toy 11 L.m. in the fourth. In absolute terw, this was an unpre­
cedented aoveaentsi it bore conparioar. :dth the other aajcr declines 
experienced in the 1950’s * the 200 I.a. drop in the second half of 1957 
end in the oiddlo half of 1952, not to mention the larger reduction in the
- '• ’ » Lkt1 '• h-® • - •- ; ’V
Er-isbhw x -
s«conc half of 1955<
’i itt 's 5 I§t V J ?
Does the experience of the second half of 1961 provide **»y evidence 
on the effectiveness of sionotary policy'; There has been, indeed, such 
speculation about the reason for tho apparently strong and rapid response 
to the authorities’ neaeure®. licet said that a nfijor reanon for
the drop in advenoeo in thia period was not due to the authorities’ noasur 
at all tout rather to the efforts of the berks to cut down their lendings. 
Alternatively, several bankers erguod that the aoveBent reflected decision 
of the banks’ customers r&thar than eny action of tho banks tbensslV'MU
Though tho bankers may not rate very highly the immediate effect cf 
the -monetary authorities’ efforts to ourtail their borrowing, the squeeze
itself was nun,Ankhiv severe. The cloarinn banks wore oreosure
of not only a new call for special deposits but also tc wbat vac in effect 
a return to a quimtite.tivo (as well as parQl tntive) directive over advowee, 
reinforced by yet another *)NmX” pressure. Bonks should no longer sell 
gilt-edged, either as a means of meting the special deposits call (in 
other words to meet the liquidity problem) or to ease the pressure put on 
advances. The authorities asked the b&ntai to adjust their assets by 
reducing advances rather than investments $ they also shoved the banks the 
broad lines of curtailing edtssme to cruatasers. The operative factor on 
this occasion was thus not the Special Deposits call, but tbs direct 
instruction to the banks, and the weapon used was xoral suasion. The 
Special Deposits system, as so far export<mced, was a signal rather than in 
itself an effective weapon. It was a threatening gesture vhoreby the 
authorities could ensure that the banks took notice of the "requests” made 
to then.
In fact, no sales of investments took place after the Chancellor1# 
measures, and after the portfolio was at the low point of 1040 B.a. (Table 
129)* The end-Decmber ratio of iirvosWntc to gross deposits was therefore 
reduced to 14. IS the lowest point in the l95O*s. Then, in the last quarter 
of the year, investments chewed oom inore&ea. Over the year as a whole, 
the net reduction in investments (by 151 I.n.) wee meh smaller than the 
reductions of 1959 and i960 (Table 32).
Considering the liquidity of the clearing banks, it is clear that the 
nuoh more favourable course of liquidity in the second half of 1961 vac 
attributable to the sharp chajigo-roimd in bank advance© and to the
requirements of the Exchequer. In each of the last quarters of 1961, the 
govcxment bad to lean more heavily on Mriwixv; from the banking system. 
One of the major reasons for this was the change in the gilt-edged market. 
Tho gover^nt, to repeat, enjoyed favourable conditions luring I960, 
celling a considerable amount of securities during the funding process.
By the first quarter of 1261, sales of stod to the domestic public scad 
non-official overseas holders fell far diort of the amount of stock ropur- 
ch&sod by the authorities from the banking system. Again the author! ties 
purchased a further 260 I .an in the second quarter and 27 L.a. in the third, 
Therefore, over the last nine usonths of 1961, the government relied hesrtfity 
on borrowing from the banking system. TU outcome was that the year ended 
with a eos^paratlvely strong liquidity ratio of 36.1$ - the bluest end-d>M* 
eember ratio since 1957 and 3& points above that for end-1960, This was a 
surprising result of a period in which an additional amount was called from 
the clearing banks in ’’Special Deposits** an a means of putting a squeeze cm 
their liquidity.
This conclusion has, in effect, to bo a little Modified as a result 
of a atriking characteristic of the years the massive expansion in the 
volume of commercial bills, chiefly no doubt because of the tighter grip 
over bank adveasea. In June, the comercial bill P or tiolios of tJws 
clearing banks reached 218 i.a. A considerable part, therefore, of the 
year’s large addition tc the liquid assets of the banks (i.e. 309 h su, 
the largest increase in the 195°*») wn« not a result of government borrow­
ing but rather a reflection of the growth of cojcuereial bill finance.
435',I
(7) aa.gg^*<BW Tear j2& .
Burkng 19^2, govonsaoat policy switched ftcr; restraint to otiaul&tion, and 
the clearing bania were freed for tlto sooond tine froa all controls on 
their lending. She result was of course «n expansion in bank credit. In 
tills reflation, the authorities1 cioasuroo for relaxation broadly roacdfcled
those of 195S-59. But, from the point of view of their offeota whether on 
the bunking syste-i or on the occuoay* they showed uare differences than 
similarities > v<
In 1958, Beak figte was reduced fron ? to Iff, Zloreovor, bank lending 
policies were suddenly frood, for the firet tic:© for twenty year©, frm
"directive" controls. And Short the increased desnand for ulvanoea thrastana* 
a strain on bank liquidity ratios, the authorities cualiioued such strain
by absorbing bank 3&les of invest iont#. SiTiilarly. Bank Bate was brought 
down fron T/> to 45* in 1962. Also, bank liquidity was cushioned by the 
return to the banka of the whole of the fir.de (in three stages of two stops 
each - in June, October and Beassfcer) that Lad been deducted Cor Special 
Benosi tSe Lcstlv, th© xw&ininK nr©auastcv rerrerniru? lending ooliov wore
withdrawn.
But neither for the banks nor the cuti-oritloa did the results prove 
in any degree coapareble to the groat lending spree of 1958-59. It nay be 
etid, however, that the rise in bank advances, aside ffcoa 1958-59, was very 
substantial. Choy rose ovar the yoor by 280 t.n. or over 8.40 , to 3609 
L.n. (or from W to 43.8. of gross deposits).
The piling UP Sf liquid eseet©, as a result of the release of tbs 
special dspooltg9 did not however ^.driv© the hanks to conserve their liqui­
dity ratios. On tlio ocntraxy, clsost tho whole of the liquid funds returned 
to the clearing banks were invested in yovemrwxt securities. During; the 
twelve months up to December, the inorocse in investments portfolios wwa 
expended by 203 !•». against a redeye of special Deposits of 221 L.n.
Hence, liquid assets increased by only 91 hua. (through other elements than 
treasury bills) (Tables 60, 82);
The events of the period 1951-62 and the ds/^reo of effectiveness of 
monetary policy in action iuore been brought out in full detail. The ex­
perience of that period vs% as w have seen, that the clearing banks reacted 
to the increase in demand for creoit (in the face of gcvemmat equeeae) by 
selling a largo volume of their government debt. High liquidity ratios also 
oncouraged an expansion in credit. The other conclusion is that rising 
interest rate© did, not seriously deter bnjdce (which comaonly hold large 
portfolio© of short-term governasat ecourities) from soiling such securities 
to moot the rising demand for loans* In view of these conclusions, it is 
rattier difficult to believe tiiat the policy of credit restraint which 
prevailed during thia period had very ncuh effect on the expansion.
These conclusions will be Mtad statistically in the present section
Our Investigation will be conducted as follows i
(a) firat, the bohaviour of basic investments as a result of movements 
In advaacoa ana liquid s-eeato. It was discussed In Chapters Till 
and XI her the clearing beaks used to liquidate some of their 
government securities in order to holster their liquidity ratios 
and/or continue their advances.
(b) the other aide of the picture is investigating the source of 
financing bunk advances: from liquidutiu,£ their investments, using 
the excess of liquid scoots and fiw the increase in deposits.
(c) lastly, evaluating the importance of c chengo in interest rates 
in deterring banka from liquidating their investments - i.e. the 
significance of the lock-in effect.
S het us start with the first point * the reaction of changes in advenes* 
and/or liquid uscetc on inreatesentB. To show the degree of correlation 
between these variables, we have to uce the "partial correlation" technique £ 
aa follows (Table 126):
r12 * simple correlation coefficient between liquid assets and 
investments.
ih- • the simple correlation ooeffioimt between adveJiees snd 
“ . investments. -
r?o ® the simple correlation coefficient between liquid assets and 
advances.
Then by using the equation sot out oa p. 2$<> , we obtain:
Js£&2l2&^.
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a/&O(3O50135) - (661)^&O<263 531) - (-825)2J • 0.216.
J. - ____ _ ____________________________________________ __ ..0.^.
//SSw 543) • (1359)2] [40(263 531) - (-625)® J
23
053135) - (6&L)2], «) - (1S55)2J
- - 0.126.
These siupie coefficients h«vo to bo adjusted, in order to produce the 
partial correlation, by nsdne th© following eqpwtiSttl
*to." rAffa
12«3
(1 - r„fc)(l - r2/)
, .... I*. .<UJMU£r. .Mt323l .
Vtl V*"O^SOT^Xl • (- O.333)ZJ
- 0.182.
and the * - 3
a/j
‘j.ia^/lio-3 1.126.
1 - (0.132)-2l.r
which io significant.
Thie partial correlation coefficient shows the influence of liquid assets 
on inveo trouts T while advances Xg arc held constant.
In tlie ©ano vny» “ -™3&~~ ■I*.
and r , - m «■ m, » w ■» <wwaw.
23a
1 ’ *12 )(1 • *13 >
1. It is soinetixaofc presented as r„ * iddoh is
obviously the sene thing* r^ • ■ ■■'* ■«»- —
see E.F. Boast. Economic 7. _ £57. „ Stir---------- y • r^ )
Models. 3.Y. l*e8, K>. »9- 
70 j Stefan Yalsvaais, Lk^uc^c trie#,
st.T. 19591 a.v. Yuia, jjLwsa&a&°a.t° **■« „gKB«y. at .^teSteSaft* 
London 1219* P* 251.
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correlation which chow© the*13.2
*23.1
2.$ the l’Oox 4.icion t oi pur Ismem* ■ 
of eluates in ndvancee X? an invaatr,.ento Y when the values of 
liquid assets are held constant.
Is the coefficient cf partial correlation which shove the influence
of liquid assets X- on advaances X-, when inveotnonta Y arc held *> • -■ <*
eonetant.
the result of our statistical aKu&iiia&iion zas$r be plotted la this violet
f&rti&l Correlation
Sispje Correlation
Coefficients t test
12
13
*23
0*218
*0.454
-G>126
x12 3 0.182 1.126 i significant 
r, c o «*&*W7 3*484 | significant■*-^2 • MS»
ro~ i -*0.036 i 0.219 not oigni- 
43,1 iiosat
•liTttV'.S'lro tri^i &znd of roxat^xonanxp co
* , J-U JfU it tv <4 .-*-•— -i ?3< ■Lp-t-C’ S^C'^A.'OOtJXOil «0O*i.iaK-^s',0• *.JtO
Loiwhip bobvoen tho variables, iss
<Xi b., *1 * ^2*2
uhero
Then 1
bveen these variables* wo use the 
ioral equation, auouEsin^ a linear
Y refers to investnonto, x to liquid assets and X-> to advances, 
ay substitution in these equations 1
Hoc * b.TX^ * a CY
|X- •> b^X- + b^fX-X-, • XX-Y^5 da d& **•
:(x£ ♦ bjC^ ♦ - cXjY
we hsvsi
40 4- t.611?
661* + 30591351^ 
1859<X - 138 926b-
x + * 1359b.
- 136 926 b? 
+ 603 563 b.,
« ■» 025
- 176943
- - 218 389
«»> A..i>X^XX £ C»*v/iJlX» -j -♦».&►*j.# k ■<<»-'* V-4»k9j*-X23' uiuoltai^ously w© have the following
coefficients* '
<X
b.
*2
0.077
0.276
Jlence, the regression equation beeonesj
Y « * 9 * O.O778L * O.2783G
rfha oetiaation of ex is of little aignificiince in our auae, but the regres­
sion coefficients b^ (for liquid £a*SUi©tO / ©Ud bp (for advance©) arc of cm- 
fiidordbl© interest. 2hoy show how uuch each variable (X< and Xp or liquid 
aaaeto and advaaoes) influoaoei* Y (or investments). In other words, IX Xj
(edvonoeo) is held constant, a onc-unlt increase in X (liquid aeeets) will 
a *
decrease Y (invoatamta) by 0.077 unit uidch is/very infil^nifioant offcot. 
By the name token, if X-, is held constant, a one-unit increase in (ad­
vances) will decrease Y (invactmnts) by 0.276 unit which ie of s&se 
significance.
Before drawing our conclusion from Wie oocminnticn, wa hare to
rooether frax our experience in chapter 1’* that seasonal variations pl$v»
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In iwv* Q&sen, an Important role in shaping tfoe behaviour of the variables* 
For this reason, it my be profitable to elaborate the above sxsainaticn 
on the basis of eosaonally adjusted figures. Table® 129-32 produce 
seasonally adjusted charges for edvesaoas <4a. inveafexmts (see Figs. 31-33)•
Ve may start with the partial oorreXatioa, on a seasonally adjusted 
basis, between the abovo-nontioned variables. Ae a eusiticry, the coeffi­
cient!. of the actual figoree will bo sot out as well in the following 
table*
Correlation Coefficients Between Partial
actual adjusted actual adjiio*
t«d
Liquid assets ana investments X12 0*238 -€.303 *12.3 0.182 -0.482
Advances and investments *13 -0.4J4 -0.406 *13.2 -0.497 -0.494
Li pAii assets and advanced *23 -O.U6 -0.166 *23.1 -0.036 -0.355
Prom this table, specifically from the last oolunm, ve may draw these 
conclusions!
(a) the correlation between liquid ossets end investments Y is negative 
and significant (other variables bein^ constant) • This means that a 
change in liquid assets of the clearing banks will negatively affect 
their investments.
(b) the correlation between fKsvences and investments Y ie aleo negative 
end significant. An increase (decrease) in bank advances will decrease 
(increase) their investments.
(c) lastly, the correlation between liquid aajeta and udrsnoaa X« la
agair. negative although lees significant. This confirms the conclusion 
in Chapter VIII that the authorities * effort to restrain liquid assets 
of the clearing banka in order to reduce their advances ie not successful
It uay still bo of interoat to lSL<aoair&tG We multiple or the 
combined effect of changes in both liquid aaseta end edvenoee (i.a. 
on the behaviour of investments Y* tbia could be denenetrated hgr applying 
the “Multiple correlation” technique* This way be dose, in principle by
the aquation i
^12
where t Ifer^ • sultipls correlation,
2
23 w standard error,
0^ • standard deviation.
But Eryant presents a short-cut way of ooraputiny the '‘multiple correlation”
which does not necessitate ocajputix^; the standard error or standard devia­
tion. Thia is by using the equation^ (see else Table 133)•
il\ Sdward C. Bxysat, Statlatioal JtoUyoia, pp* 216-217, equations 10»35» 
(ft >• 123, equations 7-8» and p. 2C4.
■
i : „ „ :d* -.i.
• 11r . .4.. ...
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' 25)T- O«377|’ - - (•82$) (1859}j
£«W(2iS3531) - (-825)
0.721
The coefficient is here significant which s^iuia that change© in liquid 
cscets end advances of the oleas’inr banks will greatly effect the behaviour
of their inveetnents.
The next ©top is to uca the LTultipIo regression in order to show tho 
kind of relationship between our variable©. By substituting for the equ©~ 
tion© on p. MSI o l\ava (ceo 7 chic 133) •
4Co< * 592 b.
592 210 363 bx
1351 x * Wjffrfc.
1351 b2
19561 b2 
402255 b,
- - 825 
- - 51140
1 ---------  2
By solving these equations siisultuioously ve obtains
- .144432
c<
b.
0-975 
- 0.230
- 0.377
hence, the regression equation, after being seasonally actuated, becomes* 
Y « 0,975 - 0,231 X, • 0,377X2
To suni up, the results of both repression equations (actual and seasonally 
adjusted) stay be put in the following tables
4*4
Actual figure© 0.077 ~0>2?8
eaoonolly adjusted figures - C.23G -0*377
------- -r .If, Mm,   ,,-ir r -T ," -- — i — * *■ - ^—- <»—» - ,«■>«»,_»'i» '•#<#-« > • III -1 >-' «»«■»*■• '
Thia table shove thcti
(&) on & seasonally trusted b^ais, the relationship between liquid 
assets and investments becones ncgotiw and much more significants 
!•©. for each unit increase of liquid assets, invest lenta will 
decline on the average by 0*280 unit#
(b) there is an increase in the significaice of the relation between 
advances find iuvest&entej !•©♦ on increase of advances by one unit 
will result in a drop of investments by €.377 unit.
Ve novo new to the next exerciae, i*e» examining, the possible ©cures 
of financing bank advances! from liquidating their investamis, using *&i* 
excess of their liquid assets, and j&pom the increase in deposits. fids 
statistical investigation is intended to ssssss the importance of o^h 
variable (seasonally adjusted figures) using We mltipi© regreocion 
toc|zniiuc where the general equation iat
T « p< + b,X„ + b,X + bJC^
X • advances,
"**1 ** inrsatn onto,
« liquid assets,
X^ * total deposits (Tables 135-4}.
By grubs titution in the following equations i
n« + - <Y
* h*xi2 * We + */Vj " t-V 
*?X2+ h<;-l^+ W + '^' . 3-tV 
<*{^1 b^ xrS ¥¥3 * M*/ ” * V
ve have (Table 137) »
40x - 8251^ * 592 b2 + 1772^3 * Hft 
*825 <x < 2337C? bx- - S9ft4bj * -144432
592 oc - SllUl^ * 210363 b2 + 2503751^ - -I556I 
1?72 x - 65516^ + 255376 b2 + 1384104 b- - 2?3738
By solving these equations simltaiieounly, ve have these roeultei
o< • 33
b^ » -0. $66 
b?> « —0.612 
b^ *» 0.24-0
Bonce, the multiple regression equation boconess
Y » 33 - 0.566X3^ - O.612X2 + O.24CX^.
Thie equation shows the aVpiif io&nde of each variable os a source of 
edvances. Banks used to liquidate iwostnents and to employ the ezeose 
of liquid assets, in order to satisfy the deriands for advances. The 
increase in deposits was a less important source.
We exaMne now a. It is argued that tMjgt^ 
clearing banks as a group hold siaallo amounts of govemnont. eeeuritioc. 
Such inrostrsents arc liable to e significant reduction in their naxfeet 
values when interest rates rise abruptly. T’oclining prices of gorenonen* 
securities, In otf.cr words, tend to reduce the willin^iess of banks to 
extend additional advances and are therefore kg integral part of the 
operation of restrictive credit policy. To tho extent that banks refuse 
to sell securities because Tcarket values hove depreciated, they are scoe-
r
,es said to be "looked-in’* to t jjweitnwut portfolios.
Sbwever, tho implications of o. decline in the ssaxfeet values of bank
inveeteifint portfolios have been a natter of debate. Pew would agree with 
proposition that a decline in the aaaflect value of banlce* irmuet—ntg
(t&ich servu partly as liquid re-sorves) tends to inhibit sales of rovera- 
iwQnt aoeuxi ties to finance cn e9cpc<-nslon of advances*
T;.i& examination will statintieslly evaluate, by applying a simple 
correlation equation, tlx? importance of the oovenent in ebort*tem interest 
rates (since banka are large holdare of shell—torn securities) on clearing 
bunks* investment© (Table 13G)>
T •
40(311033) - (72 875X177.72) -a&
/ l> (637.31) - (177.72)" [40(139 <361071) - (72 375)ZJ
This coefficient confirms the conclusion that banks wore absolutely 
unaffected by the movement of interest rates in their plan to liquidate 
gowerment securities in order to continue their advances nnd/or bolster
fiioix liquidity ratios
X
a*Bbvever, these statist lord oon 
ptiblishod statistics which arc subject
3 arc drawn froa the available
the following uinor defects»
(a) the available quarterly figures of advtr.coe are *arlvanoes and other 
accounts". But Table 13k show;; that the ite&. nother accounts” is 
indeed a very small one - 1 of the total in l?e2.
(b) the item investment s’ which van used includes government and
fpvomnieat guaranteed securities plus other investment®. However, 
nother investmeats’: is a small and slowly increased component of the 
total (1able Okj.
This review of the events of the period 19*n*»62, followed. by a statistical 
investigation, shows that the potency of monetary policy was not particu- 
lurly effective in controlling bank advices (considering the fact that w 
are still interested in the technical issues of monetary policy). The 
reason for this apparent failure was the ability of the bentos to cushion 
the authorities1 scueese by liquidating a pert of their portfolios of 
government oeeurities.
menisat»mwEMM«»i«e’’WMa
1« On the other hand, S.B. Chase, JrM alioved (“The Lock-in Effect*, 
Monthly Byviowof Federal, Ifeaqgvo ox Kanc^ City1;, June i960, pp, 
9-1?; reprinted in l.S. hitter, Hon^r <Sf y^OEdc Activity, Ksssachu- 
settc X$6l, pp. 171*77) on We experience of the iuerioan economy in 1959 
that the lock-in effect woe significant. However it does not necessarily 
oocur in all cases 1 ’* •.. a zicjor? . bentos appear to base been xehso*
tent to establish si sable net loaves on securities, and it would, seen 
correct to conclude that in these caoas Weir vdllingnosa to extend addi­
tional loan credit vac at least to s-oeio extent correspondingly teaporod. 
Thus the evidence appears to indicate that the ’lock-in’, though it io 
far from being a universal influence, is an important one."
CHAPTER WL
WFEER S0CHCS3 OF HXAKCE
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Section A
In this chapter we shall acre to the next stage end try to assess 
the response of other non-bank financial institutions to a policy of res­
tricting the supply of bank advances. The iuadcliffe deport shows that the 
result of the measures by which the authorities control bank advances Is 
not enoouraging. In this respect, the Comittee stresses the importance 
of the rise of new financial institutions: \ ••regulation of the banks
le required.because they are the biggest lenders at the shortest...and 
of the. ..markets. Any severely restrictive control of their operations 
Is certain.. • to be defeated by the devsltpipnt of rival institutions” 
(Tire. 504). "The coxwlusion we drew*••is that the twin effect of the 
restriction of bank credit was to drive the frustrated borrowers to other 
sources of credit0 (Para. 460)• It is here that the significance of the 
non-bank financial interaedioriea may becout apparent - Insurance 
companies, savings banka, building societies, pension funds, investment
trusts end the like.
la recent years, attention has been focused on the growth of a laa^e 
variety of non-bank financial intermediaries. This phenomenon has posed 
serious problems for the operation of monetary policy. The continuous
growth of such intern ©diaries, it was a^ucd, underlined the effectiveness 
of the traditional instruments of monetary control, hence, tho suggested 
remedy was to extend the control of the monetary authorities to cover such
int oruediaries•
QKts view has been proposed rather forcefully by Gurley and Shaw.2,
They have argued that these inters.-odiuriju have not been acknovlodged 
generally as competitors with banks or as substitutes for then. The tradi­
tional theory of economic behaviour tfiich concentrates only on goods, bonds 
and money is not comprehensive enough to provide an explanation of the
- >' t , ,
emergence of the modern financial structure. It does not account for the
role played by these recently arrived institutions, fcegulatexy technique*
have not been ovolved to cope with then os instruments of potential loans.
Gurley and dhaw concluded that a monetary authority which stays within
the bounds of its traditional control acy find itself more and more out of
touch with credit develoi«umta where leading by non-bank institutions
eystaoatioally increases, ihis argument seems to have attracted a number
of other adherents. Xtwr ouoplo, T. Wilson nstw that if particular
types of credit are rationed (that is banks) while other types are left
free (that is intermediaries) there is dearly an incentive to alter the 
2
channels of borrowing, and lending and thus evade the official obstacle.
Therefore, it ie apparent that an approach to monetary policy which
1. J. Gurley and b.S. Shew, Hfinancial Aspects of Economic Pevelopawnt’*, 
io.. 30on, Kev,? 19$$, pp. $1$-3S, cap. 536-8.
2, T. V3con, Inflation, p. 203.
w*
emphasises mainly the bank credit control i£ far from satisfactory. The 
traditional monetary theory does not take cdogu&te account of the complexity 
of our present financial structure, including financial institutions other 
than commercial banks, As we have seen, it was suggested that when credit 
conditions are listened, the financial wxslwinery of the country autooati- 
cally begins to work in suck a way to increase their loans. Here, the 
existence of a large national debt acts as a lubricant which adds greatly 
to the efficiency of such a movement.
Xt is hence proposed to examine, in this c lisp ter, the role ployed by 
the non-bank financial institutions during the 1950’sj and to illustrate 
with the help of some statistical evidence how far their existence and 
growth have complicated the implementation of monetary policy. Such 
analysis will lead to a further discussion on the desirability end practi­
cability of subjecting them to the administrative control of the monetary 
authorities.
Ve shall investigate mainly the possibility of a destabilising effect 
through changes in the composition of interned! arise* assets portfolios. 
Suppose that the monetary authorities, in the interest of oheeking infla­
tion, ere following a restrictive policy end inter os t rates are rising - 
Also suppose that they liave succeeded In slowing down bank advances. It 
is argued that intermediaries may then sell some of their government 
securities end invest the proceeds in higher yielding private eecuritibe, 
mortgages and other loans, thus constituting an iia}>ortent offset to the 
effectiveness of a restrictive policy. This may be called the ’ oseet-ewit-
-ohing" effect.
Section 3
It vae mentioned above tlmt the fintaiciel institutions include in- 
3'umco companies, savings banks, building societies, pension funds, 
investment trusts, etc. These institutions, vhich are not subject to 
the control of the authorities, are a potential source of embarrassment.
?or such numerous institutions, it in difficult to investigate the ci/pai* 
fleaned of each separately. Aocoixlingly wo shall only attempt, in tlds 
section, a abort summary of the significance of some of them. The arlalyaie 
will be concentrated, in ieotion G, on the most important institutions, 
i.a. insurance companies. Lastly* we shall aensider, in Section 3, the 
question of subjecting these institutions (insurance companies as 
othersy to the authorities1 control.
The Post Office Saving© Benks and the Trustee Savings Banks encourage 
thrift among the poorer and middle cl&ooeo of the community. The Post 
Office Savings Lgenks (P.O.S.B.) have displaced some of the earlier Trustee 
Savings Banks as a result of the adventc<;e of operating at moot of the 
poet offices and the more direct govormieut guarantee for depositors. The
>nMnwin«Tii»n»i
1. 0. Clayton, "British Plnmcial Intermediaries in Theoiy end Practice”,
Deoehbcr 1962, pp. 869-36•
B.O.S.B. allows withdrawal© of up to £10 cm demand> and larger amounts 
are withdrawable* at about four days’ notice. Deposits at these banks 
(which receive an unvarying rate of interest) are thus highly liquid 
although & considerable proportion is firuly hold and ineonsltive to the 
appeal of higher rates of interest offered elsewhere. The important aspect 
of P.O.S.B. is thus in the liquidity of the great bulk of their deposits. 
There are over 20 million accounts, the balances adding up to l?60 L.a. 
(Dee. 1962).^ By this neons, every large amount of individual oanmaer 
expenditure (on house-purchase, sursaar holidays and Christmas) is veil 
cushioned against any restrictive monetary (or fiscal) measures.
An important development, during the 1950*0, was the use of P.O.S.B. 
accounts as *curr*&tt! accounts of the ordinary banking type. This develop- 
raent was encouraged by the payments facilities offered by the Banka for 
the purpose of attracting doposits. Tho result was of coureo a growth in 
the liquidity structure of the economy. Although the transactions largely 
increased, they did not seriously affect the total expenditure on eonsSHf* 
tion (also there are no business accounts that might offset business 
investment). However, the more important aspect of these Banks is, as 
shown above, the greet bulk of their deposits.
The Trustee Paving banku hare almost nine million depositors und 
their total funds «wn to ©bout 1517 B.n. in 1%2. These Banks have
1. Wbitoiwr1 2* 1964. 9» OS
2. japooit3 In the Ordinary and 3p©oial inveatmont deaartaenta, on 
Nov. 20, 15>62i m. ibid.. IQO. clt.
three main departments: the Ordinary, the Special Investment and the ?took 
Ldpui'tatiiX'Ui i
(a) the last is purely a broker for the «al© of government 
securities and is irrelevant to our analysis*
(b) the Ordinary Department rune on & similar basis to the 
B.Q.3.B. and pays a fixed 2j^ rete* The government 
g^ersateos repayment of these fkndc to the Trustees •
(c> the Spe#b& Investment ^apartment ie allowed to invest 
its fhnde in a certain range of ;;cvernjaent securities 
(including local authority raortgig:oa)» ^ucii investment 
is subject tc detailed approve! by the National Debt 
Office, This employment of their funds allows the Beaks 
to pay appreciably higher rates of interest (usually #4) 
on deposits in this Deportment.
Hence, deposits in the Trustee Saving Bomkc are as safe and ae liquid so 
those in the ?.0.3»B< The higher rates of interest paid by their Special
~ in • h&ve attracted a great Increase
iug tendency in those banks (as in 
1
O.\ UOpwd v3 • ?ro is also an
tx«e ?.0»o«23« j to use the oocoun
In 19&T. on ordinal;; chequ
t. ;oy nave also b<•>on nore willin
ipurt*>«exi ts lafiixc e tlxo *^i^ .dlt
increasin
as ordinary current accounts, 
scheme was considered by these banks; 
dian the clearing banks to adapt their 
hours of business to the needs of custonoss. In short, they ere becoming 
neor-banks and their liabilities are undoubtedly & part of the structure 
of liquid assets in the economy.
A • charges foa.T current
recounts.
Building societies priiaarily co.iooxned with encouraging both 
thrift and Uxac-ownership. They use the accumulation of atiall savings to 
met the needs of house purchasers for loans Which can be steadily repaid 
out of incone. nowadays, the iaiporter-co of the building society moves sent 
has gone far beyond title* ‘'•.♦it hue seme to Isold a large place in the 
total credit structure of the eoonoeay> with potentially quick liabilities 
unountiiv to souo 2bQO L.a. at the end of 1956, and provides finance tor 
about tvo-tixirdu of private house-building, c. large end aonsitivc pert of 
total net investment" (Por&. 235) • Building oocietio© continue to 
develop and take an over larger place oxukv; other financial institutions.
The societies gain their resources fiox., and therefore have liabili­
ties to, shareholders and depositors (Table 139). The words "flwjsftolflai” 
and "share" are used here quite differently £em their ordinary usage in
vV* •- rr jmJ
the context of joint-stock ccmpony organisation. 1 building society share 
(not marketable) is practically a deposit. Its withdrawal teams are 
slijitly stiffer than those for banka1 deposit liabilities, end the shore 
curries sli^itly higher (by about ^>) interest than the deposit. Thou^i 
the liquidity of a share is loss than that of a deposit, it is today very 
high. notice of witiidrawal (<xxxionly one mnth) is fonmlly required, 
liowevex, in their competition for depocito, the societies here gradually 
broken down the original rigidity of thin requirement and in practice 
the shareholders (who provide more than 90/- of th® total funds) can get 
much of their vesy quickly (alao small or urgen ^required sums are
repaid on demand).
SLarge investors in the b^iilding societies ere relatively few. 
greater part of the money invested in dopoeits and shares comes from a 
vide range of investors - the total runs to million©. Their Msll account* 
ore, an the average, veil under £1000.
On tie other aid© of the belanco*@keet, the principal asset© of 
building eocictios are mortgages (Table Ike), particularly those covering 
their loan© to hono-owners who borrow a larr© part of the cost of the 
house and repay steadily over periods of years. The ©ocletie© hold also 
a nergin of their res cure or in the fom of ^overwaent securities (with a 
range of maturities) and bank balancec. This margin is, in effect, a 
liquidity reserve against the coAtinyo-icy that withdrawals by
and lapositors and new requix^mts for Lorre-, cr® snay temporarily 
the inflow of new fUnde in ©hares and deposits. These liquidity
R-is " ’ &■ •- L , Vp\ ’ /■ 4'. r^
all the societies toother) to 1^-17 of total ©soots (Tabla 
1^). Thio ratio is not subject to any statutory control or official 
suasion, but the Association (to which a large proportion of these 8Oww 
ties belong' require© its mergers to r.udntair not loss thm 7&* (in cash 
and securities)«
*?. • - • 2 ; - 4; / £ ' *-v¥*V\ J ' s i..^ H' '{ ,A > i^<5’ • , L /a
Ac ram-profit-making associations, the building societies only owar 
the interest paid on share© and deposits, their tax liabilities mft their 
running axponscc, out of the interest ©tamed on mortgages and eeeuritioe. 
Because of the general terns on wi-iah they lend, it is painful for the 
societies to ohaage the rates of intoroot at which they load. Also they 
are traditionally reluctant to rsuxo rates charged on existing borrowers.
■<cr
however, since they must neither mako profit nor loos, stickiness in
^59
IwIAtv; ratee sokes elec for ctlokinGce in -tec offered on shares 
end deposits. But tlie societies ere comg>otin£ with other financial inter* 
medlaries. Therefore, when the general rates of internet rise (and in the 
s*ntl* building societies hold theirs unchanged) the societies will hare 
less money cooing in than will balance We ueswxde fox* loons from house* 
purchasers* And if the aavsment in rates persists, the building soeicties 
sooner or later will he forced to etwn$e higher ratessimilarly, when 
rates fall, the building societies will have sore funds (since people can 
get better ’teruc frar, the building societies than elsewhera) and less 
demnd for loons (since the would-be sorrower get the aoney on e-sisr 
terms elsewhere)* la these circuostoncoe, the building societies sooner 
or later follow suit. A change in their raffs is therefore a defensive 
move. There ie, however (when intercut rates move substantially), a .>wriod
m*maia**nMiM«m.«a wu aftmapa nttssfUKife
I. M. Saylor allows that by the early spring of 1955» the first indication* 
of e reduction in the net inflow of funds to the building aocieties were 
apparent. The increase in withdrawals, and perhaps to a lesser extent 
a falling-off in receipts, continued through Map sad accelerated sljarply 
in June. The AsocoiaM«ls,3P®cw0mdatiDn was for an increase in the 
nininun rcto on wrtgegec from bg,* to 5 '■» sad in rates on shores Iron 
2&h to J , te free. Uovt sodoties, kewer, raised their rates above 
the rctniEFum to 5t$. After the increase of the Bank Kate in February 
1956, they raised their ttortgage rate to £$>• M. xlaylcr consents 
that such increase® in rate© in the svurrjer of 1955 succeeded in acting 
the volume of withdrawals? but they did not prevent a continuation 
of the pressure on reserves (“Building Societies in the Credit i^uacse*, 
5&e Banker, Hay 1956, pp* W9*W)-
when the sooieties lag behind the general movement and the flows of funds 
in the capital market become abnormal in one direction or the other*
These disturbances, resulting from a broad □ovenont of interest rctee, 
ore a reason for considering the building societies whan we investigate 
the relevance of banking operations to the pressure of total demand.
"Thus any persistent movement in interest rates tends not merely to drag 
building societies * rates behind it, end ao produce effects on the demand 
for building. ..but also to force, during the la* period, & considerable 
tautening (or loosing} of the purse string! the impact on the pressure 
of demand in the building industry can time be quite direct** (Para. 29*0 •
Also, liabilities of tho building societies (shares and deposits) 
have become Important in the structure of liquid financial assets of the 
econoiay. The evolution of the societies Imc node people think of these 
shares and deposits as liquid ascetst assets that become more and more 
like money, increasing the holdings of eacx assets sakes people worry 
lose about the depletion of their bank deposits and other money balances. 
These assets have tended to become a conttn<ensy reserve, replacing the 
^ore tightly •held bank deposits. The treiux of this neaaS-iacmey i© however 
hastened by the addition of services, increasing the number of branches 
and increasing the facility of withdrawal and transfer. These societies 
could, in fact, become banks•
•aar.*ue(i:Kn*i*.~ ;« iaesdatuten
1. K.3. Sayers, Rodey i Sarikin%» 6 th od., p. 161.
fcjl
It auey be profitable, at this stage of tho argument, to comment 
briefly on the above-mentioned ijitesaediorics and the significance of
their deposits. The conventional ’eretar;/ theory has distinguished between 
commercial banks and financial intermediaries on the grounds that only the 
deposit liabilities of the former arc- widely accepted as a medium of 
exchange. This gives the banks a virtual monopoly of the administration 
of the payment mechanics. '
Sorts economists argue that this monopoly is breaking down. For 
example, A* Cramp refers to the development of near banka as follcwst 
"Some 'Sn&lish intenaediarieo, however, are certainly enabling depositors 
to regard their deposits as a means of payment for sone purposes. The 
Trustee Savings Banks’ representatives told the Kadcliffe Comalttee that 
their members ’accept cheques in payment of wages into the bank and they 
pa; the rates of maahers having acoounts in the bank’ • Other intermedia- 
rise are providing full banking facilities for a restricted range of 
customers.«• For such evidence it is clear that the initial breach in 
the banks’ monopoly even of the provision of the means of payment has 
already been made.'^
2To this kind of argument, Clayton points out that such changes in 
financial practice take time to develop cad have little bearing' on the 
the probloja of short-texa cxmtru-cyclical monetary policy. However, in
MM **n* ao; m* « MB rr*» ****
1. A. Cramp, "Financial lateaaaediariea and Monetary Policy*, pconoqica,
1962, pp, lte-7.
2. G. Clayton, "British Financial Intoraoctiarieo in Theory and Practice*1, 
,>cojk dour.. December 1962, p. 871.
the Ion; run, the growth of non-bank iiituij-ediaries implies that monej 
(i«e. currency plus current account) will become a smaller proportion of 
total financial assets.
Sayers ’ comment on the developiaent of sarin&s banks is that they do 
not present a serious eaburrusasimt to the authorities in the implementa­
tion of monetary policy due to the fact thati^
(a) their funds are oloeely controlloc and are all 
ohemelled into the goverr-jent acctor*
(b) they do not include business firms cxaoRg their 
depositor©.
fteetto-j c
Ve have sc far discussed the financial intermediaries whose relevance 
tc the monetary situation comen from their liabilities which are readily 
exchangeable for cash, and from their loans to customers♦ We now turn to 
another soi't of intermediaries Whose liabilities aide of the balance sheet 
has relatively little monetary oi^dficaa.cc, though as lenders (or inves­
tors) they are of „<reat importance. X&Sttre&ee companies will be taken, in 
this analysis, as an example. These institutions usually provide the 
private sector with a considerable amount of loans, have a considerable
«* «t» w k sac* wws r w wps»B*
1. Sayers ? op. eft.,
.. ,‘k -mu,' &
p. 157-
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quantity of private investments, and &I20 held & large mount of national 
debt (government and government guaranteed securities). .Moreover, insurants 
companies are one of the intermediaries Which have published data, although 
the figures ore annual.
Personal savings have becomo, since 1939, more fra^ontaaey and diver­
sified than before. Th.^re has boon & large number of snail savers ia 
piece of a relatively snail /group of rich private Individuals. These 
savers, in order to avoid the responsibilit; of direct Investment, prefer 
to deposit their savings with various institutions. Such institutions 
usually deal with the stock oxoban^ on their behalf. Insurance companies, 
private pension funds, investment trusts are considered the most important 
of these intermediaries.
There are about 4C0 insurance companies operating in the United King­
dom. Their activities are divided into tve groupsa life and general, the 
latter coxaprlsinc fire, accident and marine insurance. Their general 
activities do not concern us9 it is their life business which has monetary 
importance. Table 144 shows that life oor^rnieo constitute the bulk of 
the total activities: they hold about of the total rsoets and have 
the sane amount of g^venasent and goverrnent gusronteed securitieet w-areas 
the general companies hold a high proportion of readily marketable aecuvi- 
ties including n&ny short-dated securities wliose market values are unlikely
to suffer vide fluctuations, life ooiapaaies usually invest their funds ia 
long-term investments. In 1%2, life coopeniee held 154? out of 1954 !.*• 
(or 8Qa>) in long-term government securities (Table 145).
The life in8ura?ics oonpenioR (technically referred to os assurance) 
sell contracts which include life policies and the rights to future pen­
sions in exchange for annual, monthly and weekly contributions• When 
clients insure, the companies receive prsriiwa payments, birgely annual 
payments fixed for lone periods of years* They invest the suns received, 
sed hold the resulting assets against their liabilities (usually called 
policies) to pay either to the heirs of tlxe extractors or to the contrac­
tors thejusolvoe. The gfcwth of life funds represents the net savinyn 
contributed throng the life insurance conpenies* They represent, in 
other words, the excess of current prenitx? irtooao over all current claims. 
The receipts in prerJum paid by policy-holders thus exceed the payments 
frllin& due to policy-holders and their heirs* This excess was 500 L*»* 
in 1%2 (Table 143)*
The activities of the insurance ca^panien are of yr eat significance 
from tho point of view of monetary policy, Discussing their importance, 
we analyse their balance sheets starting with the liabilities side*
The influence of the insurance companies on the liquidity of the would-be 
spenders is indicated by the irmo of th-9 funis at their disposal. These
"ocntroctual saving” of millions of
policy-holders. Such liabilities are in feet scoots of tlie insured. It 
is argued that those liabilities have some influence on liquidity in that 
the policy-holder can use thorn as security for a bank-loan (of course,
tho lost resort, he con realize it in ccxbfx^e for bank deposits* This is
• v;. •
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yiite true, liovevey, it is etill difficult to consider these liabilities 
to th© public co assets. The anraio2. are almost entiitily
or decrease in response to changes in oconmie situation (e«g. changes in 
interest rates). In general, policy-holders regard their policies as a
hard core of savings, the existence of which has little bearing on the
i y ./•■flow of aosndinr«
a-. *-*• •• *}*&*- ., •’:.'/■*?: - .««* vj\*iSu * i&f
The other side of the balance sheets is acre significant Iron the 
viewpoint of monetary policy. This is a result of the use the 
cosspstnio© of their assets • They rirJce
shops, and on a sraell wale, on agricultural 
1235 I,a. or 17 of total assets ia 1962 (Tables Ul-2). This is net 
large by comparison vdth the total of baste advances, and the turnover of 
the insurance ceiupimies' loans is certainly mush lower. However, these 
<fr*wo*ri4<au3 are & source from which iuillioiiQi of privet© Indian and auall
firms can borrow stem other channels are obstructed. The holding of 
securities Mygiaee the asst important part of insurance companies* anti* 
vitiee. Such boldine vas over 4000 L.ia. (or fd$ of their total assets ia 
1962, which include ••laialy long-torn mr&cUble securities, ordinary 
sad other industrial and commercial securities.
from the ear with a different pattern of
B WW ■ ■
1. Sfceept at the time of maturity,
2. To repeat,
?< U .. ' «p, ' £, ...^J ■<' ?■’: tr1;; -\U,' >ii\-fc4.;j£ Kitiitf.
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investment than th&t of the pre-war period (Fig. 3^)t
(a) the most striking change was the increase in their holding of 
government securities frtra 1# > of total cussets in 1239 to MK 
in 1947 (Thble 3A2),* This was the result of a gentlemen's 
agreement made early in the war between insurance companies and. 
the Treasury to put the bulk of their new money into various 
issues of government securities,
(b) another important change was the decline in the significance 
of mortgages and loans in their portfolios • that ia fToa tt?« 
to 9? of total asset®. Moreover, because of the excess of 
liquid assets in the hands of private individuals, deeasnd for 
loans against polioieo decreased, Consequently their relative 
importance in the portfolio declined.
The result for the insurance companies was an unusual distribution of 
assets. The investment managers’ intention, after the war, was to correct 
the distortion of their portfolio, accordingly, the companies were 
changing, during the 19jOfs, investments in that they were restoring the 
balance between government securities and other assets (i.e. loans and 
private investments) after the extraordinary war-time concentration on 
government securities. The insurance coaptsiiee’ operations in os curl ties 
were indeed the most important aspect of their activities in this period.
This is related to the role of insurraee eanpeales as a source of 
destabilisation, and the impact of their growth upon monetary polloy. We
k66
1, This percentage was over 40 at the and of the war, in 1945» «*©
G. Clayton and W.T, Osborn, "Xnsurs&ee Coopsaaiee and the Capital 1 Market", 
SaJtoss. 352*5. w$&. »• 23>
» t IFigure 3^:
Distribution of Insurance Companies’ Assets 1937-1962
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shall oonsider the possible destabilising offset through ehangea In the 
occipoaition of intemodiarion ’ -•'mpot- portfolio — or the eccct—witching 
effect. It will be soon. frm oxoninin, * the aocirieal data, that there
ie not such evidence that Inouzanco nntr^wHet have been, during the 19#* a.
gttilv of suoh destabilisation effect. ’hile the growth of such institu- 
tions has weakened monetary controls to some extent, the effects do wt 
appear to have bean very great. Also the rupdity of their growth during 
the fifties can he f>x plained by tho incrotUae in personal savings end io 
not of itself evidence of deet^bi IH wfrvon bdifiviour*
Ve have ! eft-r^od from the last chapter that cleariis banks have flnon-
cad the increase in the supply of orodita to their custouers through liqui- 
dation of govamaent securities, using the OMM of liquid assets, and 
through tho expansion in depoaito. Hanks were capable of < 1 1 aa*Iqn
behaviour of this sort because they wore thie to liquidate a part of their 
portfolios to incrcu-oe advances in the face of the authorities* aou&oze:
prims facie, insurance companies, as ano of the largo non-bank intermedia­
ries, by virtue of their also and as big holders of government securities,
have cortoinlv boon o&r>ablo of dastabiliziru* baliaviour. But thav hmm
changed, during the fifties, the distribution of their ;ortfolios not so 
muck by soiling their govamaorxt securities but mainly by diverting their 
nswly-acquirod funds into particular channel*. Tables 141-3 ahov that they 
have not in fact been sellers of siovomueiit stock in most of the years 
sines the second verj their sales tors boon relatively small and have not
shown a ^'stenotic destabilisation pattern.1
As seta above, insurance ooupuiieu emerged from the war with an
unusual distribution of assets; a aajor objective, accordingly, was to
correct the distortion of their assets. S3-is had to cono into effect
particularly by reducing the proportion of government securities ■■ The
actual allocation of funds between different possible outlets is shown
in Table 143. In 19^7^ holdings of government stocks were successfully
reduced by Jt Since then, the;' have moved up and down and in 1962
2wore actually higher than in 1945. ' However, they continued to decline sa 
a ratio of total assets (Table 142). As a result of this development, 
there vua a growth in the industrial investments. The moat striking fa*- 
ture of the changing coiaposition of the caspunies’ assets, during the X9J0’s1 
wee the massive contribution made by then to oapital formation in the 
industrial sector. This follows from the foot that if insurance eoepeniee 
invest new funds in industrial investment, this means a big flow of noney 
into the r.iorket for industrial securities and therefore nakes it easy to 
raise money for industrial expansion. Contrariwise, if the insurance ooa- 
ponies swing their new money heavily to the purchase of govemaent secuii- 
ties, the ’monetary authorities have a much easier task in cheeking indust* 
rial expansion. The value of industrial capital shown in the balanoe slxoete
1. W. Gfoith above statistically that the sene thing applied in the United 
states. Increased loans by insurance oouponles were not financed by 
liquidating their portfolios of govoiment securities ("On the i£ffeotive» 
neee of Kenetory Boliay", Am. noon. Kov. 1956, p. 592).
2. JuiZ 2 5,1954, pp. 377*81.
k?0
of insurance companies in the fora of debenture* proforonce and ordinary 
shares increased from 596 X».n. in 19^7 to 29$O L.m. in 1962. To repeat, 
such change in the asset structure of insurance ooapaniea was effected not 
so stuck by switching thelx* government securities as by altering the 
disposition of their newly-acquired funds.
In this respect, w need to fcaow ;xuch norc of the factors influencing 
the structure of the insurance codpaaics’ assets. We slight ask ourselves, 
were these companies discouraged by rising rates of interest from changing 
their asset structure by switching from (womnent debt (selling * part of 
their portfolios) into mortgagee and private ddat' We saw in the previous 
chapter that deariru; banka, as holders of short-tern government securities 
were not inhibited,by a rise in interest rates, from selling sueh securi­
ties since they would not suffer from a significant capital lose. It is 
however argued Wat th© decline in the value of government securities can
bs expected to exorcise a significant twtratoteg effect in the case of 
insurance companies which do not usually hold large amounts of short-tom 
securities (Table 1^5). In other words, it is expected that the ‘♦pinning- 
-in" effect will be much stronger in this esse.
To repeat, by the "pinning-in" effect (the lock-in or frecsing-in 
effect as it is aomotiace called) it is segued that long-tewa debt is atiei 
and more likely to remain with private investors than is short-term debt. 
Holders of long-term securities arc loss likely to sell their portfolios, 
in an inflationary pressure where interest rates ore rising, then are 
holders of ahort-tam debt. Because of this, long-term debt is said to
471
be a sore ©ffoctivc moms e£ ractx^Jniag expenditure. It la expected that 
the inhibitor;’- effect of a decline in security prices on switching froo. 
government securities into loans or other securities Is
of institutions wfcoee holding of government securities are chiefly of 
longer maturities. The basis of thia argument is (as seen in the previous 
chapter) that as interest rates rise, the price of long-term debt tends to 
fall mere sharply than the price of short-tern securities. Renos, invm- 
tors sill bo confronted with & large realised capital loss if they sell 
long terns; ia order to avoid sued loos, they will not sell. Therefore, 
investors who hold long-tom govermont securities are said to be Mlooked 
in" snd will not switch to other assets.
An examination of the evidence (both written and oral) presented by
• •• £■ ■ . 1 1
the institutions tends, as Rose observes, to confirm the view that the 
Radcliffe Comittce did not mean to claim a grout deal free a fall in the 
value of institutional bond portfolios. Ffe concludes that "tho mere 
reluctance to realize a less, although it my undoubtedly exist in som 
situations, is not to be regarded as a monetary weapon of any potency* 2bc 
question vac net raised at all in the evidence given by the British Insu­
rance Association, but it cun bo inferred Wat thie has not been a factor 
of any practical importance in deterring insurance companies from switching 
out of gilt-edged securities into relatively mere attractive assets over
1. R.B. less, ’’Financial Intermodiarioc and Kcnetaxy Policy*’, The 
g-gfeg-Eft'. MagaS*?*. 9‘ 21S aoo also Bow, O£. ait., ,. 38J.
the peat ten
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However, tho influence of changes in interest rate© on the supply of
funds provided by insurance conpcaiaa nay be argued from another point of 
2view. The Incentive for cm intex^acdiaxy such an on insurance company to 
shift some of its funds from govexmaSit securities to other kinds of 
assets is presumably a differential in yiaU sufficient to coc$ensate for
"7.<*••<.A W? "■? ’ f>\ •;# \ \ *£ Ar ■< >7-- •' A,. •■<'•' fc- 4 '■ - '• *> ;/ •■ '• t -'/ t •' • «-W < •• ’;\7« ' *p<l
the additional risk and costa of the switch# Thus, as the level of rates 
rises, the rate on corporate securities would have to rise relatively to 
the rate of government securities (thus widening the differential) in 
order to compensate for oapltal looees on the sale of government securities 
if holders of lon>term securities were to be induced to switch. In other
fe , - " • : . »* ■' j -
words, an increase in the yield on gavemrumt securities in relation to 
that on other types of assets can be expected eventually to stake inoureaou 
companies less willing to sell the former in order to take up industrial 
securities. It appears, therefore, that in many oases a snail rise in 
the differential between the interest rate© on private securities and on 
government securities should be sufficient to compensate the holders for 
the capital loss incurred in the sale of government securities.
be shall now examine the events of the 1950’ s and trace the destabili­
sing behaviour of the insurance companies $ also we shall evaluate the
1. BoeeJ oy. clt. > p. 23.
2. 2hio idea is expressed by W.L. Smith, qp. oit.. pp. $?0«l, and Hose, 
loc. cit.
- •>?»»... ■ ' ■ f.
r < ‘ la
fci'd'■ r»?7./:
- -c|
significance of the "look-in" offoot. figures used in thio study aust 
bo treated with gnat caution, Binoo they ere derived free balsnco-sfeeat 
values. Thus on apparent reduction in tlio holdings of securities aay be 
dv,s? to writing down (as naiket values fluctuate) the value of assets 
after an increase in intaraat rates or the payment of dated securities on 
maturity. In either ease, the fall will not have been earned by actual 
sales.
JF”; 5 teSt* S ?' ’ '» . ‘ ‘
Vhea credit tightened in 1951 and long yields rose sharply froa 2.9?'’ 
to 3.5? , life coBoar4.ee reduced their holdings of goveranent securities 
by 27 L.b. ’hat is also interesting ia ttast the differential in yields 
between government cecuafitloa and private cecurities1 has increasod (Cable 
lb6). luring 1952, when bank advances declined sharply by about 200 h.a., 
insurance canpaslee increased their fcdvwxee by 52 l.a. vhieh is net rosy 
different free the naturd rato of growth. Tho eerie thing applies with 
the private inveotrontn. Eowvor, govarnnout otock was q,uite stable after 
the decline of 1951 (Teble 143). sales of gilt-edged which begun in
1951 were arrested in 1952 Kid 1953 probably by the rise in long yields.
During the period 1955-57. when banks were again under restraint, 
insurance ooErotuiioe tended to expend their loans end mortgagee (as a result 
of the preasuro of demand for loons against policies) with higher amounts 
than usual, i.e. by 87, >6 and 70 L.a. Private inveetaer.ts did not show
1. Debentures aro taken as roprcoontativo of long-term private invest­
ments which correspond to long-tea^ govorinent securities.
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any particular mvesscnt. The Itadoliffe Carrot tee illustmteo tho activi­
ties of inouranco oo&yanio© ia thio periods Suring the credit squoese, 
however, they groatly extended their mrbrnges on house property to mot 
the denand (largely froa their policy-holders) frou people and coopenies 
who were finding it difficult to get mney fxou the building societies 
or bonks? in 2S$&» when building societies’ net advances on mrtgagcu 
were £60 caa. lees than ia 1955» the iwiberr: of the Iritiah Insurance 
Association increased their imrestuoatn ia nortgageo (about 60 per cent 
of which saeust hare been mortgagee in bouse property) by £32 san.* (Para. 
246). Against this increase ia activities, insurance conpenles liquidated 
not xaore than ?0 l.a. of gwernuaut oocuritios during 1255-57*
(a) In 1955» when credit tightened egein and yields ro3e to 
4.24/ (with a srnller differential in yield), their net 
liquidation of government securities amounted only to
24 L.xa. e this mi^ht show th-^.t there wee a lock-in effect.
(b) la 195^, when yields continued to increase to 5»13H 
Insurance ocsapaniec a till liquidated 24 L.u. of govemnont 
securities where the differential was etill decreasing.
(c) In X95?»wk©i yields recorded an increase of 5*4#^ (with 
a wider differential thie time), liquidation of securi- 
ties continued with a smaller mount of 21 l.su
In the roUtlanary period of 1958-52, when the surge of bank advances 
reached n peak, insurance oonnrMoo reduced the pace of loans. Again in 
19&, wheat the authorities’ objectives hooeaa© deflationary and the pace 
of bank advowee declined, insurance companies abruptly increased their 
loam and mrtgeges. Also, their holding of government securities allowed
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a big jump. Lastly, the expansion of 1962 in bank advanoes led to a 
reduction in companies' loans and investments! government securities 
sharply increased.
From this record, we observe thata
(a) the behaviour of loans and mortgages of insurance companies was 
destabilising (i.e. caused the authorities some difficulty In the 
implementation of policy) although not to a significant extent.
(b) the holding of government securities did not play an important 
role in financing the increase in loans and investments. Liquida­
tion of 8uoh securities was, in fact, a negligible factor. It 
might however be that insurance companies have caused the authori­
ties some difficulty in the implementation of policy in 1951 and 
1955-57* surely most of the funds represented flows of current 
saving - newly acquired funds.
(o) not very much confidence should be placed in the "look-in"
affect (nor on yield differentials) as a means of deterring finan­
cial intermediaries from shifting funds from long-term securities 
to private loans and investments*
It may reasonably be concluded from this sketchy empirical evidence 
that the insurance companies may have been the oause of some difficulty 
to the monetary authorities during the period 1951-62. But it is 
improbable that they were guilty of offsetting the authorities'
restrictive polioy to a serious extent.
1. The sane idea is expressed by 0. Clayton and V.T. Osborn, op.ctt.. 
?• 32.
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The quoetion v/hich arises now is whether It is practiochle to subject
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these non-baafc intenacdiajrf.ee (savinse banks, building societies, lnauxwo.
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>t etoe) to ecus fora of offioud control. Sbt points of view aa» 
In fact, different in this respect.
On the one hand, v© havo seen that Gurley and Shaw arc: in favour of 
extending the control of the noneturv authorities to these institution©.
On the other, the hadcliff© CooE&ttoo ves forthright in its rejection of 
aap attosspfc to control sue;* a wide ranje of financial inetltutionsi "...if
we
the lending behesviour of an bidofiaitely wide ran^ of financial institu­
tions.*, it ni^ht be supposed that w /should substitute for the tnwlitional
of financial institution©* 3uoh a prospect would be unwalcostt except M
1
a last resort, not mainly because of its adriniotrativo burdens, but because
‘e-
*, ''. ' t '••« continually to slip frou under the grip of the authorities” (Para.
1W. Smith takas the point of vie*u on n
• • . . • ?
1* W.b. hiaith, "Mn&ncial Intersaediaries and Hone tar: ' Controls*’, j 
Jc«r, -cotu. Swasaw 1959* PP» 533-53. 551-3. In 1955.
expressed a sliaJrUy difforant opinion! sw “On the .-ffoetivewtw of 
Monatex;- Zolioy", p. 506.
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of intermediaries could exert dcatahllialr^; effects which uould seriously 
weaken the effectiveness of monetary control, the analysis on the situatteft 
of the United States suggests that financial intermediaries have not oou- 
tributed very much to instability or to the ineffectiveness of monetary 
polioy. He concludes that oosamorcial banks still constitute a much more 
serious problem in this respect than do intora<adiarlee. What is needed to 
©ake monetary policy ©ore effective is not additional controls over the 
activities of internsediarieti but rather some means by which the scope for 
dootuhilisiny portfolio adjustments by caroreial banks can be reduced.1 
C©ith concludes his or(yoncnt? •* "Thue, there uay be valid reasons for 
applying special controls to intermediaries*•. 3ut I do not.• .believe 
that there is yet sufficient evidence to provide a strong case for the 
extension of Fodor&l asserts oontrols to financial intermediaries on the
grounds that activities of those Institutions Iiave been a serious destobi-
lisar."
/ . i ■ • ^2 -
0. Cla;-ton contests the TterioHffG Coradttee’s conclusion. Be exnuee
that although the behaviour of non-bank intermediaries during the 1950*8 
was not destabilising', it must be recognised that they regain a potential 
obstsolo to the affeotiveneoo of nonoinay control. There are a variety of 
laoans which rj^t be used to control tha financial intermediaries, including 
movements in key interest rates to produce significant changes in the
1. Such as policies which keep down the supply of short-term securities 
which commercial benko use to make such edjustmont©. If such measures 
are not sufficient, some method of influencing directly tko composition 
of bank portfolios (such as a secondary reserve requirement) might be
considered.
2. 0. Cla$-ton, 3con, Jowr. ■ 1962, p. 58*.
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capital value and thus to reduce their willingness to lend* Financial 
intermediaries nay also be subject to cash or liquidity ratio similar to 
that imposed on the commercial banka• For example, if suoh control should 
be brought into effect during a period of restriction, the required cash 
ratio would presumably be higher than their conventional ratio, so that the 
intermediaries would have to build up their deposits by curtailing their 
loans* If a given cash ratio could be held with the commercial banks, 
there would be no repercussions on the banking system. If, on the other 
hand, suoh oash balance had to be kept with the &nk of England, there 
would be repercussions on the oommeroial banks while the effect on the
intermediaries themselves would be identical. The shift of reserves
to the Sank of England would of course involve a reduction in the commercir\ 
banks* reserves. If we assume that banks were already under the author!* 
ties* pressure, and that their liquidity ratios were almost at the minimum 
of there would be a multiple contraction on their advances. Hence if
it is required that monetary control has not to bear too hard on the 
commercial banks, the first method (i.e. keeping reserves at the banks) 
would be preferable. However, the particular method of imposing reserve 
ratios on the intermediaries must be ohosen oarefully if the whole burden 
of adjustment is not to be shifted onto the commercial banks.
Our conclusion from this study ie that commercial banks are still the 
main source of destabilising the economy. They offset the authorities1 
squeeze of advances by selling some of their government securities even 
with a capital loss.
However, fro~i the above review on the behaviour of non-bank interme­
diaries during the 19^0’s, we have seen that they were not serious destabi­
lizers for the workin of monetary policy. But this does not Invalidate
**♦ /
the actual fast th&t they arc a ’’poosiblc** course of destabilisation. Bor
tliis reason, the authorities nusi not exclude then entirely few tho scans
1if effective none tar?; policy or ary reconstruction is intended.
Section B
he Ixave alre^^r seen that during a period of restriction, frustrated 
borrowers at the clearing benkc have an opportunity of raising funds £rw 
other financial inteaenediari©©. This is by no aeano the only source of 
©sternal finance; there is still the Capital Issue Market.
Let us consider what io likely to h©g$>m when the nonetar^ authorities -1 
succeed in restraining; the volume of bank advances. Those eosperienoing 
difficulty in obtaining loans will then bum to the Stock xbwhsnge cither
to sell a pert of their portfolio of govorsaueni securities ox1 to mko new
; ' . ■’■ • ijr ’ r,.p ~■'• •■■' ■ ; ••■ ■.' _ ■ ; .s .\ ■ -34s
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Concerning the first possibility' business concerns 'usually hold a 
part of their reserves in the form of bonds waxieh mi^it be so chosen as to
<MS' afc—».<wcgW!cguirrri) n.K<rr'iMMtaa: Xfl
1. The importance of one of those ihberxodi&riea (i.e. the insurance compa­
nies) has been r*ocogniaed. ”At xxo tlr.xe since the war have the insurance 
companies received any guidance or requests from the monetary authorities 
as to the general distribution of their portfolios, but their lending 
operations have been subject to the capital issues control end, in the 
later stages of the credit squooao, requests sinil&r to the "qualitative* 
requests unde to the banks Ixave been addressed to them” (?era. 2$0)| see 
also Seyers, Modern Banking. 6 th od., p. 168.
2. J.C.B. low <op« cit». p. tfc4) ©hows tii&t during l$&2-53> nearly one 
quoted company in three had resort to a market issue, and tho total eun 
raised amounted to nearly 30^ of their total investment.
#0
he very short-dated and not thorofoz’o uoriously liable to ohan&es la their 
capital values. Hovevex*, Table 1**7 skews that quoted, companies never 
resorted to this isethod of finance during Ute 1950 »s (eocoept for a elicit 
liquidation in 195**) • to the contoa*y, they ham ftlaost doubled their 
lioldin^s.
We turn now to the second method of finance, i.e. the issue of new
securities. The :;ain institutions of the new issue market ere the issuing
houses and the underwriters.
In the modem world, the volume of lonc*tem borrowing for tbs pWflOCM 
of now invostmnt depends largely on the attitude of the issue houses Who 
act as middlemen betvaon the ultimate borrowers and lenders* In fact, 
the issuing houses assist the flov of funds into productive invostnent by 
actin.; as intomodiv.rion between those seeking losv>tom oapltal and those 
willing to provide it.
When an ontex’price wants to raise funds from the general public, moms 
preparations are required. The issue house© draw up a prospectus indicating 
the nature of tho company, its record of jxroflts in recent years and its 
plan for the future. They also advise about the terms on thick the money 
is to be reload. The isauirv; houses carry out all these tasks, as weftl os 
the administrative work (such as advertising the issue, collecting tho 
subscriptions, otc.). Therefore, their business is to knew tho state of 
the market for new loans end to ensure tho success of the issue co far sc
they caa
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Tlio iwiorwrltcrs provide borrovore with a foxn of insurance. If a 
borrower vent© to ensure tho success of raising tho full amount of tho 
desired loan, tho issue house will errengo for the issue to be under­
written by one of the underwriters in the nmxteot, In return for a 
cooaisslon the underwriters proviso to buy a stated number of the securi­
ties at an agreed price. If tho public purchases the whole issue, the 
underwriters will not be called an. If same of the securitise are left 
la tbs hands of the issuing house, the underwriters will hors to pmbsM 
them. They will subsequently sell then on tho Stock Ibcohcngoj however 
they run the risk of a depreciation in prices.
The purchaser* of newly-issued securities are in part individual 
investors vitl: their personal savings, ITowodays, institutlona gush as 
insurance companies, pension funds, and industrial concerns with accmrtjfr* 
ted recervoc provide tho bulk of tho funds entering the naxfeet,
Kron the point of view of monetary control, it has been si^gested
? ' . . -T ■? ■-'•-»’■ V ' f * J ?• ? V • mJ'- J ■ * ‘ ' -< > ••‘-r -M - **->»'< - '>■ »•"-' ■'
that restricting of credit conditions may discourage the flotation of aw
issues of securities. Underwriters may find it difficult, during a period
of tight credit, tc find a market for a large amount of new issues with
security prices falling. The result will be large amounts of unsold
securities j hence issue houses will discourage the issuance of further
new securities. This argument applies, presumably, in reverse during a
period of stimulation and easier credit, although those who supported it
have usually stressed inflationaxy conditions.
♦
This possibility has been diaoussed by Keynes in A Treatise on
kQ2
He argues that capital isauea are subject to the influence of 
the Central Bank without whose goodwill their operations would beeooe 
unduly risky. The issue houses are uuunlly very much concerned with their 
reputation* Thus If tho price of bonds i© slowly rising (so that recent 
previous issues show a profit on their is^ue price) the issue houses will 
tend to facilitate further borrowing. Conversely, they will restrain new 
issues in a falling tendency since tliey will try to protect the market 
for their previous issues by restricting the output of new ones* There­
fore, tight control conditions and an atooepher© in which the central bank 
is disc ouraging issue houses rasy make a great difference to the facilities 
for financing the new lavestftMttt. The opposite situation will, of course, 
arise when the central bank encourages new issues*
In the same way, Luts^ argues that if sn issue house thinks that the 
level of long-term interest rate is unusually high, it may hesitate to 
underwrite corporate bond issues. Oorport?.tions may default on the interest 
payments in a future depression and thus affect the reputation of the 
issue house. Therefore, when tk© long-tears interest rate Is high, cor­
porations msy find it difficult to float new issues.
Un&oufcte -ly, there is seas validity in this argument. However, ffcaa 
the point of view of mono tar;/ policy, tho argument is not based on the
1, J.M. 
see also V.V.
C, Vol. IX, London 1931, pp. %7^9>
“JS&s^isJBa. JZaA.<ys<J_-taSoa.
S.T. 1930, p. 121.
2. F.A. Luts, ’ The Interest Bates and investment in a Bynamic Economy4’, 
*»♦*«». Sw.. 19*5, PP- 329-30.
effect of high interoat rates tot on the effect of rapidly rising interest 
1
rates on the issuance of new soouritlse. Therefore, it might he expected 
that when rates etcbillae at a higher level, isrues which had been poet* 
poned during the period of rising rates will he put on the market* It ie, 
in fact, a transitional effect. Xt slows down rather than reduces the
amount of new issues.
In effect, the issue of now securities can he made at a more favourabl
price if interest rates ere, in general, lev. But of course, it ie true
that firms are not much deterred by lev prices when they make a new issue* 
2
The flow of new issues depends chiefly on the scale of their investment* 
They can. get the funds they vent by paying a little more for then in 
interest or dividends each yoar the x:tra annual burden may receive 
little attention unless it Is really high.
Bow show that the market was (for a short while) “congested“ on two 
occasions during the l?$Cvs, and the flow of new Issues was temporarily 
slowed down:^ (a) the first occasion was immediately after the activation 
of monetary policy in Kovembsr 1951- 3ocurity prices then fell} hut the 
flow of new issues* was resumed wfcon pricer stabilized egain. (b) Another 
temporary ” congestion" followed the increase in Bank Kate in January and 
February 1955 because the insurance companies withdrew from the new issue
1* K.h. Smith, “On the Effectiveness of'Monetary Policy”, Am., boon. ?>gvry 
1956, p* 599.
2. J.C.K. Bow, j2£* dt*. P« 244*
3. f. Vilson, Xnfiatiogi, pp* 204*5*
4. 244*5.
nazkot* Howzer* the recovered by the late spring and in the third
£$• *• .?%■$.. •.: k •-.
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The Radcliffe Committee concluded ia lers. 4$4t "It ia sometimes 
argrnd that a rise in interest rates puts difficulties in the way of
a
•«»sny such interruption of market activity ia very short-lived**
fe /
fr* \v;
(Vs discuss now the effects of the
the effect of changes in interest ratee) on the capital issues• To 
illustrate its development, the capital io&ues control dates back to the 
beginning of the Jecond World Var. Slew issues were prohibited except with 
Treasury consent, end the Capital Issues Consult tee had been appointed to 
advise the Treasury ae to whether cny particular issue should bo allowed 
or disallowed. To do that, the Ccraaittco was guided by a memorandum 
which indicated that new issues should bo approved only for purpose; 
directly connected with defence, essential supplies and services, or 
exports. However, the new-issue control intended to control 
expenditure} but the development of physical control quickly 
cial control unnecessary for this purpose.
Capital control was continued at the end of the w^ht dejpdts
doubts dboat its umfulnau. 2he Treasury was given, by the Boxrovinc Aot 
1946, psaraanant power to control borrowing and the raising of capital by 
the issue of shores; sad the Capital Tamms Conaitts. remained in being. 
The Treasury mads new terns of .midoncos The aooreved curDOsea included
exports, public utilities, transport, housing, and the production of oapi~
tai ,’oods and of ” essential” consumer roods. Consent of ths Treasury 
required for all issuers in excess of CJO^'c a year.
The control was meh tightened at the end of 19^7> the Committee was 
enjoined to *»<***»**? permission for o&pitul outlays unless for the basic 
industries or unless the expenditure prordLaed a considerable increase in 
exports or saving of imports . Also the Coraaittee was required to get the 
”definite assurance” of devartxents that •proposed issues were in
' • y ' . • -• i ' • -‘ -“*»• ■ *♦ - V-.-vt • *}/ '.< 3rd - v . '* ‘ j‘'* V <*' ’ » 4 - ‘^ * *’ •- , . '■ T .? "*%h* • - • *-’* • Sgj
accord” with the gwernawat investraent programs.
During the l$^),s« the "approved purposes” were amended many tia»e« 
in April 1951, taking account of the new defence progracsaei in December 
1251, at the beginning of the new nonetory polioyj in February and July 
1253J in February 1955. The exaction limit was reduced, in March 1956, 
from SJCGCO to £10000a year. However, the categories remained very 
broad and general. Finally, tills control was lifted after 1939.
, '4*/f ■'*;•'•; ^1- <1- • .' ‘ 1-.^’ i*\' I I ? •. :'.- .•'•••' --' , ■-' • .• ■ .?
Events of the 195Ofs show th&t tM.** sort of control exercised through 
the Capital Issues Committee was not Tory effective* Ka already noted, one 
result of the successive squeezes on bank advances was to force industry 
to raise new issues. The credit aqueeaoa of 1952, 1255 and 1957 probably 
cash contributed to the rise in new issues that occurred at these periods.
Table 146 shows the possible effect of changes in bank advances (as 
well as chan,*es long-term interest rat* a <>y. the b ch^.v^o^r of new i&sruvs
for finance oonpruiiea and other companies * mostly factoring. The 
published data start fron 1958 on a n;<artorly figures basis and froi: 195^ 
on an annual basis $ hKWQ our analysis will be conducted fwtt
195^ on an annual basis.
AAi’Xt A'rasJ M f. V\ ifi "I O CA t B, 4,1t‘«+4 AVIA fiUl 4/VW •*•»£% ws 1 *nowever, oonc*raing wc etuuy *»> iw snows wia* one t«*jcr rciyUA*
of the sou ease of bank advances was rserelv to force Industry to raise nw
issues. This was true of the centre! lUoctricity Authority and other
nationalised boards and must »^**o hay^ been true of industry in the 
a
nrivato sector.” ww wf Walk »
' '?;v: v(V?j •"•;..-’v*-;^- . ? ;’.^%3« >'?f ‘ ' ■'•■ . ^ <->; '' »: -h'b
The authorities ware, in the inflation of 19$5» trying to stabilise 
the ocononyj ft*}*’- bank advanoes ware subjected to government pr*****^^ T 
In this period, the increase in investment was so substantial as to
noceooltate a further rise in nov cc.itel issues• Henee. altlxow^h interest 
rates rose froc; th<» be^inni/v; of tlie year, th& "slon of new-issue 
finance during the first half of the war was facilitated by the boost in
ordinary share prices which be&sn in tho previous year. It was also 
affected by strong mp+3ig< ©n the part of the companies. In these oir-
cxxnstflSMhMi, tho traditional iwmetary polioy (with its BfflfljrttM*' on interest.
rates on bills and bonds’ had not y^oh relevance to the finance of
1. Persons and private companies are, of course, not able to raise funds 
by aw issues (even 1 public raay consider new issue os
over-cos tlv urocodure . It is here that the innortant role of the 
finance ocsapanies liosi by fundr on the Stock njcohmv'o, they
n®y finance private porsone or aofill flrte.
2* 2£* P« 239.
The fall in ordinary share prices which be< an in Jly 1955 taade the
new»isvuo finance nore difficult. In thia period, the authorities intro* 
duoed more meaauros to ohook inflation, c^cocielly the Chancellor's raquo< 
to the banks to reduce their advances. however, ordinary share issues 
sade in the seoond half of 1955 were more than those floated In the first 
half of the year, despite tho more difficult conditions of the market. 
This is a result of tho fact that oomptuiioe which had already comencod
Grran^oaonts with the ioaxi© house:! went uho^d with their plansi it voa 
also influenced by the Chancellor1 a directive tc the banks to reduce their 
advances. ±br the year as a wiiGle, 237 bon were issued to the market 
(by an increase of 60 L.m of the year before). What is also interesting 
io that finance cocrpanies were successfully subject to the povenraent’a 
disinflationarypolicy.
The disinflationary policy continued in 19$6 although bank advances 
showed aooe increase• In this period, tho decline in ordinaacy share pried 
continued. The result of the year's development was a decline in tlifi new
iseuee.
II. B. Hose, cementing on the experience of 1955*56* eays it is 
”... clear that the new-isaue marluat is far leas vulnerable to tho shook 
of monetary policy. •• The quality Of the nev-issue institutions end the 
isouoa themselves, together with the deep-rooted demand by institutional 
investors for new issue®...has made the market such lees prone to tho fit 
of 1 indirection* which traditional monetary analysis has soaetiiaes
postulated as tho impact of & tight oowetey policy.
Xn 1957? tho nonotar;, authorities put ft ©oiling on bank advarxooc 
and Interest rates were increased. Hovcvor, new issues wore increased 
fron 189 In 1956 to 281 L.n, in 1957. But new capital Issues of 
finance coaprnlea noved in line with th^ exthorities’ policy. In 1958, 
when the credit ceiling was ronovod and bark advances increased dramti- 
©ally, the pr.ee of new issues declined by 8C L,». In 1959 and i960, the 
big deronnd for advances was perhaps reflected in the new issues. Thia 
acy have been encouraged by the Mg rise in the prices of ordinary ©hare®. 
The averment’s effort in 1961 to stabilise the aice of bank advances 
led to an Increase in new issue to 421 L.n. in spite of the rise in 
interest r&tes. lastly, in tha reflation of 1962, an increase in bank 
advances was net by a sharp decline in the new capital issues.
Ve nap conclude frea this short review that the raonetazy authorities1 
pressure on ban}: advances was reflected in en expansion of the total of 
new capital Issues; finance car^aniee were put under pressure very 
slightly. Xaci'eaees in interest rates did not die courage this reflection. 
In other words, the private sector (busixxacc ocncems, private cotapcnies 
and persons) were able to provide theswsclvcc with the required funds to 
go on with their piano for expenditure on invootsaente and on consumption, 
since the issue houses were & successful loophole against government 
pressure on tho banking system.
1. ^'onstary Policy and ths Capital Maxbet 1955-56". 3oor.. Jpu*., 1957 > 
PP. 397-Mfc.
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The Badoliffc Comittoo shows in different places that the capital 
issues control had no aignific^it is^iortaxicc: on the pressure of total 
derarasd. Since the control over capital isuros was intended to influence 
the direction of the capital flow rather than its amount, the Cossaittee 
we® doubtful if the total flow of new capital raised on tiie eaarket had 
ever been sigzdficantXy affected. Prospective borrowers could draft 
their applications eo as to oom within the tents of the iwaorcnda to | 
which the capital issues committee was oiarently working. Because the 
categories were so vaguely defined, it boce e easy to fraae aost applica­
tions in such a as to bring then wlldiii; the rance of ’’approved purpo- 
ass’*. The capital issues eooelttee was Indeed instructed to oor*oem itaelfi 
not with the n-xnmt, but only with the "purpose" of an application.
It was for those reasons that tho Kadeliffe Comittee concluded:
"Gur impression. . ,is that tho effect of the capital issues control as it 
has been operated in tho 19$0*® mpoa tho pressure of total demand,..was 
very slight indeed "(fara. $d3). again in lam. $12a "..♦*« do not 
regard tho oapltal issue? control as a significant Measure fcr influencing 
the total pressure of denand. Its principal effect.. .has been to force 
people to Modify the financial arreixs'Otwnte they would otherwise have 
saade." Lastly in a acre stinging phrise. "The capital issues control was 
negligible, to the point of irrelevance" (faro. $71). however, the 
control was suspended, except for overse&o issues, in February 1959, 
shortly before the Badoliffe Coixiiitoe reported*
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xxiUon A
A good deal of controversy has raged over the question of how fto the 
MWtety authorities con actually influence the pace of econoiaic sctivUy, 
There ie a substantial degree of doubt, indeed, about their power to 
influence the oconmay. Events of the 1950*8, as analysed in Part Two, 
show that tho nonotary policy applied during that period was not particu­
larly successful, in that the authorities net difficulties in their effort 
to restrain tho pressure of axeos^ive denend.
Of course, it is not denied that a restrictive monetary polio;/ applied 
with sufficient vigour car. hare a potent effect on agipregate demand. Yet 
it is likely, if ouch restraints are npplioc violently, that serious 
disturbance in the capital market (in lone-terra government and corporate 
securities) can arise. In other words, it is feared that if powerful 
monetary brakes are applied rapidly onou'i; and within a short period of 
tiao, there nay be disturbing effects in tlx capital a&rfeet which result 
in a severe collapse of expectation, hones precipitating a decline ia 
economic activity. On the other hand, if such measures are applied yontly 
end gradually, they will effectively chock the pressure of expenditures 
only after the liquidity of banka hoc boon gradually reduced. Before 
tills point is reached, a significant rise in prices may already have
occurred.
The li&doliffe report appears to he profoundly aoeptieal about the 
potency of monetary policy. It xassinistically surveys one tar;/ measure®
In Para. $14* “...We do not find ®r$- solution of the problem of influen­
cing total demand in more violent manipulation of interest rates; w find 
control of the supply of money to be no acre than «n important facet of 
debt rancrenont? we cannot rocomend cry substantial change in the rules 
under vhiefc the banks operate? we do not reyard the capital issues control 
as useful in ordinary times? and wet believe that there ere narrow Unite 
to the usefulness of hire purdwae controls.*’ It then concludes in the 
ease paragraph* ".♦•when all has been s&doc the possibility of moaetagy 
action sad of its likely efficacy, our conclusion is that monetary 
measures cannot alone be relied upon... Monetary mecsures can help, but 
that is all.” ' ; ty y y
This conclusion Is not indeed very helpful* We shall see that no 
one has oerlowly argued that monetary polioy alone is sufficient. It 
needs to be supported by other neeouree such as fiscal policy and direct 
control, which the Committee niyht usefully hove discussed in detail. 
Instead, It concentrated an nonotary polio;/ with brief hints on the role, 
merits and demerit® of the other routes to the desired objectives. It 
wald, indeed, have been more helpful had it discussed the proper "Mac" 
and means of oo-oi'dinetion of the various tools under various circum­
W8
stances
This, however, does not naan that monetary policy was wholly irre­
levant. It is true that the inflation did not yield at once to restrictive 
measures. but it nay be that without this treatment natters would have 
been nuch worse. It is, indeed, difficult to accept the view that the 
situation would have been much the sunns if the authorities, instead of 
imposing restraint, had held Mnk late at, cay, 8$£ and engaged in open 
market purchases of gwwniifint soouritieo in order to keep the yield from 
rising above, oacz, 3
However, it nay be argued that the treatment wee not applied with
sufficient severity in order to effect the full cure, inflation ai&ht
/ 7 £-A ■< * * ^.s-.z ’ < ‘
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have been brought more effectively under control if restrictive measures 
had been applied with *aore vigour from 1951 onwards. But the failure to 
do co ttasr be attributed, in part, to westerns of will and to political 
re&sona.1 Hemovar> the authorities uuy have been more cautious in their
attitude ovine to the belief that inflation could bo ended only at the
« 2 risk of halting growth and causing unemployment. In this respect S.
Kevin argues tliat, "Monetary analysis is meh more likely to be effective 
If it is applied before moversento towards boou or sluxap lucre proceeded 
very far •••few people, however, would <tey that appropriate action by the 
Central Bank, if taken in tine (which is oaeier to say than to do) can
aNMftmr •• SW *”“» BMBONaMBnMMMB
1. See above, p I •
2. See elco Lowell Harries, Tbo bn^.vio^. 7 conogy% 4th ed., Homewood, Hl., 
1962, pp. 35?-O.
J- i vplay ej part ir contributin mintenance of stabillty
■M■,<v* I lenrcl of activity and prices.**’
This analysis my load to a oboioo between the following two coarsest
(aj Have we to deal differently vith monetary policy - i»e. to remedy 
the poesible source of defect with the hope of perfonaint; its 
function more perfectly} or
(b) to discard, completely, this kind of control in favour of flocal 
policy as the min restraint on oxeeaoiv© demand?
Concerning the first question, two min points of view have been
expressed in recent discussions since the opening up of a new debate, iron
tho middle of the 1950*s, on monoiury policy*
(i) the first view holds that the existing controls of ccxacera­
cial banks are inadequate and rocosEieiifis that new control 
technique© be investigated*
(ii) the other holds that traditional rethode of nanetary 
control arc primarily directed at comcrcial bank credit. Xt 
points to tho structural chcry-OB in ike economy vdiiclx here 
und.crzr.ined the effectiveness of traditional credit controls and 
reconmends that the control of the authorities be extended to 
the non-bank intermediaries*
2
V* Smith, iiainly advocating the first point of view, argues that we 
should not be co satisfied with the effectiveness of the present monetary
MOaUUtfL'TdB SUB 29*t zr?« r~f> 3* «
*1 • S. Kevin, Teoctbook of koenoydo . 337
2. V. jmith, "Oa the X f octivonone of .''.aactary Polioy", Ar-or, Bwa« H.0 
1956, pp. 388^06.
control wa])ons that vs make no effort to toprovo then or to deviac better 
ones. The effectiveness of noneta3*r policy could be considerably increased 
if we could device mre effective Methods of controlling centrical bank 
lending• knd, although such measures arc neither necessary nor desirable 
at present, it is possible that, us the activities of &nanelal iateroediar* 
rice become more important in the Ihture, the continued effectiveness of 
monetary controls will require that monetary control be extended to cover 
seme of these institutions.
As aaid in the previous chanter, Gurley and Shaw advocate the latter 
point of view. They argue that the growth of financial intermediaries 
(prompted In pert by the competitive handicaps imposed on commericel banks 
for purposes of monetary control) proyrecoively provide a source of 
weakness to tho offset of monetary policy on the oconasay. They suggest 
that the controlling powers of the centred bank should be extended beyond 
the commercial banks to other financial institutions.
Ve have alfeo seen that although suck irtemediariee provided a ocs> 
siderable source of finance during the lp$f’8, they did not show a signi­
ficant deaidbllizinginfluenoe. In spite of this fact, it was argued that 
eente control from the monetary mr&iorltlas nggr have to be extended, when 
neceeeory, to these intermediaries.
Let us turn to tho first point of view, that tho authorities ’ grip on 
the banking system is not ^dseutvU. It woe illustrated that the ©louring 
banka are able to avoid the authorities* restraint during a period of 
inflation owing tc the facts that
(a) a pressure on banks * liquid assets will not be successful so 
long as they hold a comfortably high liquidity ratios
(b) even if the authorities ears successful in reducing liquidity 
ratios to the critical 30^, beaks can otill liquidate a part 
of their portfolios of aiiori-terra government eecuritiea in 
order to bolster their liquidity and/or increase their advances.
• • • • •
This unfortunate experience has resulted ia useful disoueeion and 
proposals which may be grouped into
(1) those relating to testa1 metM liquidity ratios,
(2) those attempting to remedy the trouble of liquidating
banks’ invaatua&fca.
In other words, the first group deals with ‘ liquid assets' while the seoood 
concerns ’‘risk assets”.1
As regards the first group, relating to additional control on banks’ 
liquidity ratios, attempts were made to find some way around these diffi­
culties. The efforts culminated in two min suggestionsi-
(a) it was proposed that a part of the terrier bill issue be replaced 
with Treasury Deposit Seoeipts. The use of T.D.H.‘s will zaean 
In this ease a lower tender issue, while the T.D.R.’s themselves 
will not count as liquid assets. The offsot of this procedure
is to reduce banks’ liquid assets and hence their liquidity ratios.
(b) The other idea, which leads to the ssz?e results, reconaends the 
compulsory observance of liquidity ratios, the minimum that has to
1. See Section C belowp. Sos
fbe observed being open to variation when conditions thus require.
In other words, in substitution for the existing conventional 
ratio of 30 per cent, a compulsory ;.iininrun ratio could be imposed, 
the level of which tho uaaotay authorities usy adjust within 
certain limits and on due notice.^ A compulsory variable liqui­
dity ratio is customarily applied in earns countries such as the 
United States.
Although tho latter idea could certainly’ be used to prevent an increase 
in the floating debt in the hands of the banking ays ten, which becomes the 
liquidity base for a still further growth in bank advances it has serious 
disadvantages. Xt would risk tho encouragement of changes in tho fora of
• e* • • 1
bank accommodation based not on the requirsfeents of cue tuners but in order 
to raise additional liquid assets* For example, bank advances could, 
within limits, be replaced by coosiercitu bill*. Further, liquid assets 
such as treasury bills right be attracted from other holders, possibly 
partly in replacement of investments; maturing investments might alee 
enable additional treasury bills to be obtained. Thia partial withdrawal 
of the banks from the gilt-edged market night have a weakening effect on 
that market, with consequent damage to tlio success of funding.2
1
It A variable ratio (of cash) was diccusoed by the Macmillan Committoe 
(Committoe on Finance and Industry, Qad. 3897 ♦ 1931), whose Report sug­
gested in Para. 370, p. 160, that, n hatever ratio of reserves be fixed 
as suitable, it Is in any event moot important that it should be rigidly 
adhered to by the bonks.' Jtar the pever of the Bank of England to control 
the aggregate volume of orodit in the country by means of open-mtirket 
operations sad other measures essentially depends on the rigidity of this 
ratio."
2. Tlis Governor of the Bank retorted later in the Minutes of Evidence of 
the ftedoliffe Coabittee (Fax's. 2733) that this effect ia a considerable 
understatement* ”..*Aa I understand this the banka would probably be on 
ocoaaion pretty heavy sellers of investments."
W8
On the disadvanta,;© of compulsion, the Bazik of IngXiind1© Memorandum 
na&e the following cosEsontst^
(i) the hsata usually observe the traditional cash end liquidity 
ratios as a conventional and proper attitude. To modify such 
conventions from the outside moans imposing on the banks a kind 
of behaviour that ie not founded upon their own experience.
(ii) dictating bank assets by tho authorities means more responsi­
bilities to the government*
(ill) the virtues of informal and flexible method© of persuasion 
would be lost. At present, such is achieved by oc-operation 
between banks and authorities. Hence, introducing an arbitrary 
ratio will induce banks to rearrange their affairs so as to 
maximise the benefit that tho lev allows.
Compulsory liquidity ratio is still criticised even la the United
States where it is now applied* fcr oxanple B.A. Alhsdeff2 argues that 
legal reserve requirements are not the only and not erven the neat Important 
neons by which the central bank can influence cotucreial bank policy.
Beaks would hold liquidity reserves even without legal compulsion | and 
the Federal Reserve can here a powerful impact on tho banking system without 
direct dealings with it.
The Radcliffe Report reetamanded reinforcing monetary policy by one 
of the ©bove-mentioned devices in order tc cake effective its restraint
cm the banking systssu ’’Because thia interest-rate brake on the expansion
1. Summarised in The Banker. 1£6G, pp* 3$3*^«
2. B.A. Alhadeff, ’’Credit Controls and Financial Intercsediaries”, A». 
aBR-.,.Wjt. x^c» »• «»•
is of limited use,
’reserve requirements * or similar devices for the restraint of lending 
by the banks#•• Any requirements of this kind (a raising of the liquidity
, • .'''. ■' -vv .. *■,. >' <rj . \ . t Q MP . •; t -. . .«* 4 . • r £r$ . :
ratio, ’special deposits’ or Treasury neooolts Receipts) would have to be 
drastic if it was to influence the banks in their lending operations” (Para. 
506).
The idea of a crnpul aery liquidity ratio was however condemned in the 
Minutes of Widenoe (Para. 2738) by the Cheimeni "...I would back r^nelf
at defo&tinc it meh more easily than imposing it.” The scheme that vss 
actually adopted, on July 3rd 1958, was the "Special deposits” ♦ It took 
a somewhat different form from the T.P.B. 'jystoro. The choice between a 
variable liquidity ratio and the system of special deposits was largely 
determined by the need to find an exclusively nonotary measure for credit 
control between the Bank end the commercial banks which did not appear to 
be designed principally as & device for government financing. XhQ choice 
was also influenced, as said before, by the historical incidence of the 
present minimum liquidity ratio. Such ratio has been accepted as a result 
of prudent banking and for the protection of depositors. Henoc, it would 
not bo consistent to alter it arbitrarily for other purposes.
Beeort to the ” special deposits” made banks freer in their lending
policies than at any time since the control by "request." started at tha 
beginning of the Cecond World Var. In effect, the Chancellor’• power to 
control the pressure of smoesaiv© demand vae apparently put in the monetary 
measures. In the ne&ntime, however, the aost objectionable type of direct
control over advances has been decisively dropped.
5^0
::evievin<.; such controls briefly* vero continuously in operatic*
froa the outbreak of the war in 1939 until July 1958. At the outset, the 
requests took a qualitative fox** The banks were requested to restrict 
advances to purposes regarded as essential to the war effort, and therefore 
to refrain fror. certain types of lending euoh as advances for epoculutive 
purposes (notably the buying or holding of f took Tbechange securities or 
the acquisition of oomodity stocks) . In Lay 19^5, the authorities favoured 
activities which included the promotion of exports (or saving of import**), 
industrial re-equipment and certain other projects. In July 1955 the banks 
were asked, in addition to observing tho selective requests, to achieve 
*’a positive and oignifleant reduction in their advanoes” during the er^uing 
non the. A further quantitative request was issued in Jeptocsher 1957, the 
then Chancellor requiring thet advances in the ensuing twelve nonthe should 
be held at the average for the preceding twelve months. However, before 
the eocpiry of this twelve-month period, i.e. in early July 1958, the 
Chanoellor removed this celling on bank lending.
In deciding not to renew the '‘reoueats*', the Chancellor accepted the 
point of view of the benkere that this sort of control was frustrating 
and led to inefficient bonking* It restricted the bankers* ccopetiticai 
aciong themselves, yet put thm under the pressure of additional competition 
fror. non-bank institutions. Yet* tho Chsceellor was not content to put 
his trust in tho accustomed devices of monetary policy. His condition in 
withdrawing the " request® *' won that tho Besik should devise an alternative 
scheme by which tho Bank could restrict, ^hen required, the liquidity of
tho banking system by calling for specif deposits. In other words, the 
special deposit pl&r. was devised to meet the Chancellor *s request for a 
plan in order to justify him in dropping his quantitative restriction on 
advances. It was made door that a return to the war-time system Of 
f D.£, was the most objectionable alternative! the least objectionable 
one would ho tho special deposit scheme. that was because the funds called 
from tho banks would directly pass to the Bsofc and not to tho gcverwnontj 
banco the instrument would be a credit oontrol and not specifically a font 
of borrowing.
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In July 195S, tho "Special l&posit plan was annoimoed. Suoh a 
scheme marked a ilmdmentel departure since it created an asset unique in 
the history of British banking. Yet it was considered a less foreign one 
to the traditional monetary polio;' then me the "ceiling” on bank advances 
The essence of this policy wee that it worked throng, and was subject to, 
the processes of the market.
: ' •-■•- . .-s -
ratios of the omnerciol banks by compelling thews to convert & part of
•BHWieRttW.MwMrtii.rjiatas •
1. Tha sohama ujis introduced ia the first jlece co a teaperajy anwmge- 
amt pending the recoaawiationo of tho I-adcliff. Croaaittw.
their liquid assets (i.e. call maey sad trecsury hills) into non-liquid 
assets or iraiofeili&ea balance - l.o. the srooial AoooRita. In effect, it 
enabled the Bank of :W’land (end at aoe renete, the Treasury) to extract 
compulsory loans from the oomorcinl banks and to Imobiliee
because of the enormous expansion of the national debt in general and 
of the treasury bill issue in particular, the clearing banks have held 
sufficient liquid assets or most occasions in recent years to allov thsa 
to defeat the efforts of the monetary authorities to reduce their liquidity 
- at least for a considerable time. A solution to this problem was the 
Special bepoait sohene, Which would altar the Bank to reduce the liquidity 
of the banks. The teobnlque of the SoMft* runs as followss suppooo that 
the authorities wish to restrict tho credit-power of the clearing; banks, 
but that the latter hold sufficient liquid eoaeta. The authorities then 
call for, say, one per cent of total baric deposits as special deposits.
As mentioned above, the banks camot regard these special deposits as liquid 
assets for the purpose of calculating their liquidity ratio. Further, the 
authorities made it cl oar that they would regard with extreme disfavour 
any bank which sold its lonq~tew povomnent cocurl ties in the open market 
to meet such a call for special deposits. The result is therefore a 
transfer of one per cent of deposits from the category of liquid aasotc to 
the category of non-liquid assets, and a <hll in their liquidity xutio 
accordingly. In theory, the axthorltles can go on making calls of this 
kind until, at least, the liquid assets loft to the banks are reduced to 
the essential 3C per cent.
request to pre
pare an oltomativo scheme, explained tlu-t the plan would he used as a
f,*cnoral credit control* It also i-jrare the following broad outline of the
schema:-
,TVhsn it appe&rou. necessary, in suppcat of other iwnetsiy measures,
to restrict the liquidity of tho breaking- tiysbam and thus the ability of
the hanks to extend credit, the Sank of □ngland would call for special
J1 4><q + 1.-< 4»V V— 4-'V.r\ ^xsxv*'*'u.«3pQBl»to , 4»v O*w xitiilt* wi V** feiiu. MwaAms. • . Such deposits would carry
interact bused on the current treasury bi11 rate* They would not qualify
for inclusion in the banks’ liquid asceta ^thva would not constitute a
•*** .■*» -4 », *.<?* ^' <*- 4 4*^ h v< -~> ■* ■*/*«“ * 1 -“' *•*<\ '!*■- wieion for partial release by
notified by Special considers-
"vJL0i4>*M* • wOXX^-O* OOXX ir-i±32Li't* uty K-i&SuX sir* their usual -riinimum ratios
a&sets aac total deposits,•• Initially the scheme Is 
sod with the Clearing said Scottish banks,♦*. The soheao
instrument a and would be employed
tVffi & gTUUU£Kj» OOXXuX*o1 O«* Creuit*
Therefore, the role of these sr>eol&}. deposits was to adjust the liqui
dity of the banking system* They ware sot^plicitly designed to be a general
monetary regulator operated by the laonetsS2»^‘ ** 11© w 4XeX ©*2» *t»OXi^tX9*
live method of s4iort->tem financing* It has been empiiasisea that the now
control was an inotrunent of monetary policy as distinct from Trocstoy
finance* Any coll from the baro. wiliko the case of waa lea
x
to the Bank of England* Althou^y sue! were, In practice, relent
ry
to tho Treasury, there vex no specific and automatic arrangement for 00 oh 
a thing
The lovcmor explained in the Hinuteo of Widence (Pare* 273}; that 
epoeit itecoipt is prir^arily < borrowing
4*/x rAz* /Viv fSfw’iA’tJJ'' 4 ti g* XT* *** x 4 ft Ijw# w XwX wf - y X»^ SrXX*>■ Ay*
« • I X cU-i *>€%/ XI
instalment. anc
that a Troraur.
on.
a c •edit instrument.** A^air* in Para. 2721, he illustrated the differoiMie
between T.P.K.s and special deposits in that the latter would not autoraa- 
tloally be invested in government stock, ’’♦••not automatically, but proba­
bly to a largo extent* There would be hope© of investin'; it in treasury 
bills or *oven:?c:it chort-tem stock.• •there would be a degree of
X AWXU.UAXX V*/
Xt is important to note than when a coll iO la£«Ct e, the bonks concerned 
(i.e. tho clearing and Scottish banks) are required to make the transfers 
in cash. As the banks have to Maintain their hccustosaed cash ratios to 
gross deposits (as veil ns their usual niniiaum liquidity ratios), asul as 
the clearing; banks keep their cash ratio relatively stable from day to day 
at eround 9$*, a call for special deposits will not be met by running down 
their existing balances. Hence, tho obligation to pay in cash means that
the transfer© cannot take place until a roughly equivalent additional 
mount of central bank credit has been created by the Bank.
Since the special deposits wore devised to regulate bank liquidity 
only, it might pexhaps be expected Wat We banks would be given the right 
to meet the calls by bunding over, alternatively, a part of their tunf-mny
- nsr" '• ”
'A'»•
‘ '•
" ■ ■•'■v— ■" •
hills. This method 'mould have the advcrxtoge of avoiding 
of disturbance of the short -loan market. It was, howeve: 
the Bank was anxious to ensure flint the rxev instrument would operate so 
far as possible by accustomed credit tochniiiuca.
Therefore, instead of accepting bills from the banks end orediting
<* them with a corroeponding frosen balance, the Bank of Bnjland insisted on 
receiving cash that it created for the purpose and then frose after 
The Bonking Bspertnent of theBori; of I&gland provided the east 
by the banks to make tho deposits nomally by the purchase of treasury
tv . i- " . .• •
#/• ; •? r?
as a percentage of gross deposits, and the gene percentage ie
bills, or possibly of short-tern stock.
As VO
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3©c, a call for special deposits is
to all banks in tho same group * i.e. all tho clearing b^nks or all 
Scottish banks. But the call is directed tc the banks individually aai 
not collectively and is calculated on tho gross deposits of each at 
last preceding make-up date. The funds tru.nf erred ere not normally 
subject to any alternation before the date of tho next aakoup. At 
ucko-up date, however, the aggregate amount of each bank’s special
de:>osite is subject to adiikstucnt. by additional oavaent ci
us to keep it at the specified proportion of gross deposits for 
in the same group. The reason behind these adjustments is the fact that 
eorao banks may lose deposits in tho ordinaacy course of business while 
others gain then; alternatively oil stay loss or all may gain. Bsnss, the
____________
amuttt of special deposits io adjusted sad month according to the latest 
figures for each bank’s gross deposits• Aryhov, tbs amountsinvolved in 
snoli adjustments are normally of nodeot siae.
It in observed that vfcatevor the rcothod by tfcieh the ccmcrcial brnks 
finance the transfers, the ultimate effect on then will be the some, The 
Bank of England, in effect, takoa over securities from the commercial 
banks (or Ic.ulc at last resort to th n^rket)# These transferred
securitise comprise, in practice, treasury bills (or • conceivably. and 
to a small extent, short government beads)# In ony case, the effect on
r ffrx P' £ '**- '' •’ V 4' ± ‘ V Ail , ■ i_ <£ •. - ?'.. .* ■ ■' 5 •«, i. '■ l#^- ' 1 . * *. : *' • 35''i
the balance <eet of the comorcial bard^j io confined to a decline in 
money market assets (call none;.' or hills) for an immobilised balance at 
tho Bank of Uaglond. This exchange does not in itself involve any change 
in the total of the concerciol banks’ risk assets. It has been intended 
to limit the special deposits for the pxtrpcco of cutting down bank liqui* 
dity vhen it is obviously excessive, without pressing it to the point at 
vhich the banks find it necessary to reduce their risk assets • government 
investments and/0* advances# There io nc rood foi the banks to feci 
obliged to restore their liquidity, but the risk in using an skSsbs of 
liquidity as & basis for a nev expansion of credit is rciwved# In other 
words, the ode purpose of the special deposits ia to prevent the credit 
creation freu beeond&g cumulative.
The Bank of kngl&nd mode it cl oar that any release from the special 
deposits Is unlikely to be made to assist the commercial bank© to west 
tbs smhmX seasonal stresses ujwn their liquid assets and liquidity ratios#
wMBP®1 as no such ixuxxxuul flexibility ua was present in the
FI **% T> Acfti x-ilo^a&to> <t *"* « I *$lS■21 t»-0 0«t tCi* i-4BOJ3^J *«»•dSBdVOS, Uith "WLiO
izljAsi 02? w-t &iy Liu
iutlj&riii&s, to adjuvt the ii'icidemce of a call between
ibu&l ccnvejiicno^.
X il w 4»£» & V p CJi>xit to be axplainGv. xn the spoolal deposit eehewe is
the inherest mts* Aa$~ £«*&$ ixonaferced in response to a call caxagr
VoXL- Ox O.0^-'0is^.i» & * XXLUfwXt. w i*-» <-* V L
1/ ,
,u /^ — X>O viix. 03- i#«4» iiXXx 2»X*CO '0».t lifi-iC*- "wOxLx**-,arX t3^C
the preceding; uc - thuc the Gllcwenco will be subject to weekly varlo*
tiouo* ii’ti g at this rate is calculated and paid on Hondeyu.
7)f*ve * oeswmt &&& v’y’MPs *r -offAjavaetu^X/4.»4. SSViSV.^f UUJMIX; wxv
1^60—&2 ■ Imm* boc*i explained In Chapter XI. Aceorfincly It la sufficient
i A’1 ■?' T^liyfFfl$e« to illustrate in tho next few paragraphs how the plan
iffeot. The expected resort to the special deposits device
6OB6 after nearly" two years, since the first coll on the banks to tiwi&fer
funds to the specdal account at the Berth of Tkigland was aixnounced on Aoril
2$, 196c.
Ttfii**’! tir «« uKUuiiA . «Ak> soon as a call io announced, letters are dispatched to
th?* bank** c ic fy”rted (i.e. the eleven clearing banks and the five Scottish
h vi *’^" th $* trocioe amounts end date or dates of the deposits. The
calls on the clefiring banks are usually for 1% of the grows deposits,
while thooo on tl ’C f’cottish bonks ere Thi^ lower re to is nerliar."’' in
consideration of
1*! *'< V*’ /*!/f*k *n» jrt iT^ - *7 /»*«*-*»** ajrp’i X ■*«*•»• *' **fc*’s*5J*lWw ilX£4i JJ*.<5iQtiElvC VI »Xu£BIli» lu ^COeXSult V4.
!♦ The Banker, June 
ttlCy#» ♦»
l$6Gt p. 377. In this roepoot Sayers erguee that
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course, the clearing banks are required to observe strictly, ia the mean' 
their minimum liquidity ratios of 3OZv.
These percentages are, as e:g>loined above, applied to the latest 
available monthly figure of total gross deposits. But, for the clearing 
banks, the amount of deposits with branches outside England and Wales is 
first deducted from the figure of gross deposits.
As regards timing, there is a specified interval between the announce* 
ment of a call and the date by which the special deposits have to be com­
pleted, Thus, the first call van made on the 28th April for completion on 
or before 15th June; the second vaa made on the 23rd Juno, half to be 
completed by the 20th July and half by the 17th August,.. .and so on.
Within these limits, each bank decided when and in what instalments to 
make deposits.
Section C
Vo have so far discussed the methods of controlling the clearing banks 
through their “liquid assets1'. Let us now turn to the next stage • to the
the difference Mss not been explained. It is possibly due to the fact 
that the Scottish banks have rather more of the element of savings benk 
business and have held a rather higher proportion of government bonds. 
However, the inclusion of Scottish banks, in itself, is anomalous. They 
were included only because it seemed equitable to include them in a plan 
that was designed to replace credit squeeze. See Modem Banking, 6th ed. f 
po.
-sets” $ In
Other words, to the powrtbilit- ••'■' pressing 0 eeraegcial M*| in 
order to Mndor then fron li^uidnting the&r govnmaent securities to 
leister their liquidity ratios.
This hind of centre?., unlike the flpeciel lepocitc cchene, is ©till 
re than a tlcoretioal suggestion. Vo ©tort *with Alhadetf*© ©flhfcne
in tb c Vnitod ftato© t^tore conpulcory ratio in applied.^ Ida
schcrie suggest© thc.t control of oomereinl boric© *aay ho effective if they 
are prevented fron hoi ‘ . But the sajer wegr in whtek
the hanhs car. offset such pressure on their reserves is their irrvostneut©* 
nonce 8 a propeoed nothod of control io to etrfhe directly at the sources 
of hank liquidity by otmcti^rul dhango instead of by additional control© 
on the cccieting structure# To report, government securities in tlie 
portfolio© of oo; perc ini ■0© of liquidity.
Bank holdings of treasury bills for short*ton liquidity reserve aro not 
troubles one for credit policy* Tha pote . vizzl »; ?oublc couoo, instead, 
fross longer-tern nurkotscle securities vldch axe purchased with funds that 
exe tetoporerily surplus on the customer loci. wg&ol and vldeh are hold for
. . \;s peauiing a rcarivel of 1c.\ ..d.^
Therefore Jihad off's propound is that, with the exception of short-
t©x& sccuritioo to serve as liquidity x*©earveat only uon-mxkotabl©
wua^snuesss «, taxtvtts&taBnu cmbucscw
!• D.A. Alhodeff, ’’Credit Control and .financial Intermediaries’’, Afe,
Soon. jfov»» 19^0, pp» v> 55—71.
2. 3a© above, ft , for the of, ,^ce of bank “increstaants”.
of controlling* then by cor.trollh'c .r ’’rich <
/;cvc‘2’iir*erii securities bo cold to tho berfx, thereby provom 
iu&thbSdicin& ccttse^gncos frees. liquidating that uncontrolled port of the 
oecuxi.ty yortfblioc. lie considers the sale of non-mx&etuble gwerrnoni 
s an effective uoans of increasing control over£» *» V**’ f ’ •* Atl +**» T» XlSllL
44^^L rr-A,tJ. r ,.,4.^, .>,% -1 ■;» i\r rtr»re'0
i-wW Wttw« Ur>» wwW 4ie»MVWMV ha lieu ofWX »3»> w>»»a» -M J .K« V*L 1
*:>V.A-W» wd»0*if^»*- 00X1 **• 3» • 0 « <*vu—L Lush Investments In goverreraeat securities,
vith the exception of ohort^texu liquidity xoservo, should b© non-oar- 
hetable. TIuls cciicra© wuld preserve for banhs uost of tho advantages of 
yov{im--oni c court holdings vhile provanting their potential unstaMi^iao
effects. ’ h; ■ 7. J' ; - /
heferc AXfcodeff*© proposals £♦ Hevin red© a sonevhut similar one in
• " «.. ’5 hie ochaue for h refer® of the national debt. Hi# idoa uey b© diaeunsed
.t the point of view of con oiling cocxucrcial banks for monetary 
purposes*' 7i h •-. ~ | >
neo We function fulfilled by ssty category
*f*I'\*A VWH 4’ *T VI \ 4* *1 ■'V\ rtfVI V* *'?>**-T'~ : W »4^
* *r • ' O* * 4 * 5 *»Yj ■'k'^'Vr’V 4' C' "• «■> / k * ’ *V- ' 4* *“JL 4** V* **-«** V-X» W V M •4'UMwM
the holder j
it was issued.
tllf, /<Vt>>W» .<1> kA t * ■/ V Qi>» w&4*v» ;w<3XU4cnee of this fact. Securities
sliottli be classified, iu other words, not primarily according tc their 
UUX uUi X Xy X*& v 00 u?"U v oecoxu XXt|.p «SQ tffctUjtow f
^Jte^LXoWSi jr 00> xO^XrXi*Lx Ui^SS-Vf--**MB4dS> iSLOUVj uliO2?O SteJb culd be a type
of aeoxri uXCo wl*xe±» n*y sc nucnw so no oe»>.u debt certificates'‘, these
211»-- i.i-.',sa£»E. SiiSW i;35acoU€1«ii5CS»
i» hu-., x xjob.le rx ShCrptox b | pf.
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cerUficatca to be into two afldg cluasec (co^:>pondinc to the
proaeiit division between treasury bilio ejj£ bonds) 1 
(a) liquidity certificaios* cro^yinj a oi cptlou&l
at pear at any tim on, sor/, on© nonth’a no tic© $ or 
on shorter notice at discount onaouncod iron tine to Une by\ r'. ..• •;
f s.;r 0>)
*• - ‘ ‘ ' * &
' <” .r> . -' . .. wj • > - 'jr •* ■- - . —
certificates} eartyinc a eucnsntee of rapayneat 
at per, on, soy, six souths' notice. but repayable at aay 
tine at a discount or preaim enmounosd fPoti tine to tine hy 
the i'roesusy. Iaouas would occur fret. tino to tine or. cinilar
S ' -*» t>* 5 * 1 f W -T . 1 7 - - r ‘ ■ •-. ; :
•i V •/-■ L
Th© inpartant difference between those "debt oaetifiaatee** and
I ■ <_ '.‘''-'xiVlV ’ |£ - c ’ ; ".- '"'- k* -r ' 7 .' ’5 ' --' *» .
-ilt-c<;£xi securities now bold by the coaucroial banks, frou tbs 
point of view, is tlsat these oertificateo would not be traraferchlc to
’ . • (". • -
non-back invootare. Clioir advantage ia that the oosasaroisl banks would 
bo fix'd, fron tho uungars of tiuskow flue tuitions in capital values.
: ioseover, by redeedn;- one class of bunk ocrtlfloatso and transferring 
to another type, the 'fsoesury and the benke could adjust tbs supply of 
liquid and relatively illiquid esssto of the banking syatoa in the light 
of current needs of either the banks or of uoaetary sutlioritico. By this 
©cbene, tfo© influence of the authorities ovoi" the bcudsixu’ svstcu could be 
exorcised in whatever direction or degree was thought necessary.
It aeons that Kevin’s schfleso did not comend iteolf. Sven Bevin. 
hinself, when advising the Hadcliffe Conedttee in 1957, called for o
reform of the national debt without referring to his previous sehenat
'•■••J- .•?
------,
.:L «□. 1 2 3i-7- v?'. •
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“It will to ourprisliin if...the Oamittoo do not find crouds far advocate 
fairly drastic reform of national debt policy end structure as so to fit
that iy into the r;*xH{FTio snvixxiaama't of tho
present dfiy."“ Again, 1» did not refer tc it ia hie Report on the
' < -
•<?
national debt which included a study on debt reform.*
-*><•*
• ••» •'!.:'c.-'
sEfa* 1., .. •■-;■.
Alhadeff'e proposal, on the other hand, we. criticized by 
different points of view.'' a. swst i.iphrtcnt oritioiaa, froa the 
isoaetory angle, related to the rqperausslana of tho soha&a. Boson atwted 
tkifiit even if a -x&voofl&l -I/- he ort^t {which. is <*«><»* to
oey thsa to do), it. disturbing repereunsioaa on the losg-tccn govomnont 
securities aarfeot would be serletu. A widespread and well-ftoctlonisv; 
narkat Cox lonc-tero govomesent aecairitico is a ac-Jor reason why they ore 
00 eartsfoaively held by 00 many different kinds of ooonanic unite. H<0no©t
W-
■ - •- •
excluding bonks froti the holding of ncrfcetehUs would certainly effect 
adversely the willingness of others to hold than. She resultant 
tioa of the narket for long-totr. ooeuribict would undoubtedly lead to on 
inore&sa ia bill issue. Such dovclopoont would hat® the unwanted effect 
of increasing bank liquidity. As Alhadeff correctly ate.tee, for aeataua 
effeetivenoaa the supply of trersuzy bill® would also have to be Halted.
“i ’Y,-,'
1. "Sic national 3obt", Bull. Qsf. laatit. stat... 1957. p. 36?.
2. "Debt IteutfBNttt”, H&lio. ab«qfte. 1561, pp. 9-26.
3. Heavin E. Bozen, "Credit Controlc and Eincncial Ir.taasmdiories, 
Commit", An. .'kton. Brv., 1962, pp. 135-96-1 see also Alhadeff'a 
pp. 196-203 in the acne issue.
Therefore, depending on hov largo a constriction of tho long-term aaa&et 
takes ploco, Alhadoff’s Otfltl "ight be self-defeating.
* « • • «
□uncdag up, vo ham seen that mastery policy lid not ploy a docieivs 
z*ol© during the 195 oatrolling the pressure of the ©aeessaivo demand,
Vcrioua studies on the behaviour of the uonetazy policy suggested its 
reinforcement by additional weapons such csi
(a) coatrolling the banks by a oocpulscry variable liquidity ratio as 
in the case of the TTnitod States. 3ucl c propoed vas defeated cad 
is still disliked in the Statac.
(b) using the 2.D.H. *s or the Jpecial .'Jcpoeits ca a pressure on bank 
liquidity• She latter cysten vae applied for the period 1260-62
:nsatiufbctory results,
(c) the theoretical proposal of striking at liquidity ratios, not by 
additions! veqp&ns but by st^Otuatl changes t that is, by altering 
banks' portfolios of governjont securities into non-mejrtietcbl© 
securities which are not eligible for liquidating in order to 
bolster their ratios*
In affect, the Uncn-uarketabler scheme was not subject to discussion, 
in tills country. As vs bears semi, a possible remedy to monotezy policy 
night come from a change ia the presort debt i^aangcoeat.^
This is by no ; leans the end of the stosy. It is true that the effse-* 
tivonesn of moaatszy policy would be cowidersbly increased if ve could
•ftwa^naw«s sttk—ww»js«B6aw»
1, Many countries Iwvo adopted special debt techniques including non- 
ass&stt&le securities: see S. Stevia, fed-lie naggice, 1261, pp. 25-26.
s*", r-
devise more effective methods of ecsxtrollitt# bank advances. But stobili- 
eatien policy slxuld also include other weapons ouch as fiscal policy.
h. 5j* :>! -j*. r*
53 /•».:
s
■>•.. . ■.,' *i' irt- ■ . ■
r 'll l<£
* #' •-;
&ese are, in principle, three main instruments that can be used to 
maintain economic stability, Tkese inntex^nts are ocnetaxy controls,
fiscal controls and direct controls* It wus n^ri in Section A tLat
the Badcliffe Report concentrated on the rcl© of monetary policy without 
giving enough attention to .other measures. This section, though still an 
inadequate study. will throw UL'ht on fiscal and direct controls and the
■ i.. ■ i
, . v '?? '
; ,?• «fV
•-:i ■ ,\L* .»
contrast between them and monetary policy.
Concerning monetary policy, it was shown that a great deal of
controversy has raged over its power, however* those who object strongly 
to the idea of government direction of economic activity nay still favour 
monetary control by the government. donatory measures are indirect. The 
authorities make a decision, end the rest of the economy adjust a little 
bit here, a little bit there, and privately. Specific changes are widely 
dispersed. The personal aspects are these between borrower and lcndar.
The adjuetaeat ia made without direct govamwat dictation of the details 
of private economic decision. On the etbtP hand, monetary policy (meaning 
the adjustment of the overall volume of credit}, apart from the question 
of its power, or luck of power, was oriticised as an "iniiscri^iinate" tool 
in its operation. By general credit restriction, all borrowers are
•3v>. : ' • ^.i-z •'
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discouraged, without regard to the socid vdu of the projects for which 
1
they wish to raise funis. As Lowell Kurrise put it, ’’Broad, indirect 
controls my seem inefficient, striking tho 'just and unjust1 2 3alike> hut 
they relieve the authorities of the job of deciding who io ’just1.*®
To avoid this defect, qualitative or 'selective credit controls” over 
lending for specific purposes have developed in most countries. The 
authorities have acquired powers tc limit or encourage tho use of credit 
in particular or specific typoe of activity, The object of these power; 
is to control sectors of tho oconoay which are of critical significance * 
they may be of strategic importance, or a najor 3ource of exports, or 
especially vulnerable to damaging inoculative boons.
In Britain, selective controls take the form of (Para. 39<)i 
first (Paras. 202*218) > - regulating tho l-irc-purchneo transactions by the 
Board of Trade (for the first time in SMbruery 1952) and in particular 
the proportion of the purchase price ’#Mch ssust be paid by th© purchasers 
as a deposit end the length of time over Mhifth the hire-purchase instaluentf 
say be spread, hire-purchase ploye an important role in the sal© of many
1. It is not in fact strictly true thut credit control makes no distinc­
tion between borrowers, /Monetary authorities expand or contract th© 
overall volume of funds, leaving to the financial institutions the 
decisions as to who is to have the extra funds in a period of credit 
sxponsion and vhc is to be denied credit in a period of contraction.
2. C. Lowell Sarriss, op. ait.. Chapter 17, pp. 3h$*72.
3. See E. Karin, T^tbyk of ,^»S<>WlSAlfeaU* ??• »M©.
K •?,-iti-xitiN? •' 'AfttiY-, .• .Vsw£ . 4.ii •tUsU.S.- tttfckisfc • . «;*1
durable consumer goods aucl. as cars, slcotrioal uppliances and furniture.
Bmp this reason 9 regulating it eon affect consumer spending to & significant 
degree. I’lie second„ and mrc important, selective measure was controlling 
the rise of new aa???.tel by the Treasury (?&ras. 219-34). This sort of 
control was discussed in detail on pf ^71- $9 above.
The Ludcliffe Committee’s views on the controls over hire purchase 
transactions (Paras. 466-9 and 49$) tbnt they arc effective in the 
short run and in the negative sense - that ie, they can reduce or prevent 
expenditure in particular directions. However, such controls arc irruch 
weaker in the expansionary direction since they do no ~iore than simply 
remove restrictions on hire purchase transaction*. Consequently, consumers 
may or iasy not increase their purchases, hven is the restrictive direction,
impact is concentrated on a narrow range of industries and this raises tho 
question of cquit; of measures Which boar more heavily on a snail group of 
industries tV^p- on the remainder. Li&ble to and violent changes
in degree of controls, such industries will find it iismnsely difficult 
to plan for the future. , Further, these -ieaoures can be effective only 
in the short run since demand will bo diverted or postponed, rather than 
permanently reduced,
Hence, the Cans&ttee concluded in B&a. 514 that "ve do not regard 
the capital issues control ao uaeful in ordinary tine a 5 and ve believe 
that there are narrow limits to tho usefulness of hire purchase controls.**
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Kevertleless, the Comitt co recommended "a cenbinntion of oontfols of 
capital la sues, bark advances and consul? credit** (Pars. 52*0* ln ether 
words, they called for the retention of both hire-purchase controls and ft 
quantitative control over capital issue©, in conjunction with quantitative 
restriction© on benk advances as short-run ••ftecgcney*’ measures.
Continuing our argument on the various policies for ocenonic stability, 
we neve to the direct controls. Suoh measures were used extensively 
effectively during the war and the oarly post-war years, to hold down total 
demand as well as particular demands. As the shortens of this period was 
gradually relieved, the scone of direct controls was prograeeively narrowed 
and their effectiveness to control total deatend correspondingly declined. 
The Mdcliffe Corenittec considered in Psm. 515 that *A return now to an 
extensive system of direct control© would involve the establishment of an 
elaborate erhn±nis$r8.ttve structure* Moreover, experience has shown that 
purchasing power frustrated by prrticvler controls will eve&ttxolly and 
inevitably spill over into other markets vhcre uncontrolled goods and 
services can be bought.’* However t wIn scse circumstaneeo, reinstatcusat 
of a control of this kind might be profsrsllc to exclusive reliance on 
monetary measures**
•**■«• *3» ■- *m sr«f as -r ssrswrw Masessas*
1« Per more detail© on direct controls, see P*V, Paleh, Studies Jn xi 
Inflatioixaa^c 'xsonqmy. pp. 123-26 and 136-9f Dov, flpH Qjt«. Chapter VI,
pp.
a?iscud policy io considered a major weapon in the hands of the govern- 
ment fox economic stabilization. It can use the annual budget to influence 
the level of activity. Budgetary policy (which includes taxing, spending,
borrowing and debt uinnagenent) softy achieve thia end in one or all of those
_ 1
wftysi
(a) Vhen the government spends as much fts a third, or even more, 
of the national incone, any appreciable change in ouch spending can have 
a pronounced effect on the level of activity. Such government expenditure 
on goods and services (such as defence, public administration, health 
cervices, education, etc,) is a sdgr&fiemt element in aggregate demand, 
hence, v&X'iaticn in it can offset tendencies in private expenditure.
If total expenditure is ihorqpacing when resources are fully employed, 
inflation tfczewkten$. To prevent it, a re uctiott in government oxponditsrft 
is needed. Conversely a deflationary tendency could be eased by ea increase 
in govoxiuaent expenditure. Tho gavcfuncnt spending involves either purchase 
of goods and services or transfer paysaoutc and welfare. By those changes, 
the government can keep the economy from. going too fax in either way.
however, thie process is cosier in theory than in practice since the 
greater part of government <3xp»onditure is determined by political faotora 
und is not easily varied from year to yjax. for example, defence 
tore ia undertaken when it appoaro necossory rather than to counteract a
1, Ibr a full study on the oosrpenoatory aspects of fiscal policy see rou>~ 
grave, j^o,ghooay of public finance., Chrmtsr 18, pp. 429-55? A.B. Prest, 
Public hinanco, Chapter 5, pp. 91-110.
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Change in aggregate dcnaad. ” Expenditure on houses, schools end hospitals 
cannot bo postponed indefinitely against the possibility of an inadequate 
aggregate denend at an unknown future date. Similarly» imroataent expen­
ditures of nationalised Indus trios are, in theory, controlled by the 
government in order to offset undesirable nevsaents in private iirreatucnt* 
In practice, the timing of capital expenditure is deterciined largely by 
the current needs of theao industries.
(b) Taxation is the second element of fiscal policy which can pbey 
a stabilising role* The rate of investment racy he influenced to sone 
extent by tea allowances on capital expenditure, or by a differential rate 
of profits tax frnrauriuy undistributed profits egeinst distributed profits* 
Ccnsmerc’ expenditure may also bo influenced by changes la the rate of 
taxation on ccaacdltics carrying purchase tax or excise duties, or by 
chances in the treatment of personal ssviage in income tax asses amenta.
(c) The final, and perhaps the aost inportnnt, aspect of fiscal 
policy conccmc tha ovarull aurpluc or deficit attained through the budget* 
During on inflationary period, the govonriant SCO&MS its spending by ad­
justing its reooipto and expenditures - i. .. curing a aurplus. hence, 
if the government can take wra noneyV In texation, free: private sp sad era 
than it upends iteolf, l.o. If it realises ;• substantial surplus, tic budged 
will have a deflationary influence on the economy. This means that, by 
reducing disposable income, the govexrxant cut3 private expenditure.
During an inflationary period, a budget surplus becomes desirable, since
it reduces incomes and therefore demand. Conversely, in periods
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of deflation, a budget deficit increase# dirposrblo incones a>id oo atim- 
l&tes demand. In order to moke u> tho difference, the gevemraent sen 
print currency or borrow*
therefore, the budget can be used (vd or inflation or deflation 
threatens) an an economic stabiliser rather than for the traditional and 
narrower purpose of the mere raising of sufficient revenue to finance 
govemnort expenditure* Modem budgets wet be framed in the light of 
the prevailing oconomic situation. They any involve & series of surpluses 
or deficits over a period of several yoem if th® prevailing economic 
situation demands it* In other words, such ooppenaatory fiscal policy 
requires that g?ovemnent budgets sonetinoa be "unbalanced". The Treasury 
met in some yearn take in aero than it pays cut, and in acme years lees*
The balancing iter becomes here a change rational debt or currency
issue since a depression will oull for a rise, an inflation for a reduction*
■ '-Wiy1011 - ;
After tide brief review oa the different stabilising policies, we 
eball discuss monetary policy versus fiscal policy* It has been argued 
that the grsf&t advantage of smetaxy polio; over fiscal polio;' is its 
superior administrative flexibility and the speed with which it can be 
adapted to changing circumstances. There can be little doubt of its 
superiority In this respect. Monetary policy has the considerable virtue
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of flexibility since It can be rapidly imposed or removed.
Proa the point of view of offactivcewoo, th* total leg involved in
eny economic nation to offbet a disturbance (i.s. between the sts&lzlmg
action and the stabilising effect of the notion token; asy be broken down 
1
into three portat
(&) the recognition lag « the time that elapses between the need, far 
action and recognition of thia needs
(b) the administrative lag or the tine that elapses between the recog­
nition of the need for action and the taking of the actions and
(c) the operational lag or the tiaxe between the taking of action and 
its stabilizing effect on the economic situation.
Pbr ncnetaiy and fiscal control®, tho recognition lag is acre or less
- ■ ' - , ’■ ' . .. . • 1
independent of the paarttottlnr weapons used. The ertmintstmtlye lag is 
o
undoubtedly mob eborter for monetary policy than for fiscal policy.
Fiscal control (in the meaning of the change in the level of activity 
imposed by changes in gwerrmnt expenditure and taxation policy) tends to 
be slaw in getting into operation. This slowness is the result of
1. See H. Friedman, "1 Monetary aid Fiscal Framework for Scanoaic Stabi­
lity”, jjeadingg inmto ghgagy. AefhA. (Homewood, XU.), 1991, jp. 
3o9~93j 0.1. Bach, “Honetray-Mscal ?olicy reconsidered", JLqadin/;n in
jagga, *•*»•*• W5. W. 2to-64j ». Itueerave, Tbejnijs®. o£ '
Public Finance, 1959. pp. 501-5.
2. 2xeept In the oom of automatic fiscal built-in stabilizers where the 
administrative Is^ is vary abort. For ezeaple if noney <««««»« ore 
rising with inflation or fallliv, with deflation, the proportion with- 
drewn by taxation will rise or fall in a stabilising wey without any 
ohenge in the rates of taxation provided that Ute structure is progres­
sive. For further utudy on the built-in stabiliser see I2usgrave, oy. 
ci£., pp. 501-121 F.H. Peano, "Automatic Stabilisation and the British 
Taxes on Inooaw", Review of Boewsaie atgdlss, February 1962.
constitutional facto??, such ad the doloy imposing legislation, end the 
convention that budgets normally occur once a year,^ end of edninictrutive 
delay in transforming decisions into notion* Fnreo er, even when tax end 
expenditure crti&nges do get into operation, their effects are spread over a 
long period and do not all come mre or less at once.
However, the operational log nay be considerably longer for monctcsy 
than for fiscal policy* Tiscal controls sre always capable of having vaay 
large effects when they are in full operation. Their great advantage is 
that they hove a direct and powerful impact on the inocne stream, whereas 
monetary policy’s first impoot is on the eneet structure. And only thrMtgh 
its effects on this structure doeo it indirectly and with son® delay affect 
the income streon.
Tills does not moan Vn&t monetary policy is useless. Both types of 
policy, fiscal as well as monetary, may well be required and each should 
strengthen the other. ”Our two great tools for eoonoxaio stabilisation • 
monetary and fiso&l policy * &re allies, not rivals.H2 The ideal situation 
would be, in effect, one in which a coiabinrtiou of the two might be 
employed. There is an overwhelmingly strong case for taking use of monctaiy 
policy in conjunction with fieoal aeweuroe. Par example, an attempt te 
restrain expenditure by fiscal policy la likely to be wre successful if 
Lionetar. policy is so devised ae to discourage an increase in bank advances.
1. Rates on income tax are usually changed ia the April Budget, but pur­
chase tax (on drink, tobacco, patrol, oil, etc.) are not geared to the
3, C, Lowell Harries, qp. ?• 37° *
:{Ct.
- 'J< i
policy can be useful in tempering the essentially moderate 
fluctuations in economic activity that occur under norael conditions. 
Monetary policy msy b° oonaidesrcd a oliort-run instrument. We have 
that budgetary measures, by their nature, can be adopted or modified 
relatively slowly (normally once a year). Thus, the proper role of 
monetary policy ie to fill the gaps between budgets, to deal with ahort-nm, 
marginal adjustments, leaving longer-run, more basic adjustments to the
rinn1^ d am. 1 T*. ■ .J M- ■ "Iff ~ 3 ~ . - - — — - _ rl f M a * rr.etxvie.. <y.rrect tiscaJ. policy* it would be, incLo&d, a dangerous nistchs 
to overrate the potency of monetary policy co as to place major reliance 
on its stabilising power to the neglect of fiscal policy. As Hansen put 
it, ^Monetary policy ebou^d nake a yrudest contribution* towurd tho
.
containment of inflation, but prhiarily rclAanoe should be placed upon
ft* vwR
fiscal pfclicy and selective controls?
Before tcsciinatiiig this it ney he useful to add briefly the
contribution of J.C.R. Bow on thia paint? He ends his dissuasion with a 
eonewhet different oonolusion ftwa tho above one. After analysing tho 
effect of fiscal polio; on oonownption end investment, he suggests that 
fiscal measures ere more effective than uonetarv* measures for these curnoaes*
■■■Mil................... ......—
1. s. Kevin, PgM^ ^wffiga, W&» >• n- I■ I " * 1
2. aji. Bsns«, sfeutesEissa^asasm, »• *9-*-
»«•» «*«• —•—**• *Msasums for Biffewnt Situations")! ass alas his hook*_____
of the British Jfoonoqy, pp. 406-12, for an elaboration of theoo
i ■• "■ . -i' »
■
F X'/i s-*m.h ’ •Jt.Ajvi. S/> Sneri j -J. -il.A tiijHM' J - i, uJS-i_______ ----------------- ----------
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Fiscal policy has to bo usod (as it ha© been in tho past) to stabilise 
censurption. Xt also ssoias nor© offoctivo over fixed investnont deoeoad. 
Konotaxy policy appears likely to bo useful only in a subsidiary role - 
before other measures acre taken to affect inveotaenti or for eubeidiaxy 
purposes • e*e» to mitigate cycles in the demand for durables or in the 
level of etooke*
It is sometimes srgusd, Bov 3ays, that fiscal policy and monetary 
policy should "work together". But tho needs of the case are rerely 
likely to be ell one way • which neons that fiscal policy end monetary 
policy should sonetines point in "opposite" directions. Hence, the 
rational rule is to decide which, kinds of dornnd need to be controlled, 
and to use the best oodbination of neasuroc for the purpose. However, 
thie process will always xerain chancy* Xt would be wrong to hope that 
all problems can be solved by stabilisation policies of thie sort-
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Table (iJ9)
Liabilities of Building Societies 
(at end of period)
£.xa.
---- ---- -———... ......■“■■■ — ' 1 - "-T
I1 1954 j 1955 1956 1957 1958 , 1959 1960 1961 1962
Shares & Deposits Outstanding 1760 1959 2111 2282 2479 2749 2950 315313515
Govemnent Loans Outstanding - - - - - 8 49 91 82
Reserves <fc Other Liabilities 110 116 127 141 154 164 185 2Q5 230
TOUT " - - 1 I’878 2075 2238 2423 2633 2921 3180 ! 3449 ] 3827
%
Shares & Deposits Outstanding 94 >4 94 94 94 I 93 91 92
OovernoentLoans Outstanding* • • • * • - 1 3 2
Reserves and Other liabilities 6 6 <T 6 6 6 6 6 6
TOME ”1® J TOO " 106 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table (140)
Assets of Building ooieties 
(at end of period)
£.m.
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Balance Due to Mortgagee 1562 1761 1886 20*0 2190 2416 2658 2881 3168
Cash and Investments 231 298 336 364 421 474 438 53* 639
Other Assets 15 16 16 19 22 31 34 37 40
TOTAL 1873 2075 2238 2423 2633• 2921 5180 3649 3827
%
Balance Due to Mortages 86.2 86.3 86.3 86.2 83.2 82.7 83.6 83.5 82.3
Cash and Investments 15.0 144 15.0 15.0 16.0 16.2 15.3 15.4 16.7
Other Assets (48 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
100 100 100 100 100 106 100d 100 106
<.
Table (141)
Distribution of Insurance Caapanies* 
•sects 1947-62
(31 at Deceober each year) i-su
Ho.
of
Coy
Loans
and
Xiort^a^es
G-ovemawit
Securities
SMsu&e
Iuvestaeots
Other
Assets TOTAL
1947... 4 --------38......- 116 t 699 596 462 1933
1948 38 210 849 583 469 2111
1949 44 260 1038 737 695 2730
1950 u 296 1034 831 759 2920
1951 44 349 1007 913 839 3103
1952 44 401 1007 984 897 3289
1953 44 436 1068 1004 936 3524
19% 44 472 1099 1279 963 3813
1955 44 559 *075 1438 1024 4096
1956 44 655 1031 1595 1132 4433
1957 45 743 1038 1802 1210 4793
<958 45 310 1063 19* 1304 5151
1959 45 «9 1096 2239 1417 5637
1960 45 997 1159 2483 1528 6167
1981 j 45 1133 1168 2777 1695 6773
1962 45 1235 1303 2950 1792 7230
_____ !______________ !________________________________________l
Source: Irwuramo Supplements of the "iSoonaalst*.
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TsKU (143)
Annual Change in Insurance Coupeniee' Assets 1947-62
Loam
and
Mortgages
Gcrrexnaent
Seaurities
Private
Xnvostiflente
Otter
Assets TOTAL
1947 15 -31 117 I 91 192
1948 24 155 -AO 47 166
1949 135 75 109 arf
1950 36 -4 94 64 190
1951 53 -27 62 7B 178
1952 52 0 71 58 181
1953 35 61 ’ 100 39 235
1954 36 3» 195 27 289
1955 87 -24 159 61 283
1956 96 -24 157 100 337
1957 70 -21 190 62 321
1958 67 25 172 % 35B
1959 75 33 265 113
1960 112 63 2U 111 530
19« 136 9 294 167 606
1962 102 135 173 97 507
raw. (144)
Distribution of Invested *—ts at the of 1957 »**
Mortgages Guaranteed
Securities
Mwta
Investments
Other
Assets TOTAL
LlfaFualr - *--- Jfc..... ■" mr J 1579 ' 763
General Funds
"PfWlT f» ~.
25 148 151 75 399
A VAAJU 4b>i*0 — 4----609— -iaar
- 1- - 1 £( - ---- 1----r 1730 838 4&41
- torsnms
General Funds
-------96-------------
.4
----------as--------
12
' '.....
9
9,
9
"9»~I
9
♦ vJvJit _
wo ‘100 fob 100
(1) Source: Radcliffe Report Table 15 P.84.
Table (14$)
Maturity Classlfloatlon of Insurance Companies* 
Holding of Gortt A Q«rr«t Guaranteed Securities *
(at at Deo)
—,—*— .
1^01
-----
1^01 * ize<j
up to 5 years » ! ..... J,- -J ~ T.? —
Over 5 and up to 10 years 200 138 11*1 7.1
Over 10 and up to 15 years 279 257 15.5 12.1
Over 15 years 929 1166 51.6 59.7
Undated 3S6 * ’ 19.9
i . ■
19.5
TOTAL • 1799 19* 100 "100 I
« at ncnlnal values*
source: "Mnanolal Statistics", Jan*, 1?64*
Table (Hd)
Differentials between Yields on long tern securities and Debentures, 
and Changes in the Holding of Iasurenos Con^aniee4 government Securities.
I 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Yields on Long-tem Securities 2.99 3.59 4.25 3.95 3.55 4.24 5.13 5.46 5.54 5.23 5.77 6.27 5.89
Yields on Debentures 4.11 4.91 5.14 4.90 4.57 5.01 5.68 6.12 6.16 5.98 6.30 7.07 7.02
Differentials 1.12 1.32 0.89 0.95 1.02 0.77 0.55 0.66 0.62 0.75 0.53 0.80 1.13
Change in Gcr4t Securities * -27 0 I diI 31 •24 -24 -21 25 33 63 9 1J6
Table (147)
Eoldlag of Uariovtable Securities by quoted Coarianlea
■
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
--------- -
1957
—
1958 1959 I960 1961 1962
£«■> 297 326 336 366 352 672 672I . _ 692 519 6M 612 589
539<‘>
Xntex 1950 - 100 100I 109 112 123 119 159 159 166 1» 216 206 198 181__ 1
(a) Figures for 1962 aaolute about 100 Oeapeoiea.
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ntlCBiL DEBT
»
An aocount of the implications of the national debt with nonotary 
policy Is not perhaps complete unions the problem of the burden Is included. 
The burden is understood iMfte la the sense of the amount of interact 
payments that the govormsnt has to make on the outstanding debt.
It has been argued in the preceding Parts that interest rates on the 
national debt (whether on treasury hills or bonds) were stabilized 
out the Second World Var and txp to the end of 1951* After that date, an 
active monetary policy started to function. The natural vehicle was a 
continuous rise In the short as well as the long rates of interest. An 
active i^onctary policy has thus added 5^5 to the cost of national 
debt (interest payments hsvo increased from 505 L.n. la 1951 to 1003 L.su 
in 1962; but this is partly because the else of the debt is gws&or). It 
has also increased interest payments abroad, The Bndcliffo Report has 
estimated (Para. b38) that a rise in Beak l ate of 1$ costa about 15 L.ru 
a year to the balance of payments. Thu question of cost is thus related 
to the pi'oblen of hov to make monetary policy work.
We have already traced the weakening of the role of interest rates as 
an instrvuaent of economic stabilisation. At the aa&o tins, the growth of 
the national debt and the activation of Monetary policy are giving a now
look to changes la interest rates* 2ho istp&ct of those changes will be 
discussed in Chapter XIV iron two joints of views (a) the effect of 
interest pay&ents on the distribution of ineone between the sectors of 
the ocsmmitz (i»e* the cost of the intesxi&lly-held debt)i (b) the 
obligations of the mtion aa a whole towards other countries (i«e« the 
cost of esct<xmally-2told debt). rJhia pcrfu^s illustrates the shift in the 
min function of interest rates, or their influence upon the income of 
interest receivers end interest payers ♦ ihie analysis will clear the 
ground for a further discussion (in Chester XV) on the desirability of 
setting a li&lt in the future to the growth of the national debt.
xonoa masKon io xsoo
*2
|>eotioa A
It nay be necessary, sinoe our ain is to discuss the impact of interest 
payments on the distribution of income, to sketch briefly the outline of 
the current theory of the national d<Sbt, This theory io baaed upon three 
basic propositions. Thess propositions will be presented float, then
followed by a description of the recent attack on them. The propositions
__  1
ores
(a) that the analogy between individual or private debt
and national debt is fallacious in all essential respects.
(b) that there is a sharp sad important distinction between 
an Internal and an external debt.
(•) that the creation of the national debt does not involve 
say transfer of the burden to future generations.
These propositions are not, In foot, independent of one another, since any 
discussion of on© of the three oust involve sons consideration of the other
two. But the shove classification provides a convenient model for exposi­
tion and initial dismission.
1. This theory is put forward by many economists, especially A.P. Leamar 
("Th. Burden of the Kutionol D«fcV in
Policy (essays in honour of Alvin Hanson), pp. 255-75l The 3oononico of 
Chapter 2b, pp. >2*22; ^onqsics of Baslcyment, lt.T. I93t»
;.ai ler X6, pp. 270-86), and S. Huvin frobles, of the jtetipnftXjjubt. 
Chapter 1, pp. 13*31).
- -A
By the first proposition, national debt, In so far as it is internally 
held, does not constitute a on the The ration oozmot be
made ’’bankrupt" by such a debt# People Who worry about the national debt 
do so because of the analogy with personal debt. They argue that it is 
imprudent for an to , ;et into debt and tb^y ayamM that *****
must also hold for the nation. They regard the nation (or the government 
that represents it) as a business concern wlieh is likely to get into 
difficulties if it gets too taeh into debt. Xt may then not bo able to 
meet its obligations and bo forced into berJcruptoy. But the nation (or 
the government) is not a business conoora or even an ordinary trader. And 
if the government does not want to raise tbs money by taxes, it osa moot 
its obligations to any oitiswi by borrowing from another oitisen.
Also it la not true that tho interoat payments on the internally-held 
debt are a burden on tho nation; they ore not lost to the nation. They 
are merely transferred from taxpayers or new lenders to bondholders; 
taking the community as a. whole, there is no loss of wealth. To on indivi­
dual within the economy, interest payments on a private debt represent a 
burden. Bither consumption or saving must bo reduced and purchasing power 
transferred to the holder of the debt.
Therefore, a domestioally-beld national debt ie not a burden on tho 
community, in the same sense as a burden is Imposed on an individual by 
the obligation to nest interest or oapital payments on a personal debt.
The proper analogy to the incurring of national debt in this oaso Is not 
an individual borrowing from another individual. Xt is instead an
individual borrowing money fron; one of his pockets tc put it into another. 
Or ae Lamer put it, "we owe tho debt to ourselves".
However, this proposition (i.e. the this© analogy between individual 
debt and national debt) recognises thos^ two facts:
(a) althoo^i as a nation *w ewe the debt to ourselves", it is true 
that *weM are not the same people as ' ourselves". Sons of us owe 
sone of the national debt to other citizens. This will, of course^ 
affeot the distribution of income among then. However, the 
distributional effect of interest payments will be discussed in the 
following sections.
(b) quite apart from this effect on the distribution of income, the 
process of debt service imposes a burden on the community in the 
shape of the coot of the taas-oolieo ting process and the administra­
tion of interest payments sad general debt manx^oment.
The second proposition of the current theory of debt suggests that
It is the externally-held debt which io analogous to individual debt. 
Increasing debt to another country (or tc cltisene of another country) 
impoverishes the borrowing country and enriches tho lending countiy. It 
constitutes a net addition to the resources of the borrowing country, and 
the service of it constitutes a very real drain on its wealth. The debtor 
nation is therefore poorer because of auoh a debt dust as an individual 
debtor is poorer because of his debt. Here the proper oritielam ia valid. 
When a country borrows from another country is something like when a man 
borrow© from another or when a business borrows from another. The 
borrower is able to consume more than he produces and has to consume lose
MB
than he produces later when he ropsye the debt. Mel the? of these Is true 
of internally-held borrowing or the repayment of it. The country cannot 
by tnn^eteyy manipulations consume more then it can pyogh^cer And just ae 
internal borrowing does not represent an addition to the wealth of a 
country, so interest or capital payments do not represent a reduction in 
the disposable wealth of the country.
Por a country to borrow fran mother ray be foolish or wise Recording 
to circumstances, Just as in the ease of individual borrowing. Such debt 
should be limited because the repayment will constitute a real burden on 
the country. Vhen the time comae to make the repayment, there may be 
great inconvenience which could lead to default.
Lastly, the third proposition argues that national debt does not 
involve a burden on future generations. A person can live beyond his 
income and on account of the wealth available to hie descendents. But a 
society cannot live beyond its resources, through the mere creation of 
monetary debt. Therefore, such debt cannot constitute a drain on the 
resource© available to any future generations. The incurring of national 
debt is often considered as unfair to posterity. The fallacy here is that 
if posterity pays interest or repays the debt, these payments are made to 
the same posterity that will be alive at the time when the payment is
made
Controversy over the burden of tho national debt has 
recently flared up. Tho current theory of tho national debt (that the 
national debt ia no burden on the notion s»d that tho cost of government 
expenditure, no natter how financed, cannot be shifted to future genera­
tions) has been attacked by a number of economists.1 They try to prove 
that national debt, internal ae well as external, ie a burden} also that 
the burden of the debt io shifted to future generations.
Literature of this controversy is indeed rich} that is why it ie so
' ■ ' .-T. - " - ' X'.-f' • J V V/r- ?•?
difficult to make a satisfactory arumarv. Fence It may be vise to con­
centrate an one ©f these »od©la and discuss It In ©ore detail. Let us 
consider the Buchanan Thesis♦
V' * jL' ’! / ? • f • art ‘
Buchanan argues that debt finer, cin- (rs compared with tax financing) 
shifts the burden from th. present generation to a future generation. Hie 
argument runs as fallows« in the year of financing, the year when the 
resources are diverted from the private 30ctor of a full-ooployicent 
eoonouy to public use, no individual will undergo a saorifiee, whereas 
in the future year, when the bonds are redeemed by taxes, there will be
1. See J.K. Buchanan, Public Principles of the public Debt. Homewood,
111., 1950J ^.2. Sieade, "le the Motion®! 3ebt a Burden?*, Oaf, Boon. 
Papers, dune 1958» PP- 1*3-83 and February 1959, pp. 109-10, 3.A.
w«*«> Jhgasr. .of. rawsaa. chapter 23, pp. 55*-*o, f.
Modigliani, "Long-run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies and 
the Burden of the national Debt", ijoon, Jour.. Beoeaber 19*1, pp. 
73O-55J V.O. Bowen, ft.G. Baris and *>.!’. Koph, "The FUblio Bebti A 
Burden on Future Generations;", ^.. x^on, Bay., Maroh 19*1, pp. 141-3- 
See also C.S. Shoup, "Debt PioKicin^ ckho Future Generations*, jbML
Peosdbsr 19$2, pp. 887-9?, for a swasaiy of sobs of these 
theories.
sorieone (the taxpayer) who ie experiencing a real sacrifice, while there 
will be no one who ie experiencing a gain. Since the sacrifice of a 
generation exists only through the sacrifice of one or more of the indi­
viduals who comprise it, we must conclude that bend financing postpones 
the sacrifice to a future generation* The nature of the government expense 
is not relevant to the ergussent, but to r<-ove any doubts, Buchanan talks 
in terms of a wasteful expenditure. And in order to build an analytical 
framework, Buchanan assumes that the fund® used to purchase government 
securities are drawn wholly frors private capital formation.
Buchanan arjues that it is true that the resources which are employed
by the government are withdrawn fresu private employment during the initial
period of financing, not during any subsequent period* But the error
lies in a misunderstanding of precisely what ie implied* The mere shifting
of resources from private to public employment does net imply any sacrifice!
If the shift takes place through the voluntary actions of private people,
it is meaningless to speak of any sacrifice having taken place. The
purchaser of a government security does not sacrifice resources for the
public project. Ke pay® for an income In some future time periodj he 
1
exchanges current resources for future roacurcas. Ko sacrifice is 
involved. Considering the total of tho individual economic units within 
it, tho economy undergoes no sacrifice or burden when the debt is created*
#7
1. However, Buchanan did not show that if, during the currency of the 
loan, there is serious inflation (caused by defiolt finance) this is 
certain to reduce the future coiamsnd over i*e&l reeources.
Instead, the public project is * purchased” or "paid for" by those indivi­
duals who will be forced to give up resources in the future* It is not 
the bond purchaser who sacrifices any economic resources anywhere in the
process*
All of tikis may be made clear by asking; who suff ere if the public 
borrowing is unwise and the public QKpCflfiltKre wasteful. Clearly the 
bondholder is not concerned as to the use of his funds once he has received 
the bonds in exchange; he Is guaranteed his income in the future. The 
taxpeyer in the financing period does not sacrifice anything since he hac 
paid no tax for the wasteful project* The burden must rest, therefore* 
on the taxpayer in future generations. He rust reduce hie income to 
transfer funds to the bondholder, and ho has no productive asset in the 
form of a public project to offset his sacrifice. In short* he bears the 
full burden of the national debt.
If, on the other hand* the debt la created for productive public 
expenditure, the benefits to the future taxpayer rwst be compared with 
the burden so that* on balance, he «ay suffer a net benefit or a net 
burden. However* the productivity or unproduotlvity of the project la 
unimportant in itself. In cither case, the taxpayer is the one who pays* 
who sacrifices real resources.
nw*i wmtiww 3xk*hub*:<*««s w-1»
1. Again it may be reduced by rising prices.
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Who pays the Interest on the national debt, and ^ho benefits?
Interest payments are usually made out of taxes. Thio means that sotao 
individuals will receive p&yaenta while the income retained by or received 
by others will be correspondingly reducedx ’’the more there la of nine, 
the less there is of yours, once the also of the pis is given."1 For 
this reason, our intention in this chapter is to trace the distribution 
of interest payments among the different sectors of the economy: also 
to examine the significance of the generally agreed burdensome (or ex* 
teroally held) debt.
Indeed, the argument that interest payments on internal debt are 
no more than a transfer of income from taxpayers to bondholders within 
the same eoonony (and without a net loss) does not mean that the growth 
of debt is of no importance. The welfare of a society still depends upon 
the distribution of its national income anongat its members in the seme 
way as the overall volume affects it. oinee interest ppyuents redistri­
bute income from taxpayers to bondholders of the same society, such 
payments are an important factor in the distribution of its income.
It may be argued that those who pay the taxes could be identical with 
those who receive them, ao that the distribution of income is left un­
affected by the existence of the debt. This contention ia, perhaps.
1. H.C. V&llleh, "Tiie Changing Significance of the Interact Kates", 
4ft.. aw», Brt», 1946, p. 772.
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difficult to provo statistically* Sswevcr, it is not expected that the 
1
' •KZ 4-;>
4 • - -• , 4. .
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nations! debt is widely held anang tlie pchlic, that is while incone tax 
is commonly paid by it. This ekv suggest that the two groups are not 
identical. We hosro Ito same result for a country where the greet rjajority 
of tho population participates in tho ownership of the national debt* 
Sooretasy of the United States Treasury^ declared! ! c uxo t co^^cl^xd 
the interest burden on the public debt is of negligible importance*.• those 
who pay the taxes and those Who hold the securities arc not necessarily 
identical."2 3
It any be concludod that the national debt adversely affects the
distribution of inooua. The benefits fion interact payments <0 not accrue
'.r/ ‘ ■ .- •
■ 5 7?V^ ‘ . j jgrf ./’'
to every individual in exactly- the Sauc degree as th© d«scge done to him 
by the additional ta^es« This aeons that erne people will be better off 
end aocio people will be worse off. The growth of the national debt nay 
luave a further impact - it nay increase inequality of j»fy< bu tier* - 
This is because richer people con buy- rore govomneait bondo and ©o get 
more of the interest payments without iactaring a proportionately heavier 
burden of the taxes. However, Lexasar cxgusa that if the additional teens 
are more progressive (acre ccmentratod on the rich) than the additional
1. S.T. Morgan, (£lgiS.tefe SX.ftKBfiSfo. §«^ ?• <&Y
shows that property- ownership including natiobal debt is largely concen­
trated in the rich classes (vhou he calls social classes I end XX).
2. 3. Mevin, The SsgfelceM.Jfefi -Sa&ja&U
3. A.P. L«cnar, "Bw Burden of tlie Wntional Mbt", Ipcaao, ^VlTWl* —I 
i^is^aiisc-
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holdings of government bonds, the effect trill be to dininieh the Infflyc-Hfo 
of incoseb*
Thiytn^ ti-n* financial yo&x 1961/62 i-Ptvr^t payments on the 
daht auountad to nare than 1000 L,a, (Table ?!►). The*, 
eaorxusly ^nflT^g-fted •» having more or less d^rthlvd since the 
of monetary policy in 1251« In fact, the problem of an motive 
pelt«y is related to the Question of costa A subject of 
been the alleged inconsisto'ic; between tho reed for higher
to monetaa*' nolicv effective tfrm cost in terms of the
interest payments oh the national debt and the sterling balances• 
any decision to use ^onet^ry policy inplien? a decision that the
tame Af hi^h«r Intapaat nstvri.&yi'fctx warth >»*»m**I n/r In
the advantages of the monetary controls.
ia
of
of inco”**'? a) «c how far do they
root of the whole problec of 
a considerable ~*~ of the
the interest payments. Tho
the overseas holders in whose
burden to the debtor.
mads? How far do they
■. t; issssns n nssi
of the national debt 
policy, The 
debt, on which it
will else be
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at th«
itself hoU.
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indeed a
Our plan In thia analysis 1© to divide interest p^nsnts1 on saoh
Item of the national debt Into poyaontc to the public sector, to the banking 
sector, to overuecs officials and to other holders* As we shall aaa, 
payments to the last sector, which includes individuals, represent the 
significance of debt as on income distributor*
(1) let us start with the interest paywmts on the floating 
j|e b t* They may be classified into payments on: Ways and Heana
Advances which accrue wholly to the public ae*fgt| Treasury Deposits
receipts which ere paid to the banking ©oetorj and treasury bills which
are paid to the different holders of bills* The only source of informs-
tion on inter*«st payments (the fSganfte Aosounta of the United Kiaatat)
states only the total amount paid on treasury bills. To break down thia
total into tap end tender, and the latter to the banking, overseas officials
and others, we have to try an estimation* This exercise will inevitably
include soiae appropriations (uafortunntoiy throughout all the payments)
2 \because of lack of data* The following exercise will take these steps)
(a) Interest paid on tap bills is ectimtsd by calculating the total 
amount paid for tender bills emu subtracting this total froxn the 
total interest payments on treasury bills*
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effect merely on the distribution of income and not directly on its slas* 
However, the national income misfit be affected indirectly if the level of 
taxation required to serve the debt averted a repressive offset on in­
centives and industry ((^arqswit, gjnenoe and Masai Policy in Postwar
saw.)-
1. It should be noted that gcv«rni.icait guaranteed securities and the
interest payments on them are exduded from the discussion*
2« Sene methods of estimation are token from 3* Serin, The hroblca of Wc 
vtoaptw II, w. 32-5?.
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(b) Interest paid to the banking syetci ic calculated (as In the esse 
of tender bills) by applying <feo annual average tender bill rate 
(published in the Annual Abstract of Statistical to their estimated 
holdings in Sables 52*3 in i&roh of the sane year. 3*
(a) She same thing applies to the overdue official a, and other 
holders.
(d) With the eid of these calculations, it is possible to allocate 
interest payments on treasury bills between officials, banking 
system, overseas officials and other holders, with n reasonable 
degree of accuracy*
' t "y , 'J oajib <i■■-f'O-y
Official holders receive, os holders of all tap bills, all the payments 
on this category of debt, hence, they obtein about a quarter of payments 
on treasury bille (Sables 151*52). She banking system receives about a 
third of the chergea on its boldine of tender bills, The overseas officials 
also receive a considerable portion, e&thougfr declining over the 1950’s, of 
such payments. The residue, a relatively email percentage, is assumed to 
go to "other holders", except for these itesnsi
• tho government nay hold a part of tender bills.
- the holding of public corporations and local authorities, a snail 
amount but difficult to estimate (so© Table 52).
- overseas private holders, for whom data ere not disclosed.
l. ffl&V • pp* 30*9 •
5W
(2) Vo novo now to tho next eta.) and diocuea tha distribution of lnt^iast 
parents oa a JLJg k ___fl AfrJk staxt with payaerntg
on official holdings, the following stepo are taken for their ecti^ationj-
(i) Payments cm ur-rkotable securities (using Tables 15-17) are 
broken down into payments on: securities up to 5 years, 5-I5 
years, over 15 years and undated (tables 155-156).
(ii) The approximation introduced kero lx that payments on one 
stock up to time end of a finam'eial year are considered as 
related to the same stock at the boginnirv of that year. For 
example payments on 9fe£ Funding Loan 1956-61 (Table 153) for the 
financial year ended 31 March 196c refers to the seme stock 
outstanding at 31 March 1959 (whether considered as a short-term 
or a medium-tern stock at that date), which nay be considered the 
beginning of the financial year I960.
glU-.
(ili) Tho mturity distribution of government and government
guaranteed securities into up to 5 years, 5-15 years, end over 
15 years and undated of both "official holdings" end "other 
holders" (Tables 116, 118, 120) is used as a basis for distri­
buting the above categories of interest payments. In this way 
payments on marketable securities of ’ official holdings'* and 
’ others' can be estimated (Tables 157-60).
(iv) Again there is & year-period gap between the holdings of each 
sector (as a percentage) and interest payments. Jbr socsaple, 
percentages of securities "up to 5 years" of "official" and 
"other" holdings (Table 157) in 31st torch i960 are used to 
estimate interest payments for the same category of debt in 
the financial year ended 31st l&rek 1961.
(▼) This way of estimation has two minor defects 1
- distribution of government and govsznae&t guaranteed
securities between official and other holders is used
to estimate payments on govemmesit securities only.
This perhaps makes our estimation a little higfr.
- The same information excludes tlie holding of the
Banking Department of the Bank of Ttogl&nd up to 
1
1958, hence the estimation qi^t be a little low.
* However, both defects are difficult to measure and 
tend to some degree to cancel one another out. Thus 
the final results are perhaps not much affected.
(vi) Of course, interest payments to "other holders0 (Table IdO) 
refer to the total psyments to the bunking aysterc, overseas 
officials and others. This total will be broken down in the 
following analysis.
(a) Xntorest payments to the baqkfoa srate^ may be calculated ia 
the following steps*
(i) using the estimation of tho holding of gilt-edged securities by 
the banking sector (Tables 57-58). Two possible errors are
• ■ k V ’
involved hero*
- they include an unknown amount of government guaranteed
securities which are ercluded from the discussion; hence 
■
the estimate my be somewhat high.
- the balance sheet values of securities, held at least by 
clearing and Scottish banka, ere placed at book values to 
an extent which cannot be assessed. Per this reason, the 
estimate might be a little low.
!♦ Ittauai Abstract of Statistics^ 1?62, Table 300, p. 247.
2. The Midland Bonk heviev, August 19$3, sliows that banks concentrate 
their holding on "short direct debt vitl. probably email amounts of 
government guaranteed securitiee.
* again, both errors cannot be measured. Sin co they tend, 
to MMB ax tent, to cancel one another out, the results 
are not ouch affected.
(ii) A knowledge of the holdings of msteeteble securities by the 
banking system is not, by itself, aici^h to estimt© their 
interest payments. The maturity distribution of their port­
folios is also required, In this respect, the -udeliffe 
Report throws some guiding lichti
* concerning the clearing hasfts it seys, "•••since the 
exid of 1?51 their total holdings of government and
' government guaranteed securities hase been more or less 
evenly divided between bends wit!: less than five years 
end bonds with more than five years to run to fin*? 
maturity date" (Para. lA4).
* the Scottish bonks "♦ .♦have.. .oomraitied thesselves acre 
deeply in their investment portfolios! these have forced 
a larger proportion of their total resets and they have 
been willing to held longer boudo than some English 
banks would have thought suitable, Until a few years 
ago they held on appreciable amount of undated stacks" 
(Para. 153).
- lastly 1 discount houses "...lend to the Government by 
holding Treasury Bills and short-dated Coverximent bonds” 
(Para, 14ft)* & decisive statement is presented by
V, Sodthi "Detailed portfolios data for the discount 
houses are not available. In addition to bills, it has 
become customary for them to hold a substantial amount 
of ahart-terr; government bonds (having less than five 
years to run). In fact, holdings of such bonds have 
apparently constituted their major source of earnings In
recent years.
'■' ' '•••^?- '.: 12 &'•..
ii’-'f. .’;aW' "'S
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(ill) Tills infonss tion helps to construct Table 161 with 
porcentageo of the maturity distribution of the total 
system for 195^. Xt nay bo safe to accuse that such percentages 
are applied for the whole period of the 1950’s* In this way tho 
boldine of the banking system is distributed into securities 
with less than 5 year© end 5-15 yours (Table 162); that is 
oasuuin/ that banks do not usually invest in long-torn securities
(It) The rate of interest payable on oaci
-5
- ■ ■ ■ •* '-
• tf ' -.' v, V
» weighted by the
nominal value of each security outstanding in the same year, is
calculated in Table 162-2 The interest payable is, of course, 
determined by the nominal rate of interest- It say be noted that
weighted short-term interest rates have become since 196c highur
than weighted nediwa-tena interest rates.
(v) Interest peystentc are then calculated for each year according 
to the weighted rate of interest for the year before. Pbr exempli 
weighted interest rate at 31st March 1$>6C ia used, together with 
ti e holdings of securities at tho ecus date, to determine the 
interest payments for the financial year ending 31st March 1961. 
The result is Table 162 with the share of tho hanking system of 
interest payments on narkatable securities*
(b) To Mtta&te the interoat pajfnonts to overseas offiol&lo, ve 
mfcitrarily sssiaa. (an sssarsption that cannot be proved statistically)
r’.»
•f ,' ’3>y'
PU3B5»t-«k««w:x^»w«*x»
1. V.L» Smith and R.F. Mikesell, “The JffoctivsReee of Monetary Policy * 
Recent British ^parlance", Jour. Pol. Jgygy,, February 1957» P- 2*, 
footnote 26.
2. g» Kevin, op. pit., pp, 41*2.
3* I ssa grateful to Mr. M. Baccy (porooruJ coaaunleaticn' who confirmed 
the foot that those "results do not seo^ to aa surprising, as it is 
auita usual for short-term rates to rise above long rates at tines of 
great uncertainty end your period does of course include the 1961 crisis 
whan Bank Bate rose to 7 per cent.”
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that thia sector invest© only in short~tora securities. Hence, short-term 
weighted rates of interest are med to calculate interest payrtonts in a 
similar say as in the case of the banking oyetou (Table 163). The 
residue of interest peymeute on marketable securities (i.e. the residue 
after considering payments to official holdings, banking sector and 
overseas officials) is meuswd to go to “ftjfcer holdera". keeping in utod 
& fractional error of including other public todies and overseas private 
holders.
The result of this exercise io Tables 364-5). It is clear that the 
govexment retain© a quarter of interest charges on marks table debt.
Both tho banking system end overuses officials gain another quarter1 of the 
total amount. Lastly, other holders* (or individuals and business concerns)
receive almost half the peyiaents.
(3) The filial item tc be dieeusscu is interest payments on no t h a r 
d e b th . The total sum in distributed as follows (Table 168) t
(a) Official holdara receive interest p^aents on two groups of 
securities (Table 166 )t
(i) the holdings of the l&tiannl Debt Ooiaiisei oners of terminable 
annuities on behalf of the Post Office end Trustee Savings Banks; 
and
(ii) a very snail sum to the Bank of England as paymnts on the 
11 L'&i. government debt of long standing.1
(b) Banking sector is assumed tc receive no interest payments frat 
this part of tho debt.
1. Goo oLoto, 9 12.
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(o) Oversea piiijoials roodvo poytaaatfi on “other unfunded debt", 
or debt posable in sterling*
(d) kolaere recoivo all peyrente on life ©nnuitieo, saving®
securities (Kntionrl Savings Certificates end .Oafonce bonds) and Tex 
Keoervc Certifioatec (Table 167).
a a a a a
Vo now have enough infosoation on t?U5 total interest pimento to 
official holders (Table 169), the banking aywtaa (Table 170), the 
overseas officials (Table 171) end to "other holder®*’ (Table 172) > ton 
Tables 173-4 and Figure 35 M» may draw tho following conclusion® i
(a) The government retained about 2C£» of the total amount of interest
PGjyjionte* This does not of course- represent an aspect of income 
1distribution-
<*) The babking system received lose than 2Gp of interact payments. . 
Similarly this does not involve en incouo redistribution*
(c) The "other holders” received a little less than half of the total 
payments. This item does represent see rnpoct of income redistribu­
tion tom taxpayers to debt-holders.
(d) The oraraaae officials received an increasing ehare of interaet 
payments, from 73 L.a. in 19$2 to l&G L.«* in 1962 or toon 13T to 
1&*. This result is in spite of tiie fact that their holding of 
debt has declined tow 5512 Lou in 1?£L to 5°9^ L.m. in 1962, or 
toon 2Q to 1& (Table® 66-7)•
»»«a -ff>■—>*imiWMK«w*iw>iiirr w
1* As ve sliall soc, the government regain mother share of payment?, 
through taxation.
o
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Psynonts to oversetic officiule rapraaeut a real burden to tee 
©oanoqy or a not looa of incone in favour of tho foreign holders. ‘Such 
increase in paymentc ie caused by tho activation of Monetary policy einoe 
1951- for eceonple their peyaento on treasury bills increased by seven 
time between 1951 and 1962 (although their holdings were reduoed) while 
paynentu on aufeetable securitioo increased by only three tinea. Of 
coarse, paynonts on external debt are excluded from the inpact of Monetary 
policy.
2he fact that the present eteucturc cod distribution of the national 
debt are at the very root of nosotaxy policy nay be appreciated by con- 
sidsrinc the external holdings of the debt. With the help of the ostina- 
tion made in Chapter IT of the extant of fbroign holdings of tee national 
debt and the structure of those holdings, it becaoe possible to know tee 
true external burden of tho restrictive Monetary policy of the 1950's.
It swy be argued that tee effect of interest poynanta on tee balance 
of payments gives acre cause for concern. 'Are the increased interest 
peyoente on the sterling liabilities (a high proportion of which arc held 
in the Xtan of treesury bills) vert!, the gains frots the offset of Monetary 
policy on tee general economic situation? We hove seen that one of tee 
nain alas of restrictive policy in tee 19? s was the reinforoenent of 
external reserves cad a strengthening of the balance of payments. Bo 
hi^ar interest rates astuslly perfeea tease Amotions? Or do they ueefcan 
the ©xtaraal
$8K
in active rxmatory policy has rosmltou in an enoxwus and continuous
outflow of Interest peyoents. Shia annual outflow has a ounulutive 
1veekoniiv; effect on the gold jfoaorves. it ni^ht however bo tabued that 
moh of this outflow is in aterlinc fora, rather than a drain on gold 
reserves* Whatever tho truth in thia, the basic foot is that the 
authorities should not under-r&tc the external costs of noaetaxy policy*
IIIBm
In diecusuirv the burden of the national debt we have distin£uiuhod 
between external and internal debt* latere© t payrnnts on the itaans? wore 
a real burden) in tho latter oase> they were considered only a transfer 
burden* We then concluded that external burden was relatively smll 
(l&> of total payments in 1962)' f t ie indeed the transfer burden of the 
iiitorxiui debt that ia of a ^ore serious nature.
Ihie pextiap© could be the and of tlxc burden story. But it ssuy still 
be interesting to extend tbs discussion to the personal sector end siiow 
the distribution oi* interest peyoent^ uaoug different inocsae brack© to,
Ve have seen that “other holders’* inoluuo ii dlViduala and busies© con- 
corns) it is tlxo patients to the former holders whicli represent the 
transfer of incotae fron taxpayer© to boxuljoldero. Unfortunately it is
MMNfcS* a"# SRs»EiS3iSesaK
1. 2. Kevin, “2h© National 3ebt“, Bull. Cfef. Inat. Gtat». 1957 > W* 36 3*7*
2« Concerning interest peyoeats to husiaasa concerns (as veil as fiixrxia 
institutions) »/♦«•»
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not possible to ueke an estimation of tho distribution as ouch ainco ve 
look the xUMMMexy data on the ownership of tho national debt which is 
needed to estimate the payments received in each incono bracket. Sowover, 
tho problem can be tackled in a different wey. The Inland Report1 throw 
light on the holdings of Individuals (for the years I960, 1961, 1962. of 
the national debt *’ although rot broken down into income brockets. 2y 
uoia; this infoiTx.tion, we oen estimate interest payments to individuals. 
•Table 175 U constructed a» ; follows:
(a) POr Preniur Bonds, we already know from Chapter I that they do 
not carry contractual interest rates -ad hence ore excluded. ft>r 
Rational dseftfl^e Certificates, it W be cafe to assuae that indi­
viduals bold all of then and hence receive their total payments.
(b) For tlie second item of the table, mo know only the aggregate 
holdings of befonee ?onda plus Tax Reserve Certificates. Poynenta 
or* thus divided according to the individuals’ portfolio of tlieeo 
securities as a percentage of the total outstanding .asouming of 
course that individuals hold a sinilnr percentage of befenoe Bonds 
and of T.Jt.C.).
(o) Concerning rorfcetsble securities, tho holding of in&ividualo go 
a percentage of tho total bolding© of ' Other holders” is used to 
divide interest payoents between individuals end bueincec. It ie
W>KW«:««ta wcacntwiM* «Mt
institutions), a large part of them io likely to go into undistributed 
profits and is liable to income tax at the standard rate. If it is 
distributed in incroaocd dividends, it is liable to the higher rate of 
Profits Tea, and in sone part to uurtax aloo> see C.S. Ross, ‘TSonotaxgr 
Centro?: and Economic Policy”, Bull*Pxf. Inst. 3tat., tor. 1957, P- 30^.
1. Report of the Cotsnissioners of H.ll. Inland Revenue for the year ended 
31st tottb 1963, Cund. 2263, Table 143, pp. 100-1.
not possible to use here thG weighted average nominal rate of 
interest together with soouritiee of individuals t according to 
thMr uaturitioc as published by tho Inland Report, jinco they 
include no veil ’'gwermeat ^arantood.1’
(d> By tills nethod, we obtain a rou^l- idea of the jxiount of interest 
payments that go to the poroon&I sector.
Again, thia is not the and of the story. Usually these payments ore
subject to tux; hence & oertain proportion of then is recovered by the
ewernaent' In Table 1?6, the gross payments to individuals are reduced 
1by the standard rate of income tax, ~ producing thereby the amount of not 
payments. ' s • >r ’,
The conclusion of thio statistic*! forves ligation is that, from th© 
point of view of redistribution of income from taxpayers to bondholders, 
the burden of the national debt is of ninor significance. In other 
words, the redistributional aspect of interest payments involve© only 
10^ of total payments, or less then of the national lnoooe.
tin., 11 n t. »3c • xxts sjetm -ix•■ *
1. Hot all the recipients of paysaeuta arc subject to s rate of tax as 
hi^T as tho standard rate, viiilo others are certainly sub joe t to a 
higher rate. But as a rou^h guide to trie movements in the net burden 
of the debt, this method io useful enough to obtain an approxii/ttian.
S&
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Action A
Interest payments reached more than 10€0 L.n. In 1%2, having doubled 
since 1951 • During this period, national debt shoved a slower rate of 
increase fHg. 11) due, it vas argued, to the increase In interest rates 
resulting from the activation of aenet&xgf policy as an instrument of econo* 
aic stabilization* At this point, ve face the question of how far the 
national debt can safely be increased in ardor to attain this and# What 
limits (other than those iiapcoed by statute) exiet to such an expansion?
This question is very closely connected with the problem of tlie in­
creasing burden of the debt. To repeat, the concept of the "burden? refer* 
to the tax rat© which must be imposed to finance the interact payments.
The burden of the debt may be understood Uj th® average tax rate covering 
the interest charges.
A continuous expansion of the national debt is sometimes criticised 
on the grounds that a rising debt mans an increase in debt charge snd hence 
an increase in the level of taxation. In other words, an ever-rising debt 
will require higher end higher taxes, which will eventually destroy tho 
eoamqr or oause a complete repudiation of tlie M>t.
It is however true that with non-felling interest rates, the interest 
payments will grow? it is also true thet tie absolute amount of taxes to
•3
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he collected for that purpose will inoreaee. But all these absolute amounts 
do not, in themselves, mean much. Vbut mat tore here is the effect of the 
existence and growth of debt In relation to other economic variables such
as national income.
How serious a problem is this 3oaar t-as shown that the problem 
becomes Indeed very serious within a static national income. Be demonstra­
ted that a continuously increasing national debt means s growth without 
limit to the payments as a ratio of national Income with an almost 100/ 
tax rate at last. In these oii'cuactancea, the net income after tax of 
non-debt-holders will approach zero. Actually this development will take 
quite a lor^; time before oondition.i become really bad. Komar’s conclusion 
is therefore that a continuous growth of debt, not accompanied by a rising 
national incone, will result, though slowly, in an ever-rising debt burden.^
Continuing his argument in a grovdny eooncscy, bonar shoved that with 
any reasonable rate of growth in the econoty (e.g. 2/ or >) the burden of 
even a steadily increasing debt will beooae a minor consideration! that 
with a national income growing at a conutfcttt relative rate, rising payments 
on the debt will ultimately settle down to a relatively snail proportion of 
income. Ee concluded that the greater the rate of income growth, the lower 
will be the tax rate, i.e. the burden of the debt is inverse to the rate of 
growth of income. If the burden is to be li^ht, there swat be a rapidly 
rising income. The problem of debt burden is in fact a problem of aa 
expending notional income.
ow«««ed« »»'»«*»«> star31
1. K. Debar, “The Burden of the Debt and the National Income*’, ia 
jgjgvts** PfiMSfr A-E.A. 1955, w. *79-JDl.
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Another variable to be taken into consideration is the national capital' 
We kavo seer. in Chapter XX that & large national debt io always the aftcsnotl 
of war* 9VMt> a debt, it baa been ttr<*uea,^ vrealcens the financial po**4 
of the State cad makes it difficult for it to raise money to meet egy 
awgewy with which it nay be confronted. Consequently, it has been the 
policy of prudent governments in peace-tine stardily to reduce it. The 
following methods have been suggested to wipe out a substantial part of 
the outstanding debt? (a) rsdsinr noro revenue tlxfin was needed for 
expenditure, tho balance being devoted to reducing the debt? and (b), in 
complete contrast, tho rival policy of asking a large immediate special 
levy to redeem debt.
£eotion _ 3
It may be interesting to exa ine tho burden of the national debt by 
using a numerical axsaple on tho Btiti&i economy.*^ Thia exercise ie ^orh/g^ft 
given as an illustration rather than an attempt to forecast. In this 
example, we shall assume*
(a) a closed econoqy (i.e. neglecting tho external factors)?
1. A*C. Pigou, A Study in Public Pisanoo, London 1922, p. 239.
2. S. L'evin mode a similar numerical example on the Irish eocnocw1* "lublie 
Debt and Tksonamlc Development1’. The JconoBdo Research Institute. Dublin 
December 1962, Paper Ho. 11, pp. 13-15.
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(b) national income in money temn and net in real terse. It will 
greatly simplify our analysis If we assume that the price level re­
mains constant ee that changes in money income follow changes in 
re&l income* Of course, the assumption of a constant price level 
considerably’ reducec the quality of the analysis. A constant price 
level is unlikely to be maintained. Alec* a fall in tbs price 
level will damage oux conclusion since the burden of the debt will 
increase•
Under these severely limiting assumptions, we proceed with our dis­
cussion* During 195^-62 the annual debt payments rose by an average of 
<S.2j,’> (Table 177), sad national income by on average of 6*5£ (Table 173)*
In Table 179, interest payments of l%0 ore projected forwards assuming a 
continuous annual rise of 6>. It is dear frem the table that their 
relationship to the national income depends on whether income (i.e. money 
income) rises acre or less rapidly trxn this. The table Shows the tte- 
peoted burden that would apply after 4-0 years at different assumed rates 
of economic growth. At the growth rate nearest to that of recent experience 
(i.e. 6 per cent) a debt charge rising continuously at would becasc 
4.1 of the national income at tho year 20CC. There might be a minor 
defect in this table, since interest payments arc calculated on a financial 
year basis end national income on a calendar year basis. To adjust the 
result, Table 13C was cone true tod but with almost the same results (M<* 36}*
Tho conclusion of this analysis is that the problem. of the burden is
tatsxxA w^«sr» »i *a emarsssi cesrrirr
1. Both fiNMS and B. Mevin used national income in money terms in thsir 
analyses.
essentially ft problem of achieving & growing national income. A rielMf 
incone will uolve the mat iasportant expect of the problem of debt. The 
faster the inooaao the lighter the burden will be.
To be fair to this conclusion, wo have to ronerber carefully that the 
burden of tho debt booonos alight "only" with a "satiafactooy*’ rate of 
growth of income. In IIwin’s nraorical esrorcise on the Irish oconoi^r, the 
annual payments riuu by an avorece of national incono by on nverore
of b.X^* Kevin found that tl den of the debt would enountte Ilf of the
national income after bC y*ere« Thia is obviously a high percentage, a 
real trouble. This conclusion contradicts the optinim of Xtear whan 
claiming that reasonable mt’j of grmrtk’ (of 2 or 1 ; will c«n.^ tho 
burden to settle down ultimately to a relatively snail proportion of income.
The next variable to be examined is the relationship between national 
debt and national capital.1 Ve shall iiwoetigate the question of whether 
the national debt, ac a result of war fbumee, has increased as a percentage 
of the nation**) capital to an alenstog extent, creating thereby financial 
difficulties for the country. Unfortunately, complete infoxnatlon on the 
national capital is not available. Ilovcvor, tho following sources provide
egiij datai
1. -a. Ciffan, jga. Growth of 2s£i£si. (^aeioa, 1339), Table S, p. 30. 
for the yecr 1978.
1. The relationship between national debt and asaetc of the public sector
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2* •» d«C« 3tCv"p -
yoar 19X4, f. mo$-.
(London, 1916), for the
K. Caapion, MUci^jfrlTaU -^operty In Croat fcc(Uia (London, 
1939>, for the ;wo 19U-13, 1326-28, 1932->, ck«Fw>
3.
4. * B.V, Ilougoa, JWS3C* M fasa*. JaASa&b
Tab lee 62-6L, for «m yewrs 1953-5-
The result of these data is Table 181 end Figure 37- la the period 
before the Hrst World War, national debt os a percentage of national 
property declined to lees than Ae a result of financing the Firot 
World War, the ratio was jmpod to about Jl, (in 1926*28), then eli^itly 
declined to 3U- i» 1932*34. Lastly, although the national debt trebled 
during the Second Vorld Vox and than inoroused by about B0£ during the
following peacetime period,1 it declined sharply, in the Biddle of the
<sF1930’•» as a ratio of national property, This is/course the result of a
OS
faster rate of growth of capital. However, it might be expected (because 
of the slow rate of increase of debt and the fast rate of increase of 
property X this ratio ie meh lower today (l%2).
1. See above, f- V'l •
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atetafoction of, latcra-t <gyt.Titg oa ?reafflay: Billa
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e 1*000
50/51 51/5' 52/53 53/5* 5*/55 55/56 56/57 57/55 53/59 53/60 60/61 61/62
• 2j}£ ?Win£ loon 1956-61 ! 19904 19904 19904 19904 9952
___ . _ __ .. _
4S§^ niu2i££ Loon 1952*57 £765 2765 2765 2765 1363i .... ri s ............ ... 1 ./............. T ................. j . ............... .....
3 Ketlonal -^Xcaace l,oan 1954*50 9625 9525' 9625 f625 *‘>£S
25 tor Loss 1955-55 J®J* 907* 907* 9074 907*
8$' Sat. v» Tends 19*9-51 1*1*2
2&H Bat. '..'« torts 1951-53 13C56 13058 10262
Sgf Kat. W Bento 1952-5* 2C2*: ' “ 202*2 15267
2&' Bet. tor Bonds 295MB T10653 15623 20593: 20593 10296
3F> Sawlaga Boats 1953-65 ! 21376
; l|>i 2cekequer Jtoek 1955 165*1 165*1 165*1 16531 16521!
Serial ?aa2ins stock 1955 km ... .'Jj-‘....--—1 366 1571* 1571*; 1571*
Serial Porting Stock 1952 L  W5.................... i ..... . f . .. {....... / .  1/j .
] 2#» serial ntuOing Stock 1953
A l 375*10102
2&> Serial Jtortiag Stock 195*
mmjimwi J wn
6251 6*96 855*
2/ SnbQQuer Stock 1960/....
? F; ! ' {'■',• ,'k ■J'/, 1
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I I •
^e^eaitc to QfXieiala j 4.6 12.6 L 14.9 2^.6 25.0 28.1 26.1 27.1 28.8, 39.7 32.6
Pa^juto to others 30.2 57.? 50.9 6?.6 74.4 101.1 137.0 141.0
ma ra:.®
167.1
129.7
»»J3.X*E
156.6
126.8 10$. 1 152.4
l20O£ 2 c.jrmts (L«&»)
H
34.3 70.3 59.5 32.$ 111.0 126.1 165.1 155.6 184.8 18$.O
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2A51S 161
Cllt-odgea Securities of -tl-p ScnfrtTy; s?gtaa 
(31 LXxwKocr 1958)
Tmn 162
(yooxs ended 31 .-xrct;
* on s^pradaote figure.

Interest acamf en iUrta 
(yascs ac&ag 31 itowki
.-. K . * ‘ '
' t' /-' '
L.i •
r —■«—"■ , S0/5X 51/52 52/53 53/56 5^*55, 55/55 55/57 , 57/531 52/59 j 55/80' 60/6I
(a> official Holders 42.8 68.? ?2.3 72.6 77.^ 31.1 92.1 95.0 101.1 1&0.1 121.9
II ■! ■>'^IIWIWIIII >i II b ...»iw.1 I I ■■■■ ■■ .... ™ 1 T - - - - - -->• ...... . ..... . ■< I. I.IIWl I »' ... • . —J , r <
i (b) ether Holders
rr.zar sr-ae^OBtrssau*.. jize ss«nBssws«
306.6 307.9 320.7 362.1 353.8 352.6 i 371.7 385«5 6CC.21 1&2.6 413,2
■M
1. Linking 66.6 65.6 76.0 83.C 91.5 99.2 87.6' 96.O 96.5 ' I06.4 91
2. tvex-seas
vxrricuia
3. Others
22.0 47.2 50.7 , 51<3 54.1 55.4
— 244.7 255 a 242.3 2$M ' w n|«»....
236.9 236.8 I 250.4 242.1 j 275.4220> 5
■MM*
63.8
T 0 T A i (a ♦ b) 367.6 376.6 393.0 Wi.7 631.2 633.7 ! 663.8 680.5 : >21.3 15<H.7 ! 533.1
."95.8
596.8
2A2L3 165> •
oa fegk;tai>le scr.ritloa 
(jawp ..mdaOX Mwwh)
<

i’XBLB 167
Interest Fynnanta on "otfcafc I eht” to "Cther Holders” 
13WS -«Pft«d 31 Kaafe)
(3ggES.<g>doC 31
"a
50/51 51/52
■ ■ * 111 ■
52/53 53/56 56/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 53/59 59/60 60/61 61/62 J
(a) Official Eoiaines *1.3 *0.5 39.6 38.2 36.9 35-5 36.2 32.7 31.3 29*8 23.3 32.9
(h) Other Bolding* 62.7 66.$ j 68.1 ! 68.1 71.6 32.9 126.5 119.5 125*8 1M.2 119.5 127.5
1* Linking e* a. * w w Bi
2. Overseas 
cmouu -- — ' — - j — ! — — - — i —
3. Others 62.7 66.5 68.1 68.1 71.6 32.9 126.5 119.5 125.8 116.2 U9.5 127.5
TO5ML (art) 106.0 107.1 107.5 106.3 108.5 118.* 160.7 152*2 157.1 m.o 167.8 160.6
TABL3 169
Inten»8t rtyyaoato to Official EoH«rs
■bggS-JBEUsl3X Harsh)
L»x&»

Total debt in starling and foreign ourrereias.
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Table (176)
Interest P^neats (Gross and Net) 
to Personal Sector
1 - Gross Interest Payments (£»st)
2 • Inoocae Tax (Standard Kate)
3 • Total Tax Paid (44m.)
4 • Net Payments (£«n»)
5 - (4) as % ef Total Papasnts
6 • (4) as % of National Inoone
1960 1961 1962
143 150 166
Tf9 7/9 7/9
55 58 64
M 92 102
10.5 1(40 10.2
0.43 0.42 0.45
Table (177)
Annual Average Inorease of Interest Payaanta 
(31 at Merab each year)
Interest
ChaMjea
(£.».)
Annual
Change
00
1949/50 498
1950/51 509 1.3
1951/52 560 11.1
1953/53 635 18.1
1953/54 658 4.5
195V55 669 2.2
1958/5$ 753 17.0
1956/57 846 18.8
1957/50 826 -4.1
195^59 853 5.3
1959/60 838 -3.0
196Q/61 922 16.8
1961/62 1002 16,8
“TOTAL 73.8
Average 6.2
Tabla (176)
nmial Avaraga Inoraaae 
of National Ineaes©
----- Na£Xofi&X—------ inpMiV
ohan^a
(£•■.) (0)
1950 10762
1951 11796 9.6
1952 12712 7.8
1955 13603 7.0
1954 14459 6.3
1955 15357 6*2
1956 16760 9.1
195? 17666 5.4
195« 16443
1999 19246 4*4
1980 2(M2 6.2
: 1961 21557 5.5
Total 71
1----Awragr -
U---- _________ j
Table
Interest Puj—ita as Boctw 
I960 -
Projected
Debt
’uyiaenfcs
Projected National Inca®
Aeauning jinoaj. urowxn
* . *
1960 838 ■Hit 20Uk2
«s* 1120 24871 27356
1970 1498 30260 36606
1975 200U. 36816 48989
1980 2681 44794
1985 3589 54498 87734
1990 woe 66305 117409
1995 6426 80670 157120
2000 8600 98147 210262
itages of Latiooel Incom
■ 2000
(at current prices)
(£.«.) 
rates of
Interest as a % of Tnoom 
AssiwAns growth of
a .••' a 6h a
20U42 M 4.1 4.1
30035 4.5 4.1 3.7
44132 5e0 4.1 3.4
64845 4.1 3.1
95280 6.0 4»1 2.8
139997 6.6 4.1 2.6
205701 7.2 4.1 2.3
6.0 4.1 2.1
444093 a»s 1.9
Tahle (
Interest Payasnts as Percent 
(Adjusted
Projected
Debt
Payaeate a
Project*! KatfonaTT 
Aaaadng. AonuaX Growth ;
* *
i960 900» r'^Kfgjljg....... “2OW53T
1965 120k 24871 27356
1970 1611 30260 56606
1975 2156 36816 48989
1960 2884 44794
1985 3858 54498 87734
1990 J162 66305 117409
1995 6908 80670 157120
2000 92441 981471
210262
a in J1 st Deoedber in each year
180)
ages of National Inoone
(at current prices)
rates of
’Wrest aa r£ of Income
Assuning Grcerth of
4r a
4.4 “4i4 “ 444
30035 4.8 4.4 4.0
44132 5.3 4.4 3.7
64345 5.9 4.4 3.3
95290 6.4 4U> 3.0
139997 7.1 4A 2.8
205701 7.8 4.4 2.5
502242 8.6 4.4 2.3
444093 9.4 4.4 2.1
Tabla (181)
National Dakt in Halation to 
National Capital
(1)
National
Dabt
(2) |
national.
Yoporty
(1) a. % 
of (2)
1878 736 (<) 8548 8.6
1914 650 14300 4.5
1911-13 676 <» 13090 5.1
1926-23 754/o) 24570 30.7
1932-34 765^ 25560 30.0
1953 26144 116465 22.4
W 26670 123026 21.7
1955 27021 131758 20.5
<•)
(o)
1887
1927
(6) 1912
(*) 1933
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So far, national debt baa bean diaeusaed froa the point of view of 
the short run - i.e. gs an imtxwont in the hands of the aonetary outho~ 
rltiof? fox the purpoee of tb" coorwy. Thio is by no necnc
the aid of the debt story. National debt has its relationship with 
•WWtttc growth. It is difficult, indeed, to analyse this aspect in full 
detail as in the coee of national debt end nonetsry policy. Ibr this 
reason, end for lagfe of spaco, the discussion will be confined to
L*
. •' —•■■'. 'i' ■ v
We have aeon in Chapter III that an important 2 
expenditures is devoted to investment ** that is, hd ftrw ■ tSo line -
turo. Skis pox’tion of the budget usually records an annual deficit 
financed, in port, by borrowing fro^ the public.
hence, this Part (in offset CSwter Wt) is concerned with the 
eaalyaio of ^arerment expenditures and their impact on growth. Also we 
shall invosti^tc the methods of fimnoinc such expenditures.
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It io nov canoruily rocoGniaod, es fc result of the wonts of the l$5o’o 
vith the revival of oonfictemco in tlie offoctivoness of no^taxy policyt 
that both monetary cad fiscal policy oui liovo lnport&nt effocte on the 
course of ooonouiic events < It booou<i3 thftt the objective of
ccoaxiic stability W k® attuned by .i&am of various oorabination© of
amatory and fiscal masuros.
'
to stabilising the eooncety ageinat the duj&we of inflation. Our interest*
boro io in fiacrl policy (apocilicnlV aovemaaent expenditures end thoir 
4Oil tho TUrtionai debt) fro.i the point of view of loxi^-run ©canonic 
Growth.
5k * '' * -■» ■; ’ i?®>5 • "'• i_\ •' ■•'■ +■ $ ’ •'*.. \ *.. • . t' * .^'(••' -4 xi * • a ‘ : y^-- j » ■• *••.: i ’
fiscal policy has generally been discussed, in a static or Keynesian 
eottiiic;, in tame of one objective - that io of cehisrvinc a fiUlMKiployuant 
level of inoocie. By various oo^jinationc of coverraent expenditure© and 
tax receipt©, the flood authorities cun attain this incme level. Along 
those lines fiscal polio;/ has gained a iiif.'r. repute, hearing aside politi­
cal end administrative considerations, there appears to be at the preeent 
tine widespread confidence in the ability- of fiscal neasuses to achieve
and to maintain a £iill~a?>plo;/nent income level.
However, i&ie apparent success on the part of fined laoasuree in
stabilising the economy has no corresponding success in ttic field of
economic growth. Discussions in dyneiaic tsodele, or steadily growing ocoao-
nics, have boon carried on with little attention to tlie role of fiscal 
X
policy in economic growth. It Ixas been assumed that fox’seraont activities 
do not exist, and correspondingly models were set up almost oxclusivoly in 
terms of private-spending decisions uninfluenced by the xnsblic policy.
In effect, there is no dbviouc reason why fiscal policy should be less 
effective in naintainisig a steady rate of growth than in achieving & full- 
employment income level. Placed moacureu arc indeed as potent in a dyacois 
as in a coarparr^voly static sotting.
Discussing the significance of fiscal polio;- on economic growth, we shall 
concentrate on the expenditure side of the budget (i.o. ignoring taxation), 
public expenditures did not, however, receive much or s&tisfectcgy interest
1. Soe 2.P. Hearod, 'JowtgCc a ■ ceixc-lca. London 19&8j B. 3osar,
Sk^EjQSaBZabafe s.x; 1957.
2. fhio is net to say that govenimont activities have been completely 
ignored. Tlioy Iwe been treated os of minor importance.
3. Sone efforts were undo to evolve fiscal policy, e.g. J.G. Gurley, 
"fiscal Policy in & Crowing Qoanofiy", Jeter- Pol, fcon.. beeeofcsr 1953, 
??• 523*35> W. Staith, "Itonstory'-l^actf Mffijy and hooxuxsio Growth", 
Quart-,, Jour. £teoa., Pohruory 1957, PP* 36-5$; A.?. Peacock and J.
iron ocomisto or students of public finance. As Lovell ilarriss put it, 
**Wh© tronondouo growth of gcvernaent e^pbftditvooe.••has been one of the 
striking oconorcic developments of recent years, Economic analysis of 
those chances has dealt primarily with the probable effects on the levels 
of cssploynent and prices* The economic effects of socio specific typoo of 
apondin.; have boon studied. On the whole, however, the analytical results 
are generally unsatisfactory* Jconouiota spedalisin^ in public finance 
have generally ooncenir&tod on taxation. Perhaps there is not meh nore 
that the economist can Sey about spending. The nature of the problems, 
especially the unavailability of a basis for appraising results, uake 
study difficult, □eooriptioa, plus the statement of rather obvious yen ora 
Itties, sway about exhaust the posaisilitios.** Of course, this inadequate
interest cannot be justified in our oaso where government expenditures 
account for a little lose than of the national incase.
Goveqteuent expenditures were considered, in the Keynesian theory or the 
Msrostatic nodel, as an dement of economic stability. Since the Second 
World War, the growing interest in the problems of economic dynamics and 
growth luw otinulntod a further interest in px&lic aeponditurs.
Xn offset, t ; theory of ooonouic growth which incorporates the role
-■wuSSW
1. C. Lowell Ilcrriss, "Publlo 3Uaanoe"» A LXa*va?, of CouuawcgaKf Lo(fy?'rt<l,r 
cd. B.». Iloley, 1252, „» 261-62.
of the public sector (particularly public expenditures) night he useful 
in the explanation of the growth process. By the anno token, ve can do 
little with a theory which ignores the public sector altogether, or treats 
it as an unfortunate nuisance. iSoono^data who developed the static 
Keynesian models considered that aggregate govemDent ejqdndirure should 
either he loft outside the system of mtual determination of the economic 
models or assumed to he 2are* For examplo. 2. Borasr soys, w0n the demand 
side ve shall time }wvs««# consumption (i»c. consumer expenditures> and 
investment (private capital formation) and, of course, tho government 
(expenditure on goods and services)♦ Ao usual, the government is tho roost 
troublesome of the three because we have no theory of government expendi­
ture whatsoever. Ir. its absence, xre nay dsasp gcremnent ***?*» on
top of the other two as an exogenous factor, merge it with consumer expen­
ditures# «• or assuKao it awsy el together# £he last suggestion io certainly
• W* *4S(#r—— wf * f *»■»<A , cwu m » wtWfeoent of a txmiblesoac factor Is
richly supported rroccdentc in economic thooxy<** Clearly* government 
-ccpendxturo . ere not usually non-ad.3tcnt, end it is inrplsuaiblc to argue 
•a# 1# neither influenwm •concede r-out: nor la Itself Influenced tow 
that growth.
HBmaawn atKOait'JWMiiatuntuuCTfB
>• aJoixor, op* cit. ♦ 3? • 2c
Section 3
Govemjaant expenditures, reaching more than of the national 
income after the second war, hove attracted considerable public interest 
in recent yeers. The growth of government expenditure, with all the 
controversy surrounding it, has not boon confined to Sri tain. It is 
common to iaoct, if not all, of the advanced countries (the United States, 
loanee, Germany? ©to.). In almost all thee© economies, the public sector 
(providing the public g*oods) has become the most important single factor 
in the oconcxay, rsaobisig ebout So of ;ational inoocio. Lowell Harriss, 
for example, on the Anericcn economy> writes that /’the biggest buyer, the 
biggest omployer, tho biggest lender, the biggest &iv<sr...ia the federal 
government. ?ror: birth#..to death, from naming to night, sometliing dona 
tlwcucr government impinges on uo. In fact, the fate of mankind, the 
checking of tho monstrous evil that threatens tho world, hinges upon tho
.\5*r, , /** ”/• • / f • > ' -*«/•' }•- Ortr-* ?-• / ’ ‘4--v ;-
spending of our government."
Why hem government axpo/ises risen? It is not, of course, difficult 
to find the reasons for the growth in the absolute volume of public spent
in any country as national incono rises. In this respect, Harries oitos
«. •• " • . ....■- 3
& list of reasons; among the moat ixqportant * *
* overwhelmingly, the biggest reason !□ vsr and araaaents.
1. Table 39.
2. African boonagy, P-136.
>» Xtifet ?• Ito-
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* a second reason io an indirect result of war, the increase in prices.
Just to keep doing the anne things coats more money,
* increasing population, and growth of the area of the country, account 
for some of the increase.
* xa&snisation has ployed a part. Xn cities peoplo turn to collective 
action for aone things that persons in amdler oomnunities and on 
ftous provide for xhcaoelvest police and fire protection, water, parks 
and sewers.
* the “wuto" has greatly stimulated fwornnent spending*
- toianitarianisn offers part of th© answer. We will not tolerate the 
nzisery that earlier levels of welfare and hospital standards implied.
- pressure groups end a growing willingness of the public to use govern­
ment to help one group at others' espouse.
‘ '■ ■ A iSfL'5/ «vT’- *jb .Jw fAiift*6 'Jf£ xT A1. £ : . > • i-ni'''.7-'!’'.
- ’’increased intordependonco” has added to the demands for goveruaout 
regulation. The common and general interest ax tends more broadly and 
into acre things as occnocdc and social life became more conplex. Coao 
of our common interest will be protected adequately only by government.
j
□iecucsiuTj oono of thee© factors in acre detail, we see that the 
growth of public expenditure has boon profoundly influenced by changes in 
the prices of goods purchased by the government and in the salaries paid 
to employees in government service. A further influence of obvious impor­
tance is the growth in population. The donend for government services 
must depend, at least to some extent, upon the numbers able to benefit free 
them.
War dominates all other cause a of increased spending. However, the 
growth rata remains formidable even if wo allowed for rise in population
6%
and price level increases. Tabla 133 allows tho groat increase in govern­
ment spending (per head of population at constant prices; from 1790 to 
1%1.
Again, as a community become richer it becomes uore inclined to take 
some part of its increasing income in the form of public rather than 
private consumption -i.o. px&lioly-provided goods and services. CSio 
extent of tide, however, depends upon tho level of Incom, the rate of 
development of tho comunity concerned, and the tqstos and preferences of 
its citizens. The growth in dUsacad for putlicfy-P^vidol goods and 
servioes as income rises is unlikely to be identical for all countries or 
at all stages of economic development.
• ;? A ' t-.r* ••! ? 1', ’ -C* *1 ' •/' ’’few 1 I ilg. '••'■ i r ' -’>A. 'r" .3'
lastly• the process of economic growth brings with it an increasing 
complexity in social and economic relationship. hence, increasing public 
expenditures become a necessary condition for such things. Increased 
expenditures of other kinds (cud; ao expenditure on what is called 
”infrastructure" investment) are regarded by many authorities as a pre­
requisite for continuous and stable economic growth, rather than simply 
as the consequence of such growth.
Such expansion in the volume of public expenditure, over a period 
when national inoone le growing, my mean an increasing, decreasing or 
constant ratio of public axpendituro to the national income. However, by 
the above-mentioned factors, we aay expect an absolute increase in gavara- 
aent expenditure. But they do not indicate eny particular size or ratio 
of increase of the public sector relative to national income tliat cun in 
some way be demonstrated to be "right”.
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Section C
Tho range of expenditures for whicn. the government is reeponelhlc 
usually vary from one aottatzy to another according to certain cireuaotaaces 
such as the exiotinc states of development, industrial patterns, political 
attitude and the like. In Britain, noro than a third of tho national 
income is spent today through ewwnxt bends. How did this high propor­
tion cons into existence? How was it spent in such a way as to contribute 
to the economic growth of this country. In order to answer these suosticna 
VC start with a brief historical review on the growth and structure of the 
ecqpendituresj then w novo to their role in economic growth.
The courcoc used in this historical review are Peccock and Wiaeasn, 
and Veverka.1* t Their enalyscc show the grovth of expenditure by all public 
authorities including the central government, local authorities and social 
insurance funds. Government expenditure means net expenditure, and tills 
excludes all expenditures financed out of proceeds from sales to other 
sectors. Item© which appear twice in govcanwwnt account, such as central 
government grantc to loot J authorities, arc excluded. The period of 
analysio is divided by our sources into two parts i 1 ??C-139C, and 1390* 
1961.
1. A.T. Peacock and J. Visesan, op. olt.l Chapter 3> J. Veverka, "The 
Growth of Public ilxpandituro in ilia United since 1790”, doot.
Jour, Pol«_ Scon., lAcbruary 1963, pp. Ill-127•
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LiacgroGuent about scope of governmezit io in part an ' economic” issue* 
Deoieione on ^overmen! spending inevitably involve political end social 
questions. Sincere end informed risn differ widely. Sons of us favour, 
others fear, big govemnent. Thoec differences Influence conclusions 
about the more specifically oconcriic questions.
J.S. Hill, representing the general :iinetecnth-centuxy attitude 
toward© government expenditure (cad national debt), was in favour of the*. ♦ V
idea that the level of govemnent expenditure had to be miniraiaod to the
level of providing protection, to the country and the naintensnee of lew
i
and order. This attitude was so universal that it is difficult to detect 
in the history of British public finance of the period soy pronounced 
disagreement* Etw. Table 182 it is possible to draw sone conclusions 
illustrating the narrowness of ninstecnth-ce&tuxy conceptions about the 
function of government.
Government expenditure, after recording a total of 123 L.a. in 1814 
during the bbpolocuic Vars, declined to ?O h.&* in 1820. It regained 
fairly constant in size until the period of the Crinecn Var (1354-56), then 
rose to 87 b.a. in i860 end continued to rice slowly tJiroughout the 18?C*s* 
In 1080, during the period of the Lulu Vrars, cocpendituro jumped to 123 L.n*, 
then reached a pod. of 265 L.n* in 1900, at the time of the Boer War.
To draw a realistic picture of the increase in importance of the w
1. John Stuart mil, -uSSSSSX (Atfiley Haitian),
London 1909 > Book 7, Chapter XI.
goven^Gnt- wo shall discuss public cuependitare, not only In absolute 
amounts but also in rel-tion to gross national produce (G.K.P.). Table 
182 shows that the proportion of total govorment expenditure to C.B.F. 
was around 12 before the Napoleonic bare. Shan a higher ratio (29 in 
181A) persisted for some time, but rotumed to the old level by W.
This decline was the result of the prevailing attitude to public expen* 
dituro, and to the fact that the governments of the tine were actively 
concerned to prevent a permanent upward Ziift In the public sector ao a 
consequence of those ware. The chare of government expenditure In G.K.P. 
has thus rooorded, during the second half of the oontury, a slow decline 
reaching a ratio of in 1890. This oo&pnrGs with a share of 26 '* in 
1920, in W and 36; in 1%1. ?
Structure of expendituret At tho end of the Napoleonic Were, 
expenditure was composed of tlsroo uua»in itcrast contra! govexment expendi­
ture on debt interest; military expenditure; and local govermaat expen­
diture on poor relief.
The sisie of debt interact vs© restricted, if not actively reduced, 
from that time until the beginning of tho ioer War. Consequently, it 
became a snail or proportion of national product. The costs of defence 
moved in an opposite directive from that of debt internet payments. dras­
tically reduced after the Napoleonic Vara, they gradually increased after 
the Crhaoan far and always constituted a mjor portion of government 
arpanditure.
^finally the residual (which largely represented local government 
expenditure) rose from X« of gross national product In 13bl to 5 in 1890* 
During this period ♦ there wna a strikin’; development in the oiaso and 
character of local govemaent QKpenditure* At the beginning of the nine* 
toer.ti century» the major function of loerf. :cvoiwx-Uv uuc Ike organisation 
end provision of poor relief, but by 18%', expenditure had inerouesd to 
five tlaee the 1880 level* The other important developmt vm the 
diversity in services undertaken. An improved road system was created; 
greater attention mm paid to public health and housing; oleo the local 
authorities began to receive grants from. the central goventaent to era- 
courage individual schools.
Xt may be concluded that rapid industrialization oust hare brought 
with it a considerable expansion In "soc^i overhead capital.” During the 
oecond half of tho century> capital expenditure by local government on 
roada and other ©canonic services be^an to increase at a rate faster then 
the rate of growth of national product. 3ut in absolute size, ouch 0290a- 
diturc was still I'smarkcbly snail, and as uo have seen, total government 
expenditure did not constitute an increasing share of national income over 
the JHM period.
Vs now iTOve to the period since 1890 md examine government expenditure 
from the point of view of its secular gtfovth an vail as changes in the 
proportion of government expenditure to G-l. P. This period has experienced 
a considerable growth in govomiaont ©xpaiditere. This is still true ©von
'Sowar&a the end of the last century expenditure started to grow at a
faster rate, and since 1890 the rate was 3<7’, almost twice the average 
1in the preceding Ixndred years. Moreover, the rate of growth ore?? the 
period was considerably greater then that of the G.li.P. 2heee develop* 
manta have resulted in the ’bi#4’ rsoveonxiiont of today#
As we shall see in the next section, this ’“big” govcrnmeiit moemo that
f
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government expenditure has played a major part in the oouatxy’s economic
not. hone economists point to the peaoibility of "creeping oonoorvatisa"
that may characterise the near future. If this happens, it will lead to
including outlays that aid gro’.'th.
> rt • ■ n F -»■'.
■‘ * ’• 14S& i?Sf 'I.?*.
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he have already examined the growth pattern of government expenditure 
frea the viewpoint of the behaviour of gross eapsnditaa and concluded thtfl 
government expenditure conaiitutea. ■nowadays, a portion of the 
national income.
.. ...........a
1. J. Yavex&c, 5£. Cit.. Table XI, p. U6.
Tho gradual growth of public utilities, tho incrorsing concern of 
the government over tho last S mired years with social services, tho
post-war nationalisation of son© of tho basic industrial
2 *.r" W • < J ?•’ 4-*- ' ' ♦ • v“- ■ i -i •’*'
increased scope of local authorities’ activities have together conferred 
on public authorities today responoibiliti' for & wide variety of
ranging fror- education and health to r&Hvcys and power. Our aim, now, is
-
to show hov important government expenditures have been in the country’s 
©ooncmic development. for thia purpose, government expenditures (central
goveinimont only) cro broken low into current end capital outlays, or shave
and below the lino.
“tn
The "eJbove-the-llne" expenditures involve (Tables 194*5)»’
Ft • • • ? ■ •i- •
(a) consolidated fund services which include debt service (i.e. interest 
payments above the line, sanagenent and expenses of the national debt 
and sinking fund), Horthem Ireland (share of reserved taxes, etc.) and
E-S" ' <;-'&»• other consolidated fund services.
■V ’’dK:'l», -V-, -M»k
(b) supply cervices whioh include national defence, justice, internal 
order and regulation, education, health, transport, relief end social
t, aid for snocial group® (agriculture and food subsidies), eto.
The ’’belov-tJw-line” itan includes capital outlay® which a&y be 
classified into (Table 186): interest on the national debt, loans to 
nationalised industries, to other public bodies (such as local authorities), 
to private industries, overoeaa cMietme, etc. . In other words, most of 
the below-tho-line expenditure;; consist of repayable loans under various
»■ »- v.ta
&// •. acts: Hjf :' ’j ■ .
1« See also in.
r. v. ’ > .» .
_____________________________
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(a) (the j loasis to the nationalised Indus tries and other public
corporations* Table 187 shows that these loazis hav© greatly itici'*©aced 
fron of total capital spending 1953 to 62/ in 1%2. They have 
increased chiefly because of tho docij/no in the of gwmMr.t
securities. This itosn nay be classified into two rrouoa for finanoin,^
(i) the £irst /rrrnrn inclu&ec tiie il&ticiial Coal Board© tho
Kcw Town Bevelopwnt Ocrpozetices, and tlie Scottish Special 
Pausirw- Association. which throughout their existence have 
obtained their capital frosa the Itcchcquer and have set had
power to borrow ©Xscwhera.
{ii) the other group consists uaiaiy of the Central *4 ©ctri^i ty 
Authority and Acottiah Boards* the Gas Council, the British
have power under their prospective statutes to raise noncy 
needed on ffftpitK* account ©gainst laarket issues of stock
which the govern xmi twv guarantee.
(b) interest on the national debt below the line, which lias also 
increaood £ron 9/ to 1#/ over the period 1953-62.
(c) loans to public bodies which, by contrast, have swiftly declined 
freaa ?J$ in 1953 to 12$ in 1962. The reason for this decline is tfast,
dice October 19551 governient policy has been that local authorities 
should, as far as possible, raise the capita’ they rood on the M&&& 
in order to reduce the cello on tho .^chequer* and the fublic works 
Loan Board lias been asked to consider local authorities* ability to 
rales cool tai on reasonable i^ryy; fro^ other source a when dealin ? with•*• ***FMF. "F^WF B'' J* ,Z*** ’Fw ** - * F»F • M MB ’F M^BlF ** ♦ *FF MM MF ™F M“B^B M* M. , •*" FB t^r Bmf Bb ^MM MF MW
applioutione for loans."2
i« !Ss2^afe-2£i24Ssasa» **■* *» »• <&•
8. White Paper, "Govemcent iSrpandite ra below the Lifts", April 1961, 
Cnai. 1338, iftam. ««>, p. U.
__________________ _____ _________ j _ ■■■:"
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(d) loans to pi'ivate Industries and to overseas comprise a small 
element, about 7^*«
(•) the remaining items (about 2^) fall into two groupsI
(i) the first are expenditures arising from war-time 
liabilities (i.e. war damage payments, post-war 
refunds oi excess profits tax, and repayment of 
post-wax* credits)*
(li) the second group mainly comprises advances for 
central government expenditure when the oommon 
feature is the desire to spread out the capital pay­
ments concern d over a period of years.
Table 45* on the structure of government expenditures, shows that the 
capital or "below-the-llne" expenditures form a considerable and Increasing 
item* They increased from 15$ of Exchequer spending in 1949/50 to 22$ in 
1961/62.
Tax* 8 are not the only source of government funds; borrowing is 
/mother. The ^overnme^t borrows to finance its capital expenditures. 
Usually the ”below-the-line” budget records an annual deficit financed, 
in pert, by borrowing from the public. It is true that borrowing from the 
public played a minor role during the 1950*81 an overall deficit of 
2755 U.m. (1950*62, Table 46) w s met by a net increase of 549 L.m. of 
marketable securities (Table 49)» but the net increase in total borrowing 
was only 108 L.m. (Table 47) • However, the continuous growth of debt 
over the same period whs a oonse uenoe of the increase by 1471 L.m. 
in the holdings of the public sector, l.e. the National Debt 
Commissioners and the Bank of iMgland (Table 49).
To draw a conclusion on the 'Whole situs tian, wo find that the continued 
increase in "beiow-the-lino" outlaws has produced considerable assets to 
the govoivur-ont as veil as a considerable increase in the debt. While the 
total debt has incrc'-sed by 2752 I.ffi* during the period 1951-62, the esti­
mated assets of the governsnont increased by 5943 b.a. (Table 188). In 
other words, government assets as a ratio cf its liabilities (fron the 
national debt) were continuously increasing - from 16> to 33* Hence, 
against the great bulk of the new borro\i.r<;, the govarsinent acquired more 
assets. Such financial assets (Tables 189-90) represent oleins to the 
repayment of money which the govcnwnt has lent to ethers. It made the 
loans to enable those others to construct or acquire tangible assets. 5br 
example, a total of 4152 I.a. (or 42/ of total assets) was lent to nationa­
lised industries for capital development (excluding the railways deficits)> 
3936 L.ta. (or 4€J$) to other public bodies of wiioh 2633 b.n. to local 
authorities for new houses, schools cuid other capital works and 294 L»a. 
to construct new towns. The rest ere loans to private industries, loons 
for oversees assistance and other advnncee. To repeat, va have to renestow 
that tho finance for the goveranont1© capital purposes has not been provide! 
entirely by borrowing.
a e a • a
•Turning from the financial aide of the picture to the physical aide,
we continue the orgunont from the point of view of invesfeamt and capital 
formation. The importance of capital formation in economic growth is wall
known. Capitol formation lies at the heart of the growth process. The 
rise in the level of living depends upon, end is reflected in, the acqui­
sition of more and bettor capital goods, both privately end publicly owned 
-i.o. f&ctox’iea and highways, apa&taenta and poet offices, stores and 
water supply systems, theatres and parks. here, saving is nocoosary for 
capital i oration. If the gcvexwucnt is tc invest, it met do soao caving 
Yet it can rely upon private searing.
Ac expected, the public sector (i<c, the central government, local 
authorities and public corporations) causes a coneideruhle amount of tho 
country's capital formation. Table 1$1 shove that between 1946 and 1962, 
the portion of fixed capital formation in the hands of the public sector 
increased from 3CJJ» to of the total (a comparison with the pre-war 
period would be still acre striking), This amount nay be divided into: 
capital formation of public corporations, end that of other public bodice 
(including local authorities). As demonstrated in Table 192, fixed 
capital formation of public corporations has grown enormously both in 
absolute terns and in yercentcgo. It is clear from the table that the 
great absolute increase occurred after 1946 j capital formation rose froa 
16 L.n. in that year to 160 L.a. in 1943. As a ratio of total capital 
formation of the public sector, it also increased from >1 tn 1936 to Wf* 
in 1955 (the last figure available).
The cEcpectod reason beldad this increase is that the public utilities 
in any advanced country (such as railroads, electric light and power, gaa, 
water, etc.) account for a large fraction of total invested capital, cron
/
4
by eooparison with heavy usnufiwturing industries such as iron and steel. 
Moroovor. tho post-wcr nationalisation has transferred to the State a lores 
anount of enterprises. However, with regard to th© share of the publio 
sector no a whole in cross capital formation, we find that it fell free 
48, to 4£, between 1950 and 1%2 (Table 191). This decline is the conse­
quence of the slower rate of increase of oil er public sector investoo.it 
rather tlien changoc in tho public cor orrtions’ share.
In order to neet the need for funds for the financing of a distinctly 
high proportion of capital foroation, tho xevomnont relics to a consider* 
able extent upon private saving, i.©. raising funds for capital projects
’* - > * 8t < *■* * •> •*1; v,. _ * j' ’< h * 4.' .- ' r y*;
by borrowing. In fact, it is not possible to demonstrate statistically 
the nethods of financing tho capital formation of the public sector. Xt 
nay be onou^pi, in this setting, to repeat that the 3xchequer supplies loans 
(financed in part by borrowing) to nationalised industries, local authori­
ties and other public bodies to carry on with their invostaent plans. 
Moreover, govarmont guaranteed securities play on important pert in finan­
cing public corporations. Perhaps Table 193 is useful to show one part of 
public sector -i.o. public corporations. Cross fixed capital formation 
vac 586 L.m. in 1955 > of which 142 t.»* or was financed by loans from 
the IkchoQuer *fc and 371 L.ta. or 63* by issuing stocks.
64?
1. And tho Mxeheguer, in turn, borrows frer, the public.
6^8
It ie now clear that the accuBxulaticn of debt Is a purfc of the 
growth prooeoe, but the rate of ocourculatior. Is not related, by a simple 
constant to the rice of incane« She proportion of the outstanding debt 
to the national income appears to record a continuous decline over the 
1950’s )• Thia proposition depends upon how rapidly income is
growing. It becomes relatively slow if incorac is growing swiftly; high 
if income growth ie alow* The stock of debt changes slowly enough fox* 
variations in the growth rate of Incone to effect significantly the 
debt-income relationship. Maticml income has doubled during the 1950! a 
wlfle debt increased by only 10^ (Tables 7t,7|«
V ;t®W : ■ ''.A' KV^w,< ~ ^-■' 1
a,.. .. -r< ** j «>' <• M ' ? '- ‘ i „,a' ' 'jj
>3-#•• •>- $ -' - 5r- ' • • — •- • ' ■ ‘ ’
•'v •' ■•S • 'i* ’P'M| W,< “ tSw ,i«« .“" J&'. ' .?® i'<.
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Table (182)
Government Expenditure and G.E.P. 
(current Erioee)
(1)
Total Gor*t 
Expenditure
(2)
G.N.P.
(1) «
% of 
(2)
1790 I 23 186 12
1800 67 . 308 22
1810 94 407 23
1814 123 418 29
1820 70 403 17
1890 69 » 438 15
. 1*° 64 598 11
1890 '; ' 64 562 11
1860 I 87 [ 778 11
1870 98 988 9
1880 112 1132 10
1890 123 1468 8
1900 265 1840 14
1910 258 2143 12
1920 1992 6070 26
1926 1107 4303 26
1932 1138 3973 29
1938 1587 5294 30
1946 4530 3778 52
1951 5217 12926 40
1956 6688 18373 36
1981 Qnng 23701 38
Table (183)
Oownaawt Expenditure 
1790 - 1961
£.a.
“Total Gwerreaent Sj^eaditwre" Index 1790 « 100
______________ I
VU
At Oonatant 
prioea
AWPer head at 
Constant prloe
v) (2)
I
18 —-lyr-------- 1»....... '"T06
1800 36 2.3 197 180
1810 44. 2.6 256 191
1820 u 2.1 239 169
iajo 69 2.0 266 166
I960 66 1.7 ! 250 160
1850 <1 2.2 330 179
1860 72 2.5 393 202
1870 76 2.6 402 191
I860 100 2.9 562 252
18J0 126 3.4 687 272
1900 265 4.4 1661 519
1910 268 5.5 1369 hj.i.
1920 569 13.® 3096 1048
1926 560 11.9 2938 960
1932 639 13.9 3677 1113
19» 969 17.9 6619 1666
1966 1652 29.5 7900 2379
1951 1362 27.1 74.10 2185
1956 1393 27.2
I
2196
1961 1616 30.6
1
8792 2668
----------- —
Table (184)
Above the Line Ea^jenditures 
(Years ended 31 st Larch)
, 53/53j 53/54 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 58/59 59/60 6Q/61»—.■  —— 61/62
Consolidated Fund Services 667 675 665 744 824 782 786 742 798 L 867
National Defence 1404 1364 1636 1405 1525 1430 1466 1476 1596 1689
Hone Department, Law A Justice 75 80 82 81 89 99 W3 94 106 120
Education and Broadcasting 288 303 338 378 634 481 523 215 204 247
Health, Housing & Local Government SB - 619 652 750 782 794 1209 1384 1417
Agriculture and Food 390 294 327 311 343 295 321 337 416
Pensions, National Insurance A Ji -
National Assistance
618
I...
432
f
463 490 575 1 610 634 658
Other Expenditure^ 1*7 . 1463 453 677
[III-11 I II' r
\ 472 513 559 577 728 821
TOTAL 63* 4275
L-
6305i 4496
^4868 6920 5103 52V+ jrsr
Table (1%)
Above the Line Expenditures 
(Years ended 31st iiaroh)
10
10
100 100
5S/6O 6C/61 61/62
100 i100
Table (186)
Below the line /expenditures 
(Tears ended 31st Larch)
53/53 ; 55/54 ■ 54/55 55/56 56/57— 57/53 W59 59/60 6^61 61/62
Interest qb the National Debt
I --—-------— ------ - - ;—-----1
64 I
87 ,°P| 119 ! 147 '
—■—«■■■■ I,.- .
170 206 2U 274
—
325
Loans to Nationalised Industries
___________ 4
41 I— ---J W 120 156
t 774 1083 1069 1110 1060 1129
Loans to Other Public Bodies
Loans to Private Industries —
491 &5~ 401 314 f170 " 196 111 aa 111 194
• A.-.. . 4 13 49 65Loans to Overseas Assistance 8
_ __ -_
6 a 11 12 10 28 58 67 70
xayraentB Arising frcsa ,.ar-tirae 
Liabilities 811
96 60 47’ 43 40 36 77fc> ;>:S.~ .
32 25
Other Advances 11 * 11 53 I 30 7 5 3 - R 5
TOTAL.. . - : '
(W- 587
I 
704 j 760 1176 1451 1455 1593 1598 1813
(a) Additional to the interest charged to the Consolidated Fund.
Table (137)
Belov the line expenditures 
(Tsars ended Ji at Maresh)
5^53 52/54 54/55 5V56 56/57 >//58 58/59! 59/60 6C/61 61/62
Interest on the National Debt
---
%2 14.8 ! 14,8 15.7 ] 12.5 11.7 14.2 15.3 17.1 17.9 ;
Loans to Nationalised Industries 5.9 7.0 17.0 65.8 70.8 73.5 69.7 66.3 62.2
Loans to Other Public Oodles
Loans to Private Industries
70.5 60.2 1 57.0 49.2 14.5 13.5 7.6 ! 5.5 7.0 10.7
* * vs
■,, ......
* 0.8.. 3.1 3.6Loans to Overseas Assistance 1.2 no 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.7 1.9 3.7 4.2 3.9
i>yiaenta Arising from s/ar-tiiae 
Liabilities
11.6 | 1.6 16.40.6
8.5
1.6
f
r---
---
-«
L"
 
i 
IaJ
p 
V •> 2.8 2.5 4.3 2.0 1.4
Other Advances 7.0 0.5 0.3 0.2t
0.3 0.3
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 fuh-llJXj.■wetwj-w100 100 100 100 I
Table (166)
The Growth of Governaaent Capital Liabilities and Assets 
(at J1 at March in each year)
1951 1»2 1953..... ..... i 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
- national Debt 25922 25391 26051 26583 26934 27039 27008 27232 27376 27733 28252 28674
? • Kxehequers*
Assets 4037 4308 4651 49® 5660
u»r,
6082
-----U-.
6111 6815 7309 7944 8547 9980
2) «% or (1) 15.6 1U 17.9 18.5 21.0 f 22.$ 22.6 25.0 26.7 28.6 30.3 34.8
Assets of the Exchequer at 31 at Larch in each year
___________ _______________________________ _ _____ _ _____ L.w.
Table (189)
1952 1953; '954 '955 '956 1957 1956 '959 1960 1961 1962
1 - Loans to nationalised industries 280
----- --
361 ..442 543 657 --- 1----1000 —J43O 192 2510 2896 4131
2 • Loans to other public bodies 2030 2463 2740 3080 3403 3520 3610 3591 3561 3546 3581
3 - Loans to private industries etc. 13 62 125
4 - Loans to overseas assistance 49 55 57 63 71 31 87 106 _ 150 211 273
3 • Other Advances 24 25 22 '5 14 15 16 8 6 5 5
6 - Total below the line advances 
outstanding (1-3) 2403 2902 3261 3701 4123 4616 5143 5640 6240 6720 8135
7 * Other Assets '9® '749 1668 '959 '957 '495 1672 1663 J2SL 1827 1847
Total Estimated Assets (6+7) ! 4308 465' 4929 5660 6082 6111 6815 7308 7944 8547 1 9982
Assets of the Exchequer at 31st March in each year
Table (190)
s®
h":, . ' ' . J 1952 1953 195k j 1955 1956C— 1957 j 1958—-—-1959 5 i960 , 1961 1962
• Loans to nationalised industries
47.6
7.8 9.0 9.6 10.4- T —-J
16.4 I 21.0 26.5 31.6-- - ! 33.9 41.6
2 - Loans to other public bodies 52.9 55.6 54.4 56.0L .. •— 57.6 53.0 49.1 44.8-- s—— 41.4—- - 35.9
3 - Loans to private industries etc. - i *■ 0.2i-,,.—--_ 0.7— 1.2 I1► - Loans to overseas assistance r 13 M "172 1.1 ■ iar f.3' T.3 1.5 1.9 2*5 2.7
!| • Other advances 0.6 0.5 Q.V 0.3 0.2-_— 0.2 0.2—,0.1L.--- 0.1;--- - 0.1 0.1
> - Total below the line advances 
outstanding (1-5) (55.8 62.4 66.2
h~
65.4 567.8 75.5 75.5 >7.2 78.5 78.6 81.5
7 • Other assets |Mh2 37.6 33.8 34.6 J32.2 24.5 124.5 22.8—.——p.5 21.4---- 18.5
Total Assets (6+7) I 100 100L
100 100
*  i,——-
j 100 100I 100 ! 100 I 100 100 100 I
Table (191)
Groat Fixed Capital Faaa&tlon 
(at current prices)
£»ab
% I
MKUc 
fleetor
Private 
beetor Total...
Public
Sector
Private
Sector I Total
1938 183 473 I 656 26 72 100
1946 275 . 650 I 925 30 70 100
1%3 67» 764
. L 1435 47 53
100
1950 820 880
I
1700
!
M 52 100
1991 986 896 1884 52 46 100
1952 1168 938 I 2106 25 45 100! |
1953 1313 1046 j 2359 56 44 100
1954 1 1297 1255 2552 51 49 100
1955 I 1300 1508 aso8 46 54 100
1956 1379 1731 i jug Mb 56 100
1957 1472 1918 3390 h w 57 100
1958 1474 2012 3486 • * 58 100
1959 1576 tIM 3719 42 58 100
19(0 1657 2448 4105 MG <0 100
i 1961 I 1799 2778 | 4577 j 39 61 100
• 1962 i 1940 2663 4606 1*9 58 } 100tx vf.
Sottroet National and. LX^nditure*
Table (192)
Gross Fixed Capital Fonaation of tiw Hihlic boctar
11
i
i=t=5«=s==aswand
.Z?;.;Z j', h ■ -Z ■■ %;. ■ |
Public
<x*rix>x*a.'ti©x'is
__, I , J *
GovwvnoiKS^
Total
Publio
bactcar
PidOle
Corporations
!' ', ■>'?' ;'r. <X;-\ ZZ
Total
A&lic
•actor
1938
' ■
10 173 183 5 » 100 -i
19b6 16 299 275 6 9b 100
19b8 180 491 <?» 27 73 100
1950 288 53*
819 J 35 65 100
1952 W9 755 • 116b It 35 65 100
195b 537 762 1299 59 100 ;
1955____ } 575 725 1JM 44 0
1001
: Peooook and Wiseaen, "The Growth of Public ilajpandito'e 
in tho United Kinaftra,1* P.128, Table 19.
Table (193)
Plaanolng of Public Cocparatiou Iiwesbaeat
ilia
% .
Loam ftaa
I •---- ■—
12 took Otbsr lotal
a'
Loaaftm
ft.« **
PArirtlrotocac
leaved
Other
Scuroe
..,IU.,1.,I.....SS=SS
! Total
1968 e J 1C0 40 212 30 * 10 100
1950 29 1<3 110 3ce 10I 56 36 100
1952 73 228 153 , & 16i 50 34 100
1953 I » | 2»9 189 447 9 49 42 100
1956 I 100 205 181 UB6 21 42 37 100
9955 142 371 73 586 ! * 63 13 100
■ e^tala gross Capital foaroation
Ibid. P.129, Table 21.
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Thia thcsic is ooncemed with the problesn of the British national 
debt during the period 125^-*^^» with opcsi-c! ref ©rone© to the nonotar^’ 
policy. i«he endyais io divided into tha follovring five peartsi*
Port On©
A statistical and historical review of the national debt is presented * 
i.e. its components (internal as wall au o^tainal) and the development of 
each lit»» The reasons behind the ievelopemit of the capital value of 
the debt are also explained. Major truro are alwet the single factor 
behind the development of the national debt throughout most of its history* 
This factor is traced for the period from near tho end of the scventoontti 
century until tbs end of tho Second World Var. However > nations! debt is 
still re wording a slow and continuous growth during th® peace period that 
follows. Lastly| this review is texninated by a doocription of the 
service of Wo national debts its components and implications with other 
variables such as the national income, government expenditures and taxation.
« art Two
T3“5O theme that dobt*managencnt end monetary policy "are one end indivisible^*
is developed in thia pert« A closed economy is assumed in the an&Xyuio
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Events of the 1930’s end the 1§4C*s ©ro <;ocer±be& with their inpaot os 
the nonettry jx>licty ae a means of control. During this jeriod fiscal 
policy took tho lead v-^&» o* s L-4«*iU j am ucnctaxy policy was disoorsiod
from the scene of economic stabilisation* iron the early 195(,s, however, 
it was reconsidered and activated* In tills respect, the 195$’s hare shown 
a obtuigo in tho objective of policy”- its new aim being to control the
whole liquidity of the eoouo^f5’ * i.e* the supply of loans erannatinc 
from th e financial Institutions, particularly the clearing bonks - 
rather than the traditional nsupply of 3KHttp*’» This now concept la 
expounded by the Icedcliffe Cosawittee und is met by strong criticism from 
different economists.-
The analysis of the control of bank advances necessitates introducing 
tiie clearing banks and the discount housesj their role in the financial 
system io also explained. Again, the X&$UY£ have seen a change in the 
technique and the working of tbs policy. The authorities, now,
work in term of contx’olling tho liquidity ratios of thw clearing bonks 
rather than tlielr cash ratios. This ncr; concept, which was recognised 
but not origin luted by the Jtadcliffe Committee, Ixoa proved more generally 
acceptable-
In order to control the liquidity ratios of the clearing banks, tho 
monetary authorities control the liquid assets available to them. In 
ether words, the authorities control tho supply of an itm of tho national 
debt« the market treasury b ills« Thio o« m be accomplished either (a)
indirectly, by onccm^aging other non*bank holders to compete with tho
clearing banks and the discount houses for the aaa® anouat of □arkct bills? 
or (b) directly, by inducing the supply of xawrieet treasury bills (i.e. by 
Anfitag).
This policy is than examined statistically and graphically ♦ Fron 
this investigation^ w© reach the following <xmc? usionsi
(1) Sogulating thr* ssarket treasury bills can srcccsafulfer 
©octroi the treasury bills uvuilubio to the clearing bonks 
and discount houses.
(2) There is a strong relationship between the behaviour of 
the treasury bills of the clearing bunks and discount 
houses end the liquid asset’? of tlie clearing banks.
(3) CbttMl in swrket treasury bills liave no strong lagoat 
on the behaviour of liquid assets of the clearing bank©- 
This saesna that the authorities are not able to control 
liquidity ratios of the clearing banks by changing the 
supply of reerkei treasury bills.
The last conclusion is explained iron two different points of views -
One believes still in the validity of the natural relationship between 
isarkot treasury bills and liquid osaots of the clearing banks, and 
that the negative result between the two is only due to MM “loop­
holes".
The other view denies "any" relationship between these two variables. 
There is nothing in the syoteo which stops the clearing banks ffcwa
increasing the supply of their advances.
The rest of Part Two is then devoted to a discussion of the laeaning 
of funding policy and dsbt-smu^enont in general. A critical study shows
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that the authorities vcre not p&rticul >rl;/ successful in their endeavour 
to fund a large port of the national debt. A major 'reason behind this 
failure v&s that the authorities were not prepared to pay sufficiently 
high rate© of intorost to attract holdose of long-teax. debt.
rqyt, 3yog
Prom a full account of the events of the period 1950*62 and the working 
of monetary policy» w realise an important fact. An itan of the national 
debt (marketable securities) has boon playing its role in reducing the 
effectiveness of the authorities’ control of bank advances. rJh© clouring 
banks could also escape the squeeze by holding a corifcrtnfcly higii ratio 
of liquid assets. A statistical and graphical examination confirms the 
fact that the banks liquidated a part of th-cir bonds in order to continue
with their advance© ewd/or to bolster their liquidity ratios against any 
squoesc. In this reepoct, it is proved that the bonks were not detorrod 
by rising interest rates (i.e* by capital Iocs) from such liquidations.
In other word©, the lock-in effect did not l ave any particular signifi­
cance. Finally t the sources of bank advances (sale of ±nvesteaentat a& 
CKcess of liquid assets and an incrosca in deposits) and the significance 
of each, are cxaciinod.
Kcn-bank financial institution sro also considered in our analysis 
SS & part of ths ‘'whole liquidity of tho economy**. However, tho signifi­
cance of some of them (i.e* savingc b&nlzs and building societies) derives
froa their deposits; of others (i.o* insurance cossponies’. fror. their 
assete. Concentrating tho ozialynic on t'nc iiuivrcuxc ocnpcadas, vo find 
that chcnges in their asset structure did not show a sigvdfieeni dcstehi- 
liaing behaviour. The trouble conos ;;uuLnly froa the activities of Uic 
clearing bonks. however, thio docs not noeji that the noaatcry authorities 
ccn i&aor o 4*,di,*fciu*iitr ins t— tutions un tne oyoratwrou ox etU>ilisation policar* ;
The capital issue r&rkct also provides a possible source of finance* 
The frustrated borrowers (i.e* quoted cagncnics) car, r^iioe the required 
funds on the mrket; , end rising interest I’ctee do not ncoru to have 
discouraged. the naw issues. What is noro iTqpcrtant is that control tlirou^ 
the Capital Issue Comittoe has recorded an slsost negligible effect on 
the street of issues. Perhaps a sign!floruit factor behind this failure 
is that the Comittce io a qualitative control rather then a quantitative 
one. Jly ■'";
The ecliianreoant of Lionctsry policy cs t tool of econosaic stcblXiG&tiatt 
appears to be insignificant* Bellowing this conclusion, a discussion 
starts. What con the authorities do Hunt they reinforce it by other 
^ensures or discard it in favour of other policies ouch rs fiscal policy, . 
selective control and direct control? The results of this discussion are*
(1) One plan, (which was put into effect during the period 
1260-62) suggests the anforccoent of nonet&ry policy by 
the “Special Deposit*• ttfcffift in order to stoxiliae & 
port of the banks’ liquid assets.
(2) Another plan (which ia still a txiooretical proposition)
calls for & ts&fae notification in the pises eat structure
f the mticxuf vl «>"*• * > 4 tm4• • * w-w nt'**' «*.<«. WL». icer t cleeris^*
banks frees freely adjusting their fiseeta \<A, . ...-.-
SO5.1© Of tholr iSTSVCCtm sat g j wli e csxrfciwitioc should supply 
theu with xwnHMmzctchle debt, aorhepa this plan docorvo3 
cloce attention as a pocaibl c measure for increasing the 
potency of nonatery policy.
(3) The last point to be rmtioaed in the inadvisability 
of relying entirely on nonote^~ polity, which has been 
seen to tore a United potency. ^nctcry policy, however, 
should not be discarded aXiopother fro:: stabilisation 
Measures, for it still has its virtues and can profitably 
be used in co-ordination with flood policy to attain 
satisfactory results.
Monetary policy is undoubtedly a costly aoasuro. The activation of such 
control has slxioct doubled intarcoi pay/senis on the national debt within 
ten years, what arc the implications of these payments; Coaceming the 
burden g~ who ccetcmal^y—xxold iXtiliTi $ *& «uu» % ilcticol investigation shews that 
it ia» increased cy more than double. But an a ratio of total payments, 
it la a relatively small xn.'orortion. However, whether or not ve consider 
these payments a noxious burden, w slosld not ignore thorn in cny iioeuaahes 
of monetary policy.
?ron the internal point of view, debt burden does not seriously affect 
tho distribution of ineone within the ooc^omity. The government rogrrixxo a
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4H»*6Ji& \ «iV* -** tfWi.4 fcMUP*quarter of mt ore© t paywucj a~#c the v»ww $
qucrtex*} the rest goes to ■'other IioUcr;'. f > me 3.uu^dg ot«usr firysticid 
ins ti trt ions > co&jx-nio© and indivi.luclc. lushing further our <rirlferc» 
we realise that individuals get only 10/ (net wrnts after tax) of the 
total. Thio anouat does affect the distribution of incase fror. taxpayers ■
to dobt-lxoldora.
Mow9 uust a linii bo set to tho increase of the national debt*? 3MMMB 
the growth of debt man aa increase in debt service year after yaer 
(paiftkri.r\; tux r&t&o behind it; until tlie ocGUQ&y ooHapoos? Joes the 
inere&ao in th© capital value of the debt, rieoa a higher percentage of the 
total national capital with all tho roaulting troubles" To these war­
nings, our answer io aa follows j intorect payeseiit© as a ratio of 
national incase need not incr&tao to a aorioue extent ao long as vc 
achieve a hi^. ©ad satisfactory rate of growth of income. She situation, 
however, d^pand^ upon the speed with which the national incase grows.
Alae> in. spite of the groat growth of tho Cftpitej, value of the debt during 
the last two world wnro, it represent© a declining percentage of the 
national wealth.
J^art JUye
ft&tioncl debt is bv no noaac r *’» />»♦ Of*? DHSk •’ x) nanetaay policy} it has a
connection with the ^canokai© growth cf the caunfcay. The present analysis 
is conoon.trat©<" on qcvexnront oxpeiidituro below the line, Chi© <x<pe'.k.;itux©
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Is partly finencsd by borrowing Iron the public. The result of theao 
(jovernmntal activities io a ooru^iiorcblo ameunt of public ilxod capital 
foiviction. And« os uentxomec. 'ixyvo, a jKiart of it is financed by an 
increase of the national debt.
e xasy conclude from this analysisi-
Th.0 dcot >.iAl0uaU-ic» .(Hi aCT-my JJfcrGV^tOUfJ yJK-i2*£ bOOlX VifjQd j
rly 195*)’g? to stabilise the ocanorv thorough.**uv wiy
□onotary policy.
luch monetary control is howve ineffective precisely 
because of the structure of the debt. If wn Iwnre to 
rely on monetary policy* wo Iicve to consider a radical 
chunpe in tho present structure.
Althoucii idle c icy is reflected in the
balance of payments, it does not pomiftt A carious 
deterrent. Iloreavox*, these payments do not seriously 
dl£2c*& who dictributxon of i-icone t«Mon£j the j^soplo 
within tho oconosy*
3*
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Prof see
V/O have seen tuat tho ncaorn W. V .._; Oi y. dcl't -COS^tS VM
vniidi t* o*- w'Oixou/j^^ u**on xt; is neoont^^y. $his view is not a w one*
It is ill fact very oM* It aL& true tfc&t tbs sincerity of the classical
oconcniots have condemned th<j idee. of ^ovectwnt borrowing there vac a
rcsaarkchle insistence on tbs “* T* A* ‘ J - S « *• rf jf* t- "U'h’4'v UiwUuSw *f©2»fc«** S* -X i.fK,’
of finance* Put thio is not tho whole truth* Hie history of the n&tlon&X
debt still provides ue vita «3C€on»3j3X O—f 0— C‘COi.iO»»ui.^3 wS hOX'XX7«J& VXOVS VuLXCM
VQ2*0 007113 idemd v3X* **kO2?Ci*"' CC-':L” by tlieir ds.oeicc.l ©olieee»e©« fho pcBpow
of this ccrTondix io to exarixio this intellectual heritage - to reconsider
tho vdidxty QX the 'uilGOXy Qj». ii£»vic**ci <ioot v«ilek was siOCGjjitcu uy some
to preaont, in this study# a coiijL/j.c wO *±4»£j toxacal survey j the wor»i cm—^
of certain economists from bl 1is British and Gexwn eciwois is discussed.
xnxo OTiu xx j taen? axms to throw li/pit on the views of several **unor-
tlKxlox” writers who, in ceseI:^02^ «/ x t ixim i'v- c* **•*• 3Lc^jSMSusdLCMft^pt
doctrine by advocating: a :;doijt*»f iiWuiCG 1 jiystesii*
•mkw cc~£» jtt3»3 satin MKSS-fswBs ot£stnfe=as
one5 nouever n.w. /maun 
dlscsnter who reco;Tiended fe
Pneaa>st P. Leroy Beaulieu ’
agrees in y;^’t with lisas*
•uoxxc ioous, xtxx># lasy a© ooniaxaeroa a 
hoxawint; to finance war. Xu
:x^i^dt do l£ Icionce dee ?irwipes* 1091)
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Section A
She grout importance of public borrowing has tended to obscure the 
fundamental fact that public credit is but one fom of credit in general 
ml is, or ought to be, reguletcsd l>y the cane loading principles. Hany of 
the oorioua errors in this field of finance bare derived from tho belief 
that the government in its borrowing was er^icipated from tho restrictions 
inposod on individuals, cod that it night safely indulge in operations that 
seuld soon have put the ordinary citinen in bankruptcy.
teang the earlier theories on public credit, ideas oisiilar to those 
of John Lax/ on the nature of credit wear 3 eorewhai widely diffuood. Public 
funds were described as Hu mine of gold", and ;.ovemmout loans ae "reaMesi. 
^Ichs&y’ • Credit was looked on as a ifccsk creation of wealth, and there­
fore all national debts wore considered 6$ m addition to the national 
possessions. Perhaps the .ideas of Joh.r. bav are the more interesting to 
discuss since they wort/ more then theoretical views; they were put into 
effect in Itnanoe during the period 1716-20.
John Law of Lauriston wno born in Bdirburgii in 16?!. Condemned to 
death for killing Ldw&rd VUlson in London in 169^? although the sen tonne 
was csrarautod to iwriconxicnt, Lsw cse&pod to Hcdlsnd. In Holland he is
CXOBC3 raaua.- «*»«i-sxs ac»3tS
1 • C .P. Baa table, public finance, 3rd od., London 1?17, pp. 661-2.
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i Ansterden Which©aid to have devoted hii^olf to & study of the Bas^k c 
W then at the height
4I0 X XI a** l <1 O v </».><.’' ^# *-lv w* lO OC2*X^|^0fej HVvOiff3^im «w? trSU9|ta SKXd if tTUO
by trade that she s&ixseod her wealth and becane the richest country in 
hurope. 2he Dutch traders were however xaxch troubled with the defective 
state of their own. coinage, and otili atfre lay the circulation of foreign 
coins of uncertain was instituted in
to reoedy tills defect* It accepted all corto of coins and gav© the 
isorchcntc bank-notes < which could always be converted into coin) represen­
ting the ucney, Thus fluctuations wore avoided. fhese bank-notes or 
credits were used to settle bills, for svoxy one knew that the bank-notes 
represented a certain nussbor of coins. Confidence in the bank was coMploto 
and bank erbdite i^ere nora convenient than coin.
It woe in Holland that Lew matured his ideas, he contrasted Scotland 
end stagl&nd with Holland and found that whilst all the natural advantages 
were in favour of tho foxsaer countries, tiie trade and wealth of Holland 
were for suxjorior. Iryiug to answer this Question. Law put Ills plan in 
tVi’o irOTJOS i t»&ons —
(a) Owin 
none
*v ystefc, there vuc. in Holland an abun&mce of 
drive trass, and that credit siu^orted new uruiartakings
with capital at a vary Moderate xx*to. . coordingly * ens of the 
principal. needs wo# to supply the nation with sufficient credit. 
Moreover. Leu* observed that not only wore the notes better than 
gold er silver but that, owing to the .;reforonce of the people for 
then, tho precious octyls which they xxj; .resented regained locked up
£1$
in tho banks and wire nwer demanded. Vos it therefore possible 
that a bank-note, or an extensive credit system, could be famed 
with aoKe other real oocurit; * 2R.icix £**5 l as its keeking?
(b) Apart £em Wo superiority of its aonetaajy sgrstea, Holland 
understood nudh hotter tho indue trial functions of tho govern* 
nent in their aspects both of freedom cxxfi of control. Hence,
Xjav ’ s wuen f*xlly vicv0“-0^'Cv» auvoca tux, on the ox*o hand,
free trade involving the abolition of ^ouopolicc and oppressive 
taxes; tM»ls on the other Ixand it iapooed on the govomamt 
heavy re ^STzOno ibllities in indues trial oiTj&nisaiion.
In 1705, Law submitted to tho Scottish Parliansat a proposal for a 
land-bank, published under We title ”110:102 and tirade Considered” • It 
involved a refoxn of the currency and tho extension of credit, i.e. the 
issue of bank-notes upon landed security, the cnount issued being strictly 
United by the govertrsetrt. The re&nen given (stressing that there was a 
strong relationship between nonoy and credit to trade, and that a schone 
of crodit would flourish in the state tSxut wcmld adopt it) was that there 
vac not sufficient cun'W/ in the country to develop its resources, and 
Wat the rmney in use vns subject to great end uncertain variations in 
value. Eovoves-, the land-bank proposal vac l'cjectod by the xtoliauenio
Between We nMila of 1?X6 and We end of l?20, Lew had in Usance a
events. it is/I p". -4 4-» a >*>«**/"}4*4-.n 4 *k<** fhMMrtnMfti* U4 e« r*»rv«J.U1L X*JJ. <A,C3 V It *$%> *WL** L.<JLcAb Ml • 4»w
necosssay to grasp tho centenporar'/ state of Prance. At the death of 
Louis XTV in her. tenter 171$, ^teaaCO vaa on the verge of national bank­
ruptcy. Ccnnoroe was prostrate j mnx^&cturcs wero stagnant and agricultaai
boor &3
i vX*r 4#OC>
j in the clocixvj years of 
.t rainous rates of interest
<16
tilt moc i«rueilf?O£i© I7*f2 tllC K< Vf the coin
was recalled, in order to sb&tracr
reissue at the socio nominal value 
to its previous value ‘because of '
Ad* • V t
%a new rul< Ito 3 trie
/•»r**’***T-y; » •• vt — •r’syi*«>*»**• u«. MwoW'^4 k rS*-W«**
Ut in 1713« coinage was brought up
resultant troubles.
:ent (We Duke of Orleans) started
2J } and for
by roduoinc We national debt (mounting to tjo by about one Iialf
on w&iich interest of bp was proaiisod. Affairs were in this state when 
John Law oane to Paris. ?"
The banks fron. whic* 
and the Bank of "England 2
were the Bank of tosterdesa
<a; The former was, us. shown above, a bank of deposits. The asroheextsz V
deposited a sun of nottey and in return received a credit*
(b) Tho xtek of Jbiglcnd i©otabdished in 16?4 ubs based upon af*i I ■ £U j’list*1* v** A-*M > -uXlti JL/£U&»
Vk<|<jJu4sr«Ui £ W**4
its charter. It offered, an imediata and powerful support to the 
gevernnon t unu also to tl 10 trade of tho country. It was organised 
for the purpose of lending to the r^vorrr. ent end thus bcscace a sort 
go&fc. Then it ass
several functions; deposits were received, accounts */lth deposits 
were opened, bills wore discounted and the issue of notes formed 
a large part of its busino 3o. Xt boeez^c, in short, a back of dis­
count and circulation*
Vfc^k.M <3m. W »X«*. *j2» A* 'v*n/ formation wan goverwont debt, as tho cost of
wx XXtXJisU. uid performed
The constitution sienex^mnt of thees and other prcssinEcit ISuropeaa
banks convinced Lqw that, if confidence vac restored in 'dranee and tho
people induced to treat with a bank aa the rerehcats in Ansterten did, 
the entire coin of the country could be druvn into its vault©, a iajqg© 
araegftt of bank noto.i could bo io hr. .1 ou. tmei would be preioxrsd to coin a© a 
ciroixlatin/; nediusx. The haute, like tho Bank of England, could act as on 
sgent of the geVGmnent and, if it received all th ee, the credit
•*&» I * * ■
/W»< +
y,
or prosperity in ar^
vould eneblc it to float etill nore no ten* The aourco 
country ho attributed to the ehxxndanc® of noraey*
foam of nosoy. Such & bank xjould Kb ere fore he nsorc powerful
the depositor;. • of all the coin
it could also 4*V*c /*» T*« <wVvtowi & #*«*♦.>#> w,S-w '**—
founding suck a bank was hence
pro;»osi tion that
sa3*,/ ixx order to create employ
+-1'<-S nMdbslje f*r»*J.i -Z, VfeW.-© X J-i• a ciroul&t&us s»
than the Barf: of Arcotcrten since it could use c part of it® deposits* A® 
t the country sad the receiver of all 1 
' Upland in strength. The possibility of 
.sod upon the cstabliohracat of oonfldenooi 
>toiaiiny a good supply of rsoncy was nodoa- 
t and that paper was max’® suitable then 
»eu However, Lav did not realise the
fact that *m ssctosisivo printing prasa oxxmttioxi was a positive inflation*
John Law started to apply tliesc plans by establishing, on the 2nd 
‘i"’L
of Ila;, 1716, a private bank, ,r3onk Generale”. It was etherised to issue 
notes payable at eight and to the boarex*, to discount bills and to receive 
rxoney on deposit» Ito notes vex*? proosfcaas to pay so naamy crowns of the 
value of the day on which they were issued; in other words bank no tea or 
credit represented a fixed anotaxt of gold.
Law’s bank gradually bcocr.e a nrtionri or royal bank. In April 1717,
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Ito notoo wore ordered to he recoivec. in poynonl of tcKoa. !2he formal 
conversion of the bank into a royal hank, ’Taaquo Hoy ale**, took place in 
Deoedbor 1718 to be adiainistarod in the nsne and under authority of the 
king, and its notes gucraatccxi by the king. Tlie coirveriion vns, however, 
osrked by an important change, l.e. the notes loaned wore sixqply promises 
to pay so many current coins ££&!.* j. W X* tlnw subject to changes in real 
value with over;/ fluctuation in the coin. 1 oreover, the first step was 
taker. to nake the notes inconvertible: all payments above a certain mowxt 
hod to he node either in gold or in notes and not in silver. Since there 
W0 vary little gold in tho country, tills practically amounted to a 
forced circulation of the notes and the extent of the credit. Lav vaa 
so much impressed with the superiority of notes that h© overlook®! the 
fact that tho essence of all credit Is the confidence of the public*
In the meantime, Law began to e^ply the second principle of hie 
pion. promoting eofimrte and industry. In August 1717 the "Cosspagnie 
de la Louisian© aw d*Occident*1 vns incorporated, which vac the begixsaiag 
of tho “Mississippi Scheme* over the territory drained by the Mississippi, 
the Ohio 0>*"Lsa- 4-i iosouri rivers, vhoro artmordimry oorsoeroiai and
industrial development was possible. Shot company absorbed all the old 
ones and thuo monopolised tho whole t$fe&$ of Stance with the colony. Stop 
by atop it acquired now pi'ivilegea s®*£ on owned new functions, e.g. the 
privilege of the collection of tttfiSS 2nd the monopoly of tobacco. In 
May 1719 it absorbed further '-zOlLij' A Y J. 0 W | U*g ■king the name of the ” Gccipagnie
dee Iodo®”. In the sea© year it obtained the control of the Mint end 
received tho fern of rcvenuesj.
Then the coispany undertook the peynmt of the national debt* In *
fact, tho subscriptions for its shares wore rv^inly used for reducing
the debt. It lent the government sufficient money at 3* to pay off all
the old creditors, who had previously received and thus relieved the
govermeat of a fourth of the burden. At the sane time, Lew induced the
owners to accept the capital sun due and buy shares in the ©oc^psny. ibis
naent Wat the MSB buy’ing up the whole debt with a greet Isens
of shores. In other vords, one of tho effects of the corxpony vas the
consolidation of the divorce forua of debt and the reduction of Its amount*
The national debt was of course bought up with haul: notes and thus thoro
was a gjpoat demand for then resulting in the issue of almost unlimited 
1§uantitittes•
In february 1720, the bank had been added to the company to complete 
control of the colonial trado of Irene© j ita currency, banking and fiscal 
policy. And Law was now in a position to tost b|S ideas: money furnished 
the life-blood of a nation, and paper (the supply of which needed to be 
limited only by the demand) was bettor tlwax coin.
But in order to obtain fbado for the conpletion of his schemes, Law 
always favoured m& even encouraged a rioo in the value of the shoroe 
already issued. Such rise was necessary because Shares of the company 
had not found favour with the public, cud were for nearly two years below 
par. Then, tho series of privileges acquired by the company in 1713 found
Is It iscy bo acid tliat the operation was We conversion of debt into notes*
norc favour and gredually stimulated the while interest in its affairs.
But tho new shares were onlyJostod to thjoco wbe already held old ahareef 
and ©on&ocuenily the denand for the now olxres raised tho value of tho old* 
It is easy to taagina how the gradual issues of si ere© would enoourego 
speculation. !15io rapid rise in tho value of the old shares encouraged the 
sale of documents and thus snomous fortunes were nado in a few weeks. 
Goixcocuontly, or. a nov issue, a rush vao End© to subscribe. Such speculs* 
tion at first helped Law1© nyabom but soon becerse its destroyer.
In mot cases, a great speeucltlon would be checked owing’ to tho 
impossibility of finding coin or credit for further extension. But tor, 
controlling both the empuny and the b&hk, issued unlimited amounts of 
notes. Moreover, ilirou&h his control of the Mat and the coinage, the 
company gave a prafcrane® to tho notes by arbitrary changes in the coins, 
i.e. by making the coins fluctuate in order to stimulate the derasnd for 
notes. Lav deliberately nadc maid changes in the value of the ooln end. 
at the sane tine, proclaimed that no changes would be mde in the ncednal 
value of the notes. By thoso measure;;, notes becocte the real standard 
tho printing proao vent on in alor-iing <£isr titles • Instead of proceeding 
cautiously in the enlargement of brnfr-notoc, Lav (encouraged by tho success 
of the early years) expanded rapidly and banco added to, rather than oh^o^ed 
tho speculative mania. Xt was therefore the issue of notes to this unliai* 
ted extent that enabled the speculation to attain a height that would 
otherwise hare been impossible. Wss^ono tried to obtain notes to bby 
shares the vslua of wliich hhd boon ORoggerntod, in order ais$4y to sohl
and pocket the difference. Bo one know What tho real value of the shores 
ought to be.
The danger© of the outrageous apooulatxoa, the oxccssive issues of 
notes and the advances node by the te: for all kinds of purposes > had 
already been foreseen in the eorly part of 1720. ibr cheeking that M*** 
of inflation, Law reduced by the edict of the 21st of Hay 172c both shares 
end notes to shout lialf of the nosainni value at which they stood when th© 
decree was issued. Xiaooe, both chorea end notes were reduced to What was 
supposed to bo a fair cosanercial value* But a p&nio foil owed from which 
the system never recovered.
i^oroughly discredited, Lav wse forced to leave France end, prevented 
from returning to his native land, died in Venice in 172J.
Having to the late eighteenth century, we find more advanced discus* 
sion on the problem of public credit* Tho question of the best method of 
raising fhnds to finance the ware was a burning one. Upon few questions, 
indeed, has opinion boon co divided for so long as upon the question of 
public credit Broadly speaking, there were two dominant end eoatesdictary 
views«
(a) Tho earlier, or the British, view held that all war coqpendituro 
should be obtained from tassa levied while tho war ws in progress.
ai
(b) The German theory advocated the view that all war expenditure 
cu^kt to bo net by leans*
These two extreme opinions wore mt heli in their original fowa: their 
clear-cut precis ion had been gradually uodifiod • Because of the length 
of tho review on the British school, it is pexh&ps tempting to odnrt with 
the German.
Baring the first half of the nineteenth century, German economists 
developed tlseir ideas on the role Sttd friction of public credit* They 
substantially agreed that public credit had a positive chermter. However, 
in recognisin:; the necessity of debt theory, they saw it m & neceesaxy 
evil. About the middle of tho nineteenth century* there came a change in 
the attitude of Gorr^ax writers which shifted the position nearer to a foil 
recognition of the nature of national debt, stressing the productive 
chamSter of public expenditure* The representative of this new departure 
was Carl Bietzel.
To start our story, there was a strong tendon©* towards the loan 
policy for war expenditures. The German writers hell Vie view that the 
requirements of practical finance made the woo of borrowing so general and 
troognired $fes necessity of loan fixwawwa. Times of this view can be found
den*» sa» <» in —m
1, In epite of the fact that the impact of the German school on British 
©oono&istc. was very slight, seme inspiration vao derived, in the Keyn- 
sian attach on classical fiscal principles, from, the most prominent 
gewan writers of the 13th oentuxy* Sec w. Burkhead, "The Balanced 
Budget”, foort* Jour* Boon** W 125^, reprinted in in
Poligr* 1255, Vi;A7, pp* 12-13, footnote 38.
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la Justi, whose chief work was issued in 1?55* He was greatly inpresoad 
with the estrone ooot of wars which required, as he said, rather the 
cacrifico of uivjenaurod suno of noway than blood. He argued that if the 
ewunt required wen not vory great am woe net required at once, while if 
on the other M the e^aoMtuxe vaa expected to he t^rny, then It 
W&a best to rely upon taxation* XI these conditions were not fulfilled, 
then leans war© neeeaoay,.
In effect, Justi directed md, attention tc the devolopssent of the 
demon school. His views wore recounted after the Hapoloonie Wars by 
von Jacob end Keboniua who, although dwelling on the evil effects of loans, 
aooepiet. thoa aa a legitiiaate expedient, Hsu wae oven noro definite in 
maortixfc’ that, in the event of a sudden emergency such as war, loans 
were not oily nocossaxy but even beneficial.
A nore definite position SM taken by Carl lietzel, who euphasisad 
the vision of public loans. Ho rogurded the loan system ^e the true 
Bathed of financing extroordii^y ui^ouditee, DietseVs views saute, in 
effect, an is^ortasit step in the develoxuont of modern thinking on the 
notioiwl debt; for thi© reason sone detoil on his work is perhaps 
profitable*
‘The concept of “productivity” pltyvd a fUidmental role in Matsel’a 
theory the debt. His views regarded the state aa a part of the ia» 
material capital of the society, end any unusual expenditure for its
«= BttWMMWfflW
1, Keference for the Geroan School ere listed in V,S, Scott, i^onoiic 
^ES&^3SU£^SSO£^jiSE. (cocoas. -«e±e»), teteKut, iplS, pp. SC-5X.
1 ,
service as an ixnreetaent
Crodit, la Dletssl’s theory, la naoosaary for economic progress and a 
neoeasnry Instrument for capital accumulation. Xts function la to 
transfer goods frosa a neutral oandltlon into oapitel; It actually- creates 
oapital. At the top of the credit structure of the eoonony stands tbs 
public credit Which promotes growth of capital and productivity. Xt 
supplamento private credit by enabling the Whole oapital in the economy 
to be productively asaployed at all times. Xa other words, public credit 
transfer# to the state capital afedoh doea act find adequate npiiintmirttlco 
for inveatnent la the Individual sector. Xa an advanced economy, oapital 
which cannot always find employment will be in danger of being diaeipoted. 
ite this reason public credit la an essential oondition for economic
.according to Sleteel, the choico between texea and loans oust dppdah upon 
whether the credit finances ordinary or extraordinary (non-recurrort) expenditures. Since the eoonotaie Impact of lens and taxes differs, the 
choloo depends upon Urn kind of expenditures. aeourrent and running 
expenditures for the fuaotioniag and maintenance of the State and the 
national eatahlislsacnt (i.e, the circulating oapital) should be net tlu-ough 
taxation. On the other hand, axpendituree which lead to a pemaansmt 
iavostoent in the State or Its institutions, for permanent publio ieprove- 
tunte end the extension of the State establishment, should be raised 
through loans.
the originality of Dietsel'a oanthibutloa to ths problem of tbs national 
dbbt extends to war finance. Be argues that once a war becomes Inevitable, 
the economists should not make its prosecution more difficult by maxiniaing 
Ito impact. They tether should apply the beat financial methods toteb 
bring the war to a speedy and eueoeoeful conclusion. R»r thia purpose tbs uas of public (audit is eaiwnitlt*
as
Stien oo Ito took Dietsel’e position that borrowing for «traordinaxy 
ca^>endituro io a necessary end organic part of the life of the State. A 
State, without a national debt, either does too little for its future or 
roots too mah upon its post. A national debt is direotly productive if 
its expenditure results in income, and indirectly productive if its 
effect is to increase tho toso^ying eapacit;. of the people (e.g. educa­
tional institutions} • Hie State, t&sn contracting a national debt, oust 
see that the cjcpenditure of the funds shall provide for interest payments 
and redemption of tho debt and, at the erne tixac, works out the eoonomio 
results for which the debt was incurred. If these conditions are not 
satisfied, then the debt beconos & consumption of tto people’s coital.
Cohn, althou^i ho did not agree with all the theoretical implications 
of this view, accepted its practice! nexla. Similarly, Bosdhsr and 
Vagner accepted the need of losno to :ioot cxtrwrdinoxy essences but 
under certain limitations.
Xt appears from this review that the German economists have modified 
their nineteenth century views on the raising of funds totally by borrowing 
although to a trifling extent.
Section G
Prior to the German School, the British School which flourished
during the oi^itoenth and nineteenth centuries argued that all war
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bo Obtain&d fffrfrP fo*?g»** i<2Vi,©& ufofll-fr tfoft «syn VS8 111 
progress. Xt rocotsaondei the raising of all funds Sax public expenditure 
within the yoar by swans of taxation.
Sir W. Potty, writing in 166$, hod based his calculations for the 
distribution of taxation to pay the expanaoL of the war with the Dutch 
upon the assumption that the whole amount would be raised by this method. 
Davensnt, writing thirty years later, agreed that it would be well to 
seet tho year's expense with revenue obteinod within tha year.1 Again, 
in the inflation of the South Sea Bubble, Archibald Hutcheson argued that 
"until our debts ape disclosed we can scarcely be said to be a people. 1 
aa sure, till then, we are a people in a state of the utaost inaeouiily.’'2
David Hume expressed his objections to the public credit vary
forcibly. Sbr bin, "either the nation oust destroy the publio credit, or
public arodit will destroy the nation.Ad«i smith devoted fifty
hpages of the 'Wealth of Nations ' to the national debt. He eupported 
Burae in his rejection of the "enormous debts which at present oppress, 
and will in the long run probably ruin, all tbs great nations of Burope." 
3oth Bate and Smith predicted that national bankruptcy would be the out- 
OCKQft ©f th© OOIlti.l'liiOU£ hnyyftwg,
1. However, Detvenant was net consistent. In 1698, he wrote that nstiane
that have a war too big to be managed by inooaw frw taxation, eould
not avoid proceeding to borrowing.
2. Ebr reference an Potty, Danreuant and iiitoheson see Seott, an. pit..
Jr dr*
3. David »S3e, tf tefclte Credit. 1752, J. 13.
*• Aden Smith, ^g.?halth^£Ua.tio?y.> Vol. XX, pp. 465-92, reprinted ften 
the 6th edition, London 1S37-
C$1
th© feitiah theory did not, howvor, go unchallenged. Occasionally 
there wore & fev who advocated reliance upon credit to a greater or Iocs 
degree. Keynes called attention to several "unorthodox*' writers in th© 
earlier literature. In particular, he gave new credit to Halthue whoa© 
views on the national debt challenged the claceie&l doctrine in several 
respects and contained sone original thoughts which bring him close to 
modem views* However, his views were not met with attention from 
economists writing on public finance.
To Ualthua, tho national debt is not the evil which it is generally 
supposed to be. "Vite rAgard...those who live upon the interest of a 
national debt, it osnnot he denied that tee-.- contribute powerfully to 
distribution and derusod...they ensure that effective oonsunption which is 
necessary to give the proper sttaulua to production. «2 However, Kalthus 
did not continue challenging the classical school* There ere after all 
evils in the debt. "Yet to oounterbaleaeo these advantages, whieh so far 
are unquestionable, it east be oohnowlSdged that injudicious taxation 
night etopo the Inoreaee of wealth." "...the revenue necessary to pay 
the interest of ouch a debt ©an only ba raised by taxation^ aad, as this 
taxation, if pushed to any oonoiderohle extent, aaa hardly fail of Inter­
facing with the powers of production, there is always dancer of inpairing
1. V.7. Stettnar, "Carl Dieteel, Publio expenditures end the Public Debt",
Iww ^iTBBW1 B&>g> ?• 276-99.
2. I.S. Malthua, /xymg.
Book XI, P5?.
2nd 6&e, London 1536,
6gg
ana elcuent of wealth, while wo aru iupxovix^ another.” Another 'objec­
tion to sue! * debt io, that it graatly ag^ragat g the evils erising free. 
chEtivsas in the value of Tlieso di&&dv&nt&rea moot be v^vi/riftfi
carefully against the advantage of rraintaining a body of ^lapaartitive* 
consumers (supported. h$r taxation) wlio e^ujouxage wealth by ^ninfr^iuc a
» jW "1 —^ikdtaA AAJMa v-titf**. vi J» Jt tffejUk *—■-«<*. J3 ... rnri -hi - ■ -_ -ff- -1v”/..jfflfGrQ 09vvR9€Xt wXvTX 8I)£t QwJ104JB5i/wJLOZXa
Attention has also been oallod to -^t Raises who at the M*1**
of Boos and tetth held views on the national debt which di forM. fr^i
classical doctrine* Bis w^-neipr.".. work* iiinci'ttloa of lolifical fhcprn -g—z 
(l?c-7)» appeared fifteen years after iksao'o essay on Public Credit. and 
nine yeora before SBith'o Wealth of Hallow, Scant attention has been 
paid to Steuart In the eeonooio literature* Only recently have tho 
originality and ff p/six^ of hiw to coonosEtc problo&s boon at
all xxicogniaod. 3n the following dioousaion, we aSiall show that tho 
development and the role of credit ferine the eighteenth oentoxy received
madonna to rooo/nitioR and undoostandinrf in Xtataart’s erfisaant. Only
tbs sain points will bo otsasaaisod
Itouart's approach to bho pgcMcu of public borrowing la indicated
1. !’. ? roe man, ("The evolutionist Revolt j^ainat dassioel Wawloa*,
XI, Jour, Pol, upon., Seoariber 1943, pp. 506-22) aentloned Stewart 
ao one of those few writers who 4- thsasolvos fiwxa tho
ci ocono^iiotSe V*y, Stettnor V^blr Jane© Stauart on the Public
Debt", a«Et, Jour. Joun.. 1945, p. 453) nenticned that Stewart’s work
1*5 XI ”*4 Skfr..- Jt .^iWt tAi tC ra-yA tfiirirl 1-s 4f* 4»» d» /•■TtJh rite rriftiifiL di —L-e-i Adi- ~" wf torn. ArV-- —- jflbkAwUMauas iouaa groaxor x^cogni <*iar; ana ©oxter unuarstsxiaing in tne Garr.ian
WMNMNliHWw'
by hie preference for tho te©u public credit” rather than ”dobt”3 This 
follows fron hie view that credit is an as&et to the eoi.irwity * ona of 
the tools of progress. His theory of public finance is closely integrated 
with sad, in fact, essentially derived frees his theory of circulation.
Still influenced by the concogpt of private debts, both Hum and dmith 
feared rod resisted debt increases. Their attitude to public credit 
aterxied from their implicit assumptions concerning the usage to which 
&oveivesents would put revenues, In shuyp contrast with the dsesioel 
eocoeeista, public borrowing and public ea^enditure play an iaqp&tsat pert 
in Steuart’s theory of public finances Ho enphasiaey that when the 
covorment borrows, it invariably’ spends the nosey thus increasing the 
circulation in tho country, providin. efiaploymnt and transferring wealth 
from one set of persons to another.
Stouart leys conaidGS^blo stress, too, on the difforancc between 
private- and public credit. Tho nature sad effect of than are fimderacntclly 
different. Public credit is rather odvxxtc^eous. Xt does not burden the 
economy, waste resources or rxke th© economy poorer. On the contrary,
1. Public credit is discussed in Part IV, book XV, pp# 343-4S1 and also 
mentioned in other parts of the Principle. Xt is however profitable to 
distinguish between these two tors®. Vbe federal Heeerve Bank of 
Chicago writes on this point that every debt mat have its credit 
counterpart aoaoUiarc. Ite every debt wLich so&aoue owes (i.e. for 
every liability) there mot exist saueons else to whom these fund© are 
owed, seoecne wiio has a credit or m usoet of equal value, Solving the 
debt pussle is partly a saettsr of souantioa. The ©motional content of 
the word "debt” is. quite different frou that associated with the word 
ncredit". But the economic transaction yeftoyn+gd to is tho anus » to noe 
■**t ie to incur dobti L.S. Uttn, '.loaey tad AoWdLtz. 2nd
ed. 1561, pp. 33-38 (Debti Ja&yll ami Uffd*").
a eoaatxuctir© rala ir tiie
To S|MKrt, public borrowing can In theory go on indefinitely. All
it means Is that "tho whole income of the nation will remain in perpetual
fluctuation* passing from one set of creditors to another*"^ tho
practical standpoint, there might he a Unit to public borrowing. The
people say he unwilling to go far enough end the transfer of property
which public borrowing involves may disturb the tranquillity of the state
if carried too far. Eowever, “if tho spirit of the people prove compatible
with the system of borrowing end supporting' public credit to the utmost 
2 *extent", such an outcome is not necessary.
a
Following the dtorelopmsnt of the British school, J.S. Nicholson
argued that the occurrence of a grout and unexpected emergency, e.g. the
outbreak of war, is historically and actually the principal cause of modem 
a .
increase of debt. In this ease, It nay be said that borrowing la tho 
only source. Taxation to be effective needs tiaei and the limits of 
possible or beneficial taxation are soon reached ooapared with the expenses 
of modern wars. A Just war ia in the interests of tho State and therefore
1. Ibid.. Book V, Chapter XXIX, p. 626.
2. $4d*. *<M. cit.
3* In this review, another economist may be mentioned. The Bari of 
Lauderdale, advocating the growth of ths national debt, wrote that a 
great extra expenditure is thd most fertile means of increasing public 
wealth aad a sinking fund the moat active means of diminishing it 
(m. H.E.I. Palgrav*. a&feQn&gz ef, AUtlwl Kaoaocg. Vol.Xt , London 
1896, p. 57*).
b. S. Hioholeon, ftcftaoiplos q^jfrjlltioal ~ een<w* Tol. 132, London 1901, 
Chapter XV1XX, pp. ^03*1$.
a part of tl:3 cost should be oot;w by fixture generation®, But apart from 
this consideration, taxation beyond a certain point injure® the productive 
powers of the State and thus injures future generations more than would 
the obligations of a loan# Indeed, in the last resort, excessive taxation 
will become unproductive, and the nation will be obliged to borrow, sad 
thus will suffer from both evils.
The laet dissenter to be nentionod in this historical review is 
Bastable, Bis argument may bo summarised in theab rulesi
(1) Expenditure should, ee far as possible, be met out of the annual
receipts, and therefor© increased outlay should be balanced by 
heavier taxation.
(2) In the case of non*reasasKmt expenditure of large ©mount, a loon
ie preferable to a serious dieturbanee of tha normal tax 
system, and say flarly be employed.
(3) Where the abnormal expenditure extends over a series of years,
the various forms of taxation should, generally, specking, be 
adjusted to meet it.
(b) This general principle, however, fails where either«
(a) it would be impossible to secure an equitable division
of the heavy taxation necessuay; or
(b) where the limit of productiveness with regard to the
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1. C.P. Bastsble, op. eit«. pp. 6?6-£, Xt might have been argued that 
the British Sol ool gradually chested its views towards the national 
debt from Hume and Smith to Bastable.
several taxes -would hove to be exceeded? or finally
(c) where for political reasons it is inexpedient to press 
heavily on the taxpeyora.
Under any of these conditions resoi’t to loans as a supplement 
to the tax revenue even for a aouiewtot lengthened period is 
defensible.
Section I)
The last subject to be mentioned in this review is the theory put 
forward by Major C.H« Douglas and hie Social Credit movement.* 1 This 
theory argues that the primary cause of the industrial depression is 
financial. It is due to lack of effective demand or the difficulty of 
obtaining orders backed by the pgwer to buy in money.
According to Major Douglas* there is a continuous tendency in the 
monetary syeton for the expenditure of the coissunity to be less than the 
cost pf producing the goods and services th<fc are available for sale.
There is some loss to the extent of purchasing power * that is the 
costs of production which are not paid directly to consumers (e.g. interest 
paid to & bank, money collected to depreciation, noney paid to other 
business firms for machinery or supplies or raw materials). In other
»«)»»»»
1. Major C.H. Douglas, Goci&l Credit. London 192b, hert II, pp. 89-136.
word®, thora is a permanent and incrcaaine disparity between the total 
price of products of the industrial systor and the total effective demand 
ftvailcfcle for the product®. Major Douglas shows that this “gap’ in the 
circular flov of money and inepeoditure is eometliaee ee large ee JK>/« (i.e. 
from all the money paid out by industry, only 10 ever gets into the heads 
of consumers end is offered in exchange for industry’s products). Xt is 
of course clear that Major Douglas has exaggerated this figure.
Xovever, the cause of the £ap is, according to Douglas, the double 
circuit difficulty popularly known as the A plus 2 theory. A factory or 
other productive organisation has (besides its eoonoadLc function ee e 
producer of goods } a financial aspect. Xt nay be regarded on the one 
head as a device for the distribution of purchasing power to Individuals, 
through the media of wages, salaries uni dividends; and on We other head 
as a Manufactory of price-financial values. From this standpoint its 
payments nay be divided into two groupsi*
Group At ell payments made to individuals (wages, salaries and dividends)| i
Group Bi all payments made to other organisations (raw materials, beak 
charges and other external costs).
How the rate of flow of purchasing power to individuals is represented
*
by A, but since all payments go into prices, tho rate of flow of prices 
cannot bo lees than A plus 2. Since A will not purchase A plus B, a pro* 
portion of the product at least equivalent to B must be distributed by a
wmawnse m«s
1. She Maemlllen Cosaitt.. on Finance ano Industry, liinutea of gvldan.,, 
Tol. I, pp« 295-307-
form of purchasing power which is not comprised in the description grouped
under A.
If we take a baker as an example, the costa of production include 
wages he psy® to hie employees (who are thereelves oonswaere), payments 
for flour, electricity, rent, etc. If he is to stay in business, the 
amount of money coming forward to buy his bread must equal ell these 
payments with something left over for his own profit. The flour*ailllag 
company that receives the baker♦s payments for flour has payment© to nates 
for com, wages, interest, ©tc, Mow, it ie ossential for the smooth 
working of the system that the full mount of money paid out by the baker 
should get into the hands of consunore and he spent by them on breed, The 
only thing that can stop this happening is if one of th© intermediary 
recipients saves some of th© money instead of passing it on. If everybody 
passes it on, non© of it is lost to th© circular flow, and if it is not 
spent on bread it will be spent on something sis©.
Major Douglas holds that if ouch a "gap" is admitted, any measures 
which increase th© amount of money available to bank orders will therefore 
increase the rate of production. Moreover, the main cause of the increase 
In the amount of money available is found in banking policy. As we know, 
every bask loan creates a bank deposit. Hence, th© deficiency between 
purchasing power and goods with coney prices attached to thw. can be sods 
up to a large extent by this process of creating bonk money. In other 
words, the total inadequacy of the money cvc liable in the hands of the 
publio to buy the available goods is countered by the ability of banking
end financial institutions to create and circulate forms of purchasing 
power*
Major Douglas concludes that If ve believe in the unstoppable gap in 
the monetary systcri, the obvious remedy ie to ©route enough now money to 
fill the gegp* He would place this extra sneney in the hands of the consumers 
Such extra money nay as veil be put in the bends of oonsmers as a free 
gift* That new money must scsaohov be put into circulation to replace that 
which Is subtracted by saving.
o
Criticising Ms theory, Crowther*” apys that Major Douglas has seen 
the effect of saving in producing a gap in the circular flow of incomes and 
expenditures but fails to appreciate the opposite effect of investment in 
closing the gap* however, if this creation of new sonsy takes place at a 
time when saving is in esosts of invectuent, and if it stimulates invest* 
neat, it will be useful* But this method seems to be very roundabout in 
achieving what ie needed* Lxperie&ce has shown that the mere offer of 
money on loan to business men may accomplish nothing* Ahd as for the free 
gifts or donation of money to consumers, a large-scale experiment was tried 
in the United States in 19% with the distribution of the so-called "vete­
rans' bonus". The result vac a temporary spurt in purchases of currentgj
goods, but little perceptible influence on the volune of investment.
1* For exaiaple, in his evidence to tho ilacedllsn Ctasnittee, Major Douglas 
proposed a plan by which every purchaser of anything was to be given new 
money (in the shape of bank deposits) to tho value of tjf? of everything 
he purbh&sedv
2* 0* Crowther, An Outline of Money. 1953, pp* 148-JO.
3* The history of social credit proved not unsuccessful in various parts 
of Canada. i.e. Alberta dnd British Columbia.
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